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I. Introduction 
The competition between developing economies in order to attract more foreign 
direct investment (FDI) forced them to introduce several legal measures to meet 
their objectives of hosting more FDI inflows. The adopted legal measures were 
based on bilateral or unilateral efforts. The examples of bilateral efforts include the 
conclusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and in other instances Free 
Trade Agreements (FTAs). On the other hand, on the unilateral side, the host 
economies tried to attract FDI through reforming the domestic legal rules in order 
to make them more appealing for foreign investors. The examples of the unilateral 
efforts include the introduction of investment laws to govern all the legal issues re-
lated to investment in general and foreign investors specifically. These laws appear 
as the main unilateral legislative tool used by developing economies to attract FDI. 
Other examples include the establishment of free zones and economic zones where 
investments are subject to special rules, which are less strict and cumbersome when 
compared to the in-land legislations. 
The thesis discusses the attempts of three developing economies in reforming their 
legal frameworks in order to make them more attractive for FDI. The main ques-
tion addressed throughout the thesis is how are the legal rules applied in an economy corre-
lated with the FDI inflows into it? In other words, the thesis explores from a Law and 
Economics viewpoint the possibility of a State to develop its domestic legal system 
and how is it correlated to attracting more foreign investors. The Law and Econom-
ics viewpoint will be provided from a civil law-based side, which intends to address 
the holistic picture of the States’ macroeconomic statuses and their legal systems. In 
this regard, the thesis will deviate from the established Law and Economics school 
principally based upon the common law notions of contract, tort, property and etc.  
The initial answer for the thesis’s question would depend on the degree of protec-
tions and guarantees the domestic legal system accords to foreign investors. Invest-
ing in developing economies could trigger threats and risks for an investor, the most 
likely of them is the State’s regulation of the private investment. Hence, the attempt 
of the governments in the developing economies to protect foreign investors 
(through bilateral or unilateral measures) will reduce the latter’s risks and possibly 
increase their investment flows to these host economies. The governments when 
engaging in such bilateral and unilateral efforts try to signal their seriousness in pro-
tecting investors. The accumulation of signals can prove the State’s reliability and 
credibility as an investment partner. For example, in developing economies during 
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the 1960, a private investment could have been nationalized (or at least suffer such 
risk) in the absence of any legal rules requiring the communication of a prompt, ef-
fective and adequate compensation.  
Currently, the situation featured two changes. First, on the bilateral level, the devel-
oping economies concluded BITs with their developed counterparts ensuring a 
standardized treatment and protection for the latter’s investments in the former. 
Second, on the unilateral level, many developing economies modernized their do-
mestic legal systems through explicitly adopting the protections provided in the 
BITs and the international investment law as part of their domestic laws. From 
these two changes, two observations become clearer. First, the changes on the bilat-
eral and the unilateral levels were always favouring the investors through (i) guaran-
teeing more protections, (ii) granting wider tax and non-tax incentives to operate 
business activity and (iii) deregulating the local market through reducing the State’s 
involvement in economic planning and activity. Second, the changes restricted the 
rights of the States to exercise their sovereignty and rights to intervene against in-
vestments. Accordingly, they were signals of the States’ willingness to compromise 
their sovereignty and regulatory rights in order to reflect their seriousness and cred-
ibility when protecting investors and investments. 
I.A Problem background 
The background of the problem under examination in this thesis stems from the 
flows of FDI into the three countries: Egypt, Jordan and Morocco1. Based on pos-
sible merits of the FDI inflows into an economy on the levels of economic growth, 
the three economies attempted to adapt their legal rules aiming to attract more FDI. 
Increased inflows of FDI reflects an increase in the inflows of capital, know-how 
and foreign currency (FX) into the economy. The three pillars of the inflows are 
drivers to stimulate the economic growth in the three countries. The thesis address-
es the updates in the legal rules of the three countries, besides the possible correla-
tions arising from such adaptations on the inflows of FDI into the three economies. 
The problem’s background is connected to the frameworks governing cross-border 
investments. On the international level, the BITs between contracting states govern 
the cross-border investment flows, while on the domestic level, the three countries 
introduced domestic legislations to govern specifically the investments legal frame-
 
1 The choice of the three countries is discussed more in depth under the subsection Why these three 
countries? 
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work. The main purpose of both legal layers is to create an investment climate at-
tractive for the FDI. On the one hand, the countries developed their domestic legal 
systems in order to align them with the BITs protections. The alignment process 
implicitly entailed deregulating the domestic market, allowing its operation upon the 
market forces and not the government interventions. On the other hand, the coun-
tries exerted obvious efforts in liberalizing their domestic markets in order to create 
a wider room for the private sector and the inflows of the FDI. Therefore, the con-
tinuous developments in the domestic legal systems and rules may have impacted 
the inflows of the FDI into the three economies. 
I.B Problem definition 
A foreign investor’s decision to route his funds into an investment destination is in-
fluenced by two legal questions. An investor from a developed country would ap-
preciate receiving a treatment in the developing country similar to that received at 
home. This kind of standardized treatment is more predictable for the foreign in-
vestor, which makes him more certain about his investment. Hence, the legal and 
economic questions for a foreign investor regarding the location of his investment 
can be associated with; first, the presence of a BIT in place between his home state 
and the potential investment’s host state. Second, the level of protection guaranteed 
under this BIT, whether encouraging the attraction of FDI through (i) rationalizing 
the prices of the factors of production (e.g., repatriation of profits), (ii) reducing 
transaction costs (e.g., cost of establishing a green-field investment), and (iii) moder-
ating the potentially incurred risks (e.g., guarantees against government’s expropria-
tion). The more rationalized the factor prices, the lower the transaction costs and 
the more guarantees accorded against risks the higher the possibility of attracting 
FDI into an economy. 
On the other hand, a State may conclude a BIT, while preserving restrictions under 
its domestic law or acting in violation of the BIT protections. This creates ambigui-
ties and raises questions regarding the harmony between the domestic legal system 
and the BIT. The importance of the domestic legal system and unilateral guarantees 
increases in the absence of a BIT between the investor’s home state and the invest-
ment’s host state. Generally, the first question addresses the treatment accorded to 
the foreign investors in the host states, in order to identify the investors’ (i) levels of 
certainty, (ii) prices of production factors, (iii) operational transaction costs and (iv) 
expected risks from their investments in a specific host state. The higher the degree 
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of certainty regarding the treatment accorded in a specific host state, the lower the 
risks of the investor and the higher the possibility an investor would route his in-
vestments into this economy. 
The second legal and economic question an investor is interested in answering 
when deciding on the location of his potential investment, is the level of the State’s 
involvement in an economy and the degree of the host state’s openness to the pri-
vate sector. This question may be implicitly answered in the cases when the devel-
oping economies are complying with the BIT protections. Complying with the latter 
could reflect the position of the host state from the private sector and the interac-
tion of the free market forces. On the other side, State’s unilaterally reformed their 
legislations, inviting the private sector for a wider participation in economic activity. 
In case of (i) wide government intervention and (ii) highly regulated economic activ-
ities, there is a limited opportunity for the private sector to operate and for the mar-
ket forces to lead such economy. Conversely, in cases of (i) limited government in-
tervention and (ii) de-regulated economic activities, a wider opportunity appears for 
the private sector to route investments and for the market forces to lead such econ-
omy. 
I.C Research question 
The research question addressed throughout the thesis could be narrowed down to: 
how are the legal rules applied in an economy correlated with the FDI inflows into it? With the 
interest of developing economies to attract FDI, several legislations are introduced 
to promote investment and stimulate foreign inflows. The thesis intends to review 
the developments in the legal rules of three countries, which, since the 1990s at-
tempted to attract FDI by introducing special investment laws. The second part in 
answering the above research question would address the possible correlations aris-
ing from (i) aligning the domestic legal system with the BITs and (ii) deregulating 
the domestic market and opening it for wider participation by the private sector in-
stead of the previous lead of the governments, on the FDI performance in the three 
countries. It is important to note that such economic analysis would focus more on 
correlations (and not causations) between the patterns of the chosen variables and 
the FDI. 
The initial hypothesis to answer the question would comprise of three pillars. First, 
the countries exerted efforts in developing their economies from being highly regu-
lated to become more opened and investor friendly. Second, the alignment of the 
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domestic legal rules with the international standardized rules provided in the BITs 
would make the domestic legal system more predictable and certain for foreign in-
vestors to route more of their investments to these destinations. Third, and in addi-
tion to the alignment process, the unilateral government reforms would make the 
domestic legal rules of the countries more liberal and opened for the inflows of for-
eign investments. 
On the way to answer the research question introduced above, a set of systematical-
ly relevant questions are addressed including;  
(i) what are the main obligations under the BITs? This question will be ad-
dressed within chapter II being the theoretical framework;  
(ii) what are the potential conflicts between the countries domestic legal rules and 
the BITs? how did the countries develop their legal rules in light of the BITs? 
how did the countries develop their legal rules to deregulate the economy and 
make it more open? These questions will be addressed in chapter IV focusing 
on the developments in the legal frameworks of the three countries;  
(iii) what are the possible law and economics conclusions derived from the final 
arbitral awards ruled by the ICSID Tribunals in the claims filed against each 
of the three countries? These questions will be addressed in chapter V focus-
ing on the ICSID arbitration case law against each of the three countries; and 
(iv) what are the possible economic correlations between the domestic legal rules 
and the FDI inflows taking into account the continuous legal developments? 
This question will be addressed in chapter VI focusing on the economic de-
terminants of the net FDI inflows to each of the three countries. 
I.D Academic context 
The thesis fits within the literature regarding the interaction between law and devel-
opment. Having the three countries as developing economies increases the societal 
relevance of the thesis since it tackles possible legal challenges hindering the devel-
opment of the three countries. The thesis attempts to address the developments in 
the three countries domestic legal rules and the possible correlations of such chang-
es with the performance of FDI inflows to the three countries. It is important to 
note that the thesis does not intend to address questions regarding neither the role 
of law nor FDI in attaining development. 
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The thesis extends the earlier discussions of LLSV2, Trebilcock3, Laffont4 and 
Stiglitz5 concerning the interaction between law, regulation and development. In the 
LLSV, the study investigated the correlation between the historical origins of coun-
tries and their legal rules affecting their economic outcomes. The thesis continues 
with the concluding remarks of the LLSV regarding the role of globalization in 
stimulating competition between countries to adopt market-friendly legal rules aim-
ing to attract FDI. The market-friendly legal rules were perceived as synonyms of 
deregulating the market’s interaction from its burdening legal barriers, evident in the 
ease of doing business, strict labour regulations etc6. For Trebilcock, a country’s le-
gal rules are an outcome of the interactions between culture, history, institutional 
and political traditions. Hence, the modernization of the legal rules in developing 
economy may depend on the legal knowledge of the domestic stakeholders who 
may later request further support from the international institutions, organizations 
and developed economies7. 
From Stiglitz’s Making Globalization Work, the thesis provides evidences for the 
countries’ attempted transformation to comply with the Washington Consensus8 
entailing the deregulation of their local markets, liberalizing trade and capital ac-
counts, downsizing the role of their government in economic activity and launching 
privatization programs. It sheds light on the significant transitions in the policies 
executed in the three countries starting from the protectionism after de-colonization 
to the deregulation and openness to markets after the debt crises of the 1980s9. Al-
so, the thesis remains connected to the studies of Laffont concerning the transfer of 
the legal rules from the developed economies to the developing ones, turning the 
difficulty to the second stage, which is the enforcement of these rules10. In other 
words, Laffont’s discussion deals with the actual enactment of the good legal rules 
transferred into the domestic legal systems of the developing economies, instead of 
keeping them on paper. 
 
2 Porta et al. 2007 The study focused on the impact of investors protection on the financial devel-
opment evident in an economy. 
3 Davis, and Trebilcock 2008. 
4 Laffont 2003. 
5 Stiglitz 2007. 
6 Porta et al. 2007 327. 
7 Davis, and Trebilcock 2008 945. 
8 For further information regarding the Washington Consensus rise and fall, please refer to Gore 
2000. 
9 Stiglitz 2007 47. 
10 Laffont 2003 3. 
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I.E Society and policy relevance 
The thesis topic is highly relevant to the current societal developments of the three 
countries for different reasons. First, the three countries are interested in attracting 
FDI in order to stimulate their economic growth restoring the rates recorded prior 
to the global financial crisis of 2008, taking into account the additional downward 
pressures on FDI inflows due to the instabilities resulting from the Arab Spring up-
risings. Second, the topic remains up to date since the three countries have either 
recently introduced new investment laws (e.g., Egypt and Jordan) or are still in the 
process of drafting a new one (e.g., Morocco).  
Third, the topic relates to the LLSV’s discussion in relation to the impact of coloni-
zation in framing the domestic legal rules of the countries. This was evident in the 
hostilities between the colonized states and their former colonizers, during the early 
years of decolonization. Moreover, the colonization has raised the sensitivity of the 
countries in specific legal matters (e.g., the rights of foreigners to own agricultural 
lands). Fourth, the thesis addresses the changes in the quality of the domestic legal 
rules on the way of the countries to align with the international laws of treating for-
eign investors. For example, the inclusion of the right to refer disputes to third-
party arbitration offers a new alternative to settle state-investor investment disputes 
other than referring to local courts, which could be partial and unpredictable. 
Moreover, such third-party dispute settlement alternative limits the possibilities of 
the politicians’ interventions in influencing the decisions of the domestic courts. 
On the policy side, the topic fits within the questions concerning the need to align 
the domestic legal rules with the international law obligations as a means to signal 
the countries credibility within the international arena. The alignment question is as-
sociated with the importance of signalling the willingness of the countries to adhere 
to the international laws governing the standardised treatment accorded to foreign 
investors. Another policy issue under consideration in the thesis is the trade-off be-
tween adhering to the treatment of foreign investors as per the international laws 
versus the countries’ interest in preserving their full sovereignty. Adhering to the in-
ternational laws treatment of foreign investors requires a compromise of sovereign-
ty, which may signal the willingness of a State to respect the international laws. 
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I.F Methodology 
The thesis required the employment of four different methodologies in order to 
pursue the detailed analysis. The four methodologies as further detailed below in-
clude; (i) legal historical desktop approach, (ii) functional comparative analysis, (iii) 
case law analysis and (iv) economic descriptive analytics approach, before justifying 
the choice of the three countries. 
I.F.1 Legal historical desktop 
Starting from chapter IV, the thesis will base the analysis upon the legal historical 
desktop approach, where the domestic legal frameworks of the three countries and 
their historical developments are analysed in details. The legal analysis starts from 
the domestic legal frameworks prevalent at the independence period, before cover-
ing its developments until the years of market openness. It encompasses the devel-
opments in the domestic legal framework featured in Constitutions being on top of 
the domestic legal system before narrowing it to the developments in domestic in-
vestment legislations. 
I.F.2 Functional comparative analysis 
The second legal methodology employed within the thesis is the functional compar-
ative analysis. The legal analysis in chapter IV will focus primarily on the domestic 
legal frameworks of the three countries and how they governed the specific topic of 
investments. This entails comparing the domestic legal rules of the three countries 
to the international investment law obligations. The objective of the three countries 
from introducing the special investment laws was the attraction of investments and 
specifically foreign ones. Taking into consideration the civil-law based legal systems 
and the nearly shared cultural and moral values between the three countries, the 
comparative analysis may provide an additional strength point to the analysis. 
I.F.3 Case law analysis 
The third legal methodology used is the case law analysis. As part of the legal analy-
sis aiming to realize the compliance of the countries domestic legislations and actual 
practices with the substantive protections accorded under the concluded BITs, the 
thesis will analyse a set of ICSID disputes for each of the countries. This analysis 
will start by providing a brief overview of the facts of the dispute, and since the 
chapter V is interested in analysing the application of the BITs in the countries, the 
  17  
focus will be directed to the claims filed against them as respondents, before mov-
ing to the Tribunal’s final ruling. The case law details will be followed by an analysis 
of the main understanding of the countries claims in an attempt to foresee the 
compliance of such understandings with the BITs and the international investment 
law. 
I.F.4 Economic descriptive analytics 
Chapter VI adopts a descriptive analytics approach when examining the perfor-
mance of the FDI inflows into the countries. The assessment broadens the investi-
gation to encompass other variables of proven impact upon the FDI inflows to an 
economy. It aims tracing correlation and not causations between the variables and 
the FDI’s performance. The economic variables under analysis will be chosen based 
on the previous literature concerning the variables affecting FDI as identified in the 
theoretical framework above. The list refers to indicators featured in the FDI host 
state and includes, for example, the levels of economic freedom, the market size, 
the level of human index development, the infrastructure’s quality, the inflation 
rates and the recorded rates of real GDP growth. 
At this stage, it is important to justify the choice of the descriptive analytics meth-
odology over the implementation of an econometric model. The three countries ex-
perience data limitations and more specifically structural breaks in their time series 
datasets, which influences negatively the planned model’s reliability. This results 
from the significant and recurrent changes in the policy orientations between a cen-
trally planned economy with the government leading the economic activity during 
the 1960s and 1970s, followed by a significant shift to a market-oriented economy, 
where the government limited its role in the economic activity during the 1980s un-
til the 2000s. With the (i) significant structural changes on the policy levels, (ii) weak 
norms and practices of data collection in these countries, the higher the probabili-
ties of flaws and inaccuracies in the data and the lower its comparability. Further-
more, and more importantly, the legal framework inconsistencies may highlight the 
legislative chaos. With legislations restricting foreigners’ ownership of lands and 
others guaranteeing a treatment equal to that accorded to national investors, the 
contradiction appears eminent. Another pillar for the structural breaks could be the 
political instability precedent either in wars, terrorist attacks or even popular upris-
ings as in the Arab Spring. 
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The chapter’s assessment of the FDI performance and the variables impacting it 
would assist in concluding a set of patterns from the available data. The chapter in-
tends to identify correlations (and not causations) between the chosen variables and 
the FDI performance in the three countries. The datasets under analysis are all 
based on the World Bank Data bank. The unification of the data source remains a 
strength point in order to avoid any reporting errors since a standardized method-
ology is used in the process of data collection. Moreover, the dependence on da-
tasets from an international institution could enhance the credibility of the data 
when compared to the local sources of data if any. The chapter’s timespan starts 
from 1990 until 2015. This is the period during which the Investment Guarantees 
and Incentives Law was promulgated in 1997 and many BITs were concluded and 
specifically in the 1990s. Hence, it assists in actually understanding the role of these 
changes in the investment framework on the performance of FDI flowing into 
Egypt. In addition, this period embraces the Egyptian economy’s transformation 
from the wide intervention of the 1980s to the partial and further openness of the 
1990s and 2000s respectively. 
I.F.5 Why these three countries? 
At a preliminary phase, there are several reasons behind choosing the three coun-
tries as the countries subject for analysis. The thesis’s in-depth analysis will consoli-
date such understating of the comparability between the three countries through 
identifying many more similarities. However, the initial similarities include; first, the 
three states are developing economies featuring to an extent similar rates of eco-
nomic growth. This appears in having the three economies falling within the lower 
middle GDP per capita categories of economies. Second, the three economies ap-
proached the International Monetary Fund (IMF) seeking financial assistance and 
support to adjust their economies and transiting them towards market oriented 
economics. This is an obvious outcome of the comparability between the three 
economies. This does not apply to Algeria, Syria and Iraq that have more closed 
economies and less globally integrated. Third, the three countries have their domes-
tic legal systems based on the civil law. 
Fourth, the three economies are not rentier11 based ones as those of the Gulf Co-
operation Council (GCC), Libya or Algeria since their GDPs and government 
 
11 Rentier economic are the ones who managed to realize their experienced rates of economic 
growth based on the exploitation of the abundant natural resources. A clear example in the MENA 
region are the member states of the GCC, Algeria and Libya as further explained in El Beblawi 2016. 
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budgets are not fully dependent on the extraction of minerals and natural resources. 
This puts the three economies under tighter pressures to diversify their economies 
through engaging in industrial activities, provision of services and further integra-
tion in the international economic system. Fifth, the three states engaged in several 
negotiations attempts to further integrate their economies in global trade through 
concluding FTAs with for example the US and the EU. Examples include the (i) 
US-Jordan FTA signed in 2000, (ii) US-Morocco FTA signed in 2004, (iii) Qualify-
ing Industrial Zones (Q.I.Z) established in Jordan and Egypt as part of the efforts 
to conclude a EU-Mediterranean FTA. Also, the three states have in common the 
Agadir Agreement signed between Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia, which pro-
vides a precedence of comparability among them. Finally, the three states currently 
feature higher levels of political stability, besides a similar heritage of civil-law based 
systems, which is not the case for other Arabian economies as Sudan, Saudi Arabia 
and Iraq. 
I.G Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is split into seven chapters providing the law and economics viewpoint 
for the analysis including the introduction and conclusion. Chapter II is the theoret-
ical framework governing the thesis. In this regard, the chapter intends to familiar-
ize the reader with the international investment law, its history until reaching the 
BITs, the motives of policy-makers to engage in BITs and finally the latter’s sub-
stantive protections. Chapter III provides a brief insight regarding the economic 
history of the countries from their independence until their market openness and 
passing through their debt crises. The chapter will assist in identifying more similari-
ties between the three countries. 
By chapter IV starts the legal analysis which extends also to chapter V. In chapter 
IV, the analysis introduces the domestic legal framework governing investments in 
the three countries. This entails reviewing the Constitutions and the domestic legis-
lations of the countries. This chapter will allow the reader to follow the develop-
ment in the countries legislations in order to align their domestic legislations with 
the protections accorded under the BITs. Moreover, it will assist in tracing the 
changing nature of the legislations from being highly restricted towards a more lib-
eral and market oriented legislation. Chapter V continues the legal analysis, howev-
er, this time it is based on the case law filed against the countries in the ICSID arbi-
tration. The chapter intends to analyse a set of cases for each country study in order 
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to draw conclusions regarding the understandings of the international investment 
law obligations and the behaviour towards foreign investors in the three countries. 
Chapter VI is the last body chapter and it proceeds with the economic analysis of 
the FDI in the three countries. Based on the chosen set of variables, the chapter in-
tends to identify the correlations and main patterns between the reviewed variables 
and the net FDI throughout the study period. The analysis focuses on tracing the 
correlations and not the causations in the three countries. This moves the discus-
sion to the chapter VII, where the main conclusions derived from the thesis are col-
lected with a set of concluding remarks. 
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II. Theoretical Framework 
II.A Introduction 
This theoretical framework adopts a descriptive approach. After introducing the 
types of FDI, it examines the rise of international investment law, followed by the 
failures of multilateralism in sections B, C and D respectively. In section E, it is 
necessary to understand why state officials engage in BITs and how this is connect-
ed to the process of economic openness in developing countries under the Wash-
ington Consensus in the 1980s. The framework in section F defines substantive 
protections, posing questions such as: Are the substantive protections offered by 
international investment law defined well enough? How can substantive protections 
affect the cross-border flows of FDI?  
The framework focuses on the incentives for policymakers of developing countries 
when deciding whether to conclude BITs, examining how the engagement incen-
tives differ depending on the type and nature of investment received or expected 
for the developing economy compared to its offered and guaranteed substantive 
protections. Additionally, the economic analysis deals with issues like: the signalling 
effect linked to engaging in BITs as well as the concerns related to the sovereignty 
of the contracting states. 
II.B Definition of foreign direct investment 
This section confronts the notion of FDI. The definition of this term is crucial for 
this paper since its attraction remains the main target driving the policymakers of 
the three countries studied. The understanding of the notion will also assist in iden-
tifying the risks associated with it. The attraction of FDI is the publicly disclosed 
aim of promulgating the domestic investment laws of the 1990s in many countries 
(including the three countries as discussed in details within chapter IV).  
Andrew Kerner began his cost-benefit analysis of BITs by defining FDI. The main 
characteristics differentiating FDI from foreign portfolios were listed as: corporate 
control, timeline, and speculative intentions12. FDI is a long-term investment 
providing an investor with practical corporate control over inflows of capital and 
 
12 Andrew Kerner, ‘Why should I believe you? The costs and consequences of bilateral investment 
treaties’ (2009) 53(1) International Studies Quarterly 73 
<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2008.01524.x/full> 73. 
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assets that could be moved again only at extremely high costs13. This control in-
cludes the investor’s rights to exploit the resources, manufacture exports or serve 
the domestic markets’ needs. FDI is expected to last for a long time to restore the 
fixed and sunk investment costs and reach a positive cash flow and return on in-
vestment. With a productive capacity, this is expected to last for a longer period 
when compared to portfolio investments known as “hot money” in reference to its 
speedy and short-term nature14. Finally, the speculative nature appears clearly in the 
case of portfolio investments, while it nearly diminishes in case of FDI where the 
productive nature of a long-term investment prevails over any speculation interests. 
The IMF provides two main definitions15 of cross-border investments: (i) FDI, (ii) 
foreign portfolio and (iii) other investment. Under the FDI, an investor (i) seeks the 
creation of a long-term interest in an enterprise resident in another economy and (ii) 
manages and influences the latter enterprise. Foreign portfolio investment is defined 
as ownerships of any money market instruments including debt (e.g., bonds), equity, 
notes and options on the international markets.  
Another point of divergence between foreign portfolios and FDI is that the ad-
vantages of attracting FDI include higher rates of job creation together with the 
transfer of capital and knowledge16. The knowledge spill-overs are experienced 
through employees being seconded or firms’ internal transfers of know-how be-
tween home and host states17. Finally, FDI is mostly characterised by the interest in 
exportation activities. This allows the host states to boost their balance of payments 
surplus as well as foreign exchange reserves. 
Investors’ interest in seeking FDI protection is correlated with the fear from politi-
cal and time inconsistencies. Investors route their capital and funds to host states 
where they are assured against expropriation or any host state regulation threats18. 
This assurance is a necessity for the inflow of investments, especially if accompa-
nied by a compensatory agreement if host states fail to comply. The absence of 
compensatory remedies puts investors in risky, insecure positions against the host 
states, which may decide to forgo their initial commitments of protection in times 
 
13 Tim Büthe and Helen V Milner, ‘The politics of foreign direct investment into developing coun-
tries: increasing FDI through international trade agreements?’ (2008) 52(4) American Journal of Po-
litical Science 741 <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00340.x/full> 
743. 
14 Chaudhuri, Mukhopadhyay 2014 3. 
15 Laurence 2013 531. 
16 Sussangkarn et al. 2011 177 
17 World Bank Group 2017 3 
18 Dalupan et al. 2015 8 
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of instability19. This will be further addressed in section E below, where the thesis 
examines politicians’ fear of displacement as an incentive for expropriating private 
property.  
The characteristics of FDI paved the way for the “obsolescing bargain” concept 
through which host state governments gain an advantageous position over already 
established FDI investments. This advantage may motivate host states to reconsider 
FDI contractual terms20. In other words, inflowing FDI is always under the threat 
of expropriation by the host state government. The risk is aggravated when the 
governments of host states feature problems of time-inconsistency. During periods 
of economic crisis or fiscal difficulties, policymakers tend to be more inclined to 
expropriate foreign investments as a means of fiscal or economic support. This de-
pends on policymakers’ prior assessment of the short-term benefits versus the long-
term costs of expropriation. If short-terms benefits outweigh the long-term ex-
pected costs, policymakers may decide to expropriate. Considering the time incon-
sistency problems in least-developed and developing countries, these scenarios be-
come more probable in these countries than in industrially advanced economies21. 
Jang in his study examined the impact of FTAs on FDI when the parties to the 
agreement are developed countries. To undertake his examination, he introduced 
three classifications of FDI.  
He first identified horizontal FDI, tested by Markusen and Venaubles in 199822. 
This type prevails when a company establishes manufacturing facilities in a set of 
states. Each facility produces finished products that are later sold within the host 
state’s domestic market to meet its needs, or are exported. This notion of invest-
ment flourishes on high tariffs, transportation costs, and other non-tariff trade bar-
riers23. It focuses on moving multinationals’ activities into the host states, which 
guarantees the avoidance of high trade costs by guaranteeing proximity to end con-
sumers. From this definition and later studies, it was concluded that two factors af-
fect this type of FDI. First, higher trade costs turn the movement of a multination-
al’s activity in the host state into a rational economic choice. Second, in terms of 
market size, a larger market motivates a multinational to move its business into the 
 
19 Kerner (n 1) 73 
20 Inadomi 2010 33 
21 Büthe and Milner (n 2) 743 
22 Yong J Jang, ‘The impact of bilateral free trade agreements on bilateral foreign direct investment 
among developed countries’ (2011) 34(9) The World Economy 1628 
<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9701.2011.01356.x/full> 1629 
23 Lim, International Monetary Fund. Middle Eastern Dept 2001 12-13 
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host state, serving its demand. Therefore, this reduces the applicable trade costs and 
tariffs24. 
Jang’s second classification is vertical FDI, comprising two-phase production pro-
jects. The production facilities are geographically separated. This allows the investor 
to take advantage of the benefits arising from lower wages, skill disparities and ac-
cessibility to natural resources25. This notion spreads among global chain multina-
tionals when local subsidiaries complete their production process before exporting 
these intermediary products as inputs for a second production phase. It stresses the 
need for labour availability regardless of the workers’ skill levels, and the abundance 
of labour encourages multinationals to move their production operations to the 
host state. Accordingly, multinationals boost their efficiency by taking advantage of 
cheaper labour and later imports the produced end products to offer them to its 
consumers in the home state. 
The factors that influence vertical FDI can be summarised in the difference in 
skilled labour levels between the host and home states along with trade costs. The 
higher the trade costs of importing end products from the host state, the less in-
clined a multinational is to follow a vertical FDI plan. On the skill differentials side, 
the wider the difference between the home and the host state, the lower the wages 
that are paid to labour in the host state26. Therefore, a multinational would prefer to 
move its production operations to the host state based on cost efficiency concepts. 
In Tim Buthe and Helen Milner’s study regarding the impact of FTAs upon FDI 
inflows, vertical FDI proved more economically appealing in the case of liberalising 
trade barriers when compared to horizontal FDI27. 
Jang’s third classification combines the horizontal and vertical FDIs. According to 
this combination, the wider the skill difference between the home and host states, 
the more dominant the vertical FDI impact is over the horizontal one. Hence, the 
more positive the benefits on FDI from eliminating trade costs through concluding 
a FTA. In fact, this was Jang’s hypothesis claiming that, between OECD (Organisa-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development) for members as developed 
countries, differences in skilled labour are limited, implying a dominant horizontal 
FDI effect over vertical FDI28. 
 
24 Jang (n 5) 1630 
25 Moran et al. 2005 274 
26 Lim, International Monetary Fund. Middle Eastern Dept 2001 12-13 
27 Büthe and Milner (n 2) 744 
28 Jang (n 5) 1633 
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This briefing of the notion of FDI is necessary prior to introducing BITs, which 
originated primarily to guarantee the required protection for investors against host 
states’ hostile approach to FDI. 
II.C Origins of international investment law 
This section aims to provide an overview of the historical background of interna-
tional investment law, briefly addressing its origins and development until it reached 
its current status. The historical background highlights former failed protection re-
gimes (e.g., the Calvo Doctrine addressed below) driving the need for the creation of 
international investment law with its current form embracing the necessary substan-
tive protections. These protections will be introduced in section F and will be the 
base for chapter IV of this paper.  
The history of expropriation dates back to the initial claims arising after the Ameri-
can war when Americans expropriated the British nationals’ properties. The process 
of fairly compensating Britons for these expropriations was developed through re-
course to the Jay Treaty between the British and the Americans29. The traditional 
protection was offered under the state’s responsibility for injuries. In accordance 
with this concept, the expropriated investor’s home state is exclusively entitled to 
claim compensation on behalf of the injured investor30. Additionally, and under the 
same treatment, a simple violation of investor-state contracts was not sufficient for 
the injuring state to be held liable for compensation under state responsibility 
claims.  
The only situation raising compensatory rights for the home state investors was in 
the event that the host state treated investors egregiously in an approach breaching 
the customary minimum treatment standards31. Breaching these standards entitled 
foreign injured investors the right to bring international action based on the host 
state’s responsibility and after exhausting all local remedies. All stipulations in BITs 
provide the minimum standard as the general rule, and national laws cannot fall 
shorter32. A disadvantaged settlement system was created and was thus less favoura-
 
29 Dugan et al. 2011 34 
30 Tom Ginsburg, ‘International substitutes for domestic institutions: Bilateral investment treaties 
and governance’ (2005) 25(1) International Review of law and Economics 107 
<http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0144818804000328> 110 
31 Ryan J Bubb and Susan Rose-Ackerman, ‘BITs and bargains: Strategic aspects of bilateral and mul-
tilateral regulation of foreign investment’ (2007) 27(3) International Review of law and Economics 
291 <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0144818807000580> 293 
32 C. Yannaca-Small, International Investment Law: A Changing Landscape: A Companion Volume to Interna-
tional Investment Perspectives (OECD Publishing 2005) 75 
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ble for individual investors who suffered low-value expropriations. Moreover, a 
state espousal system forced the government to bear part of the litigation costs; 
therefore, claimants pursued claims of less merit as the state bore a share of the 
costs. Conversely, under normal third-party settlements, claimants fully bear litiga-
tion costs and higher quality claims are submitted to settlement bodies. Because of 
these shortcomings, a new doctrine known as the Calvo Doctrine was introduced33.  
This new doctrine was named after an Argentinian jurist who survived the extended 
wave of expropriations during the nineteenth century throughout Latin America. 
The doctrine prevented expropriation-injured investors from requesting fair com-
pensation through home state diplomatic protection or armed intervention unless 
the host state’s local resolutions were exhausted34. Consequently, foreigners were 
subject to the territorial jurisdiction of the host states and their internal laws without 
any interference from their home state governments. The doctrine terminated the 
‘reverse discrimination’ by guaranteeing preferential treatment for foreign investors 
under international law in comparison to domestic investors who referred their dis-
putes only to domestic legislation. Afterwards, the Drago-Porter Convention codi-
fied the prohibition of using military force in handling foreign investment dis-
putes35. The convention prohibited recourse to armed conflict if the host state ac-
cepted the settlement through recourse to international arbitration36. The Calvo 
Doctrine was viewed as favouring developing countries since local jurisdictions are 
those responsible for first addressing investment-related disputes.  
The Mexican Revolution and the expropriation of US companies’ investments was a 
turning point in the history of international investment law, especially after the initi-
ation of the US-Mexico Claims Commission37. The origin of the Hull Rule dates 
back to a Mexican attempt to expropriate US investments in 193838. The rule was 
named after US State Secretary Cordell Hull, and began through a note Hull com-
municated to Mexico’s Foreign Affairs Minister. The note prohibited any govern-
ment from expropriating foreign businesses unless in presence of prompt, adequate 
 
33 Baker 1999 91 
34 Newcombe, Paradell 2009 18 
35 Blokker et al. 2005 32 
36 Jan Kleinheisterkamp, ‘Investment Treaty Law and the Fear for Sovereignty: Transnational Chal-
lenges and Solutions’ (2015) 78(5) The Modern Law Review 793 
<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1468-2230.12144/full> 797 
37 Ginsburg (n 12) 110 
38 Bubb and Rose-Ackerman (n 13) 294 
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and effective compensation39. This requirement enabled Hull to establish the widely 
applied rule, which requires expropriating host states to deliver “prompt, adequate and 
effective” compensation to investors40. The Hull Rule, different from the Calvo Doc-
trine being seen as favouring developing countries, was criticised for favouring the 
developed world41, because of the wide compensation guaranteed to home state in-
vestors when compared to the Calvo Doctrine that provided more ground for ex-
propriation action by host states.  
The wave of decolonisation in the aftermath of World War II was accompanied by 
nationalistic attempts at confiscation and regulation threatening cross-border in-
vestments42. Hence, customary international law proved insufficient in providing the 
necessary protection. Later, developing countries managed, through the United Na-
tions, to articulate a new standard allowing a state to expropriate foreign nationals’ 
property in exchange for “appropriate compensation”. The new standard was incorpo-
rated upon the ideology of saving the host state’s national interest and was com-
pletely vague in terms of what “appropriate compensation” meant43. This was demon-
strated, for example, in General Assembly Resolution No. 1803 of 1963, which pre-
scribed that states exercise permanent sovereignty over their natural resources. Con-
sequently, expropriations were allowed if conditional upon appropriate compensa-
tion based on the rules enforceable in the host states and in accordance with inter-
national law44. This resolution ignored the Hull Rule’s three requirements of 
prompt, adequate and effective compensation in favour of a merely “appropriate” 
one.  
In 1973, Resolution No. 3171 further worsened the situation of foreign investors. 
Besides stressing permanent sovereignty, the new resolution entitled host states to 
pay the “possible compensation”45, means of payment and exclusively setting its jurisdic-
tion as the guiding tool when deciding on any disputes regarding compensation. 
Other following resolutions preserved the same stance of sovereignty over re-
sources and expropriation compensation as an issue to be internally decided. A clear 
outcome was an increasing number of expropriations associated with mining and 
 
39 Eric Neumayer and Laura Spess, ‘Do bilateral investment treaties increase foreign direct invest-
ment to developing countries?’ (2005) 33(10) World Development 1567 
<http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0305750X05001233> 1569 
40 Newcombe, Paradell 2009 18 
41 Posner, Sykes 2013 293 
42 Ismail 2016 77 
43 Ginsburg (n 12) 110 
44 Morosini, Badin 2017 9 
45 Schutter et al. 2013 31 
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petroleum activities during the 1960s and 1970s and that reached a peak in 197546. 
Guzman confirmed that the expropriations of the 1960s and 1970s provided evi-
dence of the invalidity of the “appropriate compensation” concept, as several investors 
considered the compensation they received to be inadequate47. 
By the 1970s, the International Court of Justice questioned the absence of crystal-
lised rules governing the foreign investments scenery on the eve of the expansion of 
multinational corporations’. This issue was later addressed due to four shortcomings 
in customary law stimulating the codification of international investment law into 
treaties. First, customary law was incomplete as it ignored basic investor rights, in-
cluding monetary transfers from host states. Second, it was vague and lacked unified 
interpretations48. Third, there was the contestability of the customary law principles 
in the 1970s between the developed and newly decolonised economies requiring the 
creation of a more just economic order. Fourth, the prevailing customary law failed 
on enforcement, since investors could not pursue claims against host states’ imple-
mentation of any injurious measures violating their rights. These shortcomings rep-
resented the continuous threats to investors49.  
Another issue was the inverse relationship between political risk and governmental 
power. In other words, a state that operates under an ineffective rule of law and 
waning institutions is considered more politically risky. Accordingly, investors seek 
to mitigate these political risk effects by taking advantage of the BITs in place50. The 
above shortcomings encouraged industrialised states to engage in investment trea-
ties on a bilateral and multilateral level with developing countries, thereby guaran-
teeing the necessary protection to investors. The potential treaties – which aimed to 
address the above shortcomings – provided protection to investors by restricting 
the host states’ power to unilaterally act against them based on the states’ economic 
and political developments51. 
 
46 Bubb and Rose-Ackerman (n 13) 294 
47 Andrew T Guzman, ‘Why LDCs sign treaties that hurt them: Explaining the popularity of bilateral 
investment treaties’ (1997) 38 Va j Int'l L 639 <http://heinonline.org/hol-cgi-
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48 Norbert Horn, Stefan Kroll 2004 52 
49 J. W P Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties (Oxford University Press 2015) 155 
50 C. Ignacio Suarez Anzorena and William K. Perry, ‘The Rise of Bilateral Investment Treaties: Pro-
tecting Foreign Investments and Arbitration William Perry - Google Search’ (Summer 2010). In 
House Defense Quarterly <https://www.google.de/webhp?sourceid=chrome-
instant&ion=1&espv=2&ie=UTF-
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The 1960s intensification of the Cold War incentivised several developing countries’ 
governments to expropriate foreign owned property. This was seen in Cuba as well 
as in North Africa. In the meantime, the waning of customary international law en-
couraged developed countries to turn to BITs as a new alternative to provide neces-
sary protection and guarantees to their investors52. Thus, the World Bank, deter-
mined to protect foreign investments, launched its initiative to create the Interna-
tional Centre for the Settlement of International Disputes (ICSID). This was suc-
cessfully accomplished by finalising the ICSID Convention in Washington D.C. in 
March 196553. The ICSID acted as a catalyst, facilitating the international invest-
ment law codification process, since it became the competent institution to resolve 
international investment disputes54. The convention focused on founding a neutral 
forum to review investment disputes between states and state nationals as well as 
ensure the enforcement of its forum’s awards.  
The ICSID managed to establish its leading position as the top forum for interna-
tional investment disputes based on two reasons. First, ICSID awards are not sub-
ject to extensive review by the national courts of host states, which could be the 
case under other arbitration alternatives55. The review in place is a limited one con-
ducted by an ICSID-appointed specialised committee. The second reason is associ-
ated with ICSID’s awards recognition within host states56. ICSID contracting states 
agreed on adopting ICSID awards as a final award with the same binding power as 
local courts’ rulings. Consequently, ICSID awards require no additional procedures 
to be recognised locally.  
The basic prerequisites to initiate an ICSID claim include the following. First, there 
must be a legal dispute between a national of the home state and the host state. 
Second, the dispute must be directly connected with the national’s investment in the 
host state. Third, both states must provide written consent for the ICSID to adjudi-
cate the dispute. However, investing in an ICSID-ratifying state eliminates the need 
to meet the third requirement, as the provisions of a BIT in place between the host 
and home states satisfies this condition of written consent. Other investment con-
tracts may cover the consent provision, while other limited cases of domestic juris-
dictions entitle foreign investors to freely access international arbitration57.The trea-
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ties and the ICSID committed host states to their obligations. Hosts states’ failures 
in compliance were all filed as claims in international arbitration, where host states 
acted as respondents and were held liable for their injurious acts, based on the cir-
cumstances58. The first ICSID claim filed in 1987 stimulated the extension of the 
network of BITs. Another point of momentum for BIT-based arbitration claims 
was the Argentinian debt crisis and its related investment disputes59. 
The newly created ICSID issued a model convention guiding all subsequent BITs 
concluded, with special regard to resolving investment-related disputes between in-
vestors and host state governments. The model convention denoted a leap forward, 
offering individual investors the possibility to claim benefits against the government 
without recourse to the home state’s espousal60. The ICSID symbolised developed 
countries’ efforts to restore application of the Hull Rule with special focus granted 
to its “prompt adequate and fair compensation”. Starting from the first BIT concluded be-
tween Germany and Pakistan in 1959, the ICSID assisted in unifying the subse-
quent BITs concluded in line with the US Model61. Thirty years after the Germany 
Pakistan BIT in 1959, BITs started to gain momentum. In the 1960s, there were 75 
BITs, 167 in the 1970s, and these numbers reached 389 by the end of the 1980s.  
The momentum was in conjunction with the debt crises spreading throughout the 
developing countries in the 1980s and the significant decline in Western financial 
assistance. The restriction in funds was soon replaced by the large inflow of FDIs. 
In the meantime, developing countries managed to expand their share in FDI from 
only 20 per cent in the 1980s to nearly 31 per cent in 2003. The larger inflows to 
developing countries stimulated the spread of BITs regulating investments between 
developed and developing countries62. The expansion of BITs began in the 1990s, 
growing until it reached 2,495 by 2005. The principal aim in concluding BITs was to 
attract FDI and protect investors63. Several treaties prescribe investment protections 
as an integral part regardless of the initial purpose. An example of this includes the 
US Poland Trade Agreement addressing explicitly the investment protection and 
promotion provisions. This amplifies the number of investment-protection- related 
treaties into around 6,000 treaties, with EU members party to nearly 50 per cent of 
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them. Regional examples of investment treaties embrace the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Energy Charter Treaty64. 
The above brief examination of international investment law highlights the contin-
uous changes between the developed and developing countries in different periods, 
from the Calvo Doctrine, the Hull Rule, the spread of expropriations, developing 
countries’ diplomatic pressuring within the UN to abolish the Hull Rule, to the cre-
ation of the ICSID in 1965. The changes reflect the struggle in global hegemony be-
tween the developed and the developing countries throughout modern history. 
With these developments, economies began to engage in BITs in 1959, with the 
number of BITs increasing until the 1990s when the number of concluded BITs 
skyrocketed; nowadays, there are more than 3,000 BITs.  
The second part of this section addressed the failures associated with the older dis-
pute settlement mechanism. It required state espousal and diplomatic protection to 
back the expropriated multinationals’ claims before the host state courts for the 
proceedings to begin. Making it more limited, this protection was applicable only to 
egregious expropriations and not the regular simple contractual violations65. The es-
tablishment of the ICSID represented a leap forward in terms of granting an inves-
tor the right to file claims against the BIT-breaching state to hold it liable for its ac-
tions. It limited the capacity of host states to act against foreign investments as it 
prevailed during the 1960s and 1970s in conjunction with the decolonisation era. 
Moreover, the binding nature of its rulings boosts its credibility among investors 
since they are allowed to obtain compensation, if any is awarded. 
II.D Failure of multilateralism 
The current regime of investment treaties is obviously framed at a bilateral level 
with occasional regional examples. This section addresses the failures to establish a 
multilateral investment framework, the understanding of which will assist in further 
understanding policymakers’ motivations when engaging in investment treaties.  
The efforts to establish a multilateral investment treaty regime was not as successful 
as in trade. The exceptional scenario was featured in the ICSID success to formu-
late a multilateral investor-state dispute resolution mechanism with the support of 
the World Bank. The ICSID did not expand to enact legally binding protections or 
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guarantees. The OECD attempted twice to create a multilateral venue for invest-
ment treaties. The first attempt was in 1967, through the Draft Convention on the 
Protection of Foreign Property66. Although the Convention was never adopted, it 
became a model inspiring the majority of subsequent European BITs. The second 
attempt was launched in 1995 under the Multilateral Agreement on Investment 
(MAI)67. It was framed primarily between developed countries with the developing 
ones attending negotiations as observers with restricted authority to influence the 
negotiated framework68. The draft included a broader definition of investment, per-
formance requirement limitations covering obligatory technology transfer and local 
content, a retaliated prohibition of expropriation lacking public purpose and 
prompt redress, freedom to repatriate and transfer assets, together with a dispute 
settlement mechanism similar to that of the ICSID and the United Nations Com-
mission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).  
The spread of the news of MAI in international media created outrage between civil 
society and non-governmental organisations from 600 groups in nearly 70 states69. 
The MAI was criticised principally for three reasons. First, its supranational position 
allowed multinationals to reach superior positions compared to sovereign states. 
Second, the concern of environmentalists was principally of the limitation of states’ 
intervention in cases of environment protection. Under the broad sense of protec-
tion, there was a continuous debate regarding the possibility that governmental ac-
tions for environmental purposes could constitute an act of expropriation70. Finally, 
on the developing economy side, the abolishment of a performance requirement 
went against the domestic developmental policies of, for example, employment and 
exportation. These policies depended on granting tax and non-tax incentives upon 
the fulfilment of a set of performance requirements including exportation levels, na-
tionals’ employment or job creation rates. 
Guzman was one of the earliest scholars to question the multilateralism of invest-
ment treaties. Supporters of the notion claim it is easier when compared to trade 
especially that most BITs are homogenous. Instead, Guzman exemplified the con-
clusion of BITs as defection under a prisoners’ dilemma scene71. According to 
Guzman, the competition for FDI inflows from developed economies enthused 
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developing countries to engage in BITs with developed countries seeking a wider 
share of the investment pie72. This engagement constituted an advantage for the de-
veloping countries over its competitors. Hence, neighbouring competitors, as in a 
Prisoners’ Dilemma Game, responded similarly to eliminate any advantages and 
concluded BITs with the developed economies. This trend advanced and spread 
over developing countries to mark the jump in BITs throughout the 1990s73. Guz-
man attributed failures to reach a multilateral system upon the eruption of the war 
to conclude BITs during the 1990s.  
An additional reason for multilateralism failure was host states’ different negotiation 
powers on a case-by-case basis. Establishing a multilateral system would eradicate 
such negotiation differences, setting all countries under the same protection level 
with no advantageous positions. Therefore, players that refrained from joining the 
initiative exploit their negotiation power differences through prioritising bilateral 
treaties over multilateral ones74.  
According to the OECD reports, the multilateral efforts failed based on three rea-
sons. First, the willingness of OECD governments to hinder foreign competition 
such as in cases of Canada and France foreclosing US investments in cultural indus-
tries. Consequently, this right to exclude foreign competition obliged states to take 
protective stances regarding their advantageous industries, reducing the possibilities 
of multilateral openness. Secondly, the EU member states requested entitlement to 
preferentially treat other members, though this request was illogical since it purely 
contradicts the most-favoured-nation concept. Thirdly, non-governmental organisa-
tions and civil society objected this draft since it did not oblige its contracting 
members and beneficial investors with any human rights or environmental respon-
sibilities75. Thus, 1998 marked the termination of this draft and the OECD’s second 
failure76. More importantly, this raised public awareness regarding BITs, with civil 
society challenging them and pressuring for amending the investment protections 
negotiated77.  
Several examples exist of public dissatisfaction influencing the outcome of BITs, 
reviving the Calvo Doctrine. One of the most prominent is Evo Morales’ case in 
Bolivia. A congressman in 2000 who survived the Cochabamba Water Wars crisis in 
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Bolivia, Morales – benefiting from public discontent – won the presidential elec-
tions in 200578. The case involved a Bechtel subsidiary operating in Bolivia and re-
sponsible for the water distribution in Cochabamba. The company’s inflation of 
prices and suspension of services for non-payment ignited a wide range of protests 
in Bolivia. The Bolivian government was forced to revoke the concession and this 
was challenged in arbitration under the Bolivia-Netherlands BIT. Morales preserved 
his standpoint against BITs and, together with Ecuador’s President Correa, exited 
the ICSID79. 
An added challenge is associated with BITs’ role in forming a customary interna-
tional investment law. With views considering BITs binding only on parties to those 
BITs, some scholars considered BITs and arbitral awards as sources for designing a 
customary international investment law80. The power of ratifying BITs specifically in 
developing countries was transposed into domestic investment codes, embedding 
nearly the same guarantees, protections and incentives prevailing under their con-
cluded BITs. On the other hand, the codification of international investment law 
into bilateral treaties facilitated the creation of the international economic law for 
the interest of academics besides governmental officials, investors, multinationals, 
non-governmental organisations and legal counsellors. In other words, BITs could 
not be ignored when planning, executing or negotiating cross-border investments81.  
The advantages associated with BIT protections are linked with the absence of costs 
and the conditioned enjoyment only upon passing the nationality test. Accordingly, 
foreign investors encouraged strategic planning to utilise BITs in boosting their pro-
tection82. This planning concentrates on three pillars: (i) the presence of a BIT in 
place between the investor’s home state and the investment host state; (ii) the BIT 
network of the host state with other states to decide on the convenience and effi-
ciency of bypassing investments through third-party states; and (iii) the provisions 
of the BIT in place regarding the provided substantive protections and means of 
arbitration specified as ICSID or other options83.  
One of the growing concerns between arbitration tribunals is treaty-shopping BITs, 
where investors increasingly used BITs to introduce bad-faith structures of no sub-
stance, aiming at treaty benefits. The usual forms of treaty shopping are the estab-
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lishment of no-substance entities in countries having the good BIT clauses with the 
host states84. The challenges regarding BITs include civil society’s and environmen-
tal groups’ questioning of sovereignty, especially in developing countries. Addition-
ally, the BIT dispute settlement system is under threat of developing countries’ ac-
ceptance, considering the rising number of claims filed against them85.  
Moreover, BITs affect competition between market players based on protection. 
BIT signatories’ investors take advantage of their position over unprotected ones to 
circumvent slower, less friendly bureaucracy. Examples refer to foreign protected 
companies’ ability to challenge a national policy86 and receive compensation accord-
ingly, compared to unprotected and domestic investors who remain subject to this 
challenged national policy. Moreover, this diminishes any advantage for pre-BIT 
participants who invested in knowing the host state’s legal framework. The BIT will 
create a new model of treatment – likely easier – disregarding the formerly prevail-
ing legal framework. In addition, BITs opening the market for easier access raises 
uneven competition within the market, ruining the position and shares of pre-BIT 
players87. 
From the above overview, the conclusion derived is the failure of several attempts 
to establish the multilateral regime. The reasons differ starting from the threats 
posed to belittling the states’ rights to regulate investments if violating the labour 
and environmental standards. This urged states to leave investment treaties even on 
a bilateral level. Second, the loss of the essence of BITs as promoters and protec-
tors of investments – which applies with the risks of treaty shopping in which trea-
ties are exploited by investors to attain benefits without inflowing investments to 
the contracting states. The only inflows are sufficient to incorporate a false entity to 
allow the investor to enjoy the treaty benefits. Third, the policymakers in developing 
countries would like to exploit their varying negotiation powers in accordance with 
their potential to attract FDI. This variation together with the prisoners’ dilemma 
game can result in a war to conclude BITs. 
II.E The Economics of engaging in BITs 
Scholars have attempted to analyse the motivations behind concluding BITs. Con-
sidering these treaties as a tool for economic cooperation and development as pro-
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vided in their preambles, the economic spirit of these treaties is important. This sec-
tion provides an overview of the costs and benefits of engaging in BITs from an 
economic point of view, focusing on the inflow of investments, risks associated and 
costs borne by stakeholders after concluding a BIT. This analysis is divided into two 
sections that separately address the benefits and costs. 
II.E.1 Benefits 
The benefits of engaging in BITs, and motivations to do so, have been the subject 
of examination in several studies. Guzman studied this behaviour and analysed de-
veloping countries’ interest as capital importers in widening the manner of BITs en-
gagement to attract FDI. Benefits from this attracted FDI were fewer to host states 
in conjunction with higher protection costs, granted guarantees and waived regula-
tory rights. Nevertheless, developing countries insisted on engaging in BITs to 
achieve extra benefits based on their advantageous position in comparison to non-
BIT signatories88. This positive influence of BITs incentivised other developing 
countries to create and extend their BIT network aiming at similar benefits89. Guz-
man’s second finding addressed the benefits in the post-capital importation period 
concluding that fierce BITs competition results in less utility or even losses to host 
states from each unit of attracted foreign investments. This moved the discussion to 
the initial status, where non-BIT signatories secured investment inflows, and man-
aged to realise extra utility from each investment inflow.  
The third inference was associated with investment elasticity. For Guzman, a devel-
oping state attracting inelastic investment – mostly natural resources-oriented – 
reaps greater benefits from preserving a domestic legal framework offering less 
guarantees and protections to foreign investment and contract enforceability rules 
in comparison to BITs. A clear example appears in the case of Algeria, where the 
economy preserves its protectionist stance since investment inflows are oil- and gas-
oriented90. Hence, the Algerian government is to an extent assured that investments 
will inflow regardless of engaging in BITs and guaranteeing protection to foreign 
investments. Thus, Algeria can reap all the benefits from the investment inflows 
without bearing the costs of guaranteeing protection to foreign investors or even 
negotiating BITs91. This relates to the Hull Rule disagreement between developing 
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and developed countries since the developing countries objected to the new rule, 
showing their bad faith and willingness to keep an open door for expropriation. The 
non-BIT signers showed, in some cases, higher FDI/GDP. This was justified upon 
the presence of inelastic FDI flow due to availability of a natural resource as in cas-
es of oil and minerals92. 
(A) Investment promotion 
Another scholar is Salacuse93, who questioned and examined the motivations behind 
the engagement and conclusion of BITs between developing and industrialised 
economies. For Salacuse, the presence of this trend between developed economies 
was a source of reciprocal protection of investors. The first explanation Salacuse 
identified was investment promotion efforts. The clarity and enforceability of BITs 
mitigates investors’ uncertainty and risks, thus stimulating their investments94. The 
investment promotion notion of developing countries intensified with the debt cri-
ses of the 1980s and the 1990s. Based on this understanding, developing countries 
viewed BITs as a contractual agreement to protect investors in return for the con-
tinuous future inflows of capital and know-how. This appeared in titling BITs the 
“protection and encouragement of investments”. 
The empirical studies provided different outcomes to the role of BITs in increasing 
the FDI inflows into developing countries. Hallward Driemeier95 was one of the 
first scholars to address the topic96. He concluded that there was no relationship be-
tween BITs and FDI inflows. The second study was prepared by Tobin and Rose 
Ackerman97, which showed that FDI inflows constitute a larger share of GDP only 
in cases of low political risk, and vice-versa, regardless of the number of BITs con-
cluded98.  
Neumayer and Spess tested the effect of BITs on FDI, with the results supporting 
the positive relationship between BITs and FDI. Additionally, the results provided 
minimal evidence that BITs act as substitutes for domestic institutions. Both schol-
ars recommended that developing countries comply with their protection obliga-
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tions under their BITs since this pays off in the form of higher FDI inflows99. In 
Egger and Pfaffermayr’s study, a positive impact of 30 per cent was traced between 
BITs and FDI in certain specifications. Furthermore, both scholars deduced that 
signing a BIT had a positive impact on FDI at a smaller magnitude when compared 
to BITs signed and combined with other legal reforms100. Kerner verified the direct 
effect of concluding BITs on increasing the FDI inflows from protected inves-
tors101. 
(B) Relation-building 
Salacuse’s second explanation was linked to the relation-building process between 
developing and industrialised economies102. The friendship trend offers the former 
further benefits and assistance from the latter. The governments of developing 
countries forecasted BITs conclusion with industrialised states to amplify trade, 
technology transfer, aid and security assistance based on tighter relations103. This 
understanding was evidenced in Uruguay in 2005 when a newly elected government 
ratified the US-Uruguay BIT targeting the protection of the Uruguayan export mar-
kets. States with developed legal frameworks are less willing to engage in BITs since 
their domestic framework guarantees foreign investors the necessary protection. On 
the other hand, developing countries tend to engage in BITs to offer a substitute to 
the lacking domestic legal framework104. 
The relation-building explanation was empirically studied by Desbordes and Viscard 
who explored the role of BITs in amplifying investment inflows. According to the 
study’s hypothesis, better interstate political relations between the home and host 
state boosts FDI flows due to lower risks of expropriation. In other words, diplo-
matic disputes pose an additional risk of expropriation, leading to lower FDI105. 
Thus, additional return would be necessary before a multinational decides on invest-
ing in an uncertain state where political interstate tensions prevail or are more likely 
to erupt. The second result concerning the effectiveness of BITs in FDI flows be-
tween host and home countries experiencing different interstate relations was 
mixed. In cases of good political interstate relations, the BIT effect on FDI decreas-
es or is insignificant due to the absence of political expropriation threats. Thus, 
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BITs play a more important role under political interstate disputes. Finally, the 
study results validated the complementarity – and not substitutability – of sound 
domestic institutions and BITs106. 
(C) Market openness 
Salacuse’s third explanation was the debt crisis and the Washington Consensus fuel-
ling developing countries’ efforts to liberalise their markets and foster private in-
vestments. The state-owned economies – highly regulated and import-substitution-
led through the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s – failed to provide essential development 
without incurring lump sum debts107. Accordingly, there was a shift towards more 
neoliberal economics, prioritising private sector in leading economic activity, con-
centrating on liberalisation and market forces for assigning resources instead of cen-
tral planning108. 
In the same context of market openness, the US policymakers numbered three 
goals for BITs as clearly stipulated in the US Trade Representatives reports. First, 
BITs extend the necessary protection for US rights in host states whenever FTAs 
and double tax treaties in place are not sufficient. Secondly, BITs motivate host 
states to reform their legal frameworks, transforming them into more investor-
friendly and market-oriented frameworks109. Thirdly, BITs assist in initiating inter-
national legal standards regulating cross-border investments. This standardisation 
reduces uncertainty, risks and in turn mitigates investment costs110. Further proof 
for the same conclusion was provided in the US president Clinton’s message to the 
government of Albania when concluding the US-Albania BIT. The president’s 
wording in his 1995’s message stressed the protection of US investments in Albania 
together with encouraging the Albanian government to create more friendly market 
conditions to stimulate private sector activity. 
(D) Signalling 
Other goals attained through BITs include openness to private investments inspir-
ing domestic investors to operate within their domestic markets. The BIT conclu-
sion signalling protection for foreign investors highlighted the developing countries 
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governmental intentions regarding the private sector’s role in steering economic ac-
tivity111. The domestic investors managed to benefit from nearly equal treatment of-
fered to inflows of foreign capital. This represents a confirmation to Andrew 
Kerner’s efforts to understand developed countries’ interest in concluding BITs.  
In Kerner’s study, he identifies BITs as restricting host states’ hostile behaviour to-
wards investors. High compensation enforceable upon injurious behaviours ties the 
host states’ hands. The hand-tying mechanism is exemplified on several levels112. 
First, the dispute settlement procedure forces host states to comply with BITs since 
whether their actions qualify as expropriation is decided by an independent arbitra-
tion tribunal113. Second, linking the host (developing) state’s failure to respect its 
treaties and arbitration awards to the downgrading or the ceasing of diplomatic rela-
tions with home (developed) states poses an additional burden upon the host state 
to act lawfully and comply with the treaties. Third, failure to fulfil the compensatory 
requirements of arbitral awards affects host states investment reputations, down-
graded credit ratings, and finally the case may be referred to the International Court 
of Justice for not respecting the ICSID’s award114.  
Andrew Kerner’s second explanation for developed countries conclusion of BITs is 
associated with Neumayer and Spess’s consideration of BITs as signals of host 
states’ intention to protect and securely treat foreign investments. This signalling in-
centivises third-party investors to inject their funds and capital into those host states 
assuming an equal treatment as BIT-covered investments115. Kerner denoted these 
signals under the sunk costs mechanism. Under this concept, the conclusion of 
BITs marks the host states’ disinclination to expropriate foreign investments regard-
less of being covered by BITs or not. This is considered the indirect effect, since it 
is connected to the hand-tying mechanism by stressing the importance of the in-
vestment climate reputation globally116. Governments and states may have features 
that third parties cannot recognise. These hidden characteristics could be witnessed 
in the state’s compliance behaviour regarding its treaty-based international obliga-
tions. Based on this analysis the conclusion deemed the legal reform as a signal for a 
state’s committed intention to pursue its economic reform117. 
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Bubb and Rose-Ackerman’s model when analysing the hostility of developing coun-
tries to the Hull Rule highlighted their lack of motivation to respect the ownership 
rights for investments prior to the decolonisation era. Disregarding the importance 
of BITs in signalling the states’ willingness to protect foreign investments, after in-
dependence the expropriation constituted an opportunity to reap the benefits of the 
former foreign investments118. In consequence, developing countries opposed the 
Hull Rule in order to preserve their rights to expropriate the colonisation invest-
ments without incurring high compensation. Afterwards, the same developing 
countries concluded BITs to signal their respect to foreign investments concerning 
future investments. In other words, the BITs were used as an instrument to declare 
the end of the era of expropriations and signal the launch of a new phase where 
foreign investors’ rights were secure and protected119. The rise in the numbers of 
treaties confirm such behaviour of the developing countries since the colonial era 
investments were expropriated during the 1960s and 1970s and the maximum value 
was reaped without bearing compensation, followed by the surge in concluded BITs 
in the 1990s to signal the new legal regime and the respect of foreign investments120. 
In another context, Neumayer and Spess praised BITs for signalling the successful 
management of the dynamic inconsistencies risks121. These inconsistencies arise 
when host states do not comply with their former promises of FET to foreign in-
vestors who incur sunk costs by investing. Once a host state has violated a substan-
tive protection, it can exploit the opportunity and expropriate the foreign invest-
ment. Other developing countries refrained from engaging in BITs, claiming further 
sovereignty, and promulgated several legal changes to attract foreign investors. 
Conversely, unilateral moves were never as sufficient as BITs to ensure protection 
commitments. Success in reducing dynamic inconsistencies was evident in the 
plunge of expropriations in the 1980s and 1990s, which was simultaneous with the 
increased momentum of BITs. However, the challenges of BITs for developing 
countries is the remarkable waive in sovereignty122. 
(E) Substitutability vs. complementarity 
An important prevailing discussion regarding the nature of BITs is the substitutabil-
ity and complementarity to local domestic institutions. Ginsburg viewed the BITs 
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third-party settlement mechanism as a substitute for a poor domestic judiciary123. In 
general, domestic courts lack the independence and foreign investors lack the in-
formation necessary to assess the soundness of the judicial system applicable to 
their investments. Therefore, investors are inclined towards a third-party settlement 
with less uncertainty and longer precedence.  
In line with Ginsburg, Salacuse’s fourth explanation asserted that developing coun-
tries utilised BIT law enforcement mechanisms as substitutes for their arbitrary and 
lacking institutions. BITs provide only a partial substitute for the domestic legal 
framework since an investor must still interact with the local government’s short-
comings124. Under BITs, foreign investors were treated equally as national investors 
in compliance with the MFN (most favoured nation) principle and the national 
treatment (NT) principle. The presence of arbitration dispute settlement procedures 
guided the host states’ public institutions to improve governance and respect of law. 
This concept was translated in the Uruguayan Ministry of Finance press release veri-
fying the signing of the US BIT as a necessity to benefit Uruguayans more than 
Americans125.  
Ginsburg empirically assessed the complementarity of BITs to domestic institu-
tions126. The hypothesis adopted deemed the BITs to open the markets for foreign 
entrants, enhancing market competition. Higher competition boosts domestic insti-
tutions’ regulatory and judiciary independence. In addition, BITs spurred competi-
tion between dispute settlement alternatives, including the local courts and the in-
ternational arbitration. This competition would incentivise local courts to develop 
their qualities and receive more commercial disputes127. On the other hand, accord-
ing to Desbordes and Vicard, the BITs constitute a new framework offering multi-
nationals favourable property rights treatment and avoiding inefficiencies of the 
host state domestic institutions. In spite of this, the second view considers the BIT 
as a pledge of the host state institutions not to undertake any actions threatening 
multinationals property rights. Thus, under the second description, BITs and do-
mestic institutions are complements128. 
The five benefits from an economy’s engagement in a BIT can be divided into two 
categories. The first focuses on the direct effects, as mentioned by Salacuse, includ-
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ing direct increase in investment and relationship building between the investment 
partners. On the indirect effects side, the benefits seem more institutional. First, the 
complementarity or even substitution of the inefficient partial judiciary in favour of 
third party dispute settlement. Second, BITs’ role in encouraging the transformation 
of the legal framework governing the developing countries to a more liberal, inves-
tor-friendly one. The direct and indirect effects are both outcomes of BITs’ impact 
in tying states’ hands in conjunction with the reputational and signalling costs asso-
ciated with the violation of BITs. 
II.E.2 Costs 
The second subsection examines the costs associated with engaging in BITs. As 
mentioned above, the issue is addressed from an economic point of view. On the 
costs side, the nature of BITs was denoted by Martin Wolf as constraints on a 
state’s experience of sovereignty especially towards multinationals. In other words, 
BITs represent a credible commitment of the host state’s government not to expro-
priate a protected multinational in the future129. Other studies failed to verify a sin-
gle understanding since a set of studies authenticated the positive influence of BITs 
on foreign capital inflows, conflicting with another set portraying a negligible effect 
on inflows, compared to others featuring a limited effect on liberalising the econo-
my or improving the quality of governance.  
Other costs for developing countries are associated with concluding BITs include 
the failures to promulgate new legislation postulating necessary protections on the 
environment and labour along with other standards130. In accordance to BITs, any 
developing countries’ attempts to issue these needed amendments were all conveyed 
under international arbitration. Study groups concentrated on the role of interna-
tional arbitration as a means to sue states violating their BIT obligations. Among 
the clear conclusions was the state’s limited sovereignty when regulating enterprises 
within its borders. Another conclusion is correlated with the possibility of forcing 
injurious states to provide compensation for damage borne by investors. These two 
changes uniquely characterised the BIT dispute settlement mechanism131.  
To assess the BIT system economically, further emphasis is directed to the cost of 
BITs, which can be split into two categories. The first encompasses the direct nego-
tiation and conclusion costs. The second and the more complex cost is the one as-
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sociated with breaching the BIT. These costs, known as “sovereignty costs”, involve 
the host state’s preclusion from adopting domestic policies when addressing devel-
opmental and environmental issues. These policies are usually represented in several 
ways including taxation, property seizure and capital controls132. The most impera-
tive sovereignty cost is associated with delegating the host state’s judiciary compe-
tence to an international arbitration tribunal. The first simple direct cost of a BIT 
linked to negotiation, conclusion and ratification includes resource investment in 
negotiations. The availability of BIT models reduced the cost of negotiations and 
facilitated the conclusion of BITs133. Moreover, the UNCTAD (United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development) provides continuous technical advises to 
developing countries together with direct hosting of BIT negotiations. The second 
direct cost is represented in ratifying the BIT. This process differs in each state de-
pending on its governing constitutional procedures. The two above highlighted 
costs can be easily managed by host states unlike the sovereign costs as addressed 
below134. 
Desbordes and Vicard investigated the spill over of political relations between the 
BITs host and home states and FDI flows. Political tensions between BIT parties 
pose a risk on multinationals. Retaliatory actions by any party in response to politi-
cal tensions threatens multinationals with expropriation. Therefore, a BIT secures 
multinationals from political tension in two ways135. First, the negotiation of a BIT 
constitutes an opportunity for the host and home states to approach each other 
economically, thus excluding or at least reducing disagreement and tensions possi-
bilities. Second, the BIT restricts the host state’s ability to expropriate a multina-
tional in case of any future tension136.  
This moves the discussion to the indirect and actual costs of breaching a BIT. The 
indirect costs can be represented by the three “Rs”; retaliation, reputation and reci-
procity137. With reciprocity, indirect costs can be seen in the home state’s ceasing to 
comply with the BIT, in the event the latter is breached by the host state. The 
asymmetric nature of investment flows results in the net FDI exporter home state’s 
failure to exploit reciprocity in threatening the host state to forcefully comply with 
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the BIT. The second enforcement mechanism is retaliation or punishment138. The 
threat of punishment in the event of breach of the BIT pressures both parties to 
further BIT compliance. Retaliatory acts take different forms, starting from eco-
nomic sanctions to militarised interventions. The common principle prevailing in 
different retaliatory measures is the cost borne by the retaliating party. Accordingly, 
governments may refrain from adopting retaliatory action to seek protection for on-
ly an individual investment. 
The last of the three R’s is reputation, split into two classifications. The first is con-
nected to reputation with other states, while the second is focused on reputation 
with investors. Concerning reputation with other states, a host state that does not 
comply with BIT obligations damages its reputation within the international con-
text139. The damage specifically prevails in connection to its capacity and willingness 
to adhere to its treaty obligations. Hence, the reputational losses usually benefit 
third-party states that would not engage in a similar BIT, by knowing the state will 
fail to abide by its international obligations. The second pillar of reputational threat 
was associated with investors. A host state interested in attracting investments 
should act within the clauses of concluded BITs. Non-compliance with BITs will 
prevent investors from injecting their funds to the BIT-violating host state. Inves-
tors access information regarding the arbitration claims filed against a host state 
through visiting the ICSID and relevant websites as well as media sources and arbi-
tral awards handed down, which are a reliable information source benefiting inves-
tors in assessing the host state’s behaviour140. 
States engaging in BITs see their sovereignty diminish since any public policy enact-
ed and adversely affecting foreign investors may be challenged141. BIT sunk costs 
include constraining policymakers in law-making and compromising their public 
image. Several publicly appealing policies were disputed in arbitration cases. Exam-
ples include land reallocation during South Africa’s post-apartheid era. Another ex-
ample is the Canadian government’s non-extension of public healthcare to avoid the 
violation of foreign entities provision of services142. Moreover, these disputes may 
be raised without exhausting the available host state legal remedies. In other words, 
BITs entitle foreign investors to bypass domestic courts for international arbitra-
tion, where the BIT articles are surely applied and panellists are decided based on 
 
138 Tabari 2016 45 
139 Norbert Horn, Stefan Kroll 2004 95 
140 Sasse 2011 79-82 
141 Neumayer, Spess 2005 1569-71 
142 Kerner 2009 79-80 
  46  
the parties’ choices. This contrasts with the domestic judiciary, where parties have 
no voice in deciding on judges or the status of BITs against domestic legislation. 
With these waivers, Elkins et al. denoted BITs for developing countries as a trade of 
sovereignty for credibility143. Liberal economists criticised BITs for not banning de-
veloping countries from offering foreign investors tax incentives or tariff protec-
tion, further raising the overall borne costs144. 
When addressing the substitutability of BITs to domestic inefficiencies, the access 
to a third-party dispute settlement mechanism under BITs contested the role of 
domestic judiciary as a determinant of FDI inflows to an economy145. The foreign 
investors will bypass the local courts in search for a more independent dispute set-
tlement mechanism as prescribed under the BIT. A clear example for substitutabil-
ity is China, where commercial disputes are handled through a two-tier system. The 
first tier is of higher quality and concerned with foreign investors claims under the 
China International Economic Trade Arbitration Committee. The second tier is 
corrupted, lower quality domestic Chinese courts deciding on local commercial dis-
putes. Ginsburg concluded that BITs played a limited role in improving domestic 
governance and may end up putting local investors in disadvantageous position in-
stitutionally and competitively. Another conclusion linked to BIT signers’ character-
istics. Ginsburg utilised the means of a set of developing economy indicators con-
cluding that BIT signers are richer, larger and more stable regarding their policies146. 
With the three Rs, the direct and indirect classification of costs and the burden of 
engaging in BITs may exceed the benefits, triggering policymakers’ exits. The costs 
are mainly connected to having less sovereignty under BIT-imposed limitations up-
on the host state’s right to regulate investments. Another obvious example is the 
substitution of the domestic judiciary as a symbol of a state’s sovereignty in favour 
of a third-party dispute settlement regime. Finally, costs were classified as the three 
Rs, denoting reciprocity, retaliation and reputation. The three costs can be deemed 
direct as their impact is an inevitable outcome of a host state’s violation of a BIT. 
II.F Substantive protection 
This section provides a preview of the core protections to be discussed in more de-
tail in chapter IV. It introduces the substantive protections guaranteed under almost 
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all BITs and addresses protections based on the general understanding and defini-
tion of them within international investment law. Prior to categorising the substan-
tive protections, the section overviews the usual components of BITs. Subsequent-
ly, the section briefly introduces each protection to familiarise the reader with them 
prior to the legal framework’s benchmarking analysis in chapter IV.  
All BITs rest on three pillars: the first covers the scope, the second provides the 
protections and standards of treatment, and the third deals with the mechanism of 
settling disputes under the BIT. The scope decides on the treaty’s subjects, includ-
ing both persons and investments covered. With regard to persons, foreign inves-
tors are entitled to benefit from BITs as per the legal frameworks of the contracting 
states. This applies to individuals and companies, where the latter are mostly re-
sponsible for cross-border investments. BITs usually cover companies founded un-
der the laws of the contracting parties. However, in a limited number of BITs, pro-
tection extends to shareholders who are nationals of the contracting parties regard-
less of the legislations governing the foundation of the company whether in the 
host state or a third party. Legalist scholars attempted to tackle treaty shopping 
through conditioning the benefit from BITs upon the presence of an entity’s seat in 
the home state or having substance and operations in the contracting state’s juris-
diction.  
The second pillar upon which a BIT rests is investments covered. BITs expand the 
definition of investments protected to embrace all rights and assets invested in host 
states. Relevant case law has provided claims filed regarding concession rights, 
shareholders’ interests, private contracts, bonds and other assets147. The third pillar 
of BITs is the resolution of investment-related disputes. Third-party involvement in 
dispute resolution epitomises two commitments of the host state. The first is not to 
expropriate the foreign investments. Regardless of relations strength between gov-
ernments, BITs ensure that future host state governments do not expropriate for-
eign entities, since otherwise a claim would be filed with the International Chamber 
of Commerce, the ICSID, or an ad hoc arbitration following rules of the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law. This commitment exists regard-
less of the political situation prevailing between the home and host states. The sec-
ond commitment is linked to future host state governments’ recourse to local 
courts. BITs provide mechanisms to resolve any disputes arising between host 
states and investors in relation to the latter investments through a third party148. 
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The third pillar addresses the temporal framework of the BIT. This adopts the pro-
cedural process of ratifying the BIT if this is needed. An important example is that 
of Brazil, which engaged in dozens of BITs without undertaking the necessary do-
mestic additional steps to ratify them149. Besides this, the temporal effect of the BIT 
usually guarantees protection to investments executed prior or after the treaty 
comes into force. However, the host states’ measures adopted prior to the BIT tak-
ing effect are not part of the scope of the BIT. Investments are guaranteed extend-
ed protection for a while after the treaty’s periodic end date. This duration depends 
upon the contracting states’ agreement regarding the protections after the treaty 
ends150. 
BITs comprise nearly the same articles guaranteeing similar protections151. Those 
protections fall under six categories, which are detailed below including: most-
favoured nation and national treatment, expropriation and compensation, FET, 
third-party dispute settlement, others protections, and extended special protection 
under US BITs. 
II.F.1 Most-favoured nation and national treatment 
These clauses entitle foreign investments to treatment that is at least equal to, if not 
more favourable than, that provided to local national investors152. Under these 
clauses, any preferential treatment or even simpler procedures as incentives for do-
mestic investors are deemed a violation of the concept of NT. Additionally, MFN 
implies that foreign investors should be granted equal treatment including privileges 
and exemptions as do all investors from other home states153. The MFN clause 
obliges a host state to treat an investor or investment from the other contracting 
party no less favourably than the treatment provided to other foreign investors 
from third-party states. The absence of a MFN clause in a BIT entitles both parties 
to discriminate when treating foreign investors154.  
Both protections are considered guarantees against discrimination155. Hence, any 
kind of discrimination based on preferential agreements is abolished in the event of 
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foreign investors or domestic laws in case of nationals156. The same protections are 
present in the World Trade Organization agreement, where member states are obli-
gated to accord investors treatment that is not inferior to that accorded to nationals 
or investors from other home states. The ICSID jurisprudence for each of the three 
countries in chapter V will provide a detailed example and explanation guaranteeing 
the two protections under international investment law. 
II.F.2 Expropriation and compensation 
The second category of protection clause shields foreign investors from unlawful 
expropriation157. BITs stipulation of compensation signifies a means of protecting 
foreign investments. In absence of compensation, potential expropriation repre-
sents an obligatory transfer of resources and a discouraging risk factor for foreign 
investors158. The definition of expropriation witnessed several developments to ex-
tend it from a direct possession and change of ownership to a constructive and 
creeping expropriation.  
The modernised definition of expropriation is traceable to Article 10, paragraph 3 
of the State’s International Responsibility Draft Convention of 1961. Under this ar-
ticle, expropriation represents any outright seizure by any state’s unreasonable inter-
vention, and that influences the use, enjoyment or disposal of the expropriated as-
set. Here, an owner is barred from enjoying, using or disposing of his property for a 
period after expropriation159. This includes the revocation of licenses necessary for 
factories operation. The concept was usually the base for claims against states ban-
ning chemical products for health purposes as part of its environmental legisla-
tion160. The above article went further, considering intervention resulting in the 
owner’s lack of control over property as expropriation even if temporarily as for a 
time161. 
The acts of expropriation against foreign investors’ private property was con-
strained with a set of limitations. First, the host state is obliged to communicate 
prompt, adequate and effective compensation to the investor. The compensation 
concept is defined as the value at which an investor is indifferent between preserv-
ing his investment and expropriation. Another constraint provided in BITs is that 
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of conditioning expropriation on serving the public interest or good. This precludes 
governments from using their power to expropriate to transfer foreign entities to 
local favoured investors162. These two reasons, in addition to the changing structure 
of FDI inflows towards more manufacture and service-based industries, made con-
crete expropriations rare.  
FDI became more diverse and less dependent on natural resources. Thus, the ex-
propriation of a manufacturing plant – part of a global chain – would leave the host 
state holding a worthless establishment. Accordingly, host state governments used 
their policymaking capacities to reap benefits from foreign investments through 
amending regulations, taxation, fees and tariffs. These restrictions are usually associ-
ated with local content requirements or limiting borrowing to domestic uncompeti-
tive lenders163. Arbitral tribunal’s review of expropriation as lawful depends on the 
qualification of the broad interpretation of “public purpose”, thereby potentially 
providing states with wide discretion164. Deciding on the lawfulness of expropriation 
shifts the discussion to effective, fair and prompt compensation. Therefore, lawful 
expropriation has to be differentiated from foreign property confiscation (illegal ex-
propriation). According to the first, most scholars agreed that lawfulness of expro-
priation depends on both presence of public purpose together with non-
discrimination. In cases of lawful expropriation, a state is obliged to fairly compen-
sate or at least pay the expropriated property’s value when taken. With regard to 
property confiscation or illegal expropriation, this gives rise to state responsibility, 
requiring sufficient restitution or reparation165.  
This in addition to prescribing fair and adequate compensation in cases of public 
interest expropriation166. The significance of compensation can be examined on 
three levels. First, it covers damages arising from the illegal intervention of the host 
state against the investor167. Second, a compensation represents costs for host-state 
decision makers while deciding on the implementation of such intervention. Thirdly 
and lastly, the potential compensation may encourage the host state to recourse to 
out-of-court settlements. The main theme of compensation aims at restitution for 
losses resulting from the host state’s intervention168. 
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The protection covers expropriation in its broad sense comprising both direct tak-
ing of assets together with any measures equivalent to expropriation depriving for-
eign investors of their property rights or ability to enjoy and control their invest-
ments. Indirect expropriation prevails in the latter case since the intervention does 
not comprise a transfer of ownership title169. The US model provided a test of three 
conditions to assess the host state government’s action as constituting indirect ex-
propriation or not. The three conditions include, first, the intervention’s economic 
impact, though this is not limited to direct adverse losses. Second, the nature of the 
government’s action is examined, and finally the interference of the intervention 
with investors’ reasonable and distinct expectations. Concerning the non-
compensable regulation, the US model permitted host state governments to inter-
vene in exceptional cases without compensating foreign investments. This applies 
when the intervention takes place without any discriminatory behaviour and seeks 
the protection of public welfare such as safety and health170. 
II.F.3 Fair and equitable treatment 
The third category governs fair and equitable treatment (FET), with BITs providing 
minimal treatment of host states towards investors171. The absence of a general un-
derstanding of the FET created several debates. Muchlinski consolidated this con-
clusion, stressing unfairness and arbitrary treatment as the main violations of this 
concept. However, this is separately decided by tribunals in each case based on the 
facts and circumstances of each case. Arbitration tribunals’ awards identify four 
points in applying this principle172.  
The majority of current disputes are filed upon challenges to the application of 
FET, the first point under which a two-test analysis must be performed in order to 
enforce the FET principle. The first test deals with the legality of governmental in-
terventions in light of domestic law; the second tests whether the intervention raises 
concerns of arbitrariness and unreasonableness173. Moreover, host states have an 
obligation to exercise vigilance towards foreign investments. Although a state does 
not have the duty to prevent certain events from happening, a necessary level of dil-
igence must prevail, and failure to apply this vigilance renders host states liable174.  
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The second point in classifying FET is the host states’ ability to respect the due 
process without engaging in attempts to deny justice175. Bochard introduced FET 
under this classification as the foreign investors’ accessibility to host states’ local 
impartial and politically independent courts assuring the prevalence of objective jus-
tice and fair trial176. The third point is the host state’s behaviour and its compliance 
with foreign investors’ legitimate expectations. This compliance is highlighted in the 
host state’s efforts to preserve a stable business and legal environment, similar to 
that prevailing when the investor decided on his investment plans177. 
The fourth point provides a new level of FET behaviour introduced under Pope & 
Talbot Inc. v. Canada. In this case, the tribunal presented a new threshold of treat-
ment, known as “egregious treatment”, to represent unfair bad faith conduct that vio-
lates FET under Article 1105 of NAFTA178. Therefore, the NAFTA application of 
the FET concept featured the latest caselaw highlighting the intended arbitrariness 
of governmental intervention backed and incentivised by bad faith179. In conse-
quence, BITs secured foreign investment from discriminatory or arbitrary policies, 
besides relaxing labour laws and protecting investors from direct and indirect un-
compensated expropriations180. 
II.F.4 Third-party dispute settlement 
This substantive protection provides for a binding dispute settlement mechanism 
when conflicts arise in regard to the potential violations of its articles181. The issued 
awards are binding upon host states and the failure to comply burdens states with 
additional retaliatory actions182. BITs permitted investors to access international ar-
bitration by virtue of the treaty. This development circumvented former concepts 
of exhausting local remedies and home state diplomatic involvement resulting in 
several inefficiencies and delays. Furthermore, this permission allowed foreign in-
vestors to fully control their claims and challenges against host states in the event of 
infringements by the latter.  
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BITs provide four possibilities for dispute settlement; however, regardless of the 
method pursued, most BITs require a “cooling-off period” of three to six months be-
fore initiating the arbitration process183. The first possibility is the pre-requisite to 
file a claim in local courts before taking advantage of arbitration. The second possi-
bility requires deciding on challenging host states’ actions locally or before the IC-
SID, with any decision precluding the resort to the other choice. In the third possi-
bility claimants can initiate local court claims for declaratory and preliminary proce-
dures before waiving the claim and referring the dispute to arbitration. The most 
flexible option is the fourth one when an investor is entitled to file an international 
arbitration claim directly after the cooling-off period. From these possibilities, for-
eign investors are under an obligation to review their BIT provisions closely to 
avoid foregoing their entitlement to access international arbitration184.  
Two determinants influence an investor’s decision to revert an investment dispute 
to international arbitration. The first determinant adopts a collateral versus hostage 
scenario185. Under this scenario, a host state acts unlawfully against a private foreign 
investment. Hence, the injured investment presents a hostage taken by the host 
state. This hostage-taking scenario could transform into collateral whenever an arbi-
tral award is issued and compensation is paid to the injured party. The injured party 
guarantees his compensatory right through the possibility to enforce the award up-
on the host state, besides the reputational loss of the host state. Accordingly, the 
idea of submitting international arbitration claims always depends upon the cost of 
the lost property or investment. Situations in which winning an arbitral claim in-
volve high litigation costs discourage investors from filing claims; conversely, the 
opposite is true, with lower litigation costs with higher expected returns motivating 
investors to file claims186.  
On the host state side, the award already represents the reputational cost. Hence, if 
the additional non-reputational costs are minimal, with high awarded compensation, 
the host state’s choice to ignore the award is strategically rational187. Therefore, arbi-
tral tribunals are encouraged to issue low compensation awards, since the host state 
will be more inclined to meet the required compensation requirement to avoid any 
claims raised against it in third-party states and any further reputation damage. 
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The second determinant that influences the decision to seek international arbitra-
tion is the expected enforcement outcome. The higher the return of enforcing the 
arbitral award and the lower the cost of enforcement, the higher the incentive for 
investors to engage in arbitration seeking redress from the host state’s unlawful 
conduct188. In other words, the level of litigation costs in addition to the parties’ 
pessimism regarding their ability to win the case are the principal factors determin-
ing the host state’s interest in settlement rather than arbitration189. The higher the 
costs borne by host states represented in compensation and reputation damage, the 
higher the probability of the host state will ignore the arbitral award. This ignoring 
of the award represents the short-term implication, while in the long run the host 
state may decide to exit the whole BIT system by terminating the available BITs and 
avoiding engagement in new ones190. Also, the broader the interpretation of the BIT 
clauses, the more expensive compliance is and the less the host states will be inter-
ested in preserving its current BITs or signing new ones. This was evidenced in 
Brazil, which abstained from ratifying any BITs; likewise, Ecuador ceased or termi-
nated its previously concluded and ratified BITs throughout the 2000s191. 
With regard to types of arbitration, BITs may stipulate alternatives for investors to 
commence their claims, including before the ICSID and ad hoc arbitration in ac-
cordance with UNCITRAL. Other options under some BITs include the Stockholm 
Chamber of Commerce, the International Chamber of Commerce and the Interna-
tional Court of Arbitration192. UNCTAD prioritised arbitration over other dispute 
settlement alternatives, which were either dismissed or less efficient. The dismissal 
of the former diplomatic protection had three justifications. First, there are cases in 
which home state decide not to adopt an investor’s claim against the host state, 
hence, BITs entitles investors to directly access to arbitration193. Second, the diffi-
culty of transmitting the compensation attained by the home state from the host 
one to the investor is not drafted in any binding agreements. Third, multinational 
corporations feature complexities in deciding their nationality to determine their eli-
gibility for home-state diplomatic protection.  
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Another method of dispute settlement is mediation, wherein investors manage their 
claims against the host state directly194. Also, another option is resorting to host 
states’ domestic courts, although, while some BITs provide for this alternative, this 
has not been put into practice yet195. BIT protection extends to cover political risks 
due to instabilities in developing countries196. This third-party dispute settlement 
mechanism originated to avoid judiciary’s inefficiencies, reduced trust or lack of 
transparency under the host state’s domestic constitutional and administrative laws 
and judiciary system. Consequently, the ICSID aimed to provide equal treatment to 
home state investors regardless of where their investments are located. Under this 
similar treatment abroad, investors are more certain, reducing risks and encouraging 
further flows of FDI197. 
II.F.5 Other protections 
Other protections include freedom of profit repatriation and capital transfer198. In 
terms of currency transfers, US BITs clearly prescribe foreign investors’ rights to 
transfer investment-related funds from host states without delay. These currency 
protections are extended a step further guaranteeing US investors the full entitle-
ment to convert their investment funds using market exchange rates, to assure a 
swift transfer in or out199. 
With regard to the freedom of capital transfer, modern BITs preserve the same 
standpoint using similar provisions to those present in the Japan-Korea BIT. Under 
this treaty, all financial transfers must be transacted freely without any interventions 
from contracting parties delaying their processing. Transfers are broadly defined to 
include initial capital, payments, proceeds and dividends. The same treaty excep-
tionally permitted contracting states to delay or prevent a transfer if related to its 
application of internal laws governing bankruptcy, insolvency, the issuance and 
trade of securities, criminal offences or judicial rulings and decisions. However, this 
action has to be equitable, non-discriminatory and enforced in good faith. Modern 
BIT models entitle states to delay transfers when suffering balance of payment cri-
ses and shortages of foreign currency200. 
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Ginsburg criticised this protection before its modernisation since it constituted an 
additional pressure for developing countries, especially those experiencing foreign 
currency difficulties. Ginsburg appeared to criticise developed countries’ insistence 
to include such articles in treaties ex ante and not later based on subsequent negoti-
ation201. 
II.F.6 US BITs Extended Special Protection 
US BITs preserved a unique position by presenting three sets of rights under an 
umbrella clause, full protection and security and pre-establishment rights. First, to 
begin with umbrella clause, BITs have utilised different wording to determine the 
scope of the treaty obligations on its contracting parties. A set of BITs have limited 
parties’ liability and access to international arbitration only to non-compliance with 
BIT clauses. In other cases, the jurisdiction scope was extended to encompass all 
investors and states under in any contractual agreements in connection with a for-
eign investment202. Therefore, the wording in the second case tends to be more ge-
neric covering any disputes arising in relation to investments. This extended in-
vestment protection is known as an umbrella clause, and covers all contractual 
agreements concluded between host states and foreign investors203. The umbrella 
clause counts any violation or prejudice to an investor’s contractual obligation as a 
breach of the treaty itself. In other words, it raises contract violations to the level of 
treaty breaches, thus entitling investors to file claims in arbitration tribunals similar 
to a regular BIT violation204. 
Second, the full protection and security standard aims to secure (i) foreign invest-
ments physically, against any destruction or damage perpetrated by the host state 
through assaults by military, police or NGOs, and (ii) civilians at times of public up-
risings205. The US recently rephrased its BIT models to include “full protection and se-
curity” accompanied by FET, granting foreign investors additional protection against 
the spread of creeping expropriations. The ICSID adopted these terms in a manner 
inclined towards investors rather than states206.  
Third and last, the recently appearing protection in BITs and FTAs are pre-
establishment rights. Under this protection, US investors are entitled to access eco-
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nomic sectors formerly reserved for other foreign investors207. The US targeting the 
extension of its free trade networks has encouraged developing countries to engage 
in FTAs and BITs. Often, developing countries establish restrictions and limitations 
upon foreign investments competition in governmentally monopolised sectors. 
Therefore, the pre-establishment rights guarantee US investors preferential treat-
ment in accessing markets that were formerly monopolised and controlled by the 
government and where foreign investors were prohibited from entering208. 
With regard to performance requirements, Ginsburg tackled the issue of preventing, 
in BITs, host states from setting performance requirements on foreign entities op-
erating in the market subject to BIT protection209. The US and Canadian model suc-
cessfully transposed this prohibition on performance requirements by introducing 
exceptions permitting contracting states to ensure foreign investors’ compliance 
with public health and safety protection for humans, animals and plant life together 
with conserving natural resources. A clear example of this is Article 1106 of 
NAFTA, which preventing contracting parties from setting requirements concern-
ing exportation targets, local content, technology transfer, and limitation of imports 
to a specified share of exports. However, the clause does not prevent private parties 
from mutually agreeing upon the setting of internal performance requirements since 
the state was not involved in encouraging this arrangement210. Immunity against 
performance requirements was criticised for favouring investors over developing 
countries. As an example, technology transfer provisions to developing countries 
help in fostering their growth and development; however, such treaty articles pre-
clude this transfer. 
The importance of the above introduction of the substantive protections underlying 
any BIT is to familiarise the reader with the expected points of discussion within 
chapter IV of the three countries that will follow. The above protections are 
deemed the bases of the international investment law. In chapter IV, the framework 
regulating investments of the countries studied will be assessed against the above-
introduced benchmarks. 
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II.G Conclusion 
This intent of presenting the above theoretical framework is to provide insight into 
the subject matters that will be addressed in this paper. The primary goal in defining 
FDI is to differentiate it from indirect foreign investment (i.e., hot money invest-
ments in different kinds of securities), where the latter falls outside the scope of this 
paper. In other words, the notion of FDI used throughout this paper only refers to 
direct investment flows. 
Section C above sought to provide a base for the research laid out below in the 
chapter III. This chapter sheds light on the spread of expropriation during the 
1950s and 1960s in the three countries studied, when expropriation was worldwide 
due to lack of protection to foreign investors. Additionally, the 1980s debt crisis will 
be also discussed highlighting the initiative of the three countries to liberalise their 
economies.  
The economics of engaging in BITs was addressed in order to understand policy-
makers’ economic motivations when engaging in BITs. These incentives include the 
stimulation of investment, building economic relations between developed and less 
developed economies, supporting less developed economies to reform their legisla-
tions and adopt market-oriented policies, the provision of standardised legal treat-
ment and protection for wealthy host state investors in other developing countries. 
Section E is fundamental to the theoretical framework guiding the thesis, tracing a 
connection between international investment law and law and economics. 
Lastly, section F paves the way for assessing the domestic investment legislations 
promulgated in the three countries studied in light of their standard international 
obligations under BITs. 
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III. Economic History 
III.A Introduction 
Chapter III intends to provide an overview for the economic and political incidents 
that framed the background of the three countries. This background familiarizes the 
reader with the social and political context prevailing at the times of promulgating 
such legislations a set of the current legislations are still applicable. Prior to as-
sessing the legal frameworks of the country studies, it is beneficial to review their 
historical context. This assists in understanding the mind sets of policy-makers 
when promulgating the currently enacted legislations. Moreover, it allows the reader 
to witness the reasons behind the development in the legal framework for example 
the shift from being a restricted, state run and highly regulated economy to an 
opened, liberal and investors friendly one, which will be more evident in chapter IV 
below. Also, this background will help in further highlighting the similarities be-
tween the three countries studies, which solidifies the bases of their choice as previ-
ously introduced in sub-section 1.F.5 above. 
The chapter focuses mainly on the state’s role in economic activity. It features the 
development in the state’s role throughout the different historical phases. It pro-
vides a geo-political perspective since the impact of the political formation in the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is inevitable. Furthermore, the chap-
ter provides a narrative for the state’s activity as an evidence for the development of 
the economic freedom indicator as calculated by the Fraser Institute. Finally, the 
chapter intends to provide an insight for the main macroeconomic indicators from 
the 1950s until the late 1990s, which will be beneficial for the analysis of chapter VI 
below. 
III.B Egypt Economic History 
III.B.1 Introduction 
The discussion of the three periods will initially address the Egyptian history from 
an economic perspective, with slight reference to both the social and political con-
texts. The chapter will reference the prevailing economic conditions resulting from 
the policy-makers’ adoption of the periodic economic orientation. The primary fo-
cus within this chapter will be the development experienced in the role of the Egyp-
tian Government (GOE) and the levels of restrictions and regulations imposed up-
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on economic activity. Furthermore, the analysis shall contain the effect of the inter-
national and regional developments on the Egyptian economy. This attempt to un-
dertake an in-depth analysis of the Egyptian economic history will facilitate the pro-
cess of noticing the shared and differentiated features with the other country studies 
meaning Morocco and Jordan. 
There are four aims for revisiting the fifty years’ economic performance of Egypt. 
First, investigating the Egyptian economic history obviously highlights the similari-
ties between the three country studies in their path of economic development. 
Stressing these similarities is necessary to justify the choice of these three country 
studies specifically in the first place. Second, the historical review will assist the 
reader to understand the background of the policy-making process in Egypt. For 
example, referring to the socialist oriented era during the 1960s assists in reasoning 
to extent the current protectionist investment policies witnessed there. Further-
more, it tackles the reforms executed over a long time and their positive and nega-
tive impacts in each country study. This policy assessment takes the discussion back 
again to the first aim of the historical chapters and tracing of country studies’ simi-
larities.  
Thirdly, the economic history development allows shedding light on the degree of 
governmental intervention and influence over the Egyptian economy’s activity. The 
progress from a big government to a relatively small one has a significant effect up-
on the legal and economic freedom analysis required for the second and third chap-
ters. The chapter focuses on the shift from a restricted regulated public sector based 
economy to a liberalized, less regulated and private based economy. Fourthly, the 
historical chapters postulate the economic status prevailing throughout the last fifty 
years. Accordingly, the final outcome would be considered the base from which 
chapter VI is starting. In other words, the historical chapters analyse Egypt’s until 
the late 1990s, when Egypt introduced its domestic investment legislation. 
The historical period under examination begins since post-independence years in 
1950s until the late 1990s and early 2000s. The Egyptian economic history chapter 
will be split into three periods. This categorization shall assist in paving the way to 
feature the main similarities and differences in policies executed between the three 
country studies. The first period will be the post-colonial and independence period 
characterized by concentration on the nation building process and promotion of na-
tional identities. Thus, the national identity incentive drove the newly born states’ 
policy-makers to adopt policies in line with the above-mentioned goals of national 
  61  
identity and nation building. This period commenced from the mid-1950s and ex-
tended until mid or late 1970s. 
The second period elapsed from the 1970s to 1980s. It was characterized with a 
slump in minerals prices and degraded foreign support aggravating domestic finan-
cials and in turn accumulating foreign debts. The thesis will approach this period 
recognizing the outcomes of the two above mentioned impacts on Egypt’s budgets 
and debts. The third and last period covers the 1990s until the early 2000s. This pe-
riod evidenced the post-crisis effects and how the policies implemented to mitigate 
the crisis impacted Egypt. Hence, the third period will be necessary to proceed fur-
ther within the econometric modelling chapter, which fully concentrates on the 
economic assessment of Egypt’s rates of economic freedom. 
III.B.2 Independence and State Intervention (1952 – 1970s) 
The first period under examination focuses on the political changes and their eco-
nomic impact on the interaction of the economic stakeholders in Egypt. It examines 
the establishment of the modern state of Egypt at its current borders. This entails 
check the initial role of the GOE and what motivations encouraged it to intervene 
significantly in the economy’s activity.  
All started with the Free Officers movement overthrowing the King in July 1952 
marked a turning point in Egypt’s history211. As per the Officers, the monarchical 
corruption and the failure to conclude the British occupation lasting since 1882212 
were the drivers of the movement. When the Free Officers seized power, they had 
no specific understanding for ruling and controlling Egypt. The primary aim shap-
ing their economic policies was terminating the former regime’s control comprised 
mainly of financial capitalists and large sized land owners213. In 1952, the Egyptian 
bourgeoisie controlled the economy through natural monopolies and ties with for-
eigners along with large scale land-owners214. The new regime inherited a primitive 
economy dependent on agriculture and exportation of primary commodities, prin-
cipally cotton215. The GOE’s represented only 13 per cent of the GDP. This share 
was limited to providing social services and developing a sound irrigation system216.  
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The Free Officers conserved a pro-capitalist orientation and engaged in consulta-
tions with the private sector representatives such as the Federation of Egyptian In-
dustries217. The private sector demanded a protectionist trade policy. The new re-
gime accepted the request and imposed higher tariffs on imported final goods218. 
Moreover, the imports of capital goods and raw material were subject to lower tar-
iffs. This allowed the spill over of know-how to the Egyptian industries. The GOE 
announced its intention to invest only in heavy industries enabling the private sector 
to lead all other manufacturing sectors. Attempts to promote the GOE private sec-
tor partnership are traced in reduced profits and dividends undistributed taxes219. 
Other legislative changes included the Law No. 120 of 1952220 abolishing the 51 per 
cent Egyptian majority requirement. In addition to promulgating the Law No. 26 of 
1954221, entitled foreigners to own 100 per cent of newly established businesses222. 
The Free Officers sole move against private ownership was demonstrated in the in-
troduction of the Land Reform Law No. 178 of 1952223. In September 1952 and for 
political purposes of strengthening the new regime’s position, the Land Reform 
Law was promulgated limiting an individual’s ownership to a maximum of 200 fed-
dans224. This agrarian reform was backed by launching agricultural cooperatives to 
systemize and instruct farmers plus providing necessary inputs and marketing. 
Therefore, these cooperatives represented a mean of indirect governmental control 
of agricultural activity225. Accordingly, imperialists and feudalists hegemony during 
the monarchy rule was ceased. The new regime redistributed large scale lands 
owned by monarchy supporters among farmers in small sized holdings226. 
The turning point paving the way for the GOE wide intervention in economic ac-
tivity was linked to the plans of funding the Aswan High Dam project227. The GOE 
rejected the conditional funding offered by the UK and US governments as well as 
the World Bank. The conditions raised concerns the funding shall be completed on-
ly upon the settlement the Arab – Israeli dispute and probably under unfavourable 
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terms228. Hence, the Egyptian disapproval forced the US and UK to withdraw their 
financial offer followed by the World Bank229. This justified President Nasser’s dec-
laration on July 26 1956 of nationalizing the Suez Canal230. The declaration trans-
ferred the Canal’s full control to Egyptian hands who were determined to success-
fully handle the Canal’s operation231. The nationalization was the green light for the 
1956 tripartite invasion232.  
The nationalization of Suez Canal and the subsequent war turned the regime against 
foreign ownership. The new GOE’s economic policy was engineered upon two pil-
lars. First, the Egyptian private sector maintained its welcomed position. The first 
post-revolution Constitution of 1956233 explicitly confirmed this setting ideological 
context in which the private sector may operate. Second, the initiation of the Eco-
nomic Organization in 1957234 to effectively control the recently confiscated French 
and British private businesses after the aggression235. These private entities were 
mostly involved in banking and insurance industries improving the GOE access to 
credit236. By 1958, the Economic Organization’s accounted for half of commercial 
banks loans as well as 68 per cent of insurance transactions237. 
Thirdly and finally, the creation of the National Planning Committee in 1957 
marked the peak of GOE intervention in economic activity. The new body respon-
sible for setting the five-year industrial plans, highlighted the newly adopted eco-
nomic policy focused on the public sector238. The public sectors gross investments 
hiked from 28 to 74 per cent between 1952 and 1960. This trend continued 
throughout the 1960s and by 1973 the public sector accounted for 90 per cent of 
investments and managed nearly 63 – 70 per cent of resources239. Funds were di-
rected to the public sector since it became the only solution to reach the targeted 
growth rates. By 1960, the public ownership of most economic sectors as banking, 
insurance, construction, transportation together with wholesale trade defined the 
GOE as the sole market player240.  
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In the first five-years economic plan 1960-61, and the second wave of nationaliza-
tions known as the “Socialist Revolution”241. It targeted the Egyptian owned private 
sector. It nationalized 44 companies engaged in different industrial sectors as ce-
ment, copper and electricity, half of share capital in 86 companies operating in 
commercial activities was expropriated242. The GOE size remained growing and the 
private sector flexibility was evident only in rural, real estate and the informal econ-
omy243. Moreover, this flexibility was never freely practiced since their activity was 
always moderated and subject to margins fixation and restrictions as in the rent con-
trols244. 
The nationalizations were justified upon the private sector’s failure to lead the eco-
nomic activity. Furthermore, such policy represented a Third World states trend245. 
The import substitution plan implemented during the first five-year plan 1960-65246 
resulted in an unprecedented industrial growth of 9 per cent annually, fostering 
GDP growth to record 4.5 per cent annually247. Industry growth qualified manufac-
turing activities to constitute 19 per cent of GDP. Although an import substitution 
plan was in place, the importation bill in 1965-66 accumulated principally due to 
capital and intermediate goods imported covering 24 and 38 per cent of imports re-
spectively248. 
The National Charter of June 1962 stipulated “Arab Socialism” as the state’s ideolo-
gy249. The National Charter radical socialist pillars included; first, the public owner-
ship of economic infrastructure including industrial, banking, insurance and mining 
activities250. Second, public sector’s full responsibility and control over importation 
as well as 75 per cent of exports. Third, the implementation of rent controls, land 
reform and taxation legislations to prevent any exploitative behaviours by private 
owners. Finally, the state’s obligation in providing the basic social welfare rights in-
cluding healthcare, education, social security along with minimum wages251. 
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The above socialist evidences of the regime were accompanied by introduction of 
extensive price controls and subsidies252. With the socialist shift, the notions of in-
come distribution and social justice were prioritized. The GOE expanded its budg-
etary expenditure increasing educational spending from 3 to nearly 5 per cent within 
the period from 1953 to 1970253. Health expenditure nearly quadrupled from 0.5 per 
cent in 1953 to around 1.9 by 1975. The recorded GDP growth 1952 to 1974 al-
lowed a GDP per capita rise of more than 1 per cent on annual basis254. The GOE 
guaranteed employment generally and specifically tertiary schooling graduates. In 
consequence, public sector employees swelled from 325,000 in 1952 to 1.035 mil-
lion by 1966-67. However, this burdensome economic performance did not last es-
pecially after considering the continuous militarized conflicts with Israel on top of 
them the defeat in June 1967255. 
The expansion in GOE spending on social services and military spending pressured 
the state’s finances. The 1960s featured continuous budget deficits forcing the 
GOE to reduce its public investments from 1964 to 1968256. The 1960s marked a 
stagnant increase in domestic investments. Exceptionally, Helwan Steel complex257 
and the High Dam were the megaprojects, where lump sum amounts of domestic 
investments were allocated258. In the meantime, military spending maintained its 
wide share and even increased from 27 to 35 of published expenditures.  
On the foreign currency side, the accumulated British sterling from the World War 
II were depleted and foreign debt requests were inevitable. The westernized finan-
cial institutions suspended any funding and the United States inconsistent financial 
support was terminated by June 1966 worsening the situation more. The 1967 six-
day war defeat worsened the foreign currency threats. The economic losses of the 
six-day war defeat in June 1967 were remarkable. First, the costs of attrition war 
against Israel in an attempt to consume exert pressures on the way of military re-
building. Second, was closing the Suez Canal due to hostilities after the Sinai inva-
sion foregoing a lump sum amount of revenues. Finally, Israel’s accession of Sinai 
dawdled Egypt’s petroleum proceeds259. The only option was the return to the im-
port restrictions as of 1966. These reduced imports in one year by nearly 20 per 
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cent and by 17 per cent in the six months following the defeat260. The socialist ide-
ology discouraged the inflow of foreign capital and precluded exportation of Egyp-
tian input material was dismissed261. Regardless of the socialist ideology in place, the 
US preserved its aim program providing the necessary wheat, the GOE could not 
afford due to the foreign currency imbalances262.  
By the turn of the 1970s, the GOE was pursuing two contradicting policies. First, 
was a developmental plan aiming to extend accessibility and availability of social 
services. The higher investments required presence of savings as a pre-requisite263. 
The second policy promoted consumption through offering public employment 
and raising wages. The policies conflicted due to the obvious lack of resources, the 
absence of foreign inflows and the mounting military spending. Throughout the 
1960s and early 1970s, the GOE was involved in conducts affecting its survival and 
continuity. These conducts included continuous militarized conflicts with Israel264, 
participation in Yemeni War265, backing anti-colonial moves in Africa266 plus pro-
voking Western governments and international funding institutions. 
The economic history of Egypt since independence signals the limited role of the 
GOE at the first years of its governance and was limited to the Land Reform Law. 
Conversely, the political updates connected to the High Dam project triggered the 
regime’s hostile interaction with the private sector directly after the tripartite aggres-
sion and followed by the socialist revolution of 1961. The features associated with 
the policy shift include; the central economic planning through five years’ economic 
plans, the public-sector expansion and hegemony, the introduction of subsidies, 
prices and housing rent controls. 
(A) October War and the shift to the Private Sector  
The Sadat rise to power in 1970 and even prior to October War marked a less-
socialist policy. The new president grasped the ambitious policies humiliating the 
economy’s performance could not last forever267. The military spending maintained 
its leading share in governmental spending. This started to change only after the 
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Kippur War and specifically in 1974. President Sadat viewed the private sector and 
foreign investments specifically Arab ones as the new engines of Egypt’s potential 
economic prosperity268. This was translated into October Paper of 1974, formally 
highlighting the public and private sectors’ roles269. 
The post-1973 war period offered the private sector an opportunity to foster its ac-
tivities widening its share in total output270. The new economic policy focused on 
facilitating the investment climate through promulgating Law No. 43 of 1974271 of-
fering tax holidays, several importation and exportation licenses besides an exemp-
tion from burdensome labour laws272. The Law introduced two regimes of invest-
ments, the first applicable in Free Zones (Port Said), where no local partners were 
necessary for incorporation and tax exemptions were indefinite. The second regime 
enforced for inland businesses, where a local investor is necessary to establish a 
partnership273. The new policy proved success by lifting the economy’s average 
growth rates to 9 per cent annually for the 1970s274. The sustained growth resulted 
from; the oil boom of the 1970s, the restoration of Sinai oil fields after the war, the 
reopening of Suez Canal and finally the remittances inflow of Egyptians employed 
in oil-rich Gulf states275. 
Under the unprecedented rates of budget deficit, the GOE referred to domestic and 
foreign money markets for borrowings. These attempts jointly were successful in 
funding 60 per cent of the deficit. Besides social security and pension funds bor-
rowings, the monetary policy was utilized to cover part of the deficit. The money 
supply in 1974 rose by nearly 29 per cent compared to a real boom in output of on-
ly 4 per cent, which created harsh inflationary burdens276. On the wages side, rises 
were planned to meet prices acceleration. Regardless of productivity, employees re-
ceived higher wages covering rise in living costs. However, the pay rises were not 
sufficient to equalize real wage increases with inflation rates277.  
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The GOE shared the flourishing results with lower income classes through boost-
ing subsidies and preserving Nasser’s policy of public sector employment278. In 
1974, the budget deficit added 6 per cent to 1973’s rate totalling to 17 per cent of 
the nominal GNP279. Expenditures in 1974 increased by 28 per cent compared to 
only 12 per cent rise in the same year’s receipts. On the revenue side, the drop had 
two justifications. First, the widening in tax base due to the population growth or 
the property expansion did not result in a proportionate rise in the tax proceeds. 
Secondly, the public-sector enterprises transferred profits to the GOE budget sig-
nificantly deteriorated due to price fixations and inefficient investment mismanage-
ment280. 
The balance of payment deficiency began from the 1970s. This decade signalled the 
growth in consumer goods importation281. A significant rise in international com-
modities markets and specifically foodstuffs amplified importation total cost. Addi-
tionally, an overvalued exchange rate was maintained to satisfy an economically na-
tionalist population throughout the 1960s. Hence, domestically produced were sig-
nificantly affected by a demand reduction later transferred to domestic less competi-
tive industry282. In consequence, 1970 – 1975 period recorded an average growth of 
consumer goods importation at 9.7 per cent in real terms283.  
This was criticized by both import substitution supporters accompanied by market 
oriented promoters. For Nasserists, growing consumption totally opposed ideolo-
gies of central planning and production quotas. Infitah was blamed for abolishing 
any sense of austerity prevailing under Nasser’s economic nationalism beliefs284. For 
the market oriented supporters, consumption represented an inefficient use of re-
sources instead of directing them to more macro economically rewarding activities 
as savings and investments285. For intermediate goods, the same period recorded an 
average increase in real terms though at a lower rate of only 7.5 per cent. The re-
markable feature in the 1970 – 1975 importation trend was in the average rise in 
capital goods imports to arrive at 21 per cent. Machinery imports proliferated by 60 
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per cent from 1973 to 1974. In the meantime, input metals imports hiked by 150 
per cent286.  
On exportation side, Western demand on Egyptian products plunged worsening the 
trade gap. The commodities trade gap recorded a $1.75 billion in 1974 and nearly 
$2.5 billion in 1975. Arabs financial assistance grants in 1974 reached $1.2 billion287. 
Moreover, the US aid of nearly $1 billion assisted in narrowing the trade deficit and 
fostering importation288. However, this financial assistance was not sufficient to 
cover the balance of payments gap289. Hence, additional $510 million were attained 
from short term borrowings. These debts becoming mature shortly, besides the in-
sufficiency of export proceeds, the projected Arabian aid, the balance of payments 
deterioration was inevitably pushing the economy into deep crisis290.  
These pressures were relieved only by 1976-77, when Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar 
and Abu Dhabi decided to intervene reimbursing the short-term debts and backing 
the importation of intermediate goods291. The GOE depended primarily on short 
term credit to fund its expenditure. Therefore, mounting debts falling due shortly 
reaching 100 per cent of GDP in 1981 and a remarkable trade deficit due to a four-
fold of wheat imports between 1973 and 1976, both resulted in a severe balance of 
payments crisis292. 
The Open Door policy of 1977 demonstrated closer ties between the GOE and the 
international and regional financial institutions including the IMF, World Bank and 
the Kuwaiti Development Fund. These institutions were concerned of the GOE ir-
rational planning strategies and increasing external debt293. Pressures mounted with 
the inefficiencies of the GOE unnecessary bureaucracy and its implications on the 
utilization and usage of available resources294. President Sadat approached the IMF 
and the World Bank for financial support295. The support was conditional upon cut-
ting food subsidies. This condition was applied by January 1977, erupting the “bread 
riots”296 of the 18th and 19th of January against such price hikes. Against these masses, 
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the regime was under obligation to relief and slowly reform the economy rather 
than undertaking sudden critical moves297. 
An important problematic characteristic of the economy was precedent in the large 
unskilled, high pressuring labour force seeking public sector employment opportu-
nities. The 1970s promotion of migration to the Gulf oil monarchies assisted eco-
nomically in moderating such heightening employment pressures offering an inflow 
of foreign currency remittances298. Data available for Egyptian migrants in 1965 
show a total number of nearly 100,000 Egyptians. In more than a ten-year period 
and based on 1976’s census, Egyptians abroad recorded a 1.4 million299. The 1970s-
migration drift did not differentiate in the labour skills’. Professionals along with 
construction workers had employment opportunities in the other Arab countries300. 
After the October War, President Sadat interested in changing the lifestyle of the 
population, the door was opened widely for the private sector to the lead the eco-
nomic scene. Legislations were pertaining incentives and facilitation for investment, 
the GOE referred to financial institutions to fund its growing budget and trade def-
icits. The was accompanied with a rise in the importation costs and a plunge in ex-
ports. This paved the way to the second period under investigation. 
III.B.3 Debt Crisis and Conclusion of Structural Adjustment Programs 
(1980s – 1990s) 
The second period under investigation focuses on the outcomes of the GOE ex-
pansion in economic activity. The success of these policies was conditioned upon 
meeting a set of conditions. Non-compliance with these conditions, pushed the 
GOE into the accumulation of foreign debt and the necessity of applying for finan-
cial assistance from the international financial institutions. 
(A) Mubarak rise to power and accumulation of debt  
Mubarak accession of power in 1981 did not mark any changes in policy orienta-
tion301. Mubarak conserved Sadat’s policies of gradual openness and global integra-
tion302. Mubarak managed to reign the maximum benefits from two rentier posi-
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tions. First, is the economic rent and this is linked to international oil pricing and 
remittances inflows from migrants employed in oil rich Gulf states303. The oil re-
ceipts permitted the GOE to expand its public spending ranking Egypt the second 
public spending state in MENA region304. The sharp fall in oil prices precedent in 
1986 commanded the GOE to launch its third policy shift focused on austerity es-
pecially with its notable budget deficit305. The second rent was a strategic one, since 
the GOE benefited from its political position in the Middle East in order to pro-
mote the US regional policies. This guaranteed the GOE the backing of the US ad-
ministration even with the international financial institutions influenced by the US 
as the IMF306.  
To understand the Egyptian economic situation during the 1980s, it is important to 
review the three deficits recorded in the investment/savings balance, trade balance 
and the GOE budget. To begin with the investment savings balance, savings origi-
nated from public or private sources. The public sources were negatively affected by 
the collapse in the oil proceeds with the eruption of the Iran-Iraq War307. In addi-
tion, public sector enterprises composed of 391 entities and employing 1.2 million 
workers constituted only 20 per cent of GDP with a return on investments of only 
1.5 per cent308. On the private sources level, the banking system offered negative re-
al interest rates that did not stimulate the official savings. However, the banking sys-
tem was not appealing for depositors who preferred unofficial channels to maintain 
their funds, thus lowering the overall public savings309.  
The second experienced deficit is the trade one. In the 1980s, exports recorded a 
sluggish performance for several reasons. First, the collapse in oil proceeds from 
$2.9 billion to $1.36 in a four-year period starting 1983 until 1987. In 1986, over-
supply of oil and the slack demand reduced the oil prices further forcing the GOE 
to cut its production310. Another trade deficit crucial variable change was the popu-
lation growth in absence of the necessary agricultural expansion especially in wheat 
cultivation to cover the growing needs311. Hence, the food importation bill wors-
ened the deficit312. 
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On the exportation side, cotton exports in 1990s deteriorated to a to only a third of 
the early 1980s exports, which were already 50 per cent below 1974’s exportation 
rates313. Exceptionally, the textiles exports performed and it constituted 60 per cent 
of the exports components. Conversely, these industries were highly subsidized and 
supported by the GOE. Moreover, in 1987, the Egyptian Pound (EGP) appreciated 
by around 60 per cent compared to its value in 1970, further pressuring the export 
rates314. With such aggravated performance of exports, the GOE failed to cover its 
trade deficit unless introducing through trade restrictive measures315. The re-
strictions were of a limited scope since two thirds of Egypt’s imports were of capital 
and intermediate goods. The World Bank data proved the decline in imports to its 
lowest in 1987, when it recorded $10.63 with a 17 per cent decrease in only one 
year316.  
Conversely, the two other pillars limiting the current account’s gap where tourism 
and remittances. Tourism performed positively throughout the 1980s accumulating 
annual proceeds of $2 billion317. For remittances, the official inflow went from $123 
million in 1972 to $3.74 billion by 1989. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait deeply sev-
ered the Egyptian economy forgoing nearly $3.5 billion in declining tourism and 
trade flows through Suez Canal318. Furthermore, it forced the return of around 1 
million Egyptians employed in the Gulf adding further pressures on the Egyptian 
labour market319. All reasons justified a current account deficit of 8 per cent by 
1989. The GOE responded with currency devaluations in a three-years period from 
1987 until 1991, seeking the enhancement of the economy’s competitiveness320. The 
devaluation was principally in compliance to Western pressures and International 
Financial Institutions recommendations. 
Egypt reverted to international markets and succeeded to receipt $3 billion of annu-
al assistance and mostly in loans. The sustained twin deficits urged the GOE to ex-
tend its borrowing321. According to the World Bank data, foreign debt surged from 
$2 to $21 and $50 billion in the years 1970, 1980 and 1990 respectively. Based on 
free exchange rates, the Egyptian owing debt totalled to 150 per cent of GNP, rank-
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ing Egypt the first among indebted economies322. The debt borrowed at burden-
some conditions raised the servicing expenditure from 26.2 to 42.4 per cent be-
tween 1982 and 1987323.  
In turn, this introduces the third deficit, the GOE budget. Public expenditure rec-
orded a 61 per cent of GDP and compared to revenues of only 40 per cent in 1980. 
This reflected a 20 per cent of GDP budget deficit324. Under such pressures, the 
deficit was reduced to 16.3 per cent of GDP in 1989. In 1982, expenditure consti-
tuted 63.5 per cent of GDP, while revenues were only 40 per cent. By 1988, both 
rates decreased to 41.4 and 25.1 per cent of GDP325. The high rates of deficit re-
quired excessive borrowing beside the foreign one. The prevalent deficit fuelled an 
expansionary monetary policy that added 18 per cent of liquidity annually. An ex-
pected outcome was a surge in inflation to reach 20 per cent and in fact it recorded 
25 per cent in 1991326. The unsustainable deficits urged the GOE to approach its 
Paris Club creditors and the IMF327. 
The critical situation compelled the GOE to apply a set of austerity measures328. 
The cornerstones of the budget expenditure comprising 80 per cent were public 
sector salaries, subsidies, military and servicing public debt. The earlier two divisions 
offered the GOE a wider flexibility to cut its spending when compared to the latter 
ones329. Starting with the public-sector wage bill, the GOE did not severely use lay-
offs, instead it suspended wage rises and new hiring. This policy successfully re-
duced wage expenditures, since the public-sector employees in 1988 were earning 
only 55 per cent of their 1973 earnings330. However, the downside was the demoral-
ization of the public-sector employees who were responsible for over 50 per cent of 
the GDP331.  
Moving to the second division concerning subsidies, the situation was more com-
plex. Subsidies consisted of explicit and implicit ones. The first – mainly represent-
ed in food subsidies – were managed and controlled decreasing from over 10 per 
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cent to nearly 5 per cent throughout the 1980s332. On the implicit subsidies side, the 
first was evident in the overvalued exchange rate and its impact when valuing im-
ports. By 1988, these implicit subsidies recorded 14 per cent of GDP333. Second, in 
case of implicit subsidies created from selling domestically produced oil at lower 
than international prices. This favoured the capital-intensive industries over the la-
bour-intensive ones, and lowering the job creation rates. For scholars, the implicit 
subsidies remained around 20 per cent of the total subsidies throughout the 
1980s334. 
(B) Egypt’s formal referral to the IMF’s assistance  
With the triple deficits and benefiting from the US administration support, the 
GOE moved towards the IMF and World Bank seeking financial assistance packag-
es. A kick-start agreement concluded in 1987335, followed by several others urged 
the GOE to reduce its deficit through further subsidies reductions, cutting public 
spending and launching of a public-sector privatization program336. However, the 
GOE did not fulfil its reform obligations under the 1987 agreement. It exerted 
pressures on the US, benefiting from the strategic rent and seeking an engagement 
in a more lenient debt arrangement337. The second attempt of reform engaging in 
the IMF support programs was more successful. As always, the region’s politics as-
sisted in the successful conclusion of the second IMF funding program. In 1991, 
after the GOE position favouring the coalition liberating Kuwait from the Iraqi in-
vasion, it concluded several debt-relief arrangements. In addition, an increased co-
ordination between the Paris creditors’ clubs and international funding institutions 
prevailed338.  
The main obstacles hindering the implementation of the IMF structural changes to 
the second attempt were two. The first obstacle was the stronghold of the negative-
ly affected interest groups. The conditioned funding indicated a smaller share of the 
economy is controlled by the GOE. This is compared to a 50 per cent of the GDP 
before agreeing upon the funding program339. The ministers, GOE officials and 
public-sector administrations defended their grip over the economy, slowing the 
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privatization process in the 1990s340. The second group resisting openness was the 
private sector computing profits from the corruption opportunities arising from a 
large inefficient government. The second obstacle was public disorders and civil un-
rest. The IMF-program negatively affected the Egyptians’ incomes, subjecting them 
to additional poverty burdens especially with low rates of job creation341. Other jus-
tifications for reform postponement relate it to Eastern Bloc collapse strengthening 
the regime’s liberal decision makers turning reforms more appealing342.  
As forecasted, the IMF-program deepened poverty through cutting the public 
spending as well as the food subsidies. Based on the data published during the pro-
gram’s enforcement, the poverty rates ranged between 20 and 25 per cent343. Other 
medium term challenges developed and were mostly associated with the job crea-
tion rates. First, the projected boom in labour force in the 1990s due to the popula-
tion growth of around 2.8 per cent during 1980s. Estimates of needed jobs covering 
new entrants were nearly 6 million jobs344.  
Second, attempts to slash unemployment below the 1980s average of 10 per cent, 
required setting job creation estimates of 9 million jobs. At first, the labour migra-
tion to the Gulf dried the Egyptian labour market, raising the relative pricing of la-
bour to capital345. However, the return of nearly all the Egyptian in Iraq and Kuwait 
after the Iraqi invasion deepened the unemployment crisis346. The fourth and last 
challenge was linked to the nature of unemployed labour force. The tripling of uni-
versity graduates from 1975 to 1985 was reflected in higher unemployment or less 
quality jobs347. This appeared after the GOE’s failure to fulfil its promises of civil 
service employment due to the widening budget deficit348. 
The slump in oil prices during the 1980s, the decline in Egyptian migrants’ remit-
tances together with the large government, lack of fiscal discipline and the overval-
ued currency resulted in triple deficits. The unsustainable economic conditions of 
the GOE necessitated the formal application for financial assistance from the IMF. 
The GOE hesitation to comply with the borrowing conditionality was overcame 
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only when the terms were more flexible after Egypt’s participation in the Gulf war 
international coalition. 
III.B.4 Economic Openness and Market Deregulation (1990s – 2000s) 
The third period under examination is aligned with the economy’s status in the 
post-IMF program. The section intends specifically to address the impacts of the 
IMF SAP on five of the Egyptian economy’s pillars including; the public sector, the 
investment deregulation process, the exchange rate reform, the budget deficit con-
trol and the free market forces interaction. 
(A) IMF Structural Adjustment effects 
The effects of the IMF Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) were more obvious 
throughout the 1990s. The Egyptian SAP program implementation is split into 
three phases. The first elapsed from 1991 to 1998 and represented the start of the 
stabilization process349. In this phase, GOE adhered strictly to the IMF’s SAPs con-
cluded in both 1991350 and 1993351. This boosted confidence in the economy reflect-
ing the political will to comply with the economic conditions. In October 1996, the 
GOE seeking an economic stimulation referred to the IMF to conclude a new 
stand-by agreement. The arrangement centre-focused on encouraging a sustainable 
economic growth embracing unemployed, reducing inflation along with accumulat-
ing foreign reserves352. The second phase started from 1998 and ended by 2004. It 
was characterized with targeting further openness and institutionalization. The third 
period started in 2004 onwards. It was centre-focused on validating the openness 
benefits through adopting a set of neoliberal policies353.  
The first phase witnessed the liberalization of interest rates in January 1991354. In 
addition, the initiation of primary and secondary exchange rates before the full uni-
fication355. In fact, these were initial bona fide steps prior to agreeing on the eco-
nomic stabilization and SAPs with both the IMF and World Bank in May and No-
vember of 1991356. Under the slogans of transforming the Egyptian economy to a 
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market oriented one and restoring Egypt’s creditworthiness, the new IMF program 
Economic Restructuring and Structural Adjustment Plan (ERSAP) attended six pil-
lars. These included; privatization, abolishing price controls and subsidies, liberaliz-
ing trade together with macroeconomic stabilization357.  
Firstly, the public sector, its restructuring was executed through two policies han-
dled in parallel. The first set of policies concentrated on enhancing the public-
sector’s efficiency, decentralizing its management and eliminating all the legal and 
institutional privileges guaranteeing a preferential treatment over the private sec-
tor358. The second set was based on the privatization program launched in 1991359. 
Under this plan implemented principally between 1993 and 2003, the government 
alienated 197 public entities360. The disposed entities constituted one sixth of its 
owned enterprises net worth. By 1996, the GOE had privatized its shareholding 
ownership fully or partially in 46 companies361. The privatization program devel-
oped revenues of $1.2 billion until 1996362. It is important to mention the aliena-
tions executed were for the profitable public entities. The losing exerting entities re-
quired liquidation or restructuring. This remained a challenge for the GOE363. 
Secondly, free pricing policies and specifically for energy products were advocated 
by the lending institutions to equal the international prices364. The ERSAP targeted a 
gradual abolishment of subsidies to equalize international ones by June 1995. In ag-
riculture, the Law No. 96 of 1992365 augmented agricultural lands rents to 22 times 
the land tax moving from only 7 under the former law. By October 1997, it termi-
nated the land rentals liberalizing the contractual relationship between the landlords 
and the tenants366. On the housing side, rent controls were eradicated and a Law 
No. 4 of 1996367 was issued similarly liberalizing the contractual terms governing the 
relationship between the landlords and the tenants368. 
Thirdly, investment policies, a deregulation policy was pursued to create an attrac-
tive investment climate. This reached climax by the promulgation of Law No. 8 of 
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1997369. The execution of the SAP and the enhanced investors’ confidence to invest 
in Egypt. This inflow relieved the interest rate pressures where the nominal interest 
rate falls with more than 4 per cent in 1993-4370. Moreover, the inflows reduced the 
current account deficit to a 1 per cent surplus, besides, accumulating foreign cur-
rency reserves of $19 billion371. The liberalization of interest rates in 1991 encour-
aged the capital inflows in EGP to benefit from the higher interest rates. In conse-
quence, the less dollarization pressured down the interest rates by the above rates372. 
Fourthly, the adjustments on the external economy side were signified in the ex-
change rate reform and the trade openness. On the exchange rate side, after the du-
al system initiated in February 1991, by October 1991373, the exchange rate was uni-
fied, devalued and upon presence of necessary licenses non-bank traders were per-
mitted374. Currency devaluations of 56.7 per cent in 1987 followed by a 23.4 per 
cent in 1991 depreciating EGP from 1$ equalling EGP 2.708 to equalling EGP 
3.342 in February 1991. On the trade openness side, in October 1996 tariffs were 
reduced from 70 to 55 per cent375. Additionally, Egypt adhered to the World Trade 
Organization in 1995376 and accomplished the Greater Arab Free Trade Agree-
ment377. These outcomes were an accumulation of several changes including devalu-
ations increasing diversified exports and reducing importation. In addition, public 
investment cuts and interest rate rises inflated imports prices reducing their de-
mand378.  
A challenge surfaced regarding the levels of integration in the world economy. The 
Egyptian economy’s share in world exports and imports verifies declined from 0.2 
per cent in 1985 to only 0.07 1995, while for imports a fall from 0.5 to 0.2 per cent 
over the same time period379. The significant reduction in exports was reasoned up-
on less diversification along with cheaper more competitive imports380. On the for-
eign debt side, the post-Gulf War debt relief and simultaneous rescheduling ar-
rangement with Paris Club381 enriched the balance of payments cumulatively by 
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nearly $15.5 billion382. The World Bank valued the forgone debt service obligations 
based on written off debts to reach 2.5 per cent of GDP383. 
Fifthly, the budget deficit reaching 17.2 per cent in 1990-1 was planned equivalence 
in 1996-7384. The fiscal adjustment executed under the SAP diminished the GOE’s 
budget from a 15 to a 2 per cent deficit from 1989 to 1994. The overall deficit re-
duction was due to a revenue generation of 42 per cent as well as expenditure cut of 
58 per cent. To start with the revenue side, the currency devaluation in 1991 aug-
mented revenues realized from oil exportation, Suez Canal fees and the custom du-
ties385. Furthermore, introduction of Sales Tax386 in 1991 represented an important 
pillar in revenue raising as it was responsible for 1.4 per cent upsurge in revenues387.  
Moving to the expenditure side, the austerity was denoted in two classifications; 
current and investment totalling to 7.5 per cent of GDP388. In regard to subsides, 
the GOE exerted further efforts successfully reduced subsidies to 2.6 per cent of 
GDP, then 1.9 per cent in the years 1992-3, 1993-4 and 1994-5 respectively. Finally, 
interest payments on public debt significantly increasing during the ERSAP’s execu-
tion due to treasury bills issuance to fund the chronic Egyptian budget deficits. It is 
important to mention that interest expenditure absolute value in 1993-4 exceeded 
the wages bill and was nearly three times the subsidies389. 
(B) Post-IMF Structural Adjustment Plan 
The Egyptian economy reigned the advantages of its fierce SAP by the second half 
of the 1990s. To start with inflation, recording 21.1 per cent in 1991-2390 before 
plummeting to a 10 per cent average for the following five years and only 4 per cent 
for 1997 to 2000 period391. On the wages side, nominal pay rises successfully con-
tained inflationary pressures. This applied obviously in the post stabilization period, 
hence, reducing the program’s austerity outcomes. The current account attained a 
positive value of 1.1 per cent in 1990s after recording negative 5 per cent in the late 
1980s392. The real GDP growth was remarkably affected during the implementation 
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of the program, slumping to 1.9 and 2.5 per cent in 1991-2 and 1992-3. However, a 
jump started from 1993-4 allowing growth rates to achieve 5 per cent by 1997393.  
The second phase of the SAP was launched in 1998 and it appeared in the legal 
framework reform, EGP depreciation and further global trade integration. To start 
with the legal framework update, a set of new market oriented laws were promul-
gated staring from 2002. These laws include for example; export promotion, intel-
lectual property rights and more importantly was the Special Economic Zones fol-
lowed by the Central Banking Law. Secondly, in January 2003 a long-awaited step of 
devaluing the EGP was implemented394. Thirdly and finally, the global trade side, 
Egypt concluded an Investment and Trade Framework with the US in 1999395, a 
FTA in 2000 with the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COME-
SA) members396, plus the Agadir agreement in 2004 involving Jordan, Tunisia and 
Morocco. Also, the EU Association Agreement entered into force in June 2004397. 
III.B.5 Conclusion 
The section of Egypt in chapter III was divided into the same skeleton of Jordan 
and Morocco to facilitate the process of comparison between the country studies 
and in order to trace easily the differences and similarities. The similarities represent 
an essential part in reasoning the choice of three country studies for undertaking 
such research project. Moreover, the historical developments until the 2000s are the 
base from which the economic chapter of the research project will kick start. Final-
ly, the historical analysis will assist in analysing the protectionist and investments re-
strictions still traced in the country studies since the era of nationalism and wide 
state intervention. The main witnessed similarities highlighting the prevailing eco-
nomic orientation can be listed based on each time period under examination.  
To begin with, the first period in each country study was titled “Independence and State 
Intervention” elapsing from the 1940s until the 1970s. Politically speaking, Egypt se-
cured its independence and full decolonization in 1952. During this economic peri-
od, the GOE expanded its economic role within the new states. Features of GOE 
intervention include; the re-introduction of the Egyptianization legislation to restrict 
foreign ownership of entities. Also, Nasser’s “Socialist Revolution” entailing the ex-
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propriation wave of 1961. Other private sector limitation policies enacted were the 
pledge of guaranteed state employment to all university graduates, besides, the in-
troduction of rent controls and land reforms legislations setting ownership maxi-
mums. 
On the trade level, import substitution – as globally executed – were implemented 
in the three country studies to support domestic production. The fall in the rentier 
benefits experienced in the 1980s in oil negatively influenced the Egyptian budgets. 
These factors severed the economic situation in Egypt who could not afford the 
expansionary fiscal policies paving their ways to the second phase titled “Debt Crisis 
and Conclusion of Structural Adjustment Programs”. The period was principally character-
ized with budget deficit and foreign debt. The foreign debt accumulation and the 
continuous failures to service it, forced Egypt to revert for the IMF assistance more 
than once within a decade period. 
The adjustment programs as part of the 1980s Washington Consensus executed in 
developing economies experiencing debt crises, were enforced in the three country 
studies. The programs allowed Egypt to reach the “Economic Openness and Market De-
regulation” era prevailing until the 2000s. Examples of enforceable policies include 
austerity and currency devaluation of 56.7 per cent in 1987 followed by a 23.4 per 
cent in 1991. This period highlighted the introduction of privatization programs 
with different paces of implementation, Egypt secured a 3.5 per cent of GDP annu-
al revenues. Finally, the deregulation process was evidenced in a series of market 
oriented policies enforced in Egypt including the introduction of the Investment 
Law targeting the attraction of domestic private sector as well as FDI. The creation 
of tax incentives and free zones were the basic methods of attraction. 
III.C Jordan Economic History 
III.C.1 Introduction 
The discussion of the three periods shall initially address the Jordanian history from 
an economic perspective, with slight reference to both the social and political con-
texts. The chapter will reference the prevailing economic conditions resulting from 
the policy-makers’ adoption of the periodic economic orientation. The primary fo-
cus within this chapter will be the development experienced in the role of the Gov-
ernment of Jordan (“GOJ”) and the levels of restrictions and regulations imposed 
upon economic activity. Furthermore, the analysis shall contain the effect of the in-
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ternational and regional developments on the Jordanian economy. This attempt to 
undertake an in-depth analysis of the Jordanian economic history will facilitate the 
process of noticing the shared and differentiated features with the other country 
studies meaning Egypt and Morocco. 
There are four aims for revisiting the fifty years’ economic performance of Jordan. 
First, investigating the Jordanian economic history obviously highlights the similari-
ties between the three country studies in their path of economic development. 
Stressing these similarities is necessary to justify the choice of these three country 
studies specifically in the first place. Second, the historical review will assist the 
reader to understand the background of the policy-making process in Jordan. For 
example, referring to the socialist oriented era during the 1960s assists in reasoning 
to extent the current protectionist investment policies witnessed there. Further-
more, it tackles the reforms executed over a long time and their positive and nega-
tive impacts in each country study. This policy assessment takes the discussion back 
again to the first aim of the historical chapters and tracing of country studies’ simi-
larities.  
Thirdly, the economic history development allows shedding light on the degree of 
governmental intervention and influence over the Jordanian economy’s activity. The 
progress from a big government to a relatively small one has a significant effect up-
on the legal and economic freedom analysis required for the second and third chap-
ters. The chapter focuses on the shift from a restricted regulated public sector based 
economy to a liberalized, less regulated and private based economy. Fourthly, the 
historical chapters postulate the economic status prevailing throughout the last fifty 
years. Accordingly, the final outcome would be considered the base from which 
chapter VI is starting. In other words, the historical chapters analyse Jordan’s per-
formance until the late 1990s, when Jordan introduced its domestic investment leg-
islation. 
The historical period under examination begins since post-independence years in 
1950s until the late 1990s and early 2000s. Jordan’s historical analysis under chapter 
III will be split into three periods. This categorization shall assist in paving the way 
to feature the main similarities and differences in policies executed between the 
three country studies. The first period will be the post-colonial and independence 
period characterized by concentration on the nation building process and promo-
tion of national identities. Thus, the national identity incentive has driven newly 
born states’ policy-makers to implement policies in line with the above-mentioned 
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goals of national identity and nation building. This period commenced from the 
mid-1950s and extended until mid or late 1970s. 
The second period elapses from the 1970s to 1980s. It was characterized with a 
slump in minerals prices and degraded foreign support. The thesis will approach 
this period recognizing the outcomes of the two above mentioned impacts on Jor-
dan’s budgets and debts. The third and last period covers the 1990s until the early 
2000s. This period evidenced the post-crisis effects and how the policies imple-
mented to mitigate the crisis impacted Jordan. Hence, the third period will be nec-
essary to proceed further within the econometric modelling chapter, which fully 
concentrates on the economic assessment of Jordan’s rates of economic freedom. 
III.C.2 Independence and State Intervention (1946 – 1970) 
The first period under examination focuses on the political changes and their eco-
nomic impact on the interaction of the economic stakeholders in Jordan. It exam-
ines the establishment of the modern state of Jordan nearly at its current borders. 
This entails check the initial role of the GOJ and what motivations encouraged it to 
intervene significantly in the economy’s activity. 
Based on the mandate System introduced by the League of Nations, the British es-
tablished the Transjordan Emirate in 1922. After 24 years and in 1946, the British 
concluded an alliance and friendship treaty with Jordan abolishing mandate and 
granting the Emirate independence398. This independence created an internationally 
recognized state known as the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan399. The Hashemite 
family originated in Hejaz and ruled Mecca until defeated and expelled by Al-Saud 
family forces. However, the British awarded their expelled allies the opportunity to 
rule the newly created Monarchies in Iraq and Transjordan. Regardless of over-
throwing the Hashemite Iraqi monarchy in a deadly coup in 1958, the Hashemite 
family in Jordan maintained its power control mainly based on the Jordanian army’s 
loyalty400. 
The ruling family in Jordan focused on establishing tight alliances with Jordanian 
tribes. The British assistance was necessary to clinch the tribal support in favour of 
a foreign King401. This alliance assisted in preserving the Hashemite control over the 
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new state even after the Palestinian refugees’ waves in the post 1948 and 1967 
wars402. The new regime adopted a state employment strategy to consolidate further 
levels of social welfare and nation building. In addition, the state funded nation 
building strategies through executing public development projects as Aqaba Port, 
easing the integration of tribes and gaining their support to the Hashemite new re-
gime403. A clear example was the GOJ’s cash funding to tribal leaders in alliance 
with the regime fostering this alliance404.  
With the spread of the Arab nationalism ideology during the 1950s, Hashemite’s 
were always accused of disloyalty to the ideology405. Under these pressures, the GOJ 
welcomed the Palestinian refugees’ and granted them the Jordanian citizenship. The 
Palestinian refugees including guerrillas benefited from the Jordanian lands to raid 
on Israel disregarding the Jordanian domestic rule of law406. This threatened King 
Hussein’s control and sovereignty with the possibility of potential Israeli reprisal. In 
consequence, by September 1970 a civil war erupted between King Hussein’s Jor-
danian Army and the guerrillas of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). 
This was known as the Black September incidents. The PLO were defeated and ex-
pelled to Lebanon407. After the war, the Palestinian Jordanians remaining in Jordan 
were encouraged to migrate to the Gulf countries taking advantage of higher returns 
and standards of living in consequence of the oil boom408. 
In the 1950s, Jordan’s political economy was formulated on close business – GOJ 
relations409. This close relation was an obvious outcome of the population structure 
at Jordan’s independence in 1946. The governmental economic development plan 
by independence was articulated on state-led development as well as import substi-
tution. The state and elite merchants from – Syrian and Palestinian origins – 
launched co-operation policies through initiating various public-private partner-
ships. These partnerships lasting until nowadays exemplify the business – GOJ 
close ties410.  
In the post-independence period Jordan preserved an underdeveloped economy 
characterized by being; first, an average population growth rate of 3.2 per cent. Sec-
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ondly and despite the high population growth the market remained small. Thirdly, 
the economy was widely agricultural and lacks both mineral and financial resources 
required to stimulate economic growth and development411. The economy was in 
deep need for governmental spending to assist in encouraging development and 
growth. The needed spending actually amounted to nearly half of the GNP 
throughout the 1970s. These high rates of spending in conjunction with lack of fi-
nancial resources reflected a necessity to accept foreign grants and financial assis-
tance412. 
The remarkable history of GOJ in receipting foreign financial assistance dates back 
to the UK mandate and afterwards the friendship and alliance treaty concluded in 
1946413. The UK maintained this position exclusively until 1957, when the alliance 
and friendship treaty was terminated414. One of the justifications for the economic 
underdevelopment is the creation of Israel in 1948. Hence, finances and expendi-
tures were prioritized to militarization rather than promoting development and in-
frastructure projects415. By the 1950s, the military was the primary employer in Jor-
dan and in the 1960s the military employed 30 per cent of the workforce416. 
The economic history of Jordan since independence signals the wider role played by 
the GOJ as an employer and infrastructure promoter. The wide state involvement 
in economic activity was a necessity to ensure several objectives. First, the state em-
ployment accelerated the process of the Jordanian nation building. Second, the wid-
er the role of the state absorbed the increase in the workforce due to the high popu-
lation growth rates. This limited the rates of unemployment experienced within the 
economy. This state involvement depended on the foreign financial assistance. This 
assistance as introduced below remains a form of rentier income used by the GOJ 
to cover its budgetary deficits arising from the executed expansionary fiscal poli-
cies417. 
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(A) Jordan and the 1970s Oil Boom 
The leading GOJ position in the economic activity continued and was even extend-
ed in with the start of the oil boom in the 1970s. As in the earlier section, the Jor-
danian economy preserved its dependence on foreign funds. The oil discoveries and 
the geo-political changes (the waning of Britain) shifted the foreign funding from 
the UK to the Gulf states. This inflow of Arabian originating funds allowed the 
GOJ to complete its centrally planned policies of lifting the economic developmen-
tal levels. In addition, it allowed the GOJ to expand its welfare role within the 
economy.  
Pillai justified the importance of foreign assistance for Jordan in three reasons. First, 
the establishment of the Jordanian Development Board in 1952 followed by the 
National Planning Council in 1971, principally focused on attaining economic de-
velopment through designing and implementing different central planning plans 
depending on the UK assistance418. The external grants were utilized in funding 
these centrally planned development projects. Secondly, the involvement of Jordan 
in the 1967 and 1973 wars added further fiscal pressure turning the external assis-
tance mandatory, especially after considering Palestinian refugees fleeing from con-
flict zones to Jordan419. Thirdly and lastly, being an agricultural underdeveloped 
economy, Jordan’s imports exceeded four times its exports deteriorating the econ-
omy’s balance of payment and foreign currency reserves. Accordingly, the need for 
foreign financial assistance heightened420. 
The foreign assistance of the 1970s survived two obvious features through this dec-
ade. First, the inflow of remittances from Jordanian employment in Gulf wealthy 
states421. Secondly, is the direct inflows of funds from the surplus recording Gulf 
economies422. To start with the 1970s, the Palestinian Jordanians amounting to 
300,000 migrated to the Arabian Gulf states as expatriates. Inflowing remittances to 
Jordan accumulated to attain nearly half of the GNI during that period423. These 
remittances represented 124 per cent of exported trade and was realized through 40 
per cent of the workforce who moved to the Gulf. Remittances receipted by Jorda-
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nian families were primarily used in acquiring basic necessities and in other cases 
purchase of lands and construction of residences.  
The GOJ benefited from these revenues through enforcing an open banking system 
imposing fees on funds exiting the baking system. The foreign income sources of 
aid and remittances had clear implications on the Jordanian labour and production 
structure. First, the labour force was more inclined towards employment either in 
the Gulf or state employment where higher salaries are achieved. Second, the agri-
cultural output and production declined due to an obvious decrease in workers, 
leading to a deficiency in rural industry. Third, a rise of services sector to support 
remittances and migration flows rather than industry. However, agriculture pre-
vailed as the principal private sector employer though at declining rates dropping 
from a third of the workforce in the 1960s to 10 per cent in 1980s. Afterwards, the 
GOJ began to accept migrants mainly Egyptians to participate in agricultural activi-
ties replacing the outflow of Jordanian workers424. 
The Arabian flow of funds enabled the GOJ to intervene and foster the social wel-
fare. Examples of intervention include; the introduction of regulated prices, subsi-
dies as well as the expansion of the state’s employment. The inflow of foreign ex-
change remittances and the currency overvaluation - as part of the import-
substitution policy in place425 - stimulated additional consumption domestically es-
pecially of imports. Thus, inflation mounted and without any adjustments in place 
for the state employed civil servants’ salaries. The costs of living in the 1970s tripled 
and in response a Ministry of Supply was initiated to govern the subsidization of 
basic goods426. The GOJ imported goods and offered them for sale exclusively to its 
employees in cooperatives. As a result, the market general prices decreased. Other 
alternatives included setting price limits and fixing several products prices including 
petroleum, sugar, meat, cigarettes and school notebooks427. 
In regard to the domestic fiscal balances, during the 1970s the GOJ was mostly de-
pendent on indirect taxation to raise revenues due to its weak administration. With 
the import-substitution policy enforced a trade restricted regime offering protection 
for domestic infant industries was adopted428. In total custom duties accounted to 
half of the taxation revenues and was highly affected by the flow of international 
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trade and the product exemption policies introduced by the GOJ429. In the post 
1967 war period, a set of the enforceable restrictions were abolished especially in 
relation to holding foreign currency in Jordan’s domestic banks430. 
The second pillar of GOJ funding were the domestic revenues represented in; first, 
income taxes. These revenues accounted for nearly 90 per cent of the direct taxes 
revenues. Conversely, the tax base was evidently narrow embracing only 120,000 tax 
registered names in 1975. In 1977, the Corporate tax rate was a flat one at 45 per 
cent, with several exemptions offered under the Investment Encouragement Law of 
1972. In 1978, the corporate tax revenues represented only an eighth of the total 
governmental tax proceeds431. The main non-tax source of revenue to the Jordanian 
budget was the Central Bank. It mainly represented the profits receipted by the 
Central Bank from owning shares in profitable companies. In 1976, this Central 
Bank represented 3 per cent of the budget’s total revenues.  
Based on the above assessment of the Jordanian budget revenues, it appeared that 
expenditures essential for attaining the targeted economic development should be 
funded externally. However, Pillai concluded that external loans did not considera-
bly affect the expenditure and revenue sides since the funding was directed to capi-
tal construction. The GOJ was channelling its investments through joint ownerships 
with the Jordanian private sector. Nevertheless, these partner-ownership did not re-
flect any specific strategy or philosophy of economic development introduced by 
the ruling regime432. 
From the above we can conclude (i) the change in the population’s interest for em-
ployment shifting to the gulf, (ii) the extension of dependence on foreign sources of 
funding the domestic economic development, (iii) the execution of an import-
substitution policy with an overvalued currency (iv) the expansion of GOJ welfare 
policies to include subsidies, regulated pricing. 
III.C.3 Debt Crisis and Conclusion of Structural Adjustment Programs 
(1980s – 1990s) 
The second period under investigation focuses on the outcomes of the GOJ expan-
sion in economic activity. The success of these policies was conditioned upon meet-
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ing a set of conditions. Non-compliance with these conditions, pushed the GOJ in-
to the accumulation of foreign debt and the necessity of applying for financial assis-
tance from the international financial institutions. 
(A) First Gulf War and IMF 
By the 1980s, the eruption of Iraq Iran War induced a plunge in oil prices. There-
fore, the Arab Gulf economies were hit significantly resulting in less financial assis-
tance flowing into Jordan either in aid433 or remittances434. The GOJ struggled in 
coping with these changes. The lower inflows triggered a twin deficit due to the 
losses of Jordanian remittances from the Gulf, less exports to downturned Gulf 
economies and more importantly the decline in Arabian financial support435.  
Officials intervened to mitigate the negative implications using three different paths; 
first, the recourse to foreign debt in order to cover the budget deficit436. Second, the 
introduction of more trade restrictive measures aiming to alleviate pressures on the 
current account and to protect domestic industry. These restrictions included raising 
import duties and taxes, introducing advance import deposits and finally restricting 
license-free importation. Thirdly, an expansionary monetary policy was implement-
ed targeting the stimulation of economic players in the Jordanian economy. These 
moves were criticized by the IMF as misallocating resources towards less efficient 
domestic industries. However, these interventions were not successful success in at-
taining the aforementioned targets437. 
The GOJ - civil administration and military - preserved the position as being the 
principal economic employer having on average 47 per cent of the workforce. 
These rates would even hike in areas outside Amman to 92 per cent of the labour 
force as in Karak. In 1986, the private sector employment reached 11 per cent 
mainly in raw material exploration and extraction438. In addition, the strategy of 
channelling investments through the private-public partnerships remained in place, 
with difficulties identified in differentiating the private and public shares439.  
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The foreign indebtedness mounted, the shortage and speculation on foreign curren-
cy severed and the loan repayments were delayed, pushing the Jordanian banking 
system to a crisis. An outcome was the bankruptcy of Jordan’s third bank in 1988440. 
The economy’s previously comfortable foreign currency reserves depending on oil-
states grants and remittances plummeted in five years obliging the Central Bank in 
October 1988 to suspend its economy allocation of foreign currency. Hence, a de-
valuation of Jordanian Dinar by around 20 per cent became indispensable and by 
1989, the dinar lost a third of its value. In addition, more trade restrictive measures 
came into force including the complete ban of high quality products importation as 
well as a surge in duties applicable441. 
The real GDP per capita experienced a significant deterioration from $2227.8 in 
1981 to only $652 in 1989442. In addition to this, the threats of default forced the 
GOJ referral to the IMF seeking financial assistance443. After negotiation of one 
month, the GOJ concluded a stand-by arrangement with the IMF in April 1989444. 
The arrangement was related to further financial assistance from the World Bank as 
well as a debt restructuring program conditionally upon the application of economic 
reforms445. The IMF’s structural adjustment plan reforms agreed included privatiza-
tion, abolishment of subsidies, gradual eradication of customs and lay-offs in state 
employment.  
The privatization encompassed public utilities as electricity, water, telecommunica-
tion as well as the state’s national airline Royal Jordan446. The Ministry of Supply in 
charge of price subsidies was demolished. In compliance with the arranged plan, the 
GOJ attempted in 1989 to lift subsidies on fuel, striking wide protests especially in 
Ma’an a southern city popular for transportation services between Iraq and Aqaba 
port447. The inflation ranged between 30 and 50 per cent, with hikes in most prod-
ucts and services as cigarettes, fuel, water and phone bills after considering the 
standalone dinar’s devaluation ordinary effect. Farmers were hit by the fertilizers 
and irrigation water price increases448. 
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The “bread riots” forced the regime to introduce a controlled political liberalization 
process aiming to defuse part of the public’s dissatisfaction449. A clear motivation 
for this shift was the fiscal assistance provided by the US reflected in the IMF pro-
gram. This assistance enabled the GOJ to restrict the intense liberalization process. 
This kept the tight grip over liberalization and the decision-making powers all under 
the monarchy elite. The monarchical regime’s stability was strategic for the US since 
it was viewed as one of the corners for the American peace plans introduced in the 
region450.  
The beginning of the Second Gulf war after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 
aggravated Jordan’s compliance with the IMF conditions. The lack of necessary re-
forms and the political status of Jordan from the aggression encouraged the IMF to 
suspend the program451. On the political side, King Hussein’s refused to join the US 
coalition in liberating Kuwait452. This alienated Jordan from Western and Arab fi-
nancial support through aid and ties severance from the US as well as the Gulf 
states, that even expelled the Jordanian expatriates. In regard to Arabian assistance, 
Jordan prior to the Gulf War was granted $600 million annually from Gulf allies. 
This support totally vanished as soon as the war erupted and the Jordanian position 
proved unfavourable for Arabian backers453. In addition, the IMF program was par-
tially suspended, with only fewer millions stabilization loans were concluded offer-
ing certain relief. 
(B) The Second Gulf War Effects 
This sub-section addresses the Second Gulf War effects on the Jordanian economy, 
role of GOJ and remittances inflow. The Gulf War of 1991 purported an economic 
downturn due to several factors. First, the forfeiture experienced by the Jordanian 
regime being a close recipient of financial support and aider from Iraq454. Iraq was 
the main trading partner for Jordan during the ten years preceding the war, the UN 
Security Council Resolution No. 661 has set economic sanctions on Iraq in connec-
tion to its trade activities455. Thus, the Jordanian companies missed their Iraqi com-
panies’ dues and receivables. In November 1990, Amman’s Commerce Chamber 
declared a $2 billion Jordanian trade costs for the UN Resolution’s. Other losses 
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were represented in importing oil from international markets at higher prices com-
pared to the former subsidized price as received from the Iraqi government before 
the sanctions456. In the meantime, Jordan and specifically the Aqaba port became 
denoted as the Iraqi hub for import and export activities. The imposed sanctions 
were reflected in lower Jordanian imports throughout 1989 to 1991 from 6.2 to 1.5 
million tons. Hence, Bush administration offered financial assistance to Jordan mit-
igating the sanctions’ trade costs457. 
Secondly, on the Jordanian side, the warship activities disrupted the Jordanian trade 
flows through the Aqaba port. The vessels cost of security and monitoring the eco-
nomic sanctions implementation increased. In consequence, Jordan’s exports of po-
tassium and phosphate through the port fell. In the meantime, and for political rea-
sons, the Jordanian trade flows suffered again from the Kuwaiti and Saudi embargo 
against Jordan. Exports declined from nearly $530 million in 1990 first half to zero 
by 1990’s end and 1991’s first quarter. The embargo was based on Jordan’s stance 
during the War. Hence, the direct grants and assistance dipped to low rates, if any458. 
As expected, the tourism proceeds were negatively affected. The effect remained 
significant when compared to other sectors as trade and transportation. The num-
ber of tourists fell from 2.5 million in 1990 – providing net receipts exceeding these 
of phosphate exports – to 2 million visitors by 1991459. 
Thirdly, were the remittances the Jordanian expatriates in the Gulf. For the same 
political reasons mentioned above, Kuwait expelled 300,000 Jordanians and the 
other Gulf States followed the same policy after the liberation completion460. Jordan 
acted as the principal source of the oil states’ educated labour force461. Hence, this 
expulsion raised the unemployment in Jordan specifically between professionals re-
cording a 13 per cent between dentists and even 40 per cent for agricultural engi-
neers. The overall unemployment rate accumulated to reach in the late 1991 25 to 
30 per cent462.  
The return of Jordanians created two economic pressures. First, a sudden rise in 
demand of public services including education, health and supply of basic needs. 
Second, the decline in foreign currency remittances to only $460 million from a rec-
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ord of $1.2 billion annually during the mid-1980s. The poverty rates jumped from 
20 per cent in the pre-war period to above 30 per cent by the post-war period. An-
other pressure resulting from the war was inflow of one million refugees that costed 
nearly $60 million expenditure. This burdened the agonized Jordanian budget with 
only $12 million reimbursed by the UN463. Consequently, the return of expatriates 
from the Gulf was more injurious than expected by the Jordanian policy-makers 
since migrants turned to a burden instead of a foreign currency source.  
On the positive side, the migrants’ return represented an inflow of deposits to the 
Jordanian financial system. Moreover, it stimulated the retail business investments 
by the returnees464. This inflow eased the pressures of the shortage in the foreign 
currency reserves. This allowed the GOJ to postpone the execution of socially un-
favourable policies for two more years465. In February 1992, a second arrangement 
was launched, and the GOJ commenced applying the conditions regarding trade 
and capital flow466. Arab nationalist economists failed to provide alternatives to en-
hance the economic situation other than the IMF policies467. 
III.C.4 Economic Openness and Market Deregulation (1990s – 2000s) 
The third period under examination is aligned with the economy’s status in the 
post-IMF program. The section intends specifically to address the impacts of the 
IMF SAP on five of the Jordanian economy’s pillars including; the public sector, the 
investment deregulation process, the exchange rate reform, the budget deficit con-
trol and the free market forces interaction. 
(A) IMF Structural Adjustment effects 
The SAP threatened the long-living state employment policy. Agricultural employ-
ment became less rewarding featuring lower employment rates. The transportation 
industry flourishing dependent on the Iraqi products was impaired by the sanctions. 
The state employees halved the employed workers below the poverty lines. The un-
employment and poverty rates were uneven all over Jordan, the situation was slight-
ly less damaging in the capital compared to other peripheral cities as for example 
Karak and Ma’an. The income per capita deteriorated from $1500 in mid 1980s to 
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$1000 by 1990 and $850 in 1998, with a disparity of three fourths figured between 
rural and urban areas incomes468. 
The costs of living recorded an escalation in the basic items prices during the 
1990s469. For example, food items increased by 80 per cent in 1992 and cereal prod-
ucts doubled from 1994 to 1998, electricity and heat increases reached 150 per cent, 
clothing costs tripled as compared to their prices in 1986. In total, a consumer living 
cost index rocketed by 73 per cent from 1987 to 1993. The provided consumer in-
dex excludes imports, where the Jordanian economy depended by 60 per cent on 
foreign goods. The actual cost of living increases would outweigh the above record-
ed index. The austerity plans continued through the 1990s when the regime experi-
enced a new wave of riots in 1996 again after the lift of bread subsidies and an in-
crease in public services fees as schooling470.  
On the public services level, other than higher pricing for services, the quality was 
eroded. The public healthcare system was available for the state’s public sector em-
ployees and the military were both represented more than half the population. 
Poorer areas were mostly outside the formal healthcare system. They depended 
mainly on direct payments for services supplied. An alternative for serving the poor 
was registering in the Ministry of Health to receive the services at negligible or no 
costs. This system attracted nearly one third of the population in 1992 to hold the 
healthcare cards. The services provided were inferior due to the continuous bureau-
cracy, lack of availability and queuing. Hence, the beneficiaries evaded using this 
service unless essential471.  
The continuous austerity and cutting GOJ welfare allowed the reduction of budget 
deficit from a record of 18 per cent in 1989 to 8.2 per cent by 2002472. The GOJ 
started together with the private sector and NGOs initiatives to alleviate poverty. 
three poverty targeting programs were introduced. First, the Family Income Sup-
plement, through this program the GOJ provides cash either through additions to 
the state employees pay checks or bank collection to families surviving with in-
comes below JD500 per month473. Second, the National Aid Fund provided similar 
cash payments to unemployed poor, with an estimate of 50,000 beneficiary families 
in 1998. Finally, the Zakat Fund controlled by the GOJ and funded privately pro-
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vided cash payments to nearly 3,000 households. Conversely, these programs were 
always criticized for failing to reach poor families in rural areas as well as insuffi-
ciency to alleviate poverty threatening beneficiary families474.  
The second mean of countering poverty was the provision of micro-financing to 
small and medium sized private initiatives. The main program was the Social 
Productivity Program funded through World Bank loans. It aimed only for mitigat-
ing the social effects of the economic structural adjustments475. Several other pro-
grams were introduced on top of them was the Development and Employment 
Fund financing nearly 500 projects only in 1993 mostly in capitalized service’s sec-
tor476. 
(B) Peace treaty and the upturn 
The participation in the US-led Middle East Peace Process Conference in Madrid 
allowed the re-engagement of western and Gulf allies with Jordan477. In addition to 
signing the peace treaty with Israel in 1994. Both events were a turning point for the 
Jordanian regime. Jordan became the US cornerstone political ally in the region. 
The financial relief and assistance returned to normality and even at higher rates in 
the post-treaty period. Benefits were featured promptly in aid from western gov-
ernments, IMF and World Bank support, development loans as well as debt relief478. 
Examples of western support included; first, in 1994 a rescheduling of $2.5 billion 
sovereign debt owing to Paris Club creditors was negotiated. Second, the US gov-
ernment augmented its financial aid to the GOJ from nearly $50 million to over 
$220 million in 1999. In addition, $200 of the $700 million of the Jordanian debt 
owing to the US was unilaterally written off by the latter two days after the treaty 
ceremonial signing (Washington Declaration between Hussein and Rabbin)479.  
Thirdly, the US trade officials in 1998 supervised the establishment of the first 
Qualified Investment Zone in Jordan assisting in solidifying economic ties with Is-
rael heading towards stimulating job creation and export development. Although 
not very successful, it highlighted the interest in consolidating the peace process 
through enforcing bilateral economies ties480. Fourthly, and from the EU side the 
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partnership concluded with the Mediterranean countries directed a total of €550 
million to the GOJ for the years between 1996 and 2000. Another phase of re-
scheduling with the Paris Club was finalized 1994 and 1997, further structural loans 
were granted from the IMF and the World Bank worth $700 million between 1994 
and 1998481. Jordan failed to comply with the austerity conditions under the latter 
loans due to its narrow tax base and high public-sector employment482. The GOJ 
maintained its position as a US strategic ally for the 1990s and early 2000s during 
the latter’s war against terrorism. This entitled the Jordanian regime further diplo-
matic and economic support regardless of the domestic political transition status 
from King Hussein to his successor King Abdullah483. 
By the late 1990s, the GOJ realized the importance of foreign investments. This en-
couraged launching a process of policy-shifting towards investment promotion484. 
King Abdullah’s consolidation of power in 1999 was threatened by an uneven eco-
nomic performance where unemployment recorded 20 per cent and growing exter-
nal debts485. Hence, the King targeted stimulating economic growth through imple-
menting a set of neoliberal policies. The two pillars of the proposed policies were 
both trade and the public sector. Technocrats with western background studies 
were appointed to supervise this process openness486. The process included prom-
ulgating new economic laws sticking to the international financial institutions advic-
es, besides, acceding in the WTO during 1999 – 2000487. Moreover, the Qualified 
Investment Zones are investment zones exempted from Jordan’s labour and social 
security legislations. The exemption is conditioned upon joint investment between 
Israelis and Jordanians. It allows the products resulting from these investments to 
access the US markets duty free. Another example of openness and inclination to-
wards investment was the inauguration of the Aqaba Special Economic Zone in 
2001488. 
Jordan’s foreign policy during the early 2000s maintained the alignment with the US 
and western powers. This alignment was crystalized during the US war on terrorism 
and the invasion of Iraq in 2003, yielding an unprecedented level of financial aid489. 
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The US financial aid to Jordan for the 30 years prior to 2001 totalled $4.5 billion, 
and after 2003 average aid annually reached $750 million. In 2003, standing alone 
the US directed $1 billion to offset the Iraq war negative implications on the Jorda-
nian economy490. Regardless of the US public less support to this aid, it is growing 
especially after in 2011 the Congressional supplemental funding was approved. The 
aid had its strategic and political value, and was used by the GOJ to promote em-
ployment and mitigate fiscal pressures491. Nearly a half of aiding funds were re-
served for military expenditure on training, border control and equipment. This 
lump sum represented 28 per cent of the GOJ’s total expenditure. With this flow of 
US funds, Jordan turned to become one of the top recipients of US aid world-
wide492.  
Lately, other financial assistance became more obvious and was from the Saudi 
government during the Arab Spring protests, which offered aiding the GOJ as a 
mean to maintain political stability for a close ally monarchy against the rising wave 
of protests in the Middle East493. This aid represented to the GOJ a rentier income 
assisting it in stabilizing its economy. The first $1.4 billion granted by the Saudi 
government to the Jordanian one in August 2011 precluded the latter from an-
nouncing a record budget deficit494. The financial aid as mentioned above enabled 
the GOJ to expand its state employment and offer additional subsidies as an alter-
native to absorb the publics dissatisfaction as in the riots of 1989 and 1996495. 
In the same context, Jordan concluded a FTA with US government promoting the 
latter’s share in Jordan’s exports to reach 31 per cent by 2004 being on top of Jor-
danian products foreign markets. The same trend applied for the EU through the 
enforcement of an Association Agreement in May 2002 in line with Barcelona Mul-
tilateral Process pursuing by 2010 a free trade area496. Other examples include an 
American straight assistance of $2.8 billion from 2000-2006, $2 billion debt restruc-
ture program with Paris Club, $730 million loans and grants from European funds 
from 2001-2004 and finally $660 million financial facilities from the IMF and World 
Bank after the completion of the SAP497. 
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The promotion of King Abdullah program extended to include the privatization of 
public owned enterprises as part of the IMF renewed program of 1998. The IMF 
program was focused on fighting the inefficiencies of the public sector through 
opening the door more for the private sector for economic activity. The plan was 
formulated upon the divestiture or full privatization of the public-sector enterprises. 
By 2002, eight public authorities completed their privatization transactions through 
leases or management agreements498. The IMF-led policies reigned the benefits by 
recording a 7 per cent growth, and a reduction in poverty to around 15 per cent499. 
In parallel, the GOJ launched the Social and Economic Transformation Plan500 and 
Enhanced Productivity Program targeting an improvement in technological and liv-
ing standards, as well as the National Housing Initiative offering the distribution 
120,000 cost efficient residences from 2013 onwards.  
On the other hand, these economic reforms were not as successful from a social 
perspective. The fact of higher job creation was true, though not sufficient to meet 
all market entrants reaching an annual 60,000 entrants501. In consequence, the un-
employment rate inclined striking a two third of youth below 25 years. In the mean-
time, further lifts of subsidies fuelled higher inflation rates eroding individuals’ pur-
chasing powers. This inflation was counteracted by hikes in civil servants’ salaries to 
cover for increase in price levels. With the above-mentioned privatization plan and 
aiming to mitigate the back effect from laying-off unutilized employees, the public 
entities were offered to closely tied regime investors502 and the GOJ maintained a 
stake in these privatized entities503. 
III.C.5 Conclusion 
The section of Jordan in chapter III was divided into the same skeleton of Egypt 
and Morocco to facilitate the process of comparison between the country studies 
and in order to trace easily the differences and similarities. The similarities represent 
an essential part in reasoning the choice of three country studies for undertaking 
such research project. Moreover, the historical developments until the 2000s are the 
base from which the economic chapter of the research project will kick start. Final-
ly, the historical analysis will assist in analysing the protectionist and investments re-
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strictions still traced in the country studies since the era of nationalism and wide 
state intervention. The main witnessed similarities highlighting the prevailing eco-
nomic orientation can be listed based on each time period under examination. 
To begin with, the first period in each country study was titled “Independence and State 
Intervention” elapsing from the 1940s until the 1970s. Politically speaking, Jordan se-
cured its independence and decolonization in 1946. During this economic period, 
the GOJ expanded its economic role within the new state. Features of governmen-
tal intervention include; the expansion in governmental job offerings and the intro-
duction of subsidies. In addition, the GOJ backed by the foreign aid magnified its 
public investment in infrastructure and even established new entities.  
On the trade level, import substitution – as globally executed – were implemented 
in Jordan to support domestic production, pushing customs to represent at times 
around half of the Jordanian tax revenues. For the Jordanians, the Arab support de-
creased with the eruption of the Iran-Iraq War limiting the granted Arabian assis-
tance. These factors severed the economic situation Jordan who could not afford 
the expansionary fiscal policies paving their ways to the second phase titled “Debt 
Crisis and Conclusion of Structural Adjustment Programs”. The period was principally 
characterized with budget deficit and foreign debt. Examples of other worsening 
conditions include the GOJ employment of 47 per cent of the Jordanian workforce. 
All of the above incidents in total accumulated foreign debt with continuous failures 
to service it, forcing Jordan to revert for the IMF assistance more than once within 
a decade period.  
The adjustment programs as part of the 1980s Washington Consensus executed in 
developing economies experiencing debt crises, were enforced in Jordan. The pro-
grams allowed Jordan to reach the “Economic Openness and Market Deregulation” era 
prevailing until the 2000s. Examples of enforceable policies include austerity and 
currency devaluation reaching 33 per cent in Jordan. This period highlighted the in-
troduction of privatization programs with different paces of implementation. More-
over, the deregulation process was evidenced in a series of market oriented policies 
enforced in Jordan including the introduction of the Investment Law targeting the 
attraction of domestic private sector as well as FDI. The creation of tax incentives 
and free zones were the basic methods of attraction. 
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III.D Morocco Economic History 
III.D.1 Introduction 
The discussion of the three periods shall initially address the Moroccan history from 
an economic perspective, with slight reference to both the social and political con-
texts. The chapter will reference the prevailing economic conditions resulting from 
the policy-makers’ adoption of the periodic economic orientation. The primary fo-
cus within this chapter will be the development experienced in the role of the Gov-
ernment of Morocco (“GOM”) and the levels of restrictions and regulations im-
posed upon economic activity. Furthermore, the analysis shall contain the effect of 
the international and regional developments on the Moroccan economy. This at-
tempt to undertake an in-depth analysis of the Moroccan economic history will fa-
cilitate the process of noticing the shared and differentiated features with the other 
country studies meaning Egypt and Jordan. 
There are four aims for revisiting the fifty years’ economic performance of Moroc-
co. First, investigating the Moroccan economic history obviously highlights the sim-
ilarities between the three country studies in their path of economic development. 
Stressing these similarities is necessary to justify the choice of these three country 
studies specifically in the first place. Second, the historical review will assist the 
reader to understand the background of the policy-making process in Morocco. For 
example, referring to the socialist oriented era during the 1960s assists in reasoning 
to an extent the current protectionist investment policy witnessed there. Further-
more, it tackles the reforms executed over a long time and their positive and nega-
tive impacts in each country study. This policy assessment takes the discussion back 
again to the first aim of the historical chapters and tracing of country studies’ simi-
larities.  
Thirdly, the economic history development allows shedding light on the degree of 
governmental intervention and influence over the Moroccan economy’s activity. 
The progress from a big government to a relatively small one has a significant effect 
upon the legal and economic freedom analysis required for the second and third 
chapters. The chapter focuses on the shift from a restricted regulated public sector 
based economy to a liberalized, less regulated and private based economy. Fourthly, 
the historical chapters postulate the economic status prevailing throughout the last 
fifty years. Accordingly, the final outcome would be considered the base from 
which chapter VI is starting. In other words, the historical chapters analyse Moroc-
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co’s performance until the late 1990s, when Morocco introduced its domestic in-
vestment legislation. 
The historical period under examination begins since post-independence years in 
1950s until the late 1990s and early 2000s. The Moroccan economic history chapter 
will be split into three periods. This categorization shall assist in paving the way to 
feature the main similarities and differences in policies executed between the three 
country studies. The first period will be the post-colonial and independence period 
characterized by concentration on the nation building process and promotion of na-
tional identities. Thus, the national identity incentive has driven newly born states’ 
policy-makers to implement policies in line with the above-mentioned goals of na-
tional identity and nation building. This period commenced from the mid-1950s 
and extended until mid or late 1970s. 
The second period elapses from the 1970s to 1980s. It was characterized with a 
slump in minerals prices and degraded foreign support. The thesis will approach 
this period recognizing the outcomes of the two above mentioned impacts on Mo-
rocco’s budgets and debts. The third and last period covers the 1990s until the early 
2000s. This period evidenced the post-crisis effects and how the policies imple-
mented to mitigate the crisis impacted Morocco. Hence, the third period will be 
necessary to proceed further within the econometric modelling chapter, which fully 
concentrates on the economic assessment of Morocco’s rates of economic freedom. 
III.D.2 Independence and State Intervention (1956 – 1970) 
The first period under examination focuses on the political changes and their eco-
nomic impact on the interaction of the economic stakeholders in Morocco. It exam-
ines the establishment of the modern state of Morocco at its current borders. This 
entails check the initial role of the GOM and what motivations encouraged it to in-
tervene significantly in the economy’s activity. 
(A) Independence and 1950s Economy 
The modern Moroccan economic history dates to the decolonization and independ-
ence in 1956. The independence of 1956 marked a turning point allowing the in-
statement in power of a new regime504. This regime was under obligation to formu-
late its own economic policy. Prior to 1956, the economy was operating in a liberal 
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manner where the commercial urban bourgeoisie, the rural notables and the elites 
were prioritized. The Moroccan private sector started with the undertaking of trade 
and commerce activities during the colonial rule. This created a layer of bourgeoisie 
who even benefit more from the supply shortages experienced during the World 
War II (WWII)505.  
The post WWII period featured a significant shift of French investments to Moroc-
co. In addition, the Moroccan capitalists (especially in Fes) were encouraged by the 
liberal approach in governing the economy506. Thus, they intruded the industry field, 
previously being under the full control of colonialists. Two of the prominent Mo-
roccan investment industries at the time were the vegetable oil in Casablanca and 
textiles in Safi. The post-war economic formulation paved the way for concentrat-
ing investments in the coastal cities with a lead for Casablanca. 
In 1955, the Moroccan ownership share in the economy corporations did not ex-
ceed 5 per cent. Businesses were mostly formulated upon individual or family en-
trepreneurships rather than properly incorporated entities507. These low ownership 
per centages did not bother the newly governing regime. Oppositely, the new state 
preserved the European and French owned entities offering the latter’s full capacity 
to continue operating508. Conversely, several of these firms began to withdraw their 
investments and exit the market. On the Moroccan domestic side, a wider oppor-
tunity for investment was opened especially with the termination of favouritism and 
the former colonial business restrictions509.  
The new regime stressed the need for economic reform aiming at economic growth 
and GDP amplification, besides their reflections on the per capita incomes and 
standards of living510. Therefore, on the GOM side, policy makers adopted an im-
port substitution policy supported by seeking self-sufficiency on the agricultural lev-
el511. In addition, the Moroccan infant industry requested protection as a mean to 
ensure its development. These interests required the enforcement of a protectionist 
trade policy; demonstrated in imports quantitative restrictions and higher tariffs. 
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This trend continued throughout the post-independence era beginning from 1956 
and until the fiscal crisis featured in the early 1980s512.  
Consequently, capital goods imports prevailed since GOM attempted to moderate 
its consumption imports. On absolute importation rates, consumption goods share 
of total imports decreased from 17.6 in 1967 to 10 per cent by 1985. In the mean-
time, capital goods share in total composition of imports climbed from 22.6 to 29.3 
per cent between the years 1973 and 1980513. 
The post-independence period was characterized by the royal regime’s endeavour to 
consolidate its political power through favouring economic elites and rural nobili-
ties. By 1956, 7,500 elitists managed a quarter of agricultural lands, while 15 per cent 
of the urbanists handled mostly the Moroccan economic activities. These traditional 
elites were the main gainers from colonialists exit since they became eligible to ac-
quire their abandoned assets and lands514. Accordingly, the elites preserved their role 
as the principal economic and political actors. Having this scenario, it was foreseen 
that such inclination shall continue with the execution of any future reform pro-
cesses. The elites’ takeover facilitated the creation of a middle layer bourgeoisie515. 
In the meantime, the seeds of corruption were cultivated since independence, by the 
new regime’s recourse to the elite through favouritism and bribery as a mean to 
generate additional revenues in return for requested services516. On the state side, 
the GOM backed such corruptive behaviours to enable the new powerful elitist 
group to reconcile their positions as the regime’s allies, solidifying the new system’s 
political base517. 
The low Moroccan ownership per centages flagged the GOM to stimulate local in-
vestments. The nationalization of the French Banque d’Etat du Maroc (Central 
Bank of Morocco as known as “Bank Al-Maghrib”) in 1958, qualified the GOM to 
control the currency, credit and the foreign exchange transactions518. Favourable tax 
and investment codes were promulgated in 1958 and 1960. The new legislations 
permitted the importation of capital assets free from duty. Additionally, 20 per cent 
of the tax incentives and state investment grants were directed to the new indus-
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tries519. The National Bank of Economic Development was established in 1959, tar-
geting the provision of facilitated funding for the Moroccan start-ups520. The out-
come was a flourished inflow of Moroccan investments into the textile and leather 
industries, having a precedent advantage based on the former Moroccan trading 
lines of textiles521.  
The above GOM’s stimulation proved insufficient to attract Moroccan investments 
into heavy industries. Therefore, the GOM intended to fulfil this need through en-
gaging in joint ventures with the foreign firms in specified projects. An example was 
SAMIR, an entity initiated based on a cooperation agreement between GOM and 
with ENI to construct an oil refinery in 1959522. In the same year, another similar 
arrangement was concluded with Berliet, Simaca and Fiat, resulting in the founda-
tion of SOMACA an automotive assembly plant523. At the same time, the GOM did 
not dismiss its intention to industrially intervene and invest independently. Exam-
ples included the establishment of sugar refineries, where the GOM still invited the 
Moroccan private sector to join as shareholders524.  
An additional GOM backed policy was the direction of the public funds to modern-
ize the agricultural sector through installing machinery, new irrigation systems al-
lowing the output and the lands actual values to fold525. The GOM’s policy towards 
the inauguration of proper accessible public infrastructure including schools, roads 
and bridges stemmed a significant boom in the field of construction and contracting 
activities. In conclusion to all of the above provided incentives and trends, the Mo-
roccan investors on individual basis preferred closely-held medium and small less 
risky businesses. Thus, a GOM plan to privatize the entities owned by foreigners 
and exporting until 1965 before being nationalized did not succeed526. 
The foreign hegemony over the Moroccan economic activities was ascertained be-
tween the leaders of the spreading private sector entities. The Planning Service stud-
ied in a survey in 1970 the per centage of Moroccans appointed in directors’ posi-
tions around the economy. The survey results reflected the considerable influence 
of foreigners in the Moroccan private sector since the sample covered 160 private 
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entities, of them only 13 were Moroccans. Other estimations during the same peri-
od highlighted that in the banking sector only 500 of the top 1,000 managers were 
Moroccans527. In addition, fifteen years after independence the foreigners still held 
around 1,500 positions in public offices from a total of 6,000. The same trend was 
experienced in the case of academics and professionals including university profes-
sors, engineers, doctors and lawyers528.  
The strong GOM did not prevent the French from preserving partially their share 
in the Moroccan economy’s operations and activities. The French Banque de Paris 
et des Pays through Omnium Nord African529 (ONA) had control over 50 Moroc-
can companies dispersed in different fields including the real estate, mining, tourism 
and transportation. The Moroccan market share in most of these fields was minimal 
if excluding the textiles and hotels industries530. However, this changed by the 
GOM’s decision in 1965 to undertake its influential investment plan as mentioned 
above in the examples of the automotive and sugar industries531. 
(B) Phosphate and Rentier Economy 1970s 
By the early 1970s, Morocco experienced a rise in its intellectuals who led the politi-
cal scene adopting a pro-nationalistic sense. This strengthened the GOM’s attempt 
to decolonize its economy from the foreign hegemony532. The GOM in line with the 
identity sense introduced the Moroccanization program533. In 1973, the Moroc-
canization program was promulgated to limit the foreign ownership of entities in 
specified sectors to only 49 per cent534. The sectors covered included; fertilizers, tex-
tiles, edible oils, clothing, leather as well as processed vegetables and fruits. The 
program was enforced through introducing two legislations in March and May 1973 
setting the threshold requirement of ownership which will be further addressed in 
the chapter IV. The state backed this plan by offering to fund the foreigners’ com-
pensations for their abandoned shareholdings535. 
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The program aimed to reduce the French entities dominance in the Moroccan 
economy536. The foreign enterprises were obliged to follow the Law and in turn 
handed over their equity shares and owned lands to the State of Morocco537. This 
nationalistic step represented a hurdle for additional FDI inflows538. In the same 
context, though at a different manner, GOM declared a direct seizure of lands still 
under foreign ownership. The World Bank described these Moroccan moves as a 
mean to accelerate the rise of Moroccan entrepreneurs539. These steps widened the 
public sector’s role in conjunction with the minimal market constraints due to natu-
ral monopolies or tariffs protection540. 
The Moroccanization program’s implications were drastic. It affected 1,500 compa-
nies and nearly 400 thousand hectares of land. Foreign companies offered partner-
ships to share profits with Moroccans who had added no investment value to these 
partnerships. Other foreign companies managed to attract politically influential Mo-
roccans who eased the companies’ business operation and widened their economic 
influence541. Conversely, an insignificant number of companies benefited from a 
Moroccan partner interested who boosted the companies’ investments. A study as-
sessing the program’s effect on 4,000 entities inferred that only half of them were 
affected. Non-affected entities were either closed, changed the course business ac-
tivity or successfully eluded the law542.  
The execution of the program on the larger entities was implemented through a dif-
ferent strategy. The GOM through its financial branch under the Societe Nationale 
d’Investissements543 (SNI) had two choices. First, to acquire the shares directly in the 
large foreign companies. In case of SAMIR, Italian owned shares were purchased by 
the GOM544. The second choice – put into practice even before the Moroccaniza-
tion program – was to participate in the foreign companies as shareholders after 
contributing a new capital. The examples include; Mines de Zellidja selling 200,000 
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shares to the above-mentioned bank in 1971, followed by Lesieur, Lafarge Maroc 
and Brasseries du Maroc in 1975545.  
The GOM commanded 40 per cent of the economic activity since independence 
until the late 1970s546. The economy recorded a growth of 5.5 per cent for the peri-
od 1968-1972547. Two additional features catalysed the import substitution policy 
and the GOM wide intervention. First, the rise in remittances inflows and secondly, 
the hike in the international prices of phosphate as a mineral ore. The dependency 
on the phosphate revenues through the public holding company Office Cherifan 
des Phosphates (OCP) turned Morocco into a rentier state548. The revenues allowed 
the GOM to execute an expansionary fiscal policy were subsidies, higher civil serv-
ants’ employment and wages were introduced549.  
The rise in public spending was used to launch a Moroccan industrial sector, espe-
cially in the 1975-77 period, when the phosphate prices quadrupled550. The econom-
ic prosperity attained enabled the GOM to act as the primary employer. This creat-
ed a new urban middle class. Data available from 1970-77 show an increase in pub-
lic employment by 5.5 per cent. Also, the university enrolment tripled where the 
graduates were directed to the public sector551. In consequence, public spending rel-
ative to GDP surged to 22 per cent in 1976 from only 12 per cent in 1967. In the 
twenty years’ period from 1960 to 1980, the number of civil servants jumped from 
50,000 to 500,000552. On the growth side, the average 5 per cent growth was mostly 
obliterated by a rate of population growth reaching 3.2 per cent. Inflation, fall in liv-
ing standards the rise in unemployment ranging between 20 and 30 per cent and 40 
per cent in rural regions, signified the stagnation precedent since 1960s553.  
Another failure for GOM’s policies was in the phosphate’s exportation and pricing. 
Inspired by the Gulf countries lead after the oil boom in the 1970s, Morocco at-
tempted to exploit its quasi-monopoly in the international phosphate market. The 
phosphate exports were priced-up to forecast wider revenues needed to proceed 
with the development projects planned. The low-cost phosphate producers intense-
ly launched new investments, raising supply and negatively affecting the phosphate 
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pricing. Consequently, the projected revenues were never achieved. Furthermore, 
the global recession and the downturn in the phosphate trade terms lowered the 
phosphate proceeds further554. Along with the continuous heightened public ex-
penditure, the GOM was forced to record a budget deficit of 18.1 per cent in 1976 
from only 3.9 per cent in 1974555.  
The GOM difficult choices were any of two. First, the suspension of the ambitious 
development plans. Second, the referral to the international financial markets for 
borrowing556. Simultaneously, the threat of lower international phosphate prices 
turned real, paving the way for a severe hit for the Moroccan economy and the 
GOM budgets. Therefore, the second choice became inevitable. The foreign debt 
increased from $2.9 billion in 1976 to $11.7 in 1984 (equal to 16.5 per cent of 
GDP557) allowing Morocco to join the 15 most indebted countries list558. The World 
Bank and the IMF simplified the Moroccan economic struggle in the need to 
achieve annual growth rates between 5 and 7 per cent. 
With the above-mentioned collapse in development projects and infrastructure, the 
economy could not offer better living standards to citizens nor capable to industrial-
ize the agrarian economy. The economy conserved its stance as an agricultural one, 
primarily dependent on rainfalls, and always threatened by severe droughts. Moreo-
ver, the employment if available was mostly informal allowing it to cover 69 per 
cent in 1971 and around 40 per cent by late 1990s559. In the south, Marrakesh suf-
fered in the 1970s from an extreme drought shaping the food availability and living 
costs. Similar bad economic conditions were featured in the northeast former colo-
ny of Spain that suffered from high unemployment, lack of infrastructure and a 
credit insufficiency for agricultural progress560.  
In 1971, when the Moroccan economy reached a 35 per cent unemployment, Al-
Hoceima a north-eastern province was experiencing solely a 65 per cent. The na-
tional development plan for 1973-77 did not devote lump sum financials to this un-
derprivileged area of Morocco. The residents of Morocco’s underprivileged areas 
had no alternatives other than migrating to the neighbouring Algeria or Western 
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Europe561. The success of migration allowed the Moroccan families in the under-
privileged areas to substantially survive. On the other hand, the failing migration at-
tempts especially at higher frequency due to growing trends when compared to the 
earlier years resulted in further depressed incomes as opposed to rising living 
costs562.  
With the rise of food prices during the 1973-77 by 11.1 per cent exceeding the wage 
increases, the seasonally employed were more aggravated. In addition to the 1981 
economic crisis and referral to the IMF for a package assistance allowed the food 
index to jump by 10.6 per cent from 1973 to 1983. This raised the costs of living 
index by 8 per cent563. The cost of living rises were embraced by the middle classes, 
organized labour and small businessmen who were able to raise their incomes to 
cover the rise in costs. For the unorganized and seasonal labour, the situation was 
exacerbated since the pay rises did not fulfil the cost increases. Hence, the living 
standards deteriorated as of the World Bank report in 1984 realizing that 40 per 
cent of Moroccan population lives in absolute poverty564. 
The EU enforced an economic development policy when entering into agreements 
with the Southern Mediterranean states. It aimed to reach a level of social and polit-
ical stability with its southern neighbours. The EU-Morocco trade and economic 
bonding started in 1976. The launch was the European Economic Community con-
clusion of the Cooperation Agreement with the GOM565. The agreement covered a 
set of tariff reductions varying between 30 and 40 per cent, the liberalization of the 
EU’s industrial sector offering an opportunity for Moroccan exports. More im-
portantly, it proliferated the financial support directed by the EU to the GOM from 
€339 to €1167 million566.  
The EU successfully sealed the position as Morocco’s main trading partner. Moroc-
can exports flowing to the EU expanded from less than 4 per cent in 1960s to near-
ly 47 per cent by the 1990s, especially with the enlargement of the EU to involve 
Spain and Portugal567. The composition of exports changed from agricultural prod-
ucts and food representing 55 per cent and mineral ores of 35 per cent in the 1960s 
to only 25 and 6.5 per cent respectively in the 1990s. In turn, the electrical engineer-
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ing and chemicals increased from 0.46 and 1.2 to 9.3 and 8 per cent respectively. 
The overvalued Moroccan dirham (to account for less debt burdens) had always 
countered the Moroccan products competitiveness in international markets568. Fur-
thermore, it raised imports, which recorded their peak in the fiscal year 1976-77569. 
The new Moroccan ruling elite preserved its stance towards the private sector. 
However, it was interested in Moroccan entrepreneurs owning the economic activi-
ty and not foreigners seeking further nation building and cohesion. These plans 
were supported by the GOM entering in joint ventures with foreign investors to es-
tablish investments. By the 1970s, the increase in the international phosphate prices 
in conjunction with the oil boom, Morocco exploited its rentier natural resource. 
The exploitation expanded the GOM’s size, its welcoming public employment sys-
tem accepted more beneficiaries. The downturn began with the decline in the oil 
prices. The ambitious development plans became unattainable and the GOM start-
ed to struggle with its financials. 
III.D.3 Debt Crisis and Conclusion of Structural Adjustment Programs 
(1980s – 1990s) 
The second period under investigation focuses on the outcomes of the GOM ex-
pansion in economic activity. The success of these policies was conditioned upon 
meeting a set of conditions. Non-compliance with these conditions, pushed the 
GOM into the accumulation of foreign debt and the necessity of applying for finan-
cial assistance from the international financial institutions. 
(A) Government intervention and economic downturn  
The economy suffered a downturn in the 1980s resulting in the accumulation of 
foreign indebtedness. The debt was necessary for the GOM to pursue its proposed 
investment and development plans. The economic circumstances experienced at the 
late 1970s paved the way for a twin deficit570. On the balance of payments side, the 
foreign debt in 1986 reached $11 billion, with a servicing cost skyrocketing from 
700 million dirhams in 1976 to 5 billion dirhams in 1983. Imports realized 14.3 mil-
lion dirhams in 1979 from only 10.4 million dirhams in 1975. Thus, a trade deficit 
 
568 Bouoiyour, Rey 2005 307-9 
569 Bertola, Faini 1990 274 
570 Goldin et al. 1992 95 
  111  
emerged, especially that Morocco turned from a cereals net exporter in the 1950s to 
importing nearly 50 per cent of its domestic needs571.  
On the business side, the GOM held a significant share in the main Moroccan eco-
nomic entities including the national airline, the telephone company, banks, petrole-
um refinery, the main phosphate mining entity along with 700 other companies572. 
The chambers of commerce and the business press criticized the extensive GOM 
intervention in the economic activity. The examples of intervention included; intro-
ducing red tape measures and taxes affecting negatively the business environment’s 
openness and attractiveness. The GOM was interested in privatizing its business 
ownerships, however, the private sector’s lack of capacity to operate these compa-
nies postponed execution573.  
The outcomes of the large GOM’s economic size were contradicting. The first clas-
sical view paired the GOM role in economics with the inefficiencies deterring 
growth. The second view praised the GOM especially with the presence of an un-
derdeveloped private sector. Under this view, public investments acted as market 
stimulants spilling over developmental effects on the private sector. The empirical 
findings supported the first view blaming GOM’s spending policies for deterring 
economic growth574. In consequence, decision makers realized the importance of 
diversification and the need to concentrate on promoting the private manufacturing 
and services sectors. This implied GOM’s ceasing of its rentier behaviour primarily 
dependent on the phosphate exportation575. 
The economy throughout the 1960s and 1970s recorded averages of 4 per cent 
growth. These averages did not last in the 1980s, where the growth slowed to an av-
erage of 3.8 per cent576. The reasons for the downturn include; first, the significant 
decline in the phosphate international prices foregoing one of the main revenues for 
the whole economy577. The second reasoning was the drop in Moroccan migrant 
workers’ remittances inflows, due to the 1970s impact of oil shock stagflation expe-
rience in Europe and its subsequent recession578.  
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Third, the non-delivery of the pledged foreign grants during which the economy 
was witnessing a soared import demand579. Fourthly, and more importantly, the un-
precedented drought evidenced in 1981 ruined the agricultural output leading to 
food shortages and a spread of rural urban migration580. Fifthly, the trade re-
strictions and quotas imposed by the European states over imports of Moroccan 
fruits. Also, the involvement in Western Sahara war worsened the situation more581.  
Gregory Joffee blamed two other reasons for the economic downturn and the diffi-
culty to develop the economy’s underinvestment endogenously. The first reason 
was colonialism. Colonialists left Morocco dependent mostly on labour and a less 
capital-intensive economy. As a result, the economy remained under-industrialized, 
dependent on the cultivation and exportation of primary agricultural products to 
mainly France and the European Union582. Secondly, the demographic expansion 
mounted the pressures on the economic indicators. The expansion was experienced 
on two levels; the high population growth and the rise in the rural urban migra-
tion583. 
(B) Morocco’s formal referral to the IMF’s assistance 
The GOM tried to adjust for the mounting debt crisis through executing a set of 
emergency austerity measures. The measures included; budget and public invest-
ment cuts, freezing public servants’ wages and introducing a privatization plan. The 
budgeted spending cut reflected in lower subsidies for primary products and less 
social security support. This negatively influenced the poorer classes and burdened 
the middle one. By May 1981, a plan of subsidies alleviation and price increases was 
executed584. This pushed the products’ prices to an upsurge ranging between 14 and 
77 per cent. The public dissatisfaction forced the regime to slash such increases in 
one-week time585. The dissatisfaction was evident in demonstrations that even 
turned violent in several cities586.  
The referral to International Financial Institutions as the World Bank and the IMF 
was the only available solution587. The negotiations succeeded in 1983 to conclude 
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the Moroccan SAP588. This had put Morocco as the first North African to engage in 
a SAP589. The “Washington Consensus” of the IMF was the condition for receiving the 
institution’s support. The IMF package totalled to nine interventions from 1980 to 
1993. Six debt rescheduling plans were pursued with the Paris Club and three com-
mercial with the London Committee590. The conditions list covered privatization, 
currency devaluation, government spending austerity, relaxing export and import 
restrictions, inflation targeting and finally the promotion of foreign direct invest-
ments591. 
The first policy examined under the SAP was the privatization592. By privatizing 
state owned enterprises, the GOM abandoned its role in leading the economy in fa-
vour of the private sector. The GOM waived its obligations to create wealth and 
jobs to the private sector through stimulating economic efficiency and entrepre-
neurship593. In fact, the privatization plan was effected only by the 1990s. For ex-
ample, the privatization of SAMIR Company was implemented in 1997 after float-
ing it in CSE in 1996594. Again, the Moroccan elites - in a manner similar to that of 
the decolonization period - managed to benefit from the privatization plan in 
strengthening their economic power within the economy595. The process was pub-
licly criticized for the lack of transparency and corruption596. 
The second policy under the SAP was the trade liberalization through the reduction 
of import tariffs and quantitative restrictions597. This included; firstly, the elimina-
tion of the Special Import Tariff. It was replaced with a uniform duty imposed on 
the CIF imports’ value. Secondly, the reduction of the tariffs’ maximum from 400 
per cent in 1983 to only 60 and 45 per cents in 1984 and 1985 respectively598. By 
January 1988, and interested in raising the fiscal revenues rather than industrial pro-
tection, the Special Import Tariff and the customs duties were combined to initiate 
the fiscal imports levy. This levy was at 12.5 per cent of the imports. In effect, the 
new levy was higher than the total duty rate prevailing under the two abolished tar-
iff systems.  
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Thirdly, and on the quantitative restrictions side, the restrictions were gradually 
dismantled from 1984 to 1989. The List B products in need for licensing approvals 
were mostly transferred to List A where no licenses are required599. Furthermore, 
the prohibited imports list C was abolished in 1986600. This trade integration ad-
versely affected the GOM’s revenues. The GOM’s revenues only began to accumu-
late positively by 1986, with the introduction of the value added tax as another IMF 
policy recommendation601. 
The third policy of the IMF conditional funding was the cut on public spending and 
austerity602. The austerity policies were formulated on two tiers. The first concen-
trated on the subsidies cuts. Subsidy cuts were introduced in August 1983. These 
cuts had hit all the basic products at different rates, with tea largely consumed by 
lower classes rising by 77 per cent, butter proliferated by a half and cooking oil 
surged by 18 per cent. By January it was concluded that basic food items have fea-
tured on average a 20 per cent price increase. The second tier of austerity was 
demonstrated in the GOM’s refrainment to invest in its publicly provided utilities 
including health, education and transportation. Public investments share in the 
budget fell 13 per cent in 1982 to only 4 per cent in 1986603. Capital expenditure was 
restricted to only 5 per cent of GDP604.  
The first wave of price soaring in 1981 was accepted by the public as an emergency 
non-frequent move. However, when the GOM proposed similar cuts in the 1984’s 
budget, Moroccans were not ready for accepting additional burden605. In 1984, the 
students of Marrakesh rejected rises in their schooling tuition igniting protests, and 
were later supported by the deprived residents of Marrakesh in what was later called 
“bread riots”606. The 1984 protests can be easily linked to deprivation, disadvantage, 
unemployment and inequality607. 
The implications of IMF and World Bank funded SAPs were studied by several 
scholars, especially on the main two public utilities including; education and health. 
First a new two tier educational system was established, where students affording 
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private schooling enrol in it608. Second, although 30 per cent of Moroccans benefit-
ed from the health insurance, public hospitals had absent doctors, obsolete equip-
ment and medications. The austerity program forced the GOM to instigate a new 
civil servants’ hiring strategy with a ceiling of annually appointing only 10,000 em-
ployees609. This reduced the GOM’s annual job creation to only 10,000 and 15,000 
throughout 1983 to 1994 after reaching at 40,000 for the period 1979 to 1982610. 
Other complementary policies included the provision for early retirement schemes 
and non-automatic replacement of employees and later wage freezes611.  
The decline in GOM’s spending shaped job creation levels for poor country-side 
migrants who became more burdensome and pressuring the stability of these cities 
and the GOM itself612. The unemployment experienced in Morocco had two char-
acteristics. First, it was more urban613 by recording a 20.3 per cent in 1994 after be-
ing only 12.3 in 1982. On the rural side, the unemployment increased only from 9.5 
to 10.8 per cent during the same period. Second, it was spread among educated in-
dividuals. The data provided that urban unemployment reached 18.3 per cent in 
2002, among which 32.3 are university graduates compared to 5.6 per cent unem-
ployment between uneducated calibres. The reason was the GOM’s reduction in 
hiring since graduates were mostly serving in governmental positions614. The trap of 
poverty swelled to an unofficial rate of 14 per cent. Moreover, 25 per cent remain 
were threatened to join in case the policies enacted continued615. 
By the turn of the 1980s, Morocco suffered from a set of simultaneous changes ag-
gravating its position forcing the formal application for the IMF financial assistance. 
Of these changes were the decline in the international phosphate prices, the drought 
hitting the Moroccan agricultural activity and the plunge in remittances accompany-
ing the oil shocks of Europe. The IMF’s program was pillared upon trade deregula-
tion through abolishing quantitative restrictions and cutting tariffs, freezing the 
GOM hiring plans and finally launching the public-sector privatization process. 
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III.D.4 Economic Openness and Market Deregulation (1990s – 2000s) 
The third period under examination is aligned with the economy’s status in the 
post-IMF program. The section intends specifically to address the impacts of the 
IMF SAP on the Moroccan economy’s pillars including; the public-sector privatiza-
tion, the exchange rate reform and remittances, the budget deficit control and the 
trade 
(A) IMF Structural Adjustment effects 
The deterioration in the economy’s basic indicators continued at least in the early 
1990s. First, the unemployment reached a decade record616 of 17 per cent in 1991 
compared to only 13.9 in 1985. In 1992, the employment distribution of the labour 
force was 50 per cent in the fishing and agricultural activities regardless of the sec-
tors annual decrease in participation in the GDP. Secondly, the GDP growth fea-
tured a decline for the years 1989, 1992 and 1993 reaching an annual rate of 5 per 
cent in 1994 down from 8 per cent in 1991617. Growth in the 1990s remained de-
pendent on the climatic conditions affecting the agricultural output. Besides, the 
economic partners’ growth as in the EU and their demand on the Moroccan prod-
ucts618.  
Thirdly, inflation increased in 1990 and 1991 recording a peak of 8 per cent in 1991 
followed by a decline to 5 per cent before slightly rising again in 1995 to more than 
6 per cent619. For the foreign debt, the IMF instalments were added to the foreign 
debt. It evidenced its first decline only in the 1990s. The debt maintained its upward 
trend in the 1980s by totalling to $48.9 billion in 1990, while in 2006 recorded only 
$16.6 billion. In terms of GDP per centage, it deteriorated from 125 to 80 and 53.6 
per cent in 1993 and 2007 respectively620. 
On the budget side, the SAP enabled the GOM by late 1990s to control the budget 
deficit around the 2 per cent. In regard to the trade deficit, it preserved its deficit for 
the period between 1991 and 2001. The main factors impacting it were; first, the 
climatic conditions as droughts pressuring the GOM to import more cereal filling 
the demand gap resulting from the decline in domestic output621. Secondly, was the 
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international oil products prices since Morocco is highly dependent on imports in 
meeting its demand for petroleum products622. Finally, the Moroccan dirham over-
valued exchange rate has always exemplified a factor against the competitiveness of 
Moroccan exports in international markets623. 
In the 1990s, the European Union attempted to counteract the African migration, 
seek regional stability and economic prosperity in the Mediterranean and especially 
North Africa. A major conference was convened in Barcelona by 1995 to refresh 
the long-term bilateral economic ties between the EU and the Middle Eastern and 
North African countries initiated since 1969624. The proposed economic coopera-
tion was based on technology transfer and investment flows adopting a neoliberal 
stance. The arrangement stressed setting a friendly environment for the private sec-
tor either foreign or domestic to lead the Moroccan economic activity625.  
The signing of the Association Agreement in 1996 signalled the necessity of further 
openness. The GOM was under obligation to reform its specified economic sectors. 
The aim is to raise their competitiveness and enable them to survive in a competi-
tive market626. The Association Agreement second plan was the initiation of a Free 
Trade Area over a transitional period of 12 years commencing from 1996627. The 
way was paved for the gradual elimination of customs and tariffs on European 
products permitting their free access to Moroccan markets. This troubled the Mo-
roccan manufacturers who lack the competitiveness necessary to survive under this 
higher competition with the European products628. 
(B) Post-IMF Structural Adjustment Plan 
The GOM appointed in March 1998 concentrated on maintaining a prudent fiscal 
budget balance629. It intended to confirm compliance with the SAP programs out-
comes as in 1990s.The new government was tested over several economic prob-
lems. First, in combating unemployment, the data witnessed an increase in unem-
ployment rate from a 17 per cent in 1997 to a 23 per cent in 2001. Second, with an 
annual labour force growth of 3 per cent. Analysts calculated an average economic 
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growth of 6 per cent is required to assure a job creation rate meeting the labour 
force growth. In fact, the annual average recorded growth from 1991 to 1998 was 
only 1.9 per cent630. 
Third, the GOM could not progress the economic transformation plan towards be-
ing more industrial. Hence, the droughts maintained their outcomes as in the 1999-
2000631. First, a downfall in GDP growth since agriculture constitutes 17 per cent of 
the GDP. Second, when employing around half of the labour force, droughts in-
creased unemployment. The failure to diversify created a volatile economy realizing 
11.5 per cent growth in 1996 followed by a slump to -2.2 per cent in 1997. Expect-
edly, the income per capita recorded $1,300, which when compared to neighbouring 
Maghreb countries appeared vulnerable632. By 1999, the data revealed a growing 
non-agricultural sector at only 3 per cent annually. The industry spread close to the 
three coastal cities of Casablanca, Kenitra and Rabat. A population share of 15 per 
cent was employed in industrial activities. The principal industry focus was the 
phosphate related products, followed by foodstuffs including olive oil, vegetables 
and etc.633. 
Fourth, on the poverty alleviation level, the GOM featured difficulties. The number 
of inhabitants falling below the poverty line (having an income of less than 10 Dir-
hams a day) mounted from 13 to 19 per cent of the population for the period from 
1991 to 1999634. The per centage was split into 10 per cent in extreme poverty and 
another 30 per cent were vulnerable. The rural population’s marginalization was as-
certained through several data. The water did not access 63 per cent of the rural ar-
eas, access to electricity was for only 13 per cent and only 7 per cent reached 
healthcare635.  
The gross remittances flowing to Morocco skyrocketed to $2.1 billion in 1992 com-
pared to only $23 million in 1968. This trend did not continue throughout the 
1990s. Remittances stagnated at the same level before jumping by 2001 to reach 
$3.3 billion. Analysts argued that the 2001 jump was due to euro introduction. Mo-
roccan migrants depositing their savings in different European local currencies in 
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Moroccan banks benefited by changing them to dirhams without justifying 
sources636.  
The three means of transferring remittances were banks, postal orders and cash. By 
the 1980s, money transfers through the banking system prevailed over the postal 
office orders. In 1995, the permission for Moroccans to open foreign currency bank 
accounts eased transfers through banks637. On the other hand, cash transfers signi-
fied a 22.5 per cent of the total remittances. This rate nearly tripled in 2001 from 6.8 
to 16.2 billion dirhams They preserved their steady trend and led the economy’s 
sources of foreign currency by averaging at 6.4 per cent of Morocco’s GNP in the 
1990s638.  
For the reasons introduced above, regarding the GOM economic activity, by 1997-8 
and from 719 SOEs, the GOM owned a majority in around 351 entities. Of the 
351, 244 enterprises fully owned by GOM and 107 with GOM’s ownership exceed-
ing 50 per cent of shares. The 719 enterprises in the 1980s participated with only 17 
per cent in Morocco’s GDP639. The GOM investment in the SOEs signified 22 per 
cent of the economy’s total investments. SOEs employed nearly 200,000 Moroccans 
who received around 43 per cent of the Morocco’s budget wage bill. On the other 
hand, by 1998, only 56 out of 112 enterprises were privatized mostly of a profitable 
nature. Therefore, the privatization process allowed the flow of revenues since 1995 
accumulating to 13.5 billion dirhams, while the expenditure did not decrease as pro-
jected640. With half of the targeted SOEs, the GOM was criticised for its sluggish 
progress in complying with privatization pre-set goals. 
III.D.5 Conclusion 
The section of Morocco in chapter III was divided into the same skeleton of Egypt 
and Jordan to facilitate the process of comparison between the country studies and 
in order to trace easily the differences and similarities. The similarities represent an 
essential part in reasoning the choice of three country studies for undertaking such 
research project. Moreover, the historical developments until the 2000s are the base 
from which the economic chapter of the research project will kick start. Finally, the 
historical analysis will assist in analysing the protectionist and investments re-
 
636 Lahnait, North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Public Diplomacy Division 2009 134 
637 Besharov, López 2016 404 
638 Haas, Plug 2006 611-4 
639 Sullivan 1986 68 
640 Mouna 2000 5 
  120  
strictions still traced in the country studies since the era of nationalism and wide 
state intervention. The main witnessed similarities highlighting the prevailing eco-
nomic orientation can be listed based on each time period under examination. 
To begin with, the first period in each country study was titled “Independence and State 
Intervention” elapsing from the 1940s until the 1970s. Politically speaking, Morocco 
secured its independence and decolonization in 1956. During this economic period, 
the GOM expanded its economic role within the new state. Features of governmen-
tal intervention include; the introduction of the Morocconization legislation to re-
strict foreign ownership of entities, the exploitation of discovered rentier position 
based on phosphate exportation, magnified its public investment in infrastructure 
establishing new public entities as SAMIR in Morocco.  
On the trade level, import substitution – as globally executed – was implemented in 
Morocco to support the domestic production. The fall in rentier benefits experi-
enced in late 1970s and 1980s in phosphate negatively influenced the Moroccan 
budget. These factors severed the economic situation in Morocco who could not 
afford the expansionary fiscal policies paving their ways to the second phase titled 
“Debt Crisis and Conclusion of Structural Adjustment Programs”. This period was princi-
pally characterized with budget deficit and foreign debt. Examples of other worsen-
ing conditions include unexpected droughts in Morocco. All of the above incidents 
in total accumulated foreign debt with continuous failures to service it, forcing Mo-
rocco to revert for IMF assistance more than once within a decade period.  
The adjustment programs as part of the 1980s Washington Consensus executed in 
developing economies experiencing debt crises, were enforced in Morocco. The 
programs allowed Morocco to reach the “Economic Openness and Market Deregulation” 
era prevailing until the 2000s. Examples of enforceable policies include austerity and 
currency devaluation reaching 9.25 in Morocco. This period highlighted the intro-
duction of privatization programs with a slower pace of implementation in the Mo-
roccan case where only 66 companies were privatized. Moreover, the deregulation 
process was evidenced in a series of market oriented policies enforced in Morocco 
including the introduction of investment laws targeting the attraction of domestic 
private sector as well as FDI. The creation of tax incentives and free zones were the 
basic methods of attraction. 
  121  
III.E Comparative Conclusions 
III.E.1 Introduction 
The conclusion of the economic history chapter is divided in the same skeleton for 
the three country studies in order to facilitate the process of comparison between 
them and to follow the differences and similarities. The similarities identified be-
tween the three country studies is a critical part of justifying the choice of these 
three country studies specifically. The chapters address the historical developments 
until the 2000s, when the economic chapter of the thesis will focus more. Finally, 
the historical analysis will assist in analysing (i) the transformation in the orientation 
of the policy-makers from highly regulated markets to deregulated ones, and (ii) the 
heritage of protectionist policies and investments restrictive legislations still in place 
in the country studies since the era of nationalism and wide state intervention. The 
main witnessed similarities highlighting the prevailing economic orientation can be 
listed based on each time period under examination.  
From the three-time periods under examination within chapter III, the conclusion 
provides an overview for the main policies similarly implemented in the three coun-
try studies. This will serve two objectives within the thesis. First, it highlights the 
similar challenges, policies and solutions applied by the policy-makers when ad-
dressing the economic difficulties experienced by the three country studies. Second, 
it provides an insight for the background of the policy-makers in the three country 
studies when introducing legislations that are possibly still effective and could be 
hostile towards foreign investors (e.g., imposing restrictions on foreign investors 
ownerships in companies) as further discussed in the chapter IV. 
III.E.2 Independence and State Intervention 
To begin with, the first period in each studied country was titled “Independence and 
State Intervention” elapsing at earliest from the 1940s until the 1970s. The main theme 
in the three country studies for that period was expanding the role played by the 
central governments in an attempt to control and monitor the economic activity 
taking place within the economies of the three country studies. During this period, 
the central governments intensively intervened in the economic activity in various 
ways as exemplified in each of the three country studies. The general orientation fa-
voured a big government benefiting from rentier positions, in conjunction with lim-
ited private sector presence, if any. In addition, a hostile approach was evident in 
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guaranteeing protections and treating foreign investors, as a retaliation for the very 
recent colonization. 
(A) Egypt 
Egypt secured its independence and decolonization in 1952. During this economic 
period, the GOE expanded its economic role within the new State. Features of 
GOE intervention included; the re-introduction of the Egyptianisation legislation to 
restrict foreign ownership of companies and the nationalization of the Suez Canal in 
1956. Also, Nasser’s “Socialist Revolution” entailing the private businesses expropria-
tion wave of 1961. Other private sector limitation policies enacted were; (i) the 
pledge of guaranteed state employment to all university graduates, (ii) the introduc-
tion of rent controls and (iii) land reforms legislations setting ownership maximums. 
The October War marked a turning point in Egypt’s modern economic history 
since it featured the first openness attempt towards the private sector. This was evi-
dent in the introduction of the Arab and Foreign Investment Law No. 43 of 1974. 
(B) Jordan 
Jordan secured its independence and decolonization in 1946. During this economic 
period, the GOJ interested in consolidating its power over the new State engaged in 
direct businesses connections with the private sector. The historical incidents fea-
turing the GOJ’s intervention include; the expansion in GOJ’s job offerings and the 
introduction of subsidies. It is important to highlight the role played by the foreign 
financial assistance in (i) backing the budgets of the GOJ (ii) funding imports and 
(iii) mitigating the fiscal burdens of the 1967 and 1973 wars. The foreign aid magni-
fied the public investment pursued by the GOJ in the fields of infrastructure and 
establishing new business entities. On the trade level, import substitution – as glob-
ally executed – and were implemented in Morocco to support domestic production. 
(C) Morocco 
Morocco secured its independence and decolonization in 1956. During the post-
colonial period, Morocco’s private sector led the economic activity before the 
GOM decided to step-in and expand its economic role within the new State. The 
expansion was based on widening GOM’s control over the economy’s activities af-
ter the almost complete control of foreigners. Examples of GOM’s expansion in 
economic activity include; the (i) introduction of the Morocconisation program in 
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1973 setting a maximum limit over the foreigners’ shareholding per centage in 
companies, (ii) magnified public investment in infrastructure through establishing 
new public entities jointly with the private sector as in the case of SAMIR. The 
GOM’s intervention in economic activity was supported by (i) the inflows of remit-
tances from Moroccans migrating to Europe and (ii) exploiting the rentier position 
resulting from the exportation of the mineral ore of phosphate. 
III.E.3 Debt Crisis and Conclusion of Structural Adjustment Programs  
The second period under investigation focused on the outcomes of the govern-
ments expansion in economic activity in the three country studies. The main theme 
during this period was the incapacity of the central governments to preserve their 
high intervention levels in the economic activity. This created fiscal crises in the 
country studies pushing them to apply for financial assistance from the international 
financial institutions. During this period, the central governments of the three coun-
try studies did not have the capacity to proceed with their pursued expansionary fis-
cal policies. The referral to the international financial institutions (e.g., IMF) was 
subject to the policies prescribed under the Washington Consensus of the 1980s. 
The Consensus entailed policies including mainly; (i) liberalizing trade (e.g., cutting 
tariffs) and domestic markets (e.g., abolishing price controls), (ii) reaching macroe-
conomic stability (e.g., bringing budget deficit into control through austerity). 
(A) Egypt 
The start of the second phase was characterized by dependence on exporting oil 
and strategically receiving financial support from western powers through aligning 
with the US policy in the MENA region. The eruption of the Iraq-Iran war and the 
fall in oil prices affected negatively the rentier benefits and the GOE’s budgets. 
These factors severed the economic situation in Egypt which began to feature un-
sustainable triple deficits and could not afford the expansionary fiscal policies. This 
paved Egypt’s way to the second phase titled “Debt Crisis and Conclusion of Structural 
Adjustment Programs”.  
The period was principally characterized with (i) cutting the budget deficit through 
severe austerity measures and (ii) the accumulation of the foreign debt. The contin-
uous failures to service the growing foreign, forced Egypt to revert to the IMF for 
assistance more than once within a decade. During the austerity phase, the popula-
tion resisted through engaging in the bread riots of 1977. The launch of the Iraqi 
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invasion of Kuwait in 1990 worsened the situation further by pressuring downward 
the remittances of Egyptians abroad in Iraq and Kuwait. 
(B) Jordan 
For the Jordanians, the slump in oil prices after the eruption of the Iran-Iraq War 
limited the granted Arabian assistance to Jordan. The GOJ (i) referred to interna-
tional debt markets to cover up its financial needs, and (ii) adopted a trade restric-
tive policy to moderate its current account deficit. The (i) continued expansionary 
fiscal policy severed the economic situation Jordan, (ii) mounting foreign debt, and 
(iii) delayed debt repayments paved GOJ’s way to the second phase titled “Debt Cri-
sis and Conclusion of Structural Adjustment Programs”. 
The GOJ concluded a stand-by agreement with the IMF in 1989. With public em-
ployees lay-offs and subsidies cuts, the austerity plan triggered the bread riots of 
1989. Another worsening update was King Hussein’s from joining the international 
coalition of liberating Kuwait from the Iraqi invasion. Examples of the worsening 
conditions include the (i) expulsion of the Jordanian expatriates in the GCC, (ii) de-
cline in GCC and US financial assistance, and (iii) disruption of trade flows due to 
the war in Iraq being the main trading partner of Jordan. 
(C) Morocco 
As part of the expansionary fiscal policy adopted due to the phosphate exports, the 
GOM expanded its intervention in various economic activities in Morocco. Its con-
tinuation resulted in a twin-deficit with possibly negative impacts on the economy’s 
growth rates. The economic downturn due to several reasons including (i) lower 
phosphate prices, (ii) lower migrants’ remittances, (iii) demographic pressures and 
etc. negatively influenced the Morocco’s budgets. This paved the way to the second 
phase titled “Debt Crisis and Conclusion of Structural Adjustment Programs”.  
The GOM concluded a stand-by agreement with the IMF in 1983. The agreement 
required the GOM to implement a plan of (i) privatization, (ii) alleviation of subsi-
dies and (iii) trade liberalization. This triggered a wave of bread riots in 1983 against 
the austerity plan. The plan was executed at different speeds, with an extreme delay 
in the privatization one when compared to the cutting of subsidies. The continuous 
austerity resulted in (i) additional poverty rates pressuring the stability of the GOM, 
(ii) lower quality of public services including health and education. 
  125  
III.E.4 Economic Openness and Market Deregulation 
The third period under examination is aligned with the economy’s status in the 
post-IMF program. The section intends specifically to address the impacts of the 
IMF SAP on the country studies’ economic pillars including; the public-sector pri-
vatization, the exchange rate reform and remittances, the budget deficit control and 
the trade. The main theme within this section is the obvious continuation of the 
transformation towards the market-oriented policies and openness of the domestic 
markets for investments (in compliance with Washington Consensus and the condi-
tionality of the IMF). The deregulation process of the domestic markets of invest-
ment was evident in the three country studies in policies like (i) limiting the role of 
central governments in economic activity (e.g., privatization), (ii) openness to foreign 
investors (e.g., introduction of investment laws guaranteeing partially a standardised 
treatment and protections to FDI). This phase will be more under discussion within 
the following legal chapter since it focuses more on the developments in the domes-
tic legal rules of the country studies in favour of openness to investments and free 
market forces interaction. 
(A) Egypt 
Egypt’s engagement with the IMF during the 1990s comprised of three stand-by 
agreements. Starting by the liberalization of interest and exchange rates, the policy-
makers prioritized the restoration of confidence in the economy. The implementa-
tion of the SAP allowed Egypt to reach the “Economic Openness and Market Deregula-
tion” era prevailing until the 2000s. Examples of enforceable policies include (i) en-
hancing the efficiency of the SOEs, (ii) the partial elimination of subsidies, (iii) cur-
rency devaluation of 56.7 per cent in 1987 followed by a 23.4 per cent in 1991, (iv) 
launching the privatization programs where Egypt secured annual revenues of 3.5 
per cent of GDP, and (v) the deregulation process was evidenced in the introduc-
tion of the Investment Law targeting the attraction of domestic private sector as 
well as FDI. The creation of tax incentives and free zones were the basic methods 
of attraction. 
(B) Jordan 
With negative outcomes on the rates of state-employment, steep rise costs of living, 
an under-control budget deficit, the GOJ was finalizing its engagement with the 
IMF’s SAP. The SAPs of Jordan program allowed the economy to access the third 
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phase denoted as the “Economic Openness and Market Deregulation” era. Examples of 
policies enacted during this era include the alignment with the US and western poli-
cies regarding the peace process in MENA. This allowed Jordan a strategic position, 
where it benefited from generous financial support from the US and the EU. Other 
policies include (i) introducing the privatization program by 1998, (ii) engaging in a 
FTA with the US as well as the Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZ) program with the 
US and Israel, and (iii) the deregulation process evidenced introducing the Invest-
ment Law targeting the attraction of domestic and foreign investors. The creation 
of tax incentives and free zones (e.g., Aqaba Free Zone) were the basic methods of 
attraction. 
(C) Morocco 
The severe outcomes of the SAP implemented in many developing economies as 
part of the Washington Consensus of the 1980s, were evident also in Morocco. The 
implementation of the SAP allowed Morocco to reach the “Economic Openness and 
Market Deregulation” era lasting until the 2000s. Together with the signing of the As-
sociation Agreement with the EU, the remittances played an important role in shap-
ing Morocco’s economic status that controlled its budget deficit after the series of 
austerity policies. Examples of other enforceable policies include (i) introducing the 
privatization programs with a slower pace of implementation where only 66 com-
panies were privatized, and (ii) introducing the investment laws targeting the attrac-
tion of domestic private sector as well as FDI. The creation of tax incentives and 
free zones (e.g., Tangiers Free Zone) were the basic methods of attraction.  
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IV. Legal Framework 
The title of this paper reflects the intent to undertake a comparative analysis be-
tween the enforceable laws and state actions of the countries studied in terms of 
their obligations under international investment law. The approach taken is to assess 
the countries’ legal compliance in two ways. First, there is a focus on the formal le-
gal compliance of the countries’ domestic laws with their international obligations in 
BIT models: in other words, the aim is to develop a ‘checklist’ to analyse the degree 
to which they transpose international investment obligations into their investment-
related domestic legislations. The second part of the analysis (provided in chapter 
V) more practically addresses the cases filed against the three countries under the 
auspices of the ICSID. This will enable an assessment of the countries’ actions re-
garding the obligations prescribed under their BITs concluded with investment 
partners. 
The process of comparing the three countries’ domestic legislation to the prescribed 
international investment obligations requires an understanding of their domestic 
legislations governing foreign investments. This chapter examines the framework of 
Egypt’s, Jordan’s and Morocco’s legislations connected to international investment 
law principles as briefly introduced in chapter II. The analysis provided in chapter 
IV has two objectives. First, it targets narrowing the gap between the international 
investment principles and their adoption in the countries’ domestic laws. The Egyp-
tian Investment Guarantees and Incentives Law No. 8 of 1997641 (IGIL) is the base 
for the benchmarking analysis. Protections provided under the law are compared to 
the protections that the three countries are under obligation – in accordance with 
international investment law and BITs – to guarantee to foreign investors.  
The second objective of this chapter is to analyse the changes in the three countries’ 
legal rules in an attempt to make their investment climates friendlier and more liber-
al in order to attract more FDI than before liberalisation. Changes in the legal rules 
making a country’s legal framework more liberal can be evident in offering investors 
additional guarantees and incentives. Also, the three countries’ legal transformations 
from centrally planned economies towards private sector led ones is directly linked 
to making their economies’ investment climate friendlier and more liberal. This is 
examined through the three countries’ engagement in trade liberalisation and privat-
isation, with positive spill overs on the performance of investments.  
 
641 Law No. 8 of 1997, Investment Guarantees and Incentives Law, Official Gazette, Issue 19 (bis), 
11 May 1997. 
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In this regard, a helpful guide in dealing with the role of legal rules in attracting FDI 
is available in the study of Gray and Jaroz642 regarding legal rules in Central and 
Eastern European. The paper revealed that any host state legislation seeking the at-
traction of FDI should: (i) rationalise factor prices (e.g., allow foreign ownership of 
immovable property and repatriation of profits); (ii) reduce transaction costs (e.g., 
cost of establishing a green-field investment), and (iii) allocate risks (e.g., guarantees 
against a government’s expropriation). The more rationalised the factor prices, the 
lower the transaction costs and the more guarantees against risks, the higher the 
possibility of an economy’s attracting FDI.  
The following sections on Egypt’s, Jordan’s and Morocco’s legal frameworks are di-
vided into three subsections that provide an overview of: the country’s legal frame-
work, international investment obligations from each country’s legal perspective, 
and each country’s openness to the private sector through privatisation or trade lib-
eralisation. 
IV.A Egypt: Legal Framework 
IV.A.1 Introduction 
The Egyptian IGIL and the Investment Law No. 72 of 2017643 (IL) will be the base 
for the benchmarking analysis. Protections provided in the law are compared 
against the protections Egypt is under obligation to guarantee for foreign investors 
under international investment law and BITs. 
Egypt’s legal framework chapter is divided into three subheadings covering: the 
overview of the Egyptian legal framework, international investment obligations 
from an Egyptian legal perspective, and openness to the private sector through pri-
vatisation or trade liberalisation. 
IV.A.2 An overview of the legal framework 
Analysing the investment legal framework in Egypt requires starting from the top of 
the legal pyramid before narrowing the research. This analysis commences with the 
constitutional articles that reference and prescribe investments and private owner-
ship, based on the two modern and permanent Egyptian constitutions of 1971 and 
2014. In the second phase, the analysis delves into more details by examining the 
 
642 Gray, Jarosz 1995 
643 Investment Law No. 72 of 2017, Official Gazette, Issue No. 21-bis(c) of 31 May 2017. 
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structure and main components of the IGIL and the IL. A third area covered is in-
centives in general offered under the IGIL to highlight deregulation and openness 
to the private sector and foreign investors. 
(A) Investments in the Constitution 
It is worth providing an insight into Egypt’s constitutional heritage in connection to 
ownership and investments before comparing it with the current prevailing consti-
tutional practice. The first permanent constitution644 under the Egyptian republic 
was promulgated in May 1971 during the transition from Nasser’s Arab socialism to 
Sadat’s rule. During this period, as highlighted in the chapter III, the socialist ideol-
ogy principally framed the policies that were implemented. The Constitution of 
1971 reflected a general sentiment favouring the state’s intervention and central 
planning economics. The socialist inclination is obviously traceable by comparing 
the articles of the Constitution of 1971 to those of 2014. Prior to proceeding with 
the comparison between both constitutions, it is important to review the circum-
stances during which the Constitution of 2014645 came into existence. This Consti-
tution was drawn up after the uprising against President Mubarak and the Muslim 
Brotherhood. It reflected the economic status prevailing while drafting it based up-
on free market interactions and private sector promotion. The new Constitution 
drafters tried to frame the document in a manner that would permit the creation of 
a competitively knowledge-based economy. 
Comparing both constitutions clarifies the shift in the Egyptian society’s preferring 
private over public sector investments. In the Constitution of 1971, the prevailing 
tone prioritised the public sector and the working classes union as the cornerstones 
of the Egyptian state. This view was transformed in the Constitution of 2014 that 
translated the prevailing economic conditions by the time of the drafting of the 
constitution. These conditions arose after years of continuous attempts to restruc-
ture the economy from the 1980s until today. Hence, the Constitution of 2014 ap-
peared more investor- and private-sector friendly, allowing these actors to partici-
pate in providing basic services as well as protection against state actions. 
To facilitate the process of comparing constitutions, a set of words will be used to 
evidence the ideological shift from a regulated, entry-restricted economy, towards a 
market based and liberalised one. The three words used for this comparison are “so-
 
644 Constitution 1971, Official Gazette, Issue 36 (bis) (a), 12 September 1971. 
645 Constitution 2014, Official Gazette, Issue 3 (bis) (a), 18 January 2014.  
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cialist”, “private” and “investment”. The comparison depends on checking the number 
of times any of these three words was used in the 1971 and the 2014 constitutions. 
The hypothesis is that of a higher reference to “private” and “investment” in the Con-
stitution of 2014 compared to that of 1971. On the other hand, the word “socialist” 
appears fewer times in the Constitution of 2014 than that of 1971. 
The first word is “socialist”, which was located in the Constitution of 1971 constitu-
tion in fourteen articles. The important references to “socialist” highlighted the 
state’s economic system, as in Article 1 that presented Egypt as a “Socialist Democratic 
State” established upon working class alliances. Another instance of the word was 
evident in Article 4, clearly laying out Egypt’s economic system as one structured 
upon social democracy, targeting the narrowing of the gap between different in-
come levels and tackling exploitation and justice in duties and expenditure distribu-
tion. Other references to “socialist” were focused on consolidating socialist gains, 
and preserving and spreading the socialist behaviours, conducts and manners. Re-
markably, the public prosecutor was named in Article 179 as the “Socialist Public 
Prosecutor” and was responsible for protecting socialist achievements and committing 
to socialist practices. The latest amendments of the Constitution of 1971 in 2007 
aimed at developing the constitutional articles to represent the free-market orienta-
tion experienced since the Open-Door Policy of 1970s followed by the IMF re-
structuring programs. The amendments focused primarily on restricting or eliminat-
ing any ideologically socialist or leftist senses prevailing in the Constitution of 1971. 
Expectedly, the promulgation of the Constitution of 2014 highlighted the continu-
ous trend of the Egyptian state in favouring the free market and openness. Clear ev-
idence of this was this constitution’s lack of the word “socialist”. This confirms the 
new sense of liberalising the Egyptian economy, boosting the private sector’s role in 
development and abolishing the former state hegemony over economic activity. The 
constitution drafters were clear in replacing the former socialist context of the Con-
stitution of 1971 with a constitution that set out a social contract that more accu-
rately reflected the prevailing sentiment of the economy.  
The second word utilised in comparing both constitutions is “private”. The analysis 
checks “private” only within the context of private ownership. By revisiting the Con-
stitution of 1971, the word “private” was located four times. The first was in Article 
29, prescribing the three forms of ownership as public, private and cooperative. Ar-
ticle 32 defined private ownership as non-exploitative capital. Besides this, the arti-
cle cited the legislative framework’s role in organising such ownership to ensure at-
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taining its socially intended benefit in line with the population’s welfare. The third 
time in which the word “private” was used obliged the state to safeguard private 
ownership and disallowed expropriation unless it was for public interest and against 
statutory compensation. This must be read alongside Article 35, which allowed 
conditional nationalisations if they were in conformity with the law, served public 
interest and occurred in exchange for compensation. The fourth time highlighted 
the state’s welcoming of private ownership of newspapers.  
Alternatively, in the Constitution of 2014, the word “private” is located in eight in-
stances. Of these, some locations are in common with the Constitution of 1971, 
such as types of ownership, plus the allowed private ownership of newspapers. The 
new instances of use of the word emphasised the obligation for the private and 
public sectors to jointly provide services. This prevailed in sectors such as educa-
tion, health and scientific research. The abolishment of the state’s right to national-
ise all types of private property and investments was a remarkable step towards the 
state’s promotion of a free market. Moreover, the state’s right to lawful requisitions 
serving the public interest was conditional upon the payment of advance “fair com-
pensation” to the injured party and by virtue of law.  
From the above, three developments can be deduced. First, the use of the word 
“private” within the ownership context doubled between both constitutions. This 
verified the new stance of legislators and how the role of the private sector was 
considered. Second, the drafters of the Constitution of 2014 – grasping the short-
comings of nationalisation and its harmful impact on a host state’s investment cli-
mate – preferred to abolish the state’s right to expropriate or nationalise private 
property and investments. Third, the requisition right that Article 35 granted to the 
state is not a synonym of “nationalisation”. The validity of the requisition of privately-
owned property is conditional upon this being done by virtue of law, in return for 
advance fair compensation, and must be done only to serve the public interest. 
The third word under analysis is “investment”. Under the Constitution of 1971, this 
word was detected only once in Article 123 in connection with the granting of min-
eral resources exploitation contracts. In revisiting the original Arabic version, it 
clearly stipulates exploitation of natural resources without any reference to the literal 
Arabic meaning of “investment”. Therefore, the role of investments was nearly negli-
gible in the Constitution of 1971.  
The situation is logically different in the Constitution of 2014. The notion of “in-
vestment” is found in four articles, most obviously in the section of the constitution 
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that addresses the country’s economic components. First, under Article 27, the eco-
nomic system encourages investment as part of an overall objective of establishing a 
transparent, competitive and fair economic system that is able to generate jobs and 
confront unemployment. The second reference is in Article 32, which lays out the 
state’s willingness to maximise its use of renewable energy sources by incentivising 
investments in this sector. The third and fourth uses of the “investment” notion are in 
articles 17 and 41, which speak of the state’s obligation to safely invest pension con-
tributions and invest in human capacity development to attain inclusive growth tar-
gets. The “investment” notion in the Constitution of 2014 highlights that the drafters 
understood the concept in a broad manner, embracing both private investments as 
a source of economic activity and obligatory public investments in human devel-
opment. 
The above comparison of the two Egyptian constitutions of 1971 and 2014 helps to 
understand the shift in the Egyptian policymakers’ view of the role of the public 
and private sectors in the economy. The evolution of the articles is obvious when 
analysed from a perspective of the three keywords “socialist”, “private” and “invest-
ment”. The rise in the use of the latter two words in the Constitution of 2014, com-
pared to a complete lack of use of the first word (used fourteen times in the Consti-
tution of 1971) allows the reader to grasp the constitutional drafters’ changed view 
regarding the role of each sector in the larger Egyptian economic picture. As men-
tioned above, the new constitutional articles mirrored the prevailing economic con-
ditions, where the state is deregulating the economy and retreating from economic 
activity in favour of a wider role for the private sector. 
(B) Egyptian investment laws 
The Constitution – being on top of the legislative pyramid – guides the following 
in-depth analysis of the enforceable investment laws. The investment laws through-
out history were the tool through which the Government of Egypt (GOE) signalled 
its interest in attracting investors. These signals were communicated through ex-
panding the guarantees, protections and incentives granted to financial inflows. Be-
fore deeply analysing the prevailing investment framework, it is beneficial to pro-
vide a brief historical overview. As mentioned above, driven by the interest of at-
tracting investment flows, the GOE promulgated the Arab and Foreign Investment 
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Incentives Law No. 43 of 1974646. This law was followed by a set of amendments 
and brand-new investment laws. 
This section analyses the IGIL and IL, first addressing the IGIL and its subsequent 
amendments, and then focussing on the IL. 
- The Investment Guarantees and Incentives Law No. 8 of 
1997  
Globalisation and the waves of deregulation forced the GOE to interact closely 
with the private sector and exert more efforts to adopt the latter’s requests. The 
Egyptian policymakers’ heeding of the private sector’s calls can be seen in the 
promulgation of the IGIL in May 1997. The legislation’s primary objectives were to 
attract investors by cutting transaction costs – by facilitating the establishment of 
investments – and offering a range of tax incentives. Further, the GOE targeted the 
expansion of investments to regions other than the Nile Valley647. The IGIL abol-
ished the former Investment Law No. 230 of 1989648. Additionally, it abolished all 
provisions in other laws governing foreign investments. The legislator’s intent was 
obvious in addressing all foreign investors based on the IGIL provisions649.  
Another intent of the IGIL was to modernise the legal framework governing for-
eign investments in Egypt to stay abreast of updates and changes. Under the law, 
eighteen sectors benefited from the prescribed treatment. These sectors were not 
specifically identified650, as the Cabinet of Ministers was entitled to add any sector to 
the scope of the IGIL651. With the long list of beneficiary investments, the IGIL 
sealed its leading position as influential legislation affecting the majority of foreign-
ers willing to engage in business in Egypt652. The IGIL’s modernity was evident in 
the integration of advanced fields such as technology (e.g., software production) and 
finance (e.g., financial leasing). Another positive characteristic of the IGIL over the 
preceding law was the firm identification of the sectors eligible for the favourable 
treatment under the IGIL653. 
 
646 Law No. 43 of 1974, Arab and Foreign Funds Investment and Free Zones Law, Official Gazette, 
Issue 26, 27 June 1974. 
647 IBP 2009 74. 
648 Law No. 230 of 1989, Investment Law, Official Gazette, Issue 29 (bis A), 20 July 1989. 
649 United Nations Publications 2001 41. 
650 Hashem, Ibrahim and Tawfik Law Office 1998 75. 
651 Article 1 of the IGIL. 
652 El-Dean 2002 24 
653 United Nations Publications 2001 42 
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The IGIL introduced no developments regarding the legal form of incorporated 
businesses, and preserved the three forms of partnership limited by shares, joint 
stock companies and limited liability companies. Incorporation requests are filed 
with the General Authority for Investment and Free Zones (GAFI) as the body re-
sponsible for monitoring fulfilment of establishment conditions and commercial 
registration654. Subsequently, Law No. 94 of 2005655 amended the IGIL and unified 
the legal regime governing the incorporation of companies656.  
Prior to the amendment, the IGIL created its own procedural incorporation process 
parallel to that of Companies Law No. 159 of 1981 (Companies Law)657. This con-
tradiction influenced investors’ certainty and created inconsistencies. Hence, the 
GOE – driven by the interest to facilitate investment – unified the incorporation 
process procedures provided under the Companies Law and the IGIL under the 
former’s regime658. The amendment659 extended the guarantees of the IGIL – in-
cluding, for example, the prohibition of expropriation and the right to free pricing 
without intervention – to other companies incorporated under the previous Com-
panies Law regime. 
- Investment Law No. 72 of 2017 
The Arab Spring uprisings of 2011 negatively influenced investment flows into 
Egypt. The GOE engaged in continuous attempts to attract investments to the 
same level as that reached before the global financial crisis of 2008. The main step 
in these attempts was introducing the IL. As with previous investment legislation, 
the IL’s main objectives are to establish a more investor-friendly business environ-
ment and easing business in Egypt. The IL abolished the IGIL and all its subse-
quent amendments. It is important to highlight that investments benefiting from 
any incentives under the IGIL continue to benefit until the incentives come to a 
natural end660. 
The main highlights of the IL include the endeavour of the Egyptian legislator to 
moderate the risks of investing in Egypt through aligning the articles of the IL with 
international investment law obligations under BITs. An example is the list of defi-
 
654 Hashem, Ibrahim and Tawfik Law Office 1998 75 
655 Law No. 94 of 2005, Amendment of Companies Law No. 159 of 1981 and Investment Guaran-
tees and Incentives Law No. 8 of 1997, Official Gazette, Issue 24 (bis), 21 June 2005. 
656 Ray Jureidini 2010 21 
657 Law No. 159 of 1981, Companies Law, Official Gazette, Issue 40, 01 October 1981. 
658 OECD 2007 25 
659 Article 7 of Law No. 94 of 2005. 
660 Article 2 of the promulgation Articles of the IL. 
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nitions in Article 1 similar to that of BITs. This enhances the understanding and en-
forcement of the IL’s articles (e.g., investment, investor). These highlights send three 
signals. First, the unilateral interest in guaranteeing protection to all domestic and 
foreign investors eliminates the privilege that foreign investors, protected under the 
BITs, had over their domestic counterparts under previous investment laws. Sec-
ond, the alignment of domestic law with BITs provides unilateral protection to the 
nationals of non-BIT signatories. This confirms Egypt’s credibility and interest in 
respecting its obligations under BITs even towards non-protected investors. 
By comparing the scopes of the IGIL and the IL, the IL’s broader scope becomes 
more obvious. The definition of an “investment project” for the purposes of applying 
the IL covers 13 investment sectors (e.g., industry, agriculture, trade, energy)661. The 
IL mentions the eligible sectors in a generic sense. This conveys the interest of the 
legislator to broaden the scope of the IL’s application by entitling more investors to 
its benefits and incentives. Moreover, the IL listed technology as a sector of invest-
ment eligible for the benefits under the IL. The broader use of “technology” further 
proves the wider scope of the IL when compared to the IGIL, which was limited to 
software production. On a geographical side, the IL applies to the entire territory of 
Egypt. However, the IL promotes investments in underdeveloped areas by offering 
higher tax incentives (as detailed below). The IL did not change the legal framework 
governing the legal forms of incorporated businesses under the Egyptian laws. 
The above is intended to familiarise readers with the laws governing the investment 
climate and framework in Egypt. The objectives and targets set out in the laws’ ex-
planatory memorandums reflect continuous efforts, since the 1990s, of the state to 
retreat from economic activity in favour of the private sector and foreign investors. 
The subsections below detail the components of the IGIL and the IL compared to 
international investment law, highlighting Egypt’s development towards further lib-
eralisation and openness. 
(C) Investment laws incentives 
This subsection highlights deregulation efforts in the field of taxation by examining 
tax holidays and exemptions under both laws. A tax holiday or exemption remains 
an obvious example of deregulation, as it lowers the legal burden on an investor in 
terms of taxes due, and at times exempts the taxpayer from filing a tax return.  
 
661 Article 1 of the IL. 
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The first subsection below addresses the IGIL tax incentives, while the second fo-
cuses on the investment incentives granted under the IL. 
- IGIL incentives 
The IGIL, in both its cornerstones of fiscal incentives and guarantees, consolidated 
the sense of deregulation and liberalisation of the Egyptian economy. The guaran-
tees are examined below as part of the comparison with international investment 
obligations662. 
The second part of the IGIL addressed incentives, and specifically tax-related ones. 
These incentives were an example of deregulating the economy, as a tax exemption 
relieves a taxpayer from paying taxes due and even from filing tax returns. First, 
companies were exempted from taxes on business and industrial revenue or profits 
for five years. A ten-year exemption applied to investments established in remote 
areas, new urban communities and new industrial zones. The longest exemption 
lasted for twenty years and applied to investments incorporated away from the Old 
Valley of the Nile in areas determined by a decree of the Cabinet of Ministers. The 
exemption period commenced on the year following that in which production or 
business was commenced. 
An additional important aspect under Article 21 allowed investments with more 
than one exempted activity to commence the exemption period separately for each 
activity. Second, the same article exempted corporate profits, equalling a per centage 
of the paid-in capital, from tax663. This per centage was decided by the Central Bank 
of Egypt (CBE) and was conditional upon the listing of the joint stock company’s 
shares on the stock exchange where the shares were registered. Moreover, profits 
arising because of mergers, divestitures or a change in the investment’s corporate 
legal structure were exempted. 
These exemptions were all terminated by the promulgation of Income Tax Law No. 
91 of 2005 after a debate between two conflicting schools of GOE thought. The 
first group’s argument – supported by pointing out the positive implications of tax 
holidays in boosting investment flows to other emerging economies – was the ne-
cessity to introduce tax holidays to attract foreign investors. The second group 
deemed tax holidays as trivial when undertaking an investment feasibility study. Ad-
 
662 IBP 2015 110 
663 Article 21 of the IGIL. 
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ditionally, a tax holiday meant foregoing revenues for the host state, as investors pay 
their taxes to their home states when repatriating generated profits from host states.  
The second group prioritised the establishment of a generally more favourable in-
vestment climate with less bureaucracy and corruption to stimulate investment 
flows rather than resorting to tax expenditures664. After introducing this argument, 
the final decision was widely ceasing applicable tax incentives and limiting them to 
exemptions of taxes associated with notarisation, stamp duties and registration of 
mortgages, loans, and land sale contracts along with the initial incorporation con-
tracts. The exemption lapsed after a three-year period and was conditional upon its 
connection to the investment’s establishment or actual operations665. 
The IGIL introduced three different types of free zones. The first was the least 
common and prevailed under the whole city free zone structure. The second and 
more precedent in Egypt was the public free zone. The third and the last was the 
private free zone. Egypt public free zone areas were considered to be outside the 
state’s borders and, as a result, several foreign currency, labour, trade and tax laws 
and regulations did not apply to companies incorporated in these zones666. The dif-
ference between the first and the second types was the geographical area constitut-
ing the free zone. For the second and the third forms of free zones, the difference 
was the number of beneficiary investments. Under private free zones, a single in-
vestment could be considered a free zone, while under public free zones, a set of 
investments benefited from privileged treatment667.  
Another significant difference between the three types of free zones was the legal 
framework governing their establishment. Whole city free zones were established by 
laws introduced by parliament. Conversely, public free zones were set up through a 
decree of the Cabinet of Ministers based on a proposal by the GAFI. Although pri-
vate free zones could only be set up by a decree of the GAFI, Article 29 lists three 
conditions to set up a private free zone. The investment had to be operational, ex-
port at least 50 per cent of its production, and meet free zone safety requirements.  
The IGIL guaranteed the same minimum legal benefits to investments in free zones 
as those granted to inland investments, but also applied additional incentives if the 
investment complied with its prescribed purpose under the GAFI-issued licence. 
 
664 El-Dean 2002 25 
665 Hashem, Ibrahim and Tawfik Law Office 1998 77 
666 Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs 2015a 26 
667 General Authority for Investment and Free Zones 2016 
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These incentives included the fact that investments in free zones were not subject 
to Egyptian taxes or custom duties. Investments, until 2005, were exempt from all 
types of taxes including taxes on income and sales. Not being subject to Egyptian 
tax meant the investments in free zones were also exempted from filing tax returns. 
Accordingly, a free zone entity was obviously deregulated when compared to inland 
entities as they are not only exempt from tax but also from filing returns. 
Deregulation included a greater number of work permits being granted to foreign 
expatriates working in Egyptian free zones. Moreover, free zones saw exemptions 
from procedures governing exportation and importation outside of Egypt. Howev-
er, customs duties were applied to goods originating from investments in free zones 
when being imported to the Egyptian market668. Therefore, the transportation of 
goods from free zone areas to the inland was subject to custom duties at check-
points. The second obligation was compliance with social security provisions re-
garding the work force of free zone investments669. Finally, the most important duty 
was under Article 35, which required investments and entities with no goods enter-
ing or exiting the free zone (such as professional services) to pay a flat rate of 1 per 
cent of their annual revenues to the GAFI670. 
The private free zone regime was abolished by the IGIL amendments introduced 
under Law No. 17 of 2015671. However, entities benefiting from the regime were en-
titled to continue enjoying their status until the expiry of their licences. This created 
a contradiction in the legislation that triggered uncertainty among investors.  
Several studies attempted to assess the Egyptian investment framework as a suffi-
cient attractor of foreign investments. El-Mikawy and Handoussa summarised a set 
of weaknesses in the Egyptian investment framework under three points. The first 
weakness identified was the absence of a unified framework to guide reforms. This 
was seen in inconsistent legislative amendments influencing investment inflows in a 
contradictory manner. A clear example was the provision of tax exemptions under 
the IGIL before completely abolishing them in 2005 under Income Tax Law No. 91 
of 2005672. The second weakness was the continuous subsequent legislative inter-
ventions amending or partially abolishing preceding laws, creating a loss of legisla-
tive harmony, clarity and raising investor’s uncertainty. The third weakness was that 
 
668 Abdallah 2001 69 
669 Hashem, Ibrahim and Tawfik Law Office 1998 80-1 
670 Abdallah 2001 69 
671 Law No. 17 of 2015, Amendment of the Investment Guarantees and Incentives Law No. 8 of 
1997, Official Gazette, Issue 11 (continued), 12 March 2015. 
672 Law No. 91 of 2005, Income Tax Law, Official Gazette, Issue 23 (continued), 09 June 2005. 
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the speed of the legislative process negatively influenced its credibility: the speedy 
approval of laws without proper serious discussion lowered the integrity of the laws 
for both investors and the public. Accordingly, the swift promulgation of laws at 
times resulted in doubts regarding their constitutionality673.  
Another weakness, explained by the Egyptian Centre Economic and Social Rights 
(ECESR), considered the IGIL as being biased toward the petroleum, construction 
and, to a lesser extent, the financial sectors. This meant disregarded labour-intensive 
industries, which lessened the impact of FDI on inclusive growth possibilities. FDI 
did now flow towards new fields of investments (i.e., green field investments); how-
ever, they were mostly represented in mergers and acquisitions. In 2012, Egypt se-
cured the first position within Arab economies in mergers and acquisitions after 
France Telecom acquired 100 per cent of Mobinil. These investment examples raise 
the same set of questions regarding the validity of FDI inflows’ developmental im-
pact, whether in the form of potential transfer of technology or know-how and the 
possibility of introducing new industries674. 
- IL incentives 
The IL – with the same objective as the IGIL in attracting private investments – in-
troduced a similar set of fiscal incentives. The IL preserves incentives such as those 
provided under the IGIL. This applies to the continuation of the free zones regime, 
including its three forms: (i) city, (ii) public, and (iii) private. The IL re-introduced 
the private free zones regime after its abolishment in 2015675. The tax incentives 
granted to the free zone investment projects under the IGIL were transferred to the 
IL, though the fees applicable upon free zone investment projects under the IGIL 
were slightly increased under the IL676. Additionally, the GAFI remained in place 
without any changes under the IL. 
The new tax incentives offered under the IL are special incentives677, taking the 
form of a tax deduction (deductible from the taxable income) and applicable to in-
vestment projects that: (i) begin after the introduction of the IL, and (ii) are located 
within the investment map678. Two tax deduction rates are available depending on 
 
673 Louis, M., El-Mahdy, A. and Handoussa, H. 2004 55 
674 Sherif, N., Khalil, H. and Zayed, H. 2015 82 
675 4th Article of Law No. 17 of 2015. 
676 The old fees applicable upon free zones projects under the IGIL are still applicable they naturally 
come to an end. 
677 Article 11 of the IL. 
678 Article 17 of the IL identifies the investment map providing details such as the type and the sys-
tem of investment, its geographical regions and sectors. 
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the geographical location and field of investment. First, investors with projects in 
sector A (which covers the Suez Canal Economic Zone and geographical areas 
most in need of development)679 can deduct 50 per cent of their investment costs 
from their taxable income. 
Instead, investors with projects in sector B, which covers geographical areas outside 
of the scope of sector A (i.e., the rest of Egypt), can deduct 30 per cent of their in-
vestment costs from their taxable income. The second incentive applies to a list of 
investment projects including labour intensive projects680, small and medium enter-
prise projects, national and strategic projects as determined by the Supreme Council 
for Investment, and projects that export their products outside of Egypt’s borders. 
In all of the above cases, the special investment incentive cannot exceed 80 per cent 
of the capital paid in up to the date the project starts producing revenue681. Addi-
tionally, the period of deduction from the taxable income cannot exceed seven years 
from the date the project starts producing revenue. The Executive Regulations (ER) 
defines682 “investment cost” for the purposes of calculating the special incentive as the 
costs necessary to set up the investment, including equity and debts (e.g., financial, 
long-term obligations), which are invested in tangible and intangible assets683. 
The IL provides four conditions for an investment project to qualify for the special 
incentives684. First, the project must be for a newly incorporated company or estab-
lishment. Second, the new company or establishment must be incorporated within 
three years from the date the ER enter into force. Third, the company or establish-
ment must be able to demonstrate that it keeps proper accounting records. If the 
company or establishment operates in sector A and sector B, it may benefit from 
the different deduction rates of each area only if it keeps separate accounting rec-
ords for the investments in each area. 
Finally, none of the company’s or establishment’s shareholders, partners or owners 
must have contributed or used in the founding, incorporation or establishment of 
the investment project any of the tangible assets of a company or establishment that 
already existed when the IL entered into force. Moreover, none of the above parties 
 
679 These areas are identified based on the: (i) investment map, and (ii) data and statistics provided by 
the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics. 
680 in accordance with the guidelines provided in the ER. 
681 See Income Tax Law No. 91 of 2005, Official Gazette, Issue No. 23 (cont.) of 9 June 2005. 
682 Article 11(2) of the ER. 
683 Investments in intangible assets must be made in cash. 
684 Article 12 of the IL. 
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must have liquidated a company or establishment during the three-year period (sec-
ond point above) with the aim of establishing a new investment project to benefit 
from the special incentives. If these two conditions are breached, the new company 
or establishment is ineligible for the special incentive. 
The introduction of the IL is the GOE’s attempt to limit the inconsistencies created 
by the continuous amendments of the previously in place IGIL. This enhances in-
vestors’ certainty regarding the legal framework applicable to their potential projects 
to be established in Egypt. From the above critiques of El-Mikawy and Handoussa, 
the one potentially valid for the IL could be in connection to the speed of approv-
ing the IL within the parliament. Although, some members of parliament raised se-
rious red flags in relation to the IL, it was passed after hurried, brief discussions, 
which may have a negative impact on the integrity and credibility of the IL. 
The re-introduction of corporate income tax incentives under the IL after abolish-
ing the ones of the IGIL by the Income Tax Law No. 91 of 2005 comes as an obvi-
ous example for the GOE’s interest in cutting investors’ transaction costs and ra-
tionalising the factors of production prices. Generally, the tax incentives offered 
under the IGIL and the IL have two implications. First, the incentives confirm the 
GOE’s interest in limiting its role in the economic activity in favour of the private 
sector. Second, the minimising of the GOE’s size through tax incentives signals the 
deregulation of economic activity in Egypt. By approving the incentives, the GOE 
forgoes a portion of revenues in favour of attracting investors. 
IV.A.3 Investment laws principles and international obligations  
The development towards a more liberal economy appears obvious, especially by 
benchmarking the IGIL’s and IL’s guarantees against the obligations prescribed by 
BITs. The guarantees were deemed the signal necessary to attract foreign investors 
to flow into the Egyptian economy. This relates to the discussion introduced under 
the theoretical framework concerning the benefits investigated by the policymakers 
when deciding on their states’ engagement in BITs. The guarantees were deemed as 
important as the fiscal incentives in assuring the foreign investors and translating 
Egypt’s willingness to accord foreign investors the standardised treatment as re-
quired under international investment law. Prior to starting the benchmarking analy-
sis to assess the level of compliance, the chapter introduces briefly the main com-
ponents of Egypt’s BITs, while introducing the guarantees offered under the IGIL 
and the IL. 
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The Egyptian policymakers maintained activity on the international scene regarding 
the engagement and conclusion of BITs. With 72 already BITs in force685, the in-
crease in concluded BITs justified the current slower pace of finalising new ones 
since the possible investment partners available without BITs decreased. The poli-
cymakers did not concentrate merely on signing BITs with partners from the north-
ern hemisphere. However, Egypt widened its treaty network to encompass several 
South-South BITs with other African and Middle East and North African econo-
mies. Another characteristic evident in Egypt’s management of BITs is the non-
ratification of several signed BITs. This applies to most BITs concluded with Afri-
can states due to the lack of an actual investment flow between their economies. 
With the current potential outflow of Egyptian investments to other African econ-
omies, ratification of BITs must be of interest for Egyptian investors seeking pro-
tection against treaty-breaching actions by the host states686.  
On the other hand, Egypt has engaged in similar BITs with most of the members of 
the EU members. These BITs in general prescribe the same protections as the ones 
available under BIT models. This encompasses the principles introduced before 
within the theoretical framework including NT and MFN. Other guarantees under 
Egyptian BITs include the rights of currency transferability and the referral of dis-
putes between states as well as state and investors to a third-party dispute settlement 
mechanism687. The US-Egypt BIT provides a list of investment sectors to which the 
NT principle does not apply. The long list of sectors was subject to subsequent leg-
islative amendments reducing its scope688. 
Being the base for the legal analysis in the three countries studied, it is important to 
introduce briefly the guarantees under part 2 of the IGIL689. The guarantees prohib-
it: (i) nationalisation or confiscation of investments690, (ii) administrative sequestra-
tion of investments691, (iii) administrative intervention in pricing products or profit 
margins692, and (iv) abolishment or suspension of the property’s usufruct licences 
 
685 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 2017a 
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687 Congress 11/3/1986 
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unless the latter’s conditions are violated693. In a generic sense, this guarantee pro-
tects investors against any kind of creeping or indirect expropriation negatively in-
fluencing their rights to own, possess, benefit from and operate their investments. 
Other guarantees under the same part of the IGIL include the explicit entitlement 
of foreigners to own buildings and lands (assigned for building purposes) as neces-
sary for their investment activities, regardless of their nationality694. Investors are al-
so entitled to freely repatriate the proceeds of their investments from operation or 
liquidation abroad in accordance with investment-related laws and decrees695. Addi-
tionally, investments became entitled to import their production and activity neces-
sities without engaging an Egyptian agent, besides waiving them from being listed in 
the Importation Registry696. The same exemption prevails regarding the requirement 
of licences or listing in the Exportation Registry697. 
To proceed with the legal question of comparing the IGIL and the IL with Egypt’s 
international obligations under international investment law, the discussion will now 
include four subsections covering NT and expropriation, dispute settlement and, 
finally, foreign ownership of investments, the right to transfer currency and employ 
foreign employees. 
(A) National treatment and foreign ownership 
The above leads to three clear inferences. First, the GOEs exerted efforts to liberal-
ise the economy from its protectionist policies. This was exemplified in the intro-
duction of three complete investment laws from 1974 until 2017. The common fea-
ture of all these laws and amendments is easing the doing of business and creating a 
more open economy that is investment-friendly, especially for foreigners. Although 
the influence of the socialist era was fading by the mid-1970s, several pieces of legis-
lation from the socialist heritage (mostly hostile to foreign investors) remained in 
place. The first international investment law principle under consideration in the 
benchmarking analysis is NT698. 
 
693 Article 11 of the IGIL. The decision of abolishing or suspending the licence is issued by the 
prime minister. The investor may challenge the decision before the administrative courts within 30 
days. 
694 Article 12 provided limitations of foreigners’ ownership in certain zones as Sinai. 
695 Article 10 (bis) of the IGIL as introduced by Article 5 of Law No. 17 of 2015. 
696 Article 13 of the IGIL 
697 Hashem, Ibrahim and Tawfik Law Office 1998 77 
698 See II.F.1. The NT was introduced in the theoretical framework chapter as one of the substantive 
protections under the international investment law regime. 
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- Ownership of shares 
The increased liberalisation was not sufficient to ensure full compliance with princi-
ples of international investment law. With restrictions still in place to the disad-
vantage of foreign investors, the reasoning behind them seemed to be mistrust in 
foreign investors, along with Egypt’s socio-political sensitivity in the post-
colonisation socialist era. The differential treatment between Egyptian and foreign 
investors was continuously evident. For example, earlier investment laws condi-
tioned offering shares in companies to foreigners only after a one-month period 
had gone by without the shares being subscribed by Egyptians. In an attempt to 
align with the NT, in 1998 the Companies Law699 was amended. The amendment700 
abolished the obligation on companies to offer 49 per cent of their shares exclusive-
ly to Egyptians and, accordingly, foreign investors became entitled to subscribe 100 
per cent of a company’s shares regardless of  nationality701. 
The IL consolidated the equal treatment of Egyptian and foreign investors regard-
ing ownership rights through the general reference to the law’s enforcement on 
domestic and foreign investments without any differences. For example, this ap-
pears in the IL’s definition of an “investor”702 as any: (i) natural person or legal entity, 
or (ii) Egyptian or foreigner – regardless of the legal framework governing the in-
vestment – who invests in Egypt pursuant to the IL. Another important example 
confirming the development of Egypt’s legal rules towards liberalisation and open-
ness is the elimination of the Companies Law703 restriction on the alienation of 
shares in joint-stock companies within the first two financial years of the newly in-
corporated company704. 
As can be seen, the IGIL and the IL did not foresee different treatment of domestic 
and foreign investors. This helps Egypt move its legal framework closer toward its 
NT obligations under its concluded BITs. On the other hand, the equal treatment 
of domestic and foreign investors rationalises the prices of production factors in 
Egypt, which may stimulate an increase in FDI inflows. Foreign investors are al-
lowed direct ownership of their businesses without framing special business organi-
sations to qualify for benefits under the IGIL or the IL. Additionally,, the elimina-
 
699 Law No. 3 of 1998, Amendment of Companies Law No. 159 of 1981, Official Gazette, Issue 3 
(bis), 18 January 1998. 
700 Article 1 of Law no. 3 of 1998. 
701 Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs 2015a 5 
702 Article 1 of the IL. 
703 Article 45 of the Companies Law. 
704 Article 53 of the IL. 
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tion of the Companies Law time limitations on shares subscriptions and trading is 
another step favouring the rationalisation of the prices of production factors in 
Egypt. 
- Ownership of land 
An example of other legislative restrictions against foreigners were related to the 
right of foreigners to own immovable property and land, a right that the IGIL was 
the first law to grant705. This right was limited to owning buildings and lands (as-
signed for building purposes) as necessary to perform the activity. The theoretically 
unified treatment accorded to both Egyptian and foreign investors is another exam-
ple of the GOE’s willingness to adhere to the international investment law princi-
ples of MFN and NT. The authorities tried to ensure equitable treatment to inves-
tors regardless of their citizenship or background. Compliance with the NT was a 
step towards bringing the IGIL more in line with international investment law obli-
gations. However, this situation was aggravated again by amending706 the IGIL and 
explicitly restricting foreigners’ ownership in special areas falling in the scope of 
special laws as in Sinai Semi-Integrated Development Law No. 14 of 2012707 upon 
the fulfilment of specific conditions. 
In the same context of land ownership restrictions, the plan to liberalise Egypt’s leg-
islation did not address the restrictions on foreigners’ ownership of arable agricul-
tural lands stipulated plainly in Law No. 15 of 1963708. The lands were explicitly 
identified as the Nile Delta and Valley, plus oases lands. Egyptian investors were el-
igible to own agricultural lands for any purpose, while foreign investors remain were 
a disadvantaged position. Although the IGIL moved closer toward compliance with 
the NT principle by narrowing the differential treatment accorded to Egyptian and 
foreign investors, the Egyptian investors were still treated more favourably com-
pared to the foreigners in connection to areas governed by special laws and arable 
agricultural lands falling within the scope of Law No. 15 of 1963. These inconsist-
encies highlight the Egyptian authorities’ need to develop their frameworks and de-
part from the old-fashioned socialist oriented policies in place since the 1960s. 
 
705 Article 12 of the IGIL. 
706 Article 4 of Law No. 17 of 2015 amended Article 12 of the IGIL. 
707 Law No. 14 of 2012, Integral Development in Sinai Law, Official Gazette, Issue 3 (continued), 19 
January 2012. 
708 Law No. 15 of 1963, Prohibition of Foreigners Land Ownership Law, Official Gazette, Issue 16, 
19 January 1963. 
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The IL introduces no amendments to the treatment of domestic and foreign inves-
tors regarding their rights to own lands as accorded in the IGIL after its latest 
amendment709. The IL entitles an investor to own immovable property necessary to 
undertake its business activity regardless of its shareholding per centage or contribu-
tion in capital710. An obvious difference between the IL and the amended IGIL is 
that the former entitles the investor personally, and not the company or the entity 
he or she owns, as was the case was under the IGIL. This entails attaching the right 
to the investor and not to the incorporated company or entity. Concerning the re-
striction applicable for geographical zones governed by special laws and agricultural 
lands, the IL does not offer any alternatives to ownership. 
The continued application of special laws and restrictions on the foreigners’ owner-
ship of agricultural lands may seem to be a violation of the NT as domestic inves-
tors are guaranteed a favourable position compared to foreign counterparts. Fur-
thermore, such differential treatment increases prices of the factors of production 
and costs of doing business in Egypt, which may result in lower FDI. Such re-
strictions ban foreigners from accessing the immovable property needed to develop 
their business activities, preventing them from reaching business goals in Egypt. 
Even if a foreigner indirectly establishes a 100 per cent Egyptian-owned company 
to overcome the restrictions on certain areas of land ownership, the authorities 
could question the foreign shareholding in the parent company. If the authorities do 
not question the business structure, it requires additional burdens, thereby raising 
the total transaction costs, which could make the business opportunity for the for-
eign investor less favourable. 
- Importation 
A significant advantage under the IGIL was the exemption from registration in the 
Importers’ Register if connected to imports of operational and activity necessities711. 
However, in the case of importation for trading and commercial purposes a signifi-
cant advantage prevailed for Egyptian investors over foreigners. This constituted an 
obvious limitation and violation of the NT, negatively influencing the investment 
climate in Egypt. After introducing the guarantee under the IGIL, the analysis in 
this section addresses limitations on foreigners’ eligibility to import for trading pur-
poses. 
 
709 Law No. 17 of 2015 amended the IGIL. 
710 Article 55 of the IL. 
711 Article 13 of the IGIL. 
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Importation rights for trading purposes were exclusively exercised by Egyptian na-
tionals or Egyptians fully owned entities712. The law required any natural or legal 
person wishing to import goods for trading purposes to be registered in the Im-
porters’ Register after meeting registration requirements713. For natural persons, 
eight requirements were necessary to register, among which the requirement of 
holding Egyptian citizenship. For companies, registration required the company to 
be fully owned by Egyptians. Additionally, the CEOs, board members and manag-
ers had to be Egyptian citizens or ten years had to have passed from the acquisition 
of citizenship714. 
This limitation obviously violated the NT since it restricted the right to import for 
trading purposes only to companies fully owned and operated by Egyptians. For-
eign entities executed several structures to circumvent this limitation. One of these 
was by entering into agency agreements with fully owned and operated Egyptian 
companies to import on behalf of the foreign entity in return for a commission or 
an agency fee. Another alternative was the establishment of an Egyptian fully 
owned subsidiary to exercise importation. Under both scenarios, the production 
factors of an investor increased significantly. 
Within its efforts to promote investment, Egypt introduced an amendment715 to its 
law governing the importation for trading purposes and moved it a step toward the 
equal treatment of foreigners and Egyptian investors (i.e., the NT). Under the 
amendment, companies that were 49 per cent owned by foreigners became eligible 
to import for trading purposes. With regard to Egyptian citizenship, the amendment 
limited the requirement to the company’s manager responsible for the importa-
tion716. The IL maintains (as provided in the IGIL) the exceptional treatment of the 
investment projects from registration in the Importers’ Register when importing 
raw material, production necessities, machinery and spare parts required for the in-
corporation, expansion or operation of the business activity717. However, in the 
event of importation for trading and commercial purposes, the amendment ex-
plained above applies to such business activity. 
With the entitlement under the IL and the amendment of the legal framework gov-
erning importation for commercial purposes, Egypt’s rules in this regard are moving 
 
712 Law No. 121 of 1982, Importers’ Register Law, Official Gazette, Issue 31, 05 August 1982. 
713 Articles 1 and 2 of Law No. 121 of 1982. 
714 Article 2(2)(f) of Law No. 121 of 1982. 
715 Law No. 7 of 2017, Official Gazette, Issue 9 (bis)(a), 07 March 2017. 
716 Article 1 of Law No. 7 of 2017. 
717 Article 7 of the IL. 
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closer to the NT obligation under BITs. Conversely, 49 per cent Egyptian owner-
ship remains a prevalent limitation on foreigners interested in undertaking a busi-
ness activity of importation for commercial purposes in Egypt. On the legal rules 
related to FDI, the IGIL’s and the IL’s exemptions from registration in the Import-
ers’ Registry rationalise the prices of the factors of production and cut the transac-
tion costs of doing business in Egypt, which can be reflected positively on FDI in-
flows to Egypt. The same applies for easing the rules governing importation for 
commercial purposes since the amendment releases foreigners from the need to es-
tablish a 100 per cent Egyptian-owned subsidiary through which importation can 
take place. 
- Public procurement 
Under public procurement, a more favourable treatment is accorded to Egyptian 
investors over their foreigner counterparts. The general rule in public procurements 
is deciding on the winning bid with the best financial and technical offers718. Under 
the Tenders and Bids Law719, Egyptian bids are awarded the project only if they ex-
ceed the lowest foreign bid by no more than 15 per cent720. This provides Egyptian 
investors more favourable treatment over their foreigner counterparts. Another ex-
ample is the Preferred Egyptian Products in Government Contracts Law721 intro-
duced principally to assist domestic industries in expanding their activity. Under the 
law, Egyptian manufacturers hold a more favourable position over foreign ones in 
the GOE’s procurements and public contracts. The favourable position appears in 
forcing the GOE to ensure that 40 per cent of the values of the total offered pro-
jects is from an Egyptian source722. 
By revisiting the status of the GOE procurement in connection to NT, a distinction 
must be made between international trade and investment laws. Article III:8(a) of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade allows preferential treatment of do-
mestic goods in governmental purchases. On the other hand, in the international 
investment law arena several BITs have treated government procurement as an ex-
ception to NT under international investment law. An example is paragraph 5 of 
Article 15.12 of the US-Singapore FTA permitting the exception of government 
 
718 OECD 2010 98 
719 Law No. 89 of 1998, Tenders and Bids Law, Official Gazette, Issue 19 (bis), 08 May 1998. 
720 Article 16 of the Tenders and Bids Law No. 89 of 1998 
721 Law No. 5 of 2015, Preferential Treatment of Egyptian Products in Governmental Contracts 
Law, Official Gazette, Issue 3 (bis), 17 January 2015. 
722 Article 3 of Law No. 5 of 2015. 
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procurement from the NT723. The Egyptian-concluded BITs did not refer in any ar-
ticles to such exceptional treatment of government procurement. Therefore, Article 
16 of Law No. 89 of 1998 and Article 3 of the Preferred Egyptian Products in Gov-
ernment Contracts Law No. 5 of 2015 could be in conflict with Egypt’s internation-
al investment obligation of NT. 
(B) Expropriation 
The second notion in the process of benchmarking is “expropriation”. The principle 
was introduced in the theoretical framework chapter as one of the substantive pro-
tections under the international investment law regime724. The presence of this 
clause in all BITs encouraged Egypt to introduce it within its domestic investment 
legislation. In the IGIL, protection of investments from direct and indirect expro-
priations was prescribed in the guarantees section725.  
As provided in the introductory part concerning the guarantees accorded under the 
IGIL, the IGIL prohibited: (i) nationalisation or confiscation of companies or enti-
ties, (ii) administrative blocking, sequestration or requisition of companies’ assets, 
and (iii) interventions with the companies’ or entities’ pricings or profit margins. Fi-
nally, the IGIL provided a guarantee to safeguard the licenced projects from any 
administrative measures revoking the licences unless the licences were violated. 
Moreover, an investor whose licence is suspended or cancelled had 30 days to chal-
lenge the order from when it is notified726. This exemplified the legislator’s stance 
against any attempts of creeping expropriation. 
The prohibition of expropriation under the IGIL was absolute in nature as it made 
no reference to the state’s exceptional right expropriate a private investment in the 
event of the need to serve the public interest and in return for effective and ade-
quate compensation to the injured party. The absolute protection granted to inves-
tors seemed against the World Bank Guidelines permitting non-discriminatory ex-
propriations executed in good faith for public interest purposes. On the other hand, 
the absolute prohibition under the IGIL727 appeared in line with the elimination of 
any reference to expropriation in the Constitution of 2014.  
 
723 {Wehrlé 2016 #176} 7 
724 See II.F.2. 
725 Article 8 of the IGIL. 
726 Hashem, Ibrahim and Tawfik Law Office 1998 76 
727 Article 8 of the IGIL. 
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Scholars question the validity of the absolute expropriation prohibition and whether 
it effectively banned the GOE from nationalising private investments728. Under the 
Constitution of 2014, a property requisition is effective only if to serve public inter-
est, in return for a fair compensation and pursuant to the Egyptian law729. In this re-
spect, Egypt governs requisitions of property that serve public interest by the Law 
No. 10 of 1990730. 
The mentioned Law provides examples for works serving “public interest” among 
others infrastructural roads, irrigation, sanitations, energy, transportation731. A requi-
sition of private property is due when a presidential decree is issued (i) determining 
the public interest and (ii) the property to be requisitioned in order to serve that 
public interest732. The Law creates a committee, as responsible to evaluate the com-
pensation due to the property owners733. The compensation must be equal to the 
property market price at the time when the requisition’s presidential decree was is-
sued. Furthermore, compensations must be paid within one month from the requi-
sition decrees734. A presidential decree requisitioning private property as per the 
guidelines provided in the Law No. 10 of 1990 remains a pre-requisite to limit the 
possibilities of an investor challenging the validity of the requisition decree. 
Another form of requisition is provided under the notion of “temporary occupation of 
property” in which by virtue of a presidential decree, a property can be temporarily 
(maximum for three years735) seized by the government to serve public interest. The 
rules of valuing the compensation apply in this case, however, the compensation 
must consider the owners forgone revenues from not using the property during the 
seizure period736. Section three of the Law governs appeals against requisition de-
crees and compensations due to property owners737. 
The compliance with the due process under the Law No. 10 of 1990 would render 
the state immune against any investors’ claims of damages since the requisition of 
property was also pursuant to the Egyptian law. The mentioned Law is aligned with 
 
728 {El-Dean 2002 #229} 31. 
729 Article 35 of the Constitution of 2014. 
730 Law No. 10 of 1990 concerning Requisition of Property to Serve Public Interest, Official Gazette, 
Issue 22 (bis), 31 May 1990. 
731 Art. 2 of the Law No. 10 of 1990. 
732 Art. 3 of the Law No. 10 of 1990.  
733 Art. 6(1) of the Law No. 10 of 1990. 
734 Art. 6(2) of the Law No. 10 of 1990. 
735 Art. 16 of the Law No. 10 of 1990. 
736 Art. 14 of the Law No. 10 of 1990. 
737 Art. 9 of the Law No. 10 of 1990. 
  151  
the constitutional right provided in Article 35 of the Constitution of 2014 through 
which the state can requisite privately owned property in order to serve the public 
interest, however, this must be in return for fair compensation and in accordance to 
the Egyptian law. 
Debates exist regarding the scope of Article 35 of the Constitution of 2014, and 
whether requisition constitutes expropriation. Under Article 8 of the IGIL and Ar-
ticle 4(1) of the IL, the reference is explicit to the prohibition of nationalising com-
panies and entities. In this sense, the legislator seems to differentiate between the 
state’s action of nationalisation and requisition. As clarified above, the state’s act of 
requisition is still allowed under Article 35 of the Constitution of 2014 and the Law 
No. 10 of 1990 only after meeting certain conditions. On the other hand, Article 8 
of the IGIL and Article 4(1) of the IL absolute prohibition of nationalisation are 
now compliant with the Constitution of 2014. The new Constitution makes refer-
ence only to requisition and eliminated any reference to nationalisations, which was 
the case in Article 35 of the Constitution of 1971. Based on this conclusion, the ab-
solute protection under Article 8 of the IGIL and Article 4(1)738 of IL gains further 
validity from the elimination of the word “nationalisation” from the Constitution of 
2014. 
The IL explicitly prohibits the expropriation of investments739, and maintains the 
prohibition on requisition unless it serves the public interest and is in return for fair, 
advance compensation. The compensation must be (i) equal to the fair economic 
value of the requisitioned funds on the day prior to the act of requisition and (ii) be 
transferrable without restrictions740. The IL prohibits the sequestration of invest-
ments or their funds unless in accordance with a final court ruling or order741.  
From the IL’s guarantees accorded to investments against expropriation by the 
GOE, the wording of the IL is more aligned with the wording of Article 35 of the 
Constitution of 2014 and the Law No. 10 of 1990. The explicit prohibition of ex-
propriations confirms the Egyptian legislator’s interest to differentiate between ex-
propriation and requisition. Both the Constitution of 2014 and the IL allow requisi-
tions only upon certain conditions being met742. With such developments, the IL 
seems more in line with BITs’ guarantees against unlawful expropriation. On the 
 
738 The same applies for Article 8 of the IGIL before its abolishment.  
739 Art. 4(1) of the IL. 
740 Art. 4(2) of the IL. 
741 Art. 4(3) of the IL. 
742 In compliance with the Law No. 10 of 1990. 
  152  
other hand, the alignment of the IL with the constitution removes any doubts re-
garding the words “expropriation” and “requisition”. Furthermore, this guarantee low-
ers investors’ risks from any potential intervention by the GOE since any risky vio-
lations could be managed through referring the violations to a third-party dispute 
settlement, where the investor may be awarded compensation. The reduction of 
possible risks of investing in Egypt may stimulate investors to route more funds in-
to Egypt. 
With the absolute protection of investors against nationalisation, the constitutional 
and legal references lower the potential risks featured by investors seeking to invest 
in Egypt. Such guarantee lowers the uncertainty and unpredictability regarding the 
investor being a subject of an act of nationalisation. With lower investor uncertain-
ties in accordance with the no nationalisation guarantee, the volume of the FDI in-
flows to Egypt can increase. 
(C) Dispute settlement 
The third notion in the comparison process is the right of a foreign investor to re-
vert the disputes against the host state to the ICSID. As per the theoretical chapter, 
the referral of a contractual dispute between the host state and foreign investors to 
a third party for international arbitration is a fundamental protection under BITs743. 
The Egyptian legislator has struggled since the 1970s with granting the right to turn 
disputes over to the ICSID. 
Law No. 43 of 1974 represented a change in the GOE’s orientation regarding the 
private sector’s role in economic activity744. The law had several innovative features, 
one of which was embracing the ICSID Convention in Egyptian laws745. The law 
explicitly referred to the ICSID Convention as a mechanism to settle investment 
disputes between investors and Egypt. The explicit reference did not prevent the 
GOE from declaring its lack of consent necessary for filing an arbitration claim 
against it. This claim was filed within the case of Southern Pacific Properties v. Arab 
Republic of Egypt. The tribunal ruled that Article 8 of Law No. 43 of 1974 was suf-
ficient to evidence Egypt’s unilateral consent to the ICSID’s jurisdiction. This was 
justified upon the mandatory nature of the article’s wording “shall be settled” when 
referring to disputes between the state and the investor. Accordingly, no subsequent 
 
743 See II.F.4. 
744 Haim, Kedourie 2005 108 
745 This was firstly stipulated in Article 8 of the Arab and Foreign Funds Investment and Free Zones 
Law No. 43 of 1974. 
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agreements were needed to allow both parties’ rights to arbitration before the IC-
SID.  
This ruling on the ICSID’s jurisdiction resulted in the introducing Investment Law 
No. 230 of 1989, with the right to revert a dispute to the ICSID based on “optional” 
wording. Examples of the language used were disputes “may be settled” or parties 
“may agree”. This language entailed that the parties’ prior consents were prerequisites 
to filing an arbitration claim. The same language was used in Article 7 of the IGIL. 
The positive aspect of adopting this language was the signalling, to foreign investors 
and states, the GOE’s willingness to respect its obligations under the ICSID Con-
vention and its BITs.  
With the development featured in international arbitration case law, the optional 
language in itself became a sufficient reference for the host state’s unilateral consent 
to arbitrate. In other words, the only way to avoid the ICSID’s jurisdiction over ar-
bitration claims was to make explicit reference to the need to conclude a subsequent 
consent agreement between Egypt and the investor. The new trend in interpreting 
the referral to the ICSID in domestic laws was an outcome of the concepts of “in-
vestor reasonable expectations”, “good faith” and finally host states’ “duty to avoid ambigui-
ty”. With the witnessed proliferation of concluded BITs, the fact that Egypt’s do-
mestic laws granted the right to turn disputes over to the ICSID benefited foreign 
investors of non-signatory home states since they became eligible to initiate claims 
against Egypt before the ICSID. Hence, Article 7 of the IGIL was amended746 to 
eliminate any reference to international arbitration or to the ICSID Convention. 
The same wording is used in the IL747. 
In accordance with the wording used in the IL, Egyptian Arbitration Law No. 27 of 
1994 (AL)748 grants investors the right to settle disputes as contractually and inde-
pendently agreed with the GOE749. The amendment eliminating the referral to IC-
SID and the IL do not limit the foreign investments protection. However, it en-
sured the advantageous position granted to the foreign investors who are nationals 
of the BIT signatories or those in contractual investment agreements with the 
GOE. Therefore, these continuous amendments aimed to abolish Egypt’s perma-
nent unilateral consent to revert disputes to the ICSID regardless of the existence of 
 
746 4th Article of Law no. 17 of 2015. 
747 Article 90 of the IL. 
748 Law No. 27 of 1994, Arbitration in Civil and Commercial Affairs Law, Official Gazette, Issue 16 
(continued), 21 April 1994. 
749 Hashem, Ibrahim and Tawfik Law Office 1998 76 
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BITs. This precluded foreign investors with no investment contracts and nationals 
of non-BIT signatories with Egypt from initiating arbitration claims against the lat-
ter750. 
Regardless of consent within Egyptian investment laws, the Egypt-US BIT granted 
investors the right to initiate claims under a binding third-party arbitration system to 
settle disputes. The Egyptian judicial system validated these international arbitration 
clauses. In several rulings, the Court of Cassation endorsed the arbitration clauses 
prevailing in foreign investors’ contractual agreements with Egyptian authorities. 
The recourse to the ICSID and international arbitration was essential to mitigate the 
damaging effects of the slow Egyptian judiciary, where disputes can last for years.  
Most foreign investors engaging in contracts with Egyptian parties are inclined to 
add a binding arbitration clause to avoid the partial, arbitrary and extremely slow 
judgments of the Egyptian judiciary751. Under the current framework, the settlement 
of investment disputes involving foreigners in Egypt passes through a process aim-
ing to ensure solving the dispute prior to referring the conflict to the judiciary or 
arbitration752. This was clarified in the IGIL amendment under Law No. 17 of 2015, 
where three committees were established to review investment contract disputes.  
Firstly, the Investment Contract Disputes Ministerial Committee’s753 competence 
prevails over all investment contract-related disputes to which the GOE or its au-
thorities or companies are a party. The second is the Complaint Committee, which 
can only receive complaints filed in association with enforcement of the IGIL. The 
final committee is the Investment Disputes Settlement Committee, whose responsi-
bility is to decide on complaints regarding the implementation of the IGIL. The 
process was an attempt to reduce arbitration claims filed against the GOE before 
the ICSID. The three committees exist under the IL754, with a slight difference in 
their hierarchy and names. Additionally, it establishes an Egyptian Centre for Arbi-
tration and Mediation755 to settle investment disputes. The centre has jurisdiction 
over disputes between investors, and between investors and the GOE or its au-
thorities or companies. 
 
750 Salah 2015 
751 IBP 2015 119 
752 Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs 2015a 12 
753 Known under the IL as the “Ministerial Committee to Resolve Investment Disputes”.   
754 Articles 82-91 of the IL. 
755 Article 91 of the IL. 
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The process of enforcing a foreign arbitral award in Egypt is applicable upon meet-
ing a set of conditions. First, the award must be under the umbrella of international 
agreements to which the GOE is party, such as the New York Convention of 1958 
governing the enforcement of arbitral awards, the ICSID Convention of 1965756 and 
the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States Hosting 
Arab Investments and Citizens of Other States of 1974. The second way to enforce 
such awards is complying with the conditions set out in the AL. Under this law, the 
foreign entity requesting enforcement is bound to file for an exequatur757. This filing 
is procedurally similar to initiating a regular lawsuit. In addition, the Egyptian court 
must verify the arbitral tribunal’s remit in deciding on the dispute. Finally, the inves-
tor’s home state must respect the reciprocity principle758. 
The investment laws are a clear example of attempts to align with international in-
vestment law obligations as prescribed under the BITs. Both the mandatory and op-
tional language in granting the right to settle disputes succeeded in qualifying Egyp-
tian investment laws as unilateral consent. The IL759 highlights the GOE’s success in 
complying with its international obligations, specifically regarding dispute settlement 
and referral of claims to international arbitration760. The Egyptian legislator contin-
uously intervened to amend the article dealing with Egypt’s unilateral consent, in-
tending to limit the dispute settlement methods to those agreed contractually with 
investors or under the AL.  
On a practical level, the amendments did not influence the ability of foreign inves-
tors from BIT-signatories to initiate claims against the GOE. The reasoning is con-
nected to the GOE’s BIT network of 72 signatories. Most of the investment flows 
into Egypt arise from BIT partners, with BITs already allowing their investors the 
right to access arbitration in the event of disputes761. The various mechanisms of 
dispute settlement offered under Egypt’s legal framework boosts the certainty of 
foreign investors regarding the expected treatment accorded by the GOE. The 
guarantee of third-party dispute settlement lowers the risk of investing in Egypt can 
be likely reflected in increased FDI. 
 
756 Law No. 90 of 1971, Approving Egypt’s Membership in ICSID Law, Official Gazette, Issue 45, 
11 November 1971. 
757 Articles 56 of Law No. 27 of 1994. 
758 IBP 2015 119 
759 See footnote 94. 
760 Salah 2015 
761 IBP 2015 119 
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(D) Currency transfer, pricing freedom and performance re-
quirements 
The fourth and the last subsection within the benchmarking analysis is that covering 
the right of foreign investors to repatriate their profits, freely price their products 
and employ foreigners762. The right to employ foreigners is the test to determine 
whether Egypt applies performance requirements in its legal framework. 
- Currency transfers 
Under the US-Egypt BIT, investors have the right, among others, to freely transfer 
foreign currency to the home state, hold operational licences, and employ foreign-
ers. Article 5 of the BIT provides investors the full right to transfer any type of for-
eign currency payments in connection to the different sources of foreign exchange 
(FX) receipts, whether royalties, dividends, compensations, sale proceeds or con-
tractual instalments763. The BIT entitles the investors to freely transfer their funds at 
the market currency conversion rate. 
The IGIL consolidated this international investment law obligation by granting in-
vestors the full right to freely transfer their investment proceeds and profits 
abroad764. This applies to individuals as well as to corporate entities. Additionally, 
the banking law (BL)765 governing the process of profit transfers and repatriation 
confirmed the banking system’s pledge to ensure the repatriation of foreigners’ 
profits to attract investments766. Accordingly, the IGIL was theoretically in line with 
the international obligation. It explicitly guaranteed foreigners’ right to repatriate 
funds abroad. This allowed the IGIL to pass the benchmarking test in connection 
to currency transfer rights. 
Practically, the political turmoil of 2011 increased capital flight, pressuring Egypt’s 
FX reserves. The CBE introduced a set of caps on the transfers of FX out of 
Egypt767. This was reflected in Egypt’s rating with the OECD Arrangement on Of-
ficially Supposed Export Credits, which rates the risks of FX convertibility on a 
scale from zero to seven, with seven being the riskiest. Egypt kept its risk level at 
four at length. The January uprising lowered the country’s rating to level five by 
 
762 See II.F.5. 
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764 Article 10 Bis of the IGIL introduced by Law No. 17 of 2015. 
765 Law No. 88 of 2003, Central Bank, Banking Sector and Monetary System, Official Gazette, Issue 
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January 2012, with level six being reached in June 2013768. Restrictions on the flows 
of foreign currency continued 2014–2016. This verified the lack of the practical en-
forcement of the guaranteed right to repatriate profits. In other words, the right was 
guaranteed only on paper without actual enforcement. 
In November 2016, the CBE floated the EGP against foreign currencies769. This 
helped abolish several FX limitations and eliminated the backlog experienced by 
foreigners on their FX transfers of profits770. This entailed Egypt’s increased com-
pliance with its treaty obligations of currency transfers. Hence, in accordance with 
the Egypt-US BIT, the investment and banking laws theoretically provide the same 
rights for foreign investors. On the other hand, the current practice of the CBE 
puts actual practise in line with the IGIL and BITs. 
The introduction of the IL preserves the IGIL771 guarantee since an investor may 
incorporate, establish, expand and fund an investment from abroad in foreign cur-
rency and without restrictions. Additionally, an investor is eligible to own, manage, 
use and alienate profits from an investment project and transfer them abroad and 
finally liquidate the project and partially or fully transfer the proceeds abroad772. In 
the IL, Egypt allows the swift transfer of all foreign currency connected to foreign 
investment. Finally, foreigners employed in the investment projects are guaranteed 
the full right to transfer their earnings abroad and in foreign currency773. 
As mentioned above, the IL seems to be in line with Egypt’s obligations to ensure 
the rights of foreign investors to transfer their funds abroad and in a convertible 
currency. From the legal rules development perspective, such entitlement rationalis-
es the prices of the production factors since the movement of capital is theoretically 
easier under the amended IGIL and the IL. Concerning cutting transaction costs, 
the foreign investor may easily transfer his funds in and out of Egypt without fram-
ing complex business structures to facilitate the flow of funds. This entitlement will 
possibly have a positive effect on FDI inflows to Egypt, taking into account the ac-
tual sufficiency of the FX reserves in the CBE. 
 
768 IBP 2015 118 
769 Kholaif 2016 
770 On 14 June 2017, the CBE moved another step towards the full application of the free FX mar-
ket: it removed the USD100,000 (or equivalent) cap on the annual FX transfers for Egyptian indi-
viduals and companies (without an underlying commercial transaction). 
Bicciato, R. & Elfar, M. 2017  
771 See footnote 107. 
772 Art. 6(1) of the IL. 
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- Freedom of pricing 
The second right considered in this subsection is the one connected to investors’ 
right to freely price their products. The IGIL prohibited administrative bodies from 
intervening on the pricing of companies and entities774. This obvious prohibition 
does not extend to the judicial right of intervening with the private sector’s pricing 
policies. Another side is the broad definition of the notion of “products” to embrace 
both goods and services, and not only goods. Consequently, the legislator guaran-
teed absolute immunity for the private sector to set its pricing policy based on mar-
ket forces. This guarantee preserved its importance in folding any GOE interven-
tion with pricings unlike the 1960s and 1970s when the price controls restricted the 
interaction of the market forces. 
The IL does not make explicit reference to the right of investments to price their 
products. However, the IL prohibits administrative authorities from: (i) issuing 
regulatory decrees, and (ii) imposing fees, increasing the financial and procedural 
burdens of incorporating or operating an investment project unless the regulations 
were primarily approved by the Supreme Council of Investment and the Cabinet of 
Ministers775. This guarantee is of the same essence as the full right of investors to 
price their products under the IGIL. With this guarantee, a foreign investor is pro-
tected from any administrative decrees setting the prices for the sold products since 
it would qualify as a regulatory decree that burdens the investment’s operations. Ac-
cordingly, this guarantee lowers the risks of investing in Egypt and makes it more 
appealing for foreign investors. 
- Performance requirements 
The limitations on foreign investments in Egypt under the IGIL can be grouped in-
to two subheadings. First, the operational restrictions applicable based on the eligi-
bility and conditionality of hiring foreign employees. In this regard and in accord-
ance to the Companies Law776: (i) the number of foreigners employed may not ex-
ceed a maximum of 10 per cent of a company’s total employees, and (ii) their sala-
ries may not exceed 20 per cent of total salaries paid by the company. The IL enti-
tles an investment to hire foreign employees representing no more than 10 per cent 
of total employees in an investment project777. This number may be increased to no 
more than 20 per cent of total employees, if it is not possible to use Egyptian labour 
 
774 Article 10 of the IGIL. 
775 Art. 4(4) of the IL. 
776 Article 174 of the Companies Law. 
777 Art. 8 of the IL. 
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with the necessary qualifications. This remains another disadvantaged position for 
foreign investors who face this quota or limitation on hiring the necessary calibres. 
This implies an increase in the prices of the factors of production, which may be re-
flected negatively on the FDI inflows to Egypt. 
The second category of investment restrictions is connected to licence issuance. 
The GOE may suspend the issuance of operational licences. Hence, no new en-
trants are allowed to access the market unless they acquire an operating incumbent 
entity (i.e., brown field investments). This suspension is currently experienced in the 
banking sector. Another licencing-related restriction is evident in existing monopo-
lies. The SOE Telecom Egypt and Egypt Air monopolies over fixed lines and inter-
national airline services are pure examples of the FDI restrictions778. However, the 
IL intends to protect the licensee by prohibiting the administrative authorities from: 
(i) revoking or suspending the licences issued, and (ii) claiming back the lands allo-
cated to the investment projects unless the investor was: (a) warned of the commit-
ted violations, (b) clarifies his viewpoint and (c) is granted time to remedy the situa-
tion779. This guarantee lowers foreign investors’ risks of investing in Egypt, which 
may be reflected positively on FDI inflows to the economy. 
The licence issuance restrictions depend on the Egyptian authorities’ policies re-
garding business operations within the restricted sectors. In the case of the banking 
sector, the CBE – vested with the powers to supervise and regulate the financial 
sector – has the full right to issue operation licences for new banks’. Concerning the 
monopolised public services markets, foreign entities are excluded on a practical ba-
sis. Although the GOE is taking several steps to liberalise markets such as electrici-
ty, these steps are still in the early phase. Other sectors are still far from liberalisa-
tion and the monopolising entities are protected by the GOE regardless of their ef-
ficiency. Such protection could be triggered by the dependence on the generated 
state revenues resulting in the lack of the GOE’s interests to liberalise the market. 
IV.A.4 Trade, privatization and openness to the private sector  
The aim of discussing this section is to highlight the additional legislative efforts to 
deregulate the Egyptian economy. This section addresses the trade aspect as well as 
the GOE’s political changes, demonstrating its liberalisation stance. The start will be 
with the trade openness pillar. Then, the analysis examines changes in the political 
 
778 OECD 2007 32-3 
779 Art. 5 of the IL. 
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structure and how they catalysed the privatisation program and the shift towards de-
regulation and the private sector. Finally, a brief overview is provided of Egypt’s 
privatisation program and the conclusions derived by the European Bank for Re-
construction and Development (EBRD) mission regarding the compliance of 
Egypt’s legislation with international standards. 
(A) Trade 
On the trade openness pillar, Egypt concluded a set of FTAs, allowing it access to 
the global markets. These agreements include the Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA) and the EU Association Agreement in force since 
2004. Other FTAs were concluded with Turkey in 2007 and Mercosur in 2013. 
Egypt does not have a FTA agreement with the United States. Moreover, Egypt en-
gaged with Israel and the US in the QIZ Agreement to allow Egyptian products im-
ported to the US to enter customs-free if at least 10.5 per cent of the value of the 
product is of Israeli content780. Of all the above FTAs, the QIZ maintains a specific 
nature in this analysis since it simplifies comparison with the situation in Jordan, 
which is both a case study in this research and engaged in a QIZ agreement with Is-
rael and the US. 
The QIZ agreement originated initially to promote business ties and cooperation 
between former hostile states. It was an attempt to spread a peaceful economic de-
velopment. Although, the GOE concluded the Camp David Peace Treaty in 1979, 
economic relations with Israel never normalised. The QIZ was subject to continu-
ous critiques from the Egyptian public generally and businesspersons specifically. 
Egyptian opposition parliamentarians criticised the agreement as another oppor-
tunity by the then-ruling regime to normalise ties with Israel against the public’s 
will781. Other members blamed the GOE for engaging in the agreement in the dark 
without obtaining prior parliamentary approval782. In this sense, the reduction of the 
Israeli content per centage requirement was expected to mitigate the mounting op-
position. 
 
780 Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs 2015a 14 
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(B) Market oriented policies 
On the political side, the reform attempts in the early 2000s were not limited to a 
set of legislative changes. The GOE that was appointed in July 2004783 and its shuf-
fle after the general elections of November 2005 raised the number of ministers 
with experience in business to six. Prominently ministers of tourism, transportation, 
industry and social solidarity have been operating in the private sector at different 
levels. The personnel appointed in policy-designing positions were shuffled to fit 
with the new forecasted direction of the economy. The ministerial shuffle of 2004 
was significant in highlighting the regime’s enthusiasm for market reform.  
Examples of ministers include Unilever’s regional president (for Africa, Turkey and 
the Middle East) appointed as Minister of Industry and Foreign Trade, the founder 
of the Nile Cotton Trade Company (leader of Egyptian market cotton exporters) as 
Minister of Agriculture, and Zoheir Garana, the managing director of Garana Travel 
Company (widely involved in hotel and tourism industries) as the Minister of Tour-
ism. On a parliamentary level, the same trend prevailed where businesspersons se-
cured their seats in the legislative chamber. Of them was Ahmed Ezz, the CEO of 
Ezz Steel, the dominant steel company holding 70 per cent of the market share784. 
The conflict of interest was aggravated by his leading the Budgeting and Planning 
Committee in the Egyptian parliament. According to the Al-Ahram Center for Po-
litical and Strategic Studies, the number of parliamentarians who were businessper-
sons more than doubled from 31 in 1995 to 68 in the 2005 elections785. 
These appointments were considered in line with the new economic orientation of 
the regime in favour of accelerated liberalisation. Principally appointed to catalyse 
the pace of orienting the economy towards market-based policies. The public ac-
cused the GOE of its adherence to the IMF and World Bank instructions to global-
ise and liberalise the economy. The GOE of 2004 began executing the third genera-
tion of the investment reforms. This generation of openness evidenced the promul-
gation of a set of investment-related legislation including consumer protection, 
competition, e-signatures, customs, telecommunication, intellectual property and a 
unified new income tax law. The tax changes emphasised widening the tax base and 
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784 Joya 2011 377. As a consequence of the speedy, unregulated liberalisation, new elites and monop-
olies were created by benefiting from their political stances and links with the ruling regime. A clear 
example was Ahmed Ezz, the CEO of Ezz Steel, dominating two-thirds of the steel market, while 
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expanding the tax revenues to adjust the budgetary deficits. Therefore, the tax legal 
reforms were accompanied by structural reforms in the management of the tax au-
thority by the creation of a large taxpayers’ unit covering the biggest 2,000 taxpay-
ers786. 
(C) EBRD and privatization 
To evaluate the Egyptian legal framework from a commercial point of view, the 
EBRD assessed the pace of liberalising the Egyptian legislation. The pillars exam-
ined include laws connected to insolvency, corporate governance and judicial capac-
ity787. The insolvency law proved cumbersome and unfriendly to investors. The ju-
dicial capacity suffered from its inefficiency and complex system of judicial rulings 
and enforcement of contracts. Attempts to reform were translated into the Eco-
nomic Courts Law No. 120 of 2008788. Conversely, the judges responsible for en-
forcing the laws lacked the required knowledge and training to decide on the re-
viewed disputes. This amplified investors’ interest in adding arbitration clauses to 
their contracts, resulting in an increase of arbitration claims filed against Egypt789. 
Accusations of the GOE’s liberal stance were supported by the stimulated pace of 
privatisation between 2004 and 2006 (as briefed below), when the GOE alienated 
the public entities and the unexploited lands. The GOE executed the privatisation 
plan using five methods. These included: (i) initial public offerings (IPOs) for mi-
nority or majority shares, (ii) direct alienation to strategic investors, (iii) liquidation, 
and (iv) the disposal or leasing of unutilised assets. The method most largely em-
ployed was IPOs. The GOE approached strategic investors to ensure their acquisi-
tion of large shares; therefore, the GOE was essentially substituting its leading posi-
tion with a private sector investor790. This was a significant example of the GOE’s 
interest in withdrawing from economic activity and opening up to the private sec-
tor. 
From the three components of section IV.A.4, the trade openness pillar, the change 
in political elite together with the privatisation and the EBRD mission, all these el-
ements reflect the Egyptian economy’s experience of intense legislative changes 
during the 2000s. The unified title for all of these changes is justified based on the 
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interest in recording the process of deregulating, liberalising the Egyptian economy 
and exiting the former restrictive, highly regulated protectionist economy of the 
1950s–1970s. These changes should be analysed in conjunction with the IGIL, the 
IL and their prescribed incentives and guarantees. They all serve the same interest 
of deregulating and opening the economy to the private sector and foreign inves-
tors. 
IV.A.5 Conclusion 
The conclusions from the overview of the Egyptian legal framework can be placed 
into three categories. The first regards the IGIL’s level of compliance with interna-
tional investment law obligations. The second tackles the shift in the Egyptian legal 
framework from being a restricted regulated economy to a more open and liberal 
one. This moves the discussion to the third category connected to the concept of 
economic freedom (this is investigated further as part of chapter VI). 
Under the first category, and from the second section assigned principally for the 
benchmarking analysis, the guarantees provided resemble a commitment by the 
GOE to create a legal and investment climate standardised with the international 
framework. This commitment of treatment is a signal that the Egyptian economy is 
less regulated and more open than before. In addition to that, it reflects the GOE’s 
assurance to foreign investors to provide this standardised credible minimum stand-
ard of treatment. Finally, in the third section, the trade agreements pillar, besides the 
new private sector backed GOE were additional proofs of the Egypt’s obvious shift 
towards the private sector. 
From the benchmarking analysis, the Egyptian IGIL and IL prove compliant with 
the international obligations in several instances as detailed above. Examples of 
such levels of compliance are evident in connection to national treatment through 
abolishing the 49 per cent maximum foreign shareholding capital. Another example 
is the simplification of foreigners’ ownership as long as it is connected to undertak-
ing business activity. On the other hand, the violations of the national treatment 
principle are witnessed in the exclusivity of Egyptian nationals over foreigners to 
undertake importation activities for trading purposes. Another traced violation is 
the one connected to the foreigners’ right to own agricultural lands in the Nile Val-
ley and the Delta. 
For the compliance with the guarantee against expropriation, the Egyptian IGIL 
and IL theoretically are in conformity with the international investment law obliga-
  164  
tions. The IGIL and IL refer to expropriation in the broad sense encompassing di-
rect and indirect expropriation. State interventions against investments are prohibit-
ed explicitly in the Law. The IGIL and the IL stay silent regarding the State’s right 
to requisite private property to serve public interest and in return for a prior paid 
fair compensation. The State’s requisition right preserves its superiority by being a 
constitutional right under Article 35 of the Constitution. The constitutional right is 
exercised by Law No. 10 of 1990 providing a due process framework for determin-
ing a “public interest”, compensations due and means of appealing the relevant ad-
ministrative decrees. 
For the dispute settlement, the analysis provided an overview of the development 
of the guarantees under the Egyptian Investment Laws. All of these developments 
confirm the same understanding that Egypt is complying with its international obli-
gations in allowing the referral of disputes to third parties for dispute settlement. A 
clear evidence of the investors’ eligibility to practise such right appears in the high 
number of cases filed against Egypt in ICSID as will be further detailed in the fol-
lowing chapter associated with Egypt’s adjudication. This guarantee allows Egypt’s 
legal rules to reduce the risks borne by an investor in case decided to direct his in-
vestments to Egypt. 
On the compliance with the currency transfer, pricing freedom and the employment 
of foreigners, the Egyptian IGIL and IL partially comply with the international ob-
ligations. On the currency transfer side, the conformity appeared theoretical after 
the practical experience provided for the lack of actual repatriation of profits due to 
backlogs or even caps on international transfers. For the pricing freedom, it falls 
within the indirect expropriation scope as introduced above. Finally, the last notion 
under this conclusion paragraph is connected to the foreigners’ employment as an 
indicator for performance requirements. The IGIL and IL limit the right of employ-
ing foreigners. This represents an advantageous position for nationals over foreign-
ers. Moreover, it restricts investors from hiring the needed calibres, besides conflict-
ing with the international investment law principle of limiting performance re-
quirements. This restriction increases the cost of labour and the factor prices in 
general. 
The second category dealing with the shift in Egypt’s legal framework from being 
restricting to more open and liberalized, the evidences are located in the three sec-
tions of the analysis. For example, the constitutional analysis highlighted the in-
crease in using the words “private” and “investment”, accompanied with a reduced us-
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age of the word “socialist” between the Constitutions of 1971 and 2014. Another 
important example was provided in the sub-section related to the fiscal incentives. 
These incentives are an obvious example of liberalizing and deregulating the econ-
omy through relieving investors from paying taxes or even filing tax returns in some 
instances. Finally, the unification of the incorporation processes is another proof of 
reducing transaction costs through cutting legal difficulties for new investments. 
These were all evidences from different sections consolidating the shift towards less 
regulation and more interaction of market forces. Besides that, it signals the invita-
tion to the private sector to participate in the liberalized economy, aiming to fill the 
gap from the GOE’s retreat.  
This moves the discussion to the last conclusion, briefly highlighted in this chapter. 
The last conclusion is introduced here before tackling it with more details in chapter 
VI. The above evidence of compliance with international obligations, the shift from 
a regulated to a deregulated economy, the privatization and trade openness are all 
explanatory changes with the variable known as economic freedom. The notion of 
economic freedom is the base used for the economic analysis upon the other mac-
roeconomic variables. The above legal changes and examples will help the reader to 
grasp the legal meaning of the economic freedom when it is discussed in a more 
economic sense in the final chapter specifically dealing with the possible impact of 
the legal rules on the net FDI inflows to an economy. 
IV.B Jordan: Legal Framework 
IV.B.1 Introduction 
The Jordanian Investment Promotion Law No. 16 of 1995791 (IPL) and the Law No. 
30 of 2014792 (Inv. Law) will be the base for the benchmarking analysis. Protections 
provided in the law are compared against the protections Jordan is under obligation 
to guarantee for foreign investors under international investment law and BITs. 
Jordan’s legal framework chapter is divided into three subheadings covering: the 
overview of the Jordanian legal framework, international investment obligations 
from a Jordanian legal perspective, and openness to the private sector through pri-
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IV.B.2 An overview of the legal framework 
Analysing the investment legal framework in Jordan requires starting from the top 
of the legal framework before funnelling the research to a narrower context, con-
centrating on more detailed issues. The section first identifies the constitutional arti-
cles that refer to and prescribe investments and private ownership, by examining the 
only Jordanian Constitution promulgated in 1952 with the establishment of the new 
state. Secondly, the structure and main components of the IPL and the Inv. Law are 
examined. Lastly, the tax incentives offered under the IPL and the Inv. Law are 
highlighted, to show the country’s deregulation and openness to the private sector 
and foreign investors. 
(A) Investments in the constitution 
The Jordanian Constitution instituted a constitutional monarchy. Incorporated up-
on the civil and criminal codes, Jordan’s legislations was inspired by several legal 
backgrounds. Within Jordanian laws are references to French codes instituted under 
Ottoman rule, as well as British laws adopted during the 20th century mandate peri-
od. More importantly, Sharia Law has played a role in influencing the western origi-
nating codes, contextualising them within the state’s culture793.  
The review of Jordan’s Constitution of 1952 - and its amendment of 2011794 - assists 
in formulating a general understanding of the legal orientation concerning an indi-
vidual’s right to own private property and the state’s right to regulate the private 
sector. In the Constitution of 1952, the word “private” could not be found in the 
context of ownership. In other words, individuals’ and corporate entities’ right to 
private ownership was not explicitly provided by the constitution. The same applies 
to the word “investment”. However, the constitution was unique compared to its re-
gional counterparts in adopting, to a certain extent, the Hull Rule. In this period, 
most developing economies gaining independence were engaged in nationalisations 
as a mean to promote sovereignty and national identity. The different stance in Jor-
dan justified the west’s welcoming of Jordan’s position by the opening door for 
continuous flows of assistance and aid, especially from the US, since the 1950s.  
 
793 General Counsel Office 2013b 2 
794 The amendment of Jordan’s Constitution of 1952 in 2011 did not change Article 11 dealing with 
expropriation of private property.  
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With only one reference to ownership, the constitution prohibited expropriation 
unless upon three conditions795. First, expropriation must serve the public interest 
or be necessary for public utility purposes. Second, the injured party is entitled to 
just compensation based on the law governing compensation for expropriation. Ar-
ticle 12 of the Constitution expressed the drafters’ interest in protecting private 
ownership rights by explicitly prohibiting unlawful confiscation of movable and 
immovable property. The understanding of the constitution promoted broadening 
the scope and the definition of investment to embrace movable and immovable 
property as well as loans796. 
The Constitution of 1952 requiring compensation for the state’s unlawful interven-
tion in the ownership of private property 1952 remains remarkable. This reference 
highlights the orientation of the ruling elite during the state’s institution phase. 
What arises is a sensation of the drafters’ interest in promoting the private sector by 
protecting private ownership of property. Moreover, granting exceptional protec-
tion under the new Hull Rule (when compared to other developing states) reflects 
the level of the ruling elite’s modernity and view towards the importance of protect-
ing private ownership. With the nationalisation policy spreading in neighbouring 
countries, the inclusion of the three conditions of the Hull Rule within Jordan’s the 
Constitution of 1952 is an advanced leap in the field of treating foreign investments. 
(B) Jordanian Investment Laws 
The openness of the GOJ to private property was not in conjunction with the plans 
of attracting foreign investors. As explained in the historical chapter, the GOJ wid-
ened its role throughout the 1960s and 1980s and depended on foreign governmen-
tal assistance until the region’s geopolitics forced the country to liberalise its econ-
omy. From the constitutional analysis, it appears that the constitution of 1952 was 
private sector-oriented and this was evident in investment legislation only by the 
1990s. This section of the analysis addresses the openness and liberalisation of Jor-
danian legislation, which was adopted to signal the GOJ’s willingness to comply 
with its international obligations. The analysis is split into two subsections with the 
first addressing the IPL and its subsequent amendments through Law No. 68 of 
2003 and the second focussing on the latest Inv. Law. 
 
795 Article 11 of the Constitution of 1952. 
796 Article 12 of the Constitution of 1952. 
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- The IPL and amendment of Law No. 68 of 2003 
The history of Jordanian investment laws dates back to even before Law No. 27 of 
1992. This law was the first Jordanian domestic legislation governing both domestic 
and foreign investments797 and it provided investors with a limited set of guarantees 
that inspired subsequent investment legislation. The law set a maximum non-
Jordanian ownership of any commercial, construction or transportation project at 
49 per cent. Furthermore, it granted Arab investors the privileged treatment equal 
to that offered to Jordanian nationals, removing the requirement of the Cabinet of 
Ministers (Cabinet) prior approval, as non-Arab investors were required to obtain 
prior approval from the Cabinet to undertake an investment project in Jordan798. 
Taking into account the levels of bureaucracy, the law was not successful in attract-
ing the necessary flows of investments799. 
The worked continuously in the 1990s to promote investment and revolutionise 
Jordan’s framework to put it at the top of the MENA region legal reformers. The 
GOJ’s inefficiencies associated with bureaucracy remained the primary problem for 
businesses. An obvious example was the ease of obtaining operational licences to 
start business activities. The Jordanian Investment Board (JIB) was criticised for its 
inefficient one-stop shop vested with partial authority to grant all necessary licences. 
Other prominent deficiencies included the increasing number of authorities’ that 
investors are forced to interact with and the minimal budget assigned for invest-
ment promotion purposes800.  
The GOJ drafted the IPL in 1994 and issued it in 1995. The IPL had two corner-
stones, the first of which was reducing bureaucracy by abolishing the formerly re-
quired Cabinet approval for all foreign investments. It also opened the door for the 
full foreign ownership in certain fields of investments (e.g., tourism) only if the capi-
tal contribution of the foreign shareholder was transferred into Jordanian bank ac-
counts in foreign convertible currency. The second element was widening invest-
ment incentives with primary focus on tax holidays and tax rate reductions. On a 
corporate level, tax rates were cut to 30 per cent rather than 50 per cent in the in-
surance and banking sectors, and in the mining and tourism industries were reduced 
to 15 per cent from 40. A follow-up regulation was enacted to govern non-
Jordanian investments. The implementing regulation allowed foreigners to access 
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the tourism industry by floating on the Amman Stock Exchange801. In other eco-
nomic sectors, such as trade, transportation, telecommunications and construction, 
the 49 per cent foreign ownership limit remained in place. The same regulation set a 
minimum for foreign investor capital in any projects at JOD 100,000802. 
The IPL paved the way for investment laws adopting similar understandings until 
the latest Inv. Law. The IPL was principally focused on the establishment of an in-
vestment-friendly climate through explicitly prescribing incentives for qualified in-
vestors. The IPL published in October 1995 divided Jordan into three regions based 
on each level of development. Investment in the least-developed regions guaranteed 
investors the most incentives, and vice versa803. The IPL defined foreign capital 
broadly through integrating cash transfers, importation of assets, intangibles and 
capital increases funded by reinvestment of profits804. 
The private sector pressured to abolish the 50 per cent foreign investment ceiling 
for commercial services, mining and construction. The Higher Council for Invest-
ments adopted this recommendation. The GOJ acknowledged this pressure and in-
tended to eliminate all foreign ownership restrictions. However, the new imple-
menting regulation’s805 final outcome liberalised all the economic sectors except for 
the three recommended by the Higher Council for Investments. Furthermore, the 
regulation reduced the non-Jordanian minimum capital requirement for an invest-
ment to JOD 50,000. The Higher Council for Investments preserved its stance and 
recommended abolishing the 50 per cent ceiling, but no changes were implement-
ed806.  
The following legislative step was the issuance of Investment Law No. 68 of 
2003807. It included articles similar to those provided in the IPL808. The similar guar-
antees include the right to repatriate profits and revenues809 and freedom of labour 
management. A development in comparison to the IPL was the composition of a 
committee authorised to review investors’ applications for incentives and other re-
quests to obtain operational licences. On the other hand, the law eliminated articles 
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addressing the dispute settlement regime. Reference was only made to Arab and in-
ternational agreements related to the matter. 
The guarantees under Law No. 68 of 2003 first include explicit ones on the right of 
non-Jordanians to invest in Jordan through ownership, participation or partnership 
depending on specific factors and minimum capital requirements810. The sectors and 
capital requirements were determined through subsequent regulations. The sectors 
not specifically regulated in the previously mentioned regulation were open to for-
eign investors on equal basis with the Jordanian counterparts. Second, the law pro-
hibited the expropriation of investments unless for public interest purposes and in 
return for fair compensation in convertible currency811. Third, the law guaranteed 
investors’ right to repatriate profits and proceeds abroad in convertible currency812. 
The same rights were guaranteed to employees regarding their salaries and wages813.  
The law recognised all Arab and international agreements in relation to investment 
dispute settlement814. It also prohibited banning the entry of any entities due to the 
absence of necessary licences unless it justified based on public policy, national 
healthcare, security, education, environmental concerns or the national economy’s 
interest815. Moreover, the law obliged the administrative authority to respond within 
seven days to applicants’ licence requests816. The administrative rejection had to be 
reasoned and applicants could challenge the decision within sixty days. 
The OECD mission reviewing Jordan’s investment framework criticised the frame-
work’s lack of clarity, with consequent uncertainty for investors. The investment 
framework was governed by three pieces of legislation. The first prescribed the tax 
incentives under the IPL. Second, Law No. 68 of 2003 amended the IPL and pre-
scribed the procedures to obtain the operational licences. Third, Regulation No. 54 
of 2000 set the maximum foreign ownership in Jordanian investments. The 2003 
laws were promulgated, initially, only temporarily. However, the authorities en-
forced them until issuing the Inv. Law. The continuous amendments and overlap of 
legislation created several loopholes and raised uncertainty. The prevalent ambiguity 
encouraged Jordan’s policymakers to issue unified investment legislation integrating 
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all the investment-related authorities into one new institution, known as the Higher 
Investment Council. The founded institution included primarily the JIB and the 
Free Zones Development Commission817. 
- The Inv. Law 
For the same reasoning of boosting investment inflows and dealing with the defi-
ciencies witnessed in the governing investment legislation, the GOJ introduced the 
Inv. Law. It was promulgated with the same mind-set of openness to the private 
sector and granting tax incentives. The Inv. Law remains further evidence of the 
continuous focus of favouring the private sector through opening more investment 
fields to foreign investors. Similar understandings of tax incentives appear in the 
Inv. Law. These are confirmation of the GOJ’s priority in deregulation. 
The essence of the Inv. Law is granting investors a wide range of incentives to 
stimulate their interest to invest. The Law defines the “foreign capital”818 in line with 
the broad definition provided in the IPL819. It addresses the forms of foreign in-
vestment in Jordan as owners, partners or shareholders820. Moreover, it identifies 
the willingness to introduce a new subsequent regulation to govern the maximum 
per centages of foreign ownership in Jordanian entities. More importantly, it reflects 
Jordan’s respect of the NT821. 
Chapter 6 of the Inv. Law embraces most of the international investment law obli-
gations. It starts with preserving investors’ right to swiftly repatriate any amount of 
profits, returns or liquidation proceeds abroad822. The same right of repatriation ap-
plies to employees’ salaries and wages. The law prohibited actions by the GOJ that 
constituted indirect expropriation. These actions constitute a compensation right 
for injured investors823. The Inv. Law guides foreign investors with the process of 
approaching their investor-state disputes. The first period lasts for less than six 
months, where both parties pursue settlements amicably. Afterwards, investors are 
entitled to proceed with the dispute in international arbitration, through Jordan’s 
domestic arbitration law, or even Jordanian courts824. On the administrative side, the 
Inv. Law established the Jordanian Investment Commission (JIC) as the sole com-
 
817 Rey M. 2013 53 
818 Article 41(a) of the Inv. Law. 
819 Article 41(a) of the Inv. Law uses a definition to that provided in Article 5 of the IPL. 
820 Article 10 of the Inv. Law. 
821 Article 10(b) of the Inv. Law. 
822 Article 41(b) of the Inv. Law. 
823 Article 42 of the Inv. Law. 
824 Article 43 of the Inv. Law. 
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petent authority to supervise and govern investments. The Higher Investment 
Council after the Cabinet approval sets the guidelines upon which the JIC has to 
act. The JIC’s primary objective is enhancing the investment’s climate administra-
tively.  
Returning to the start of the Inv. Law, the first two chapters focus on the invest-
ment incentives in and outside development zones. The third chapter addresses the 
investment window regime and licencing regimes as elaborated on below. Chapters 
four and five are the administrative umbrellas for the JIB and the Commission de-
termining their goals of interacting independently to avoid overlaps resulting in am-
biguities. The JIB is a higher authority and is responsible for consulting the GOJ re-
garding legislatively enhancing the investment climate825. The GOJ representation is 
undeniable within the composition of the JIB. The second body is the JIC, targeting 
the attraction of foreign and Jordanian investors. The JIC can issue the necessary 
regulations in development zones. Other capacities include the marketing of in-
vestment opportunities in Jordan through establishing representative offices and 
participating in exhibitions. 
Before moving the discussion to the investment incentives, from the above analysis 
of the three investment laws of 1995, 2003 and 2014, an obvious conclusion can be 
drawn. The legal development reflects the continuous efforts of the GOJ to liberal-
ise its regulatory framework, allowing wider access of foreign investors to economic 
activities. With all critics to the investment legislations, it is possible to conclude 
that the policymakers’ ultimate interest remains the attraction of foreign investors at 
whatever cost. The benefit from such developments in investment legislation is rec-
ognising the concessions the policymakers are willing to offer over time to achieve 
their objective. 
(C) Investment laws incentives 
This subsection highlights deregulation efforts in the field of taxation by examining 
tax holidays and exemptions under both laws. A tax holiday or exemption remains 
an obvious example of de-regulation, as it lowers the legal burden on an investor in 
terms of taxes due, and at times exempts the taxpayer from filing a tax return. 
The first subsection below addresses the IPL tax incentives, while the second is fo-
cuses on the investment incentives granted under the Inv. Law. 
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- IPL 
Under the IPL, Jordan was split into three development zones and the associated 
investment incentives were granted according to the designated zone. Zone C pro-
jects were subject to the widest range of incentives since implemented in the least 
developed part of the country, when compared to zone A, which received the low-
est benefits due to its initial higher development rates. The second categorisation 
for incentives was the nature of business or activity. Transportation investments 
such as railway and maritime, besides agriculture are all deemed Zone C projects re-
gardless of their location. On the other hand, tourism-related investment through 
the Dead Sea’s coast were treated as zone A projects826.  
The incentives under the IPL included custom duties, municipalities and localities 
fees. As an example, spare parts imported under an investment project within the 
first ten years from the start of production were exempted from social taxes and 
custom duties if they were worth 15 per cent or less of the total fixed assets of the 
investment. For industrial zones, investments were subject to a two-year full exemp-
tion from property, social services and income taxes. Other exemptions were grant-
ed for projects located in the three Jordanian development zones after receiving the 
necessary approval of the competent administrative authority827. Under Article 7, 
paragraph (a), income tax exemptions lasted for ten years and their rates depended 
upon the investment’s location. Thus, investments in development zone A benefit-
ed from a 25 per cent exemption. The rate increased to 50 per cent for zone B in-
vestments and 75 per cent for zone C. An additional year of exemption applied if 
investors successfully raised their investment production capacity by no less than 25 
per cent. More importantly, the IPL did not discriminate between domestic and for-
eign investors. In other words, exemptions and holidays were available to all inves-
tors regardless of nationality or citizenship. 
Investment Law No. 68 of 2003 abolished several clauses of the IPL without chang-
ing the investment exemptions and incentives. The law had transparently addressed 
the necessary procedures to enjoy the provided incentives. The Investment Incen-
tives Committee was vested with powers to review incentive application requests 
and decide on their validity within 30 days. Rejections were justified and investors 
were entitled to challenge such rejections828. However, the Income Tax Law of 2009 
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terminated all applicable tax exemptions except, for example, in the Aqaba Special 
Economic Zone. 
- Inv. Law 
The new Inv. Law of Jordan maintains the same stance in exempting newly estab-
lished investments from various applicable taxes. Additionally, the law preserved an 
overlap between different investment zones regimes, with Article 8 prescribing the 
Cabinet competent to offer additional exemptions and holidays to whatever eco-
nomic activity. With regard to investment incentives, under the law the Cabinet can 
grant a set of incentives to investments based on the Higher Investment Council’s 
prior recommendation.  
Incentives include exemption from custom duties and the refund of general taxes 
borne upon receiving production inputs within 30 days after filing the necessary re-
quest to the competent tax department. Other crucial tax incentives are connected 
to the development and special economic zones. Investing in these zones offers the 
investor at least a 30 per cent exemption if not more, based on the investment’s lo-
cation. Finally, exporting entities were eligible for an income tax exemption without 
extending this exemption to fields of phosphate and fertiliser exportation. However, 
these exemptions were terminated by 2015 based on an agreement with the 
WTO829. 
The first and second chapters are fully focused on the granted holidays and exemp-
tions under and outside the development and free zones. Of the main incentives, 
the reduction of income tax rates to 5 per cent for entities established within devel-
opment zones. Article 12 provided a zero tax for purchases and imports connected 
to business activity. Under Article 14 and in the event of investments located in free 
zones, a full income tax exemption applies. The third chapter initiates the one-stop-
shop regime. Article 15 founds an investment window to streamline bureaucracy 
and issue the necessary operational licences.  
Further interpretation and clear competencies were stipulated in the subsequently 
issued Investment Window Regulation No. 32 of 2015830. The window system was 
composed of bureaucrats vested with all powers and authority to facilitate and issue 
several approvals and licences turning applicants’ investments operational. The ap-
provals issued under Article 4 of the Regulation include incorporating and register-
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ing entities, construction, employment and all similar miscellaneous permits. The 
exclusive purpose for initiating this Window was the facilitation of business incor-
poration and operation. The objective was achieved by gathering all governmental 
authorities and departments necessary for approving and licencing the business op-
eration in one place. By then, investors can apply for any necessary licences and ap-
provals in a simpler manner831. 
- Other beneficial incentives 
Another legislative reform promoting investment was promulgating the Aqaba Spe-
cial Economic Zone. The law issued in August 2000832 considered the zone outside 
the scope of applying customs and general sales tax on imported products. All in-
vestments operating under the regime are fully exempt from customs and subject to 
a mere 5 per cent income tax on net profits, 7 per cent general sales tax instead of 
the inland rate of 13 per cent, and are exempt from real estate taxes and fees on 
buildings necessary for operations. The exemptions apply to all investments in the 
zone with exclusion of insurance and financial institutions that remain subject to the 
regular Jordanian income tax laws833. The zone provides a set of different incentives 
including a 5 per cent flat income tax and facilitated customs treatment through the 
Aqaba Port834. 
The three sections above address the tax incentives granted under the Jordanian in-
vestment laws to attract investors. The cornerstone of the policy is relieving inves-
tors from the obligation of paying taxes or even filing a tax return. Hence, as as-
sumed throughout this research, tax exemptions, holidays or even rate reduction all 
remain examples of deregulating the economy and moving further towards the pri-
vate sector. This conclusion is confirmed as the three laws provide similar tax incen-
tives. 
IV.B.3 Investment laws principles and international obligations  
In this section, the development towards a more liberal economy appears more ob-
vious, especially through benchmarking the IPL’s and the Inv. Law’s guarantees 
against the obligations prescribed by BITs. The guarantees were deemed the signal 
necessary to attract foreign investors to flow into the Jordanian economy. This re-
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lates to the discussion introduced under the theoretical framework concerning the 
benefits investigated by the policymakers when deciding on their states’ engagement 
in BITs835. The guarantees were deemed as important as the tax incentives in trans-
lating Jordan’s willingness to accord foreign investors the standardised treatment as 
required under the international investment law. Prior to starting the benchmarking 
analysis to assess the level of compliance, the chapter briefly examines Jordan’s 
BITs and introduces the guarantees offered under the IPL and the Inv. Law. 
Jordan has 48 BITs in force836. The high rate of ratifying BITs in Jordan compared 
to the region’s average (non-ratification of 25–30 per cent of the signed BITs), high-
lights the GOJ’s interest in granting foreign investors the needed protection. The 
high rate of ratification places Jordan second regionally in terms of ratified BITs af-
ter Egypt (one of top ten signatories world-wide). Jordan’s BITs have been primari-
ly concluded with MENA region partners, besides 20 OECD members. Another 
important feature is the engagement in most BITs over the last two decades, where 
the openness and liberalisation processes intensified. In this sense, the behaviour of 
the GOJ in concluding BITs conforms to the global trend of a surging number of 
BITs.  
The second cornerstone pillar of increase in BITs was through engaging in FTAs. 
On the bilateral level, FTAs concluded with the US included a chapter on the pro-
motion of investment837. The EU Association Agreement tackled investment pro-
motion once838, when it urges Jordan to: (i) simplify its administrative procedures 
linked to the investment climate, and (ii) maintain its behaviour in framing an in-
vestment environment favourable for investors through expanding its BITs and 
double tax treaty (DTTs) networks839. An additional regional investment charter is 
the Unified Agreement for Investment of Arab Capital in Arab States of 1980 as 
promoted by the League of Arab States (LAS). The unified agreement provides a 
protection umbrella for Arab-Arab investments between LAS members840. It adopt-
ed the classical investment protection understandings, besides setting an institution-
al framework to decide on disputes. Protections provided under the agreement in-
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clude the MFN, NT, direct expropriation without reference to the indirect expro-
priation, freedom of capital transfer and finally the Arab Investment Court841. 
This section intends to benchmark the legal analysis provided above regarding the 
domestic investment laws in Jordan against the State’s international obligations un-
der its BIT network. The base for the analysis will be the BIT substantive protec-
tions as introduced in the theoretical framework842, and the IGIL guarantees will de-
termine the fields of law to be addressed under this section regarding Jordan843. In 
other words, the silence of the Jordanian investment laws regarding the invest-
ment’s right to freely price its products, will be determined through visiting other 
Jordanian domestic legislation to ensure compliance with such BIT obligation. Four 
subsections below cover NT and expropriation, dispute settlement, and foreign 
ownership of investments, currency transferal rights and employment of foreign 
employees. 
(A) National treatment and foreign ownership 
The first notion in the phase of benchmarking Jordan’s legislations and the BIT ob-
ligations is NT. The notion was introduced in the theoretical framework chapter as 
one of the substantive protections under the international investment law regime. 
Jordan pursued continuous attempts to modernise its domestic legislation to: (i) 
standardise the treatment of foreigners, (ii) rationalise the costs of the factors of 
production, and (iii) cut transaction costs of doing business in Jordan. 
- Ownership of shares 
Jordan’s legislation features a minimal level of foreign ownership limitations. This 
minimal level confirms the effect of the former protectionist policies adopted by the 
government at earlier stages. The foreign ownership restrictions were enacted by 
Regulation No. 54 of 2000844, which provided three forms of non-Jordanian partici-
pation in private sector investments. The first form permitted foreigners to own a 
maximum of 50 per cent of investments in Jordan in activities such as trading of 
goods, importation and distribution, construction, advertising, money exchange and 
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engineering services. In total, 13 services and six commercial activities fall within 
the 50 per cent limitation845. 
The second form of foreign ownership restriction allowed foreigners a maximum of 
49 per cent ownership in investments. Two services only fell within this scope, in-
cluding regular airlines and jet rental services. Finally, the third form of restriction 
prohibited foreigners from any kind of ownership or participation in investments 
associated with security services and sports clubs846. Therefore, the regulation identi-
fied three categories of investments with limitations of 50, 49 or 0 per cent. Activi-
ties falling outside these three categories entitled foreigners to own up to 100 per 
cent of the investments without any restrictions847.  
Openness was still restricted in specified sectors and the minimum capital for for-
eign owned investments engaging in commercial activities was exceptionally set at 
JD 50,000848. The minimum capital requirement could obviously violate the interna-
tional investment law principle of NT. Aiming to eliminate any differential treat-
ment, the IPL accorded non-Jordanian investors treatment equal to their Jordanian 
counterparts849. An additional step was the theoretical elimination of any formal 
screening processes concerning foreign investors interested in sectors governed by 
the IPL. Practically, the prior implicit approval of the central GOJ remains a cor-
nerstone for foreign investors’ success in doing businesses in Jordan850. 
In the Inv. Law. the legislator explicitly treats the foreign investor as a national in-
vestor when applying the provisions of that law851. However, the Inv. Law still re-
ferred to a subsequent regulation governing foreign investors’ participation in in-
vestments in Jordan852. The new regulation853 maintains the right of non-Jordanians 
to fully own any investments without any restrictions and without prejudice to any 
national security, public purpose and national healthcare854. It shifts activities and 
services between the three forms of private sector participation with ownership per 
centages of 50, 49 or 0 per cent.  
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The 50 per cent foreigner ownership restriction includes 11 services and two com-
mercial activities. Conversely, six services are capped at 49 per cent, while there are 
eight prohibited ownership activities. The regulation entitles non-Jordanian entities, 
where Jordanians own 50 per cent or more, to own and fully or partially operate in-
vestments in Jordan855. Finally, it verifies Jordan’s obligation to adhere to its con-
cluded BITs856. A significant change is abolishing the minimum capital requirements 
for foreigners. In this sense, foreigners are only restricted from entering certain ac-
tivities without any additional restrictions. 
In examining a set of the BITs the GOJ recently concluded, several observations 
and conclusions can be drawn regarding the GOJ’s behaviour in adopting the NT. 
First, Jordan adheres to a broad definition of “investments” in BITs (as in the domes-
tic law), when entitled to exercise the benefits of the BIT. The definition embraces 
assets utilised in non-business purposes and portfolio investment. On the side of 
defining “investors”, for legal persons, Jordan’s nationality is granted based on the 
place of incorporation, taking into account the necessity of undertaking a real busi-
ness activity. Another important concept related to the NT application is “pre-
establishment rights”. 
Pre-establishment rights appears in Jordan’s BITS with Canada857, the US858 and 
Singapore859. Under these clauses, investors are granted protections as NT and 
MFN, as well as the right to claim BIT benefits when they have seriously considered 
a potential investment and have concretely moved forward towards making the in-
vestment. It extends the scope of applying the NT to include investments at the po-
tential phase and not only in the post-establishment one. This is connected to the 
above list of foreign ownership restrictions on certain activities, which may violate 
the NT under the pre-establishment rights. The discrepancies in Jordan’s BIT word-
ings of the NT principle raise ambiguities. For example, the Jordan-Russia860 BIT 
entitles each contracting state to promulgate domestic legislation that conflicts with 
the NT. Conversely, the Jordan-Singapore BIT prescribes pre-and post-
establishment rights for investors with the inclusion of NT. 
The US trade office representatives when engaging in free trade/investment agree-
ments negotiations prioritises transparency and the facilitation of investment and 
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trade climates. One of the means to attain these goals is through listing the legisla-
tive investment and trade related restrictions applicable to US investors in the 
FTA’s partner. These restrictions are prescribed in the FTAs’ annexes attached to it. 
Revisiting the US-Jordan FTA, the Services Schedule A in Annex 3.1, sets limita-
tions regarding the incorporation of US businesses in Jordan. These restrictions are 
often in violation of the NT. Examples of restrictions include the setting of a higher 
minimum capital for entities incorporated in Jordan and owned by foreign inves-
tors. This minimum capital was abolished by the Inv. Law. 
With the IPL, explicitly treating foreign investors at least in a similar manner861 to 
how domestic investors are treated862, the Inv. Law adopted a set of clauses prevail-
ing under the former IPL. More importantly, the Inv. Law verifies the equal treat-
ment of foreign and domestic investors863. Internal efforts of liberalising the Jorda-
nian legal framework have produced two effects. First, in terms of the minimum 
capital requirement for a foreign investor to invest in Jordan, the requirement of at 
least JOD 100,000 as per the regulation of 1996, was reduced to JOD 50,000 by the 
regulation of 2000, and was totally abolished by the regulation of 2016. The reduc-
tion and later abolishment of the amount further prove Jordan’s liberalisation and 
opening of its economy to foreign investors. 
The second effect is evident in the legislator’s becoming more flexible regarding the 
protected sectors formerly reserved only for domestic investors. This even puts the 
Jordanian laws more in compliance with the NT though not in full compliance. 
- Land ownership 
The second concept analysed in this subsection is connected to restrictions on non-
Jordanian ownership of real estate. The Foreigners’ Ownership of Immovable 
Property Law864 differentiates between individuals and corporate entities. For an in-
dividual, the law conditions non-Jordanians ownership of lands upon: (i) the indi-
vidual’s home state accordance of reciprocal treatment to Jordanians, (ii) whether 
ownership is necessary for the non-Jordanian’s activity and projects, and (iii) wheth-
er the land is within the cities’ and villages’ specified borders and does not exceed a 
specific size865. For corporate entities, the law allows ownership regardless of the na-
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tionality of the corporate entity as long as it is necessary to undertake the entity’s 
business activity and upon the receiving the required approvals from the competent 
minister or the Cabinet itself depending on the size of the land required866. Similarly, 
the law facilitates the leasing of lands to non-Jordanians for periods less than three 
years (otherwise approval from the Minister of Interior is required)867. 
Under the Economic Boycott Law868, non-Arab nationals are eligible to acquire, 
lease and own immovable property in Jordan. The law differentiates between Arab 
and non-Arab investors. The latter are entitled to own lands in Jordan only if four 
conditions869 prevail (i) the accordance of reciprocal treatment to Jordanians in the 
investor’s home state, (ii) the business utilization of the land within five years’ peri-
od since ownership or lease, (iii) the business activity performed over this property 
does not threaten national security, and (iv) the investor obtains the Cabinet’s ap-
proval. In case of corporate entities, they are prohibited from investing in the agri-
cultural sector870. 
From the above, it appears that the Immovable Property Law of 2006 adopts a 
softer and more open stance when compared to the tone of the Economic Boycott 
Law of 1995. The conditions required under the latter are still applicable upon for-
eign investors’ individuals or corporate entities. The strictness of the Economic 
Boycott Law clearly appears in the usage of vague notions as threatening “national 
security”. This opens a wide door for the GOJ to intervene to favour Jordanian and 
Arab investments over non-Arab ones. Moreover, prohibiting foreign companies 
from investing in the agricultural sector under the Economic Boycott Law resem-
bled an obviously favourable treatment for domestic and Arab investors, triggering 
concerns of NT violations. 
The business-friendly tone of the Immovable Property Law of 2006 demonstrates 
the new orientation of the GOJ adopted in the early 2000s. Apart from the law’s 
specific application to foreign subjects, it simplifies the process of foreigners’ land 
ownership for business purposes upon receiving the required approvals. This lowers 
the prices of the factors of production necessary for the foreigners’ business activity 
in Jordan and can increase the inflows of FDI into Jordan. In addition, with no limi-
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tations on nationalities, the transaction costs of operating business in Jordan de-
cline, which can have a positive result on the volume of the FDI inflows to Jordan. 
- Importation 
Another notion subject to under the NT is the right to import. Jordan does not al-
low importation through foreign entities unless they have the necessary licences to 
operate an activity in Jordan. Without a licence, a special business structure is need-
ed to import. This includes hiring a direct registered agent as indirect or sub-agents 
are not legally sufficient871. 
The importation and exportation law (IEL)872 permits importation of goods with no 
restrictions other than showing the importer’s card873. Under Regulation No. 114 of 
2004874 (concerning exportation and importation licences875), foreign entities with 
operational licences to undertake non-commercial operations are allowed to obtain 
importation cards through which they can import in their own names after register-
ing in the importers’ registry876. For foreign contractors and companies operating 
under Jordan’s laws the imported goods must be necessary for the implementation 
of the contracts concluded with the GOJ, which must be approve the quantity and 
the type of the imported goods. 
With having the necessary licenses as a pre-condition to engage in importation ac-
tivities for nationals and foreigners, Jordan has taken a leap forward regarding the 
compliance of the foreigners’ right to import with the NT principle. In this regard, 
Jordan’s equal treatment for nationals and foreigners eliminates any advantages for 
local investors over their foreign counterparts since both are required to register in 
the importers’ registry. Regarding the doing of business, with such entitlement of 
importing the business necessities, Jordan significantly allows foreign investors to 
lower the transaction costs of their business operations through engaging directly in 
the importation and not through agents. In addition, the ease of access to business 
necessities through importation lowers the prices of the factors of production. 
Hence, both factors can positively affect the volume of FDI inflows to Jordan. 
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- Public procurement 
With regard to public procurement, Jordan’s score has put its legal framework in the 
region’s lowest quarter. The main negativities were the preferential treatment of 
domestic products, the weak administration of the procurement process and the 
contractual management. Although the Public Procurement Law advocates free, fair 
competition, contracts are awarded to offers close to the Cabinet of Ministers’ pre-
determined price preference.  
(B) Expropriation 
The second concept in the process of benchmarking is that of expropriation. As the 
preceding one, the notion was introduced in the theoretical framework chapter as 
one of the substantive protections under the international investment law regime877.  
Jordan’s right to expropriate is granted under Article 11 of the constitution. The ge-
neric provision conditions expropriation on its serving the public interest, being in 
return for compensation, and conforming with domestic law. Investment Law No. 
68 of 2003 refers to “expropriation” as depriving an owner of his possession or 
adopting any measures resulting in similar experiences878. This wording permitted 
the law to encompass both direct and indirect forms of expropriation, while pre-
serving the above principles of the expropriation being in the public interest, for 
compensation and in conformance with the law. The compensation was expected to 
be in a convertible currency, though the law was silent on879 investors’ rights to 
transfer compensation freely as in the case of proceeds and profits. The Inv. Law. 
adopts880 an understanding similar to that of the above-mentioned law in prohibit-
ing the expropriation of any business activity or subjecting it to any procedures that 
tantamount to expropriation unless the expropriation is deemed a requisition for 
public purposes and is effected only after fairly compensating the investor in a con-
vertible currency. From the Law of 2003 and the Inv. Law, both had totally forgone 
other essential referrals to implementing an expropriation without any discrimina-
tion, in respect of due process and subjecting it to judicial review. 
An important reference to expropriation is found in Law No. 12 of 1987881 (Requi-
sition Law), which regulates requisitions. It explicitly allowed the GOJ to requisition 
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property in the public interest, in conjunction with the necessity of fairly compen-
sating the owner882. In this case, the discussion regarding the similarity between req-
uisitions and expropriation applies, as in the section on Egypt883. The Requisition 
Law details the pre- and post-requisition procedures in terms of notifications and 
entitlements to the tenants injured by the requisition884. The Requisition Law also 
details the rules of compensation. To begin with, compensation must be determined 
by the court if both parties (the GOJ and the private owner) fail to agree885. 
The Law lists the components and the criteria guiding the determination of the 
compensation based on the court’s ruling or the parties’ agreement886. The compen-
sation must fairly cover: (i) the utilisation of the property and the potential revenues 
arising therefrom, and (ii) the damages incurred by the owner due to the restricted 
usage of the property after the establishment of the project. For the criteria to be 
considered, the value of the neighbouring properties is used887. Another important 
guarantee is the imposition of an annual interest of nine per cent for the delay in 
communicating the compensation due. The compensation payment’s delay starts by 
the first day after one month from the court’s ruling or the parties’ agreement888. Fi-
nally, the owners are entitled to restore their property ownership after requisition, if 
it is proved in court that the GOJ – within three years from the requisition – did 
not commence the public interest project upon which the property was requisi-
tioned889. 
The OECD review mission praised the coverage of expropriation in Jordan’s do-
mestic laws. Moreover, it recommended the harmonisation of Law No. 68 of 2003 
and the Requisition Law by adopting unified and precise definitions and procedures 
to attain prompt judicial review for requisition decisions. An additional amendment 
can be introduced by explicitly listing the criteria to deem an expropriation (requisi-
tion) lawful. These recommendations were principally proposed to preserve a bal-
ance between the state’s right to expropriate and the investor’s right to protect pri-
vate property890.  
 
882 Article 3 of the Requisition Law. 
883 See IV.A.1(A). 
884 Articles 4 to 9 of the Requisition Law. 
885 Article 22(a) of the Requisition Law. 
886 Article 10 of the Requisition Law. 
887 Article 10 (c) of the Requisition Law. 
888 Article 14 of the Requisition Law. 
889 Article 20 of the Requisition Law. 
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All Jordanian BITs contain expropriation clauses. The model Jordanian BIT is an 
apparent example of lawful expropriation conditions. The four conditions that legit-
imise the state’s attempt to use its expropriation rights encompass compliance with 
the domestic investment law, subjecting the action to judicial review promptly and 
in return for a compensation as detailed under the BIT. The Jordan-Canada BIT in 
Annex B 13 permits the review of case-by-case decisions to investigate the constitu-
tion of an indirect expropriation. 
On the BITs side, Jordan’s BITs successfully adopted international customary law 
in the clauses related to expropriation. All treaties cover the two notions of expro-
priation indirect and direct. The recent Jordan-Canada BIT uniquely defined indi-
rect expropriation providing for the host state’s right to regulate in connection to 
public health and environment. On the compensation side, Jordan approved the 
concepts of fair market value and full transferability of compensation. The assess-
ment of the market value is based on period during which the expropriation took 
place. Conversely, the right to judicially review the expropriation decisions domesti-
cally is not prescribed in all BITs. 
The legal framework governing expropriation lowers the uncertainties of investing 
in Jordan, which can affect positively the inflows of FDI to Jordan. It moderates 
the possible risks to be borne by the foreign investor through two means. First, the 
constitution as well as the investment laws have all prohibited direct and indirect 
expropriations. This lowers the risks of expropriating the business activity or bur-
dening it with imposed fees or obstacle procedures (i.e., indirect expropriation). 
Second, the presence of a Requisition Law to govern the procedures of implement-
ing requisitions, the compensation’s valuation, components and timing of calcula-
tion, besides the significant guarantee of the investor’s right to restore the requisi-
tioned property in case it was not used by the requisitioning authority in serving the 
public purpose within a time period. 
(C) Dispute Settlement 
The third notion in the comparison process is the right of a foreign investor to re-
vert the dispute to the ICSID. The referral of a contractual dispute between the 
host state and foreign investor to a third party for international arbitration is a fun-
damental protection891.The constitution’s exceptional reference to expropriation was 
complemented by verifying the necessity of paying adequate compensation to inves-
 
891 See II.F.4. 
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tors in a convertible currency. With regard to dispute settlement, Jordan’s legal 
framework is an outcome of a mix of civil law, customary international law, and 
Sharia Law. 
Jordan’s commercial law does not differentiate between non-Jordanian and Jordani-
an investors. The foreign rulings including international arbitration awards are exe-
cuted in Jordan after the application to enforce these rulings through a special pro-
cedure in the domestic judiciary. Jordanian law grants foreign investors the right to 
revert conflicts to third-party dispute settlement mechanisms. Evidence of arbitra-
tion provision prevail in the US-Jordan BIT892. Similarly, the US-Jordan FTA and 
the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism of which Jordan is a member provide for 
similar settlement options. On the international scene, Jordan signed the ICSID 
Convention in 1972. The early accession did not trigger several cases against the 
GOJ in ICSID arbitration. In the same context, Jordan signed the New York Con-
vention of 1958 concerning the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards.  
International arbitration seems to be in an advantageous position when compared 
to the local judiciary since cases, which extend up to four years to reach a final rul-
ing. However, in arbitration, disputes are decided in 12–18 months. Another rea-
soning favouring arbitration is the lack of necessary knowledge on the domestic side 
of judiciary regarding commercial and investment disputes893. Finally, Law No. 68 of 
2003894 provided a third-party dispute settlement under international arbitration. In 
the former Law, the article referred to the ICSID since Jordan signed its Washing-
ton Convention. Regardless of the article in the law, foreign investors are recom-
mended to include an international arbitration clause in their contractual arrange-
ments with the GOJ since the latter will always prefer reverting disputes to local 
courts895.  
The Inv. Law allows amicable settlement between the State and the investor during 
a cooling-off period of six months896. Alternatively, investors may settle their claims 
with the State through filing claims in Jordanian courts or in accordance with Jor-
dan’s arbitration law or the other means of dispute settlement as agreed by the dis-
pute’s parties. Conversely, half of the OECD-reviewed Jordan BITs include a fork-
 
892 Article 9 of the US-Jordan BIT. 
893 Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs 2015b 8-9 
894 Article 33 of Law No. 68 of 2003. 
895 Kanaan, T. and Kardosh, M. 2005 18 
896 Article 43 of the Inv. Law. 
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in-the-road clause, prescribing the mutually exclusive relationship between interna-
tional arbitration and domestic judiciary897. 
In line with the interest in alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, the new Arbi-
tration Law898 widened its scope to cover both civil and commercial disputes arising 
from any legal relationship between private and the public personnel without limita-
tion to contractual arrangements. The conditional recourse to arbitration requires 
the presence of an arbitration agreement either within the contractual arrangement 
as a clause or as a separate subsequent agreement between parties when the dispute 
arose. Concerning procedural matters, arbitration proceedings in Jordan are not 
subject to any mandatory international arbitration rules. The rules closely linked to 
the dispute are applicable unless they contravene Jordan’s public policy. The ren-
dered arbitral award is final and cannot be appealed under the Jordan’s civil proce-
dures law.  
The award is later directed to the competent court to issue its execution orders. For 
foreign arbitral awards governed by the New York Convention, the award is en-
forceable only if already enforceable in the jurisdiction where it was rendered. Ap-
peal of foreign arbitral awards is possible under Jordanian law, though limited to 
challenging them only based on specific grounds. Jordan attained a unique position 
in its region by introducing separate legislation in 2006 regulating mediation as an 
alternative dispute resolution mechanism. It is defined as a voluntary process and 
informal, whereby settlements must be accepted by the disputing parties’. The Jor-
dan Chamber of Commerce encourages the settlement of disputes out-of-court 
through benefiting from the alternative means under arbitration and mediation899. 
The guarantee of dispute settlement in accordance to the possible agreements be-
tween the State and the investor is another important point in reducing the potential 
risks borne by foreign investors when investing in Jordan. This protection allows 
foreign investors to avoid the partiality of domestic judiciary or bias through offer-
ing an alternative route by accessing international dispute settlement mechanisms as 
arbitration. This comes in line with recommendations provided by donor groups to 
involved investors to incorporate dispute settlement clauses and specifically arbitra-
tion ones within their contractual arrangements in Jordan so as to boost their cer-
tainty and predictability. The guaranteed access to third party dispute settlement, 
 
897 Rey M. 2013 102-3 
898 Law No. 31 of 2001, Arbitration Law, Official Gazette, Issue 4496, 16 July 2001. 
899 Rey M. 2013 90-1 
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lowers the potential risks of foreigners investing Jordan, which can increase the vol-
ume of FDI inflows to the latter. 
(D) Currency transfer, pricing freedom and performance re-
quirements 
The fourth and final subsection of the benchmarking analysis is that covering the 
right of foreign investors to repatriate their profits, freely price their products, and 
employ foreigners. The three notions were to an extent introduced in the theoretical 
framework. The right to employ foreigners appears to be an indicator of the pres-
ence of performance requirements within the domestic legal framework. 
- Currency transfers 
The IPL guaranteed foreign investors the right to repatriate their profits and in-
comes abroad without restrictions in line with BITs900. The US and Canada BITs 
with Jordan provide for exceptional circumstances where the GOJ is entitled to ap-
ply restrictions upon FX transfers. Two exceptions exist: (i) transfers are restricted if 
connected to insolvency, bankruptcy or whatever criminal offenses, (ii) during crises 
in the Balance of Payments (BoP) accompanied with the fall in FX reserves, host 
states are exceptionally permitted to apply limitations on FX transfers901. 
The monetary regime in Jordan adopts fully convertible dinars without restrictions 
on capital and commercial transactions. The Jordan Central Bank (CBJ) grants the 
licences and supervises the operations of FX exchangers. The main FX-related 
regulations entitle non-residents to create FX bank accounts. The CBJ offers an ad-
vantageous treatment to such accounts by exempting them from commission fees 
associated with transfers. Furthermore, residents are free to deposit whatever FX 
amounts within their accounts without enforceable limits or ceilings902. Additionally, 
residents’ transfers of profits, returns, liquidation, alienation or exit proceeds, in FX 
abroad, even if for investment purposes are permitted without ceilings903. The trans-
fer rights are not subject to the CBJ’s prior approval. The same flexibility applies to 
foreigners remitting their profits, liquidations proceeds or salaries and compensa-
tions abroad904.  
 
900 Article 30 of the IPL. 
901 Rey M. 2013 102-3 
902 Usa International Business Publications 2008a 109 
903 Article 41(b) of the Law No. 30 of 2014. 
904 Article 31 of the IPL. 
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The same rights of repatriation were guaranteed under the investment law of 
2003905. The guarantee to repatriate FX abroad puts Jordan’s investment framework 
in conformity to its international obligations under its BITs. Moreover, guaranteeing 
such right of FX repatriation reduces the risks experienced by foreign investors dur-
ing the periods of Jordan’s deficits in the BoP. In addition, such guarantee reduces 
the transaction costs of investing in Jordan since no special business structures are 
needed to ensure the repatriation of the FX. Finally, the freedom to transfer FX 
abroad lowers the price of accessing money in Jordan, which is an inevitable factor 
of production necessary for any business activity. 
- Freedom of pricing 
The second right considered in this subsection is that connected to investors’ right 
to freely price their products. Jordan’s Competition Law906 provides that market 
forces and the principles of free competition are the only factors considered in pric-
ing goods and services907. The law prescribes two exceptions for the free pricing in-
cluding: (i) goods and services fixed priced under the Industry and Commerce Law 
or any other laws, and (ii) prices determined by the Cabinet based on temporary 
procedures as necessary to face exceptional circumstances or emergencies908.  
The two exceptions raise a red flag regarding the capacity and scope of the competi-
tion authority’s right to intervene with the pricing of goods and services whether 
based on the aforementioned Industry and Commerce Law or to face the excep-
tional circumstances. The absence of concise definitions may raise investors’ con-
cerns regarding the instances of applying such wide powers.  
The obscure understanding of the two exceptions raises the risks faced by foreign 
investors when operating in Jordan as their business operations can be subject to 
fixed pricings either (i) under the scope of the Industry and Commerce Law or (ii) 
becomes part of the necessary measures in exceptional circumstances. The higher 
risks can affect negatively the certainty of investors if interested in investing in Jor-
dan, which in turn can influences the forecasted volume of FDI inflows to Jordan. 
Furthermore, the investors can bear additional compliance costs in order to identify 
the basic products and services subject to the price fixing under the Industry and 
Commerce Law. Accordingly, investors going to Jordan and not interested in price 
 
905 Article 18 of Law No. 68 of 2003. 
906 Law No. 33 of 2004, Competition Law, Official Gazette, Issue 4673, 01 September 2004. 
907 Article 4 of Law No. 33 of 2004. 
908 Article 4(b) of Law No. 33 of 2004. The procedures should be reviewed within a maximum of six 
months since its first application.  
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fixing their products or services must ensure that their offered products and ser-
vices do not within the scope of the Industry and Commerce Law or any other 
price fixing legislation. 
- Performance requirements 
The third and last guarantee considered in this subsection is the investors’ entitle-
ment to employ foreigners in Jordan. Jordan applied no quotas or per centages of 
total employees or paid salaries. As per Jordan’ labour law909, the employment of 
non-Jordanians is possible on two conditions: (i) the prior approval and permit 
from the Ministry of Labour, and (ii) the job’s requiring a high level of experience 
and technical skills that cannot be found among Jordanian workers910. For residen-
tial purposes911, the foreigner must have a residence permit to stay and work in Jor-
dan912. 
Residence permits are awarded based on the applicant’s fulfilment of any of seven 
legally stipulated cases913. Of importance is the requirement dealing with employees 
offered employment contracts. The only prevailing obligation is the non-crowding 
of Jordanian employees in their jobs and this can be proved through a certificate is-
sued from the Ministry of Social Affairs. The fourth possibility for working in Jor-
dan is proving that Jordanian workers lack the necessary skills for the position 
(proved through official accredited certificates). 
With regard to other performance requirements, Singapore’s and Canada’s BITs 
with Jordan maintain their unique position in eliminating any performance require-
ments914. The US-Jordan BIT bans Jordan from imposing any performance re-
quirements linked to local content requirements in purchases or manufacturing915. 
By Jordan’s simplifying of the process of hiring foreigners to the proof of the lack 
of specific technical skills among nationals, it allows foreign investors to lower the 
prices of an important factor of production as labour. This can have a positive in-
fluence on the volume of the FDI inflows to Jordan. 
 
909 Law No. 8 of 1996, Labour Law, Official Gazette, Issue 4113, 16 April 1996. 
910 Article 12 of Law No. 8 of 1996. 
911 Law No. 24 of 1973, Residence of Foreigners Law, Official Gazette, Issue 2426, 16 June 1973. 
912 Article 16 of Law No. 24 of 1973. 
913 Article 26 of Law No. 24 of 1973. 
914 Rey M. 2013 98 
915 OECD 2008c 95 
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IV.B.4 Trade, privatization and openness to the private sector 
The aim of this section is to highlight the additional legislative efforts to deregulate 
the Jordanian economy. This section addresses the trade aspect as well as the GOJ’s 
political changes, demonstrating its liberalisation stance. The analysis begins with 
the trade openness pillar. It then examines changes in the political structure and 
how they catalysed the privatisation programme and the shift towards deregulation 
and the private sector. Finally, a brief overview is provided concerning Jordan’s pri-
vatisation programme and the conclusions derived from the EBRD’s mission re-
garding Jordan’s legislation compliance with international standards. 
(A) Trade 
King Abdullah’s taking the Jordanian throne in 1999 marked an explicit turn in the 
state’s orientation towards the institution of a competitive economy dependent up-
on market forces interaction and qualified to FDI. The new king’s orientation was 
directly reflected in Jordan’s participation in the WTO in April 2000. Moreover, Oc-
tober 2000 marked the date the US-Jordan FTA was signed916 before fully imple-
menting it only by January 2010. In conjunction, the BIT between both partners 
was signed in 1997 before ratification and entry into force only in 2003.  
Before reaching the US-Jordan FTA and aiming to benefit from the settlement of 
armed conflicts between Jordan and Israel in 1994, the US government initiated the 
QIZ agreement in 1996. The US Congress initiated the QIZ regime in 1996 after 
signing it in Doha in November 1996917. Its introduction was primarily political in 
consolidating the peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflicts by deepening the 
economic interaction between the former enemies918. Another simultaneous trade 
agreement was the US-Jordan FTA in force since 2001 and fully executed by 2010. 
The FTA was enforceable in conjunction with QIZ initiative without abolishing it. 
Accordingly, the exporters preferred to trade their products under the FTA, where 
35 per cent Jordanian content still applies, however, with no further detailed specifi-
cations.  
Other trade liberalisation efforts are seen in the EU economic association agree-
ment signed in 2002 establishing the founding of a free trade area foundation in a 
period of 12 years. A similar agreement was concluded with the European Free 
 
916 United Nations (UNCTAD) 2000 
917 Kanaan, T. and Kardosh, M. 2005 28 
918 Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs 2015b 17 
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Trade Association, completing its transitional duration by 2014919. Additionally, un-
der the Greater Arab Free Trade Area, the exchange of goods between 17 Arab 
states free from customs has been in place since 2005. A set of other FTAs was 
completed with Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia under the Agadir Agreement920 in 
2004, Singapore in 2004, and Canada and Turkey in 2009921. 
(B) Market oriented policies 
The new monarch’s continuous efforts to strengthen economic ties with the US 
government resulted in sealing both states agreement regarding the Statement of 
Principles for International Investment. According to Ron Kirk, former US trade 
representative, the 2012 agreement was a step towards stimulating economic growth 
and job creation in Jordan as a close political and economic partner922. The main 
aim of this list of principles was the creation of a transparent, friendly and competi-
tive business environment necessary to attract investors and protect them from any 
discriminatory governmental behaviour923. 
On the GOJ unilateral side, attempts to stimulate the Jordanian private sector and 
attract foreign investors to participate in Jordan’s economic development took place 
through several measures, implemented simultaneously to create a favourable busi-
ness climate. An important measure was opening the door to the private sector rep-
resentation in the investment policy setting authorities. Private sector representa-
tives were members in the Council for Higher Investment, whose remit covers both 
supervising the promotion of corporate investment, as well developing the future 
investment policy. The private sector was represented through five members in a 
council constituted only of thirteen members.  
The interaction between the GOJ and the private sector regarding the development 
of the IPL was fruitful for the business environment by June 1999. It resulted in 
granting automatic approvals for businesses unapproved during the official process. 
The amendments of the IPL were welcomed by business stakeholders since they 
bypassed the lengthy inefficient bureaucracy. The main difficulty was the private 
sector’s failure to unify its claims directed to the GOJ. Questions linked to how the 
private sector should participate and who should represent it created several ten-
 
919European Council and Commission 5/15/2002 
920 Government of the Kingdom of Morocco, the Government of the Kingdom of Jordan, the Gov-
ernment of the Republic of Tunisia and the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt 8/5/2001 
921 Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs 2015b 18 
922 Office of the United States Trade Representative 1/28/2012 
923 Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs 2015b 3-4 
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sions within the private sector environment, resulting in an unfavourable out-
come924.  
Another move towards deregulation was reflected in launching the plans of incor-
porating free trade zones925. A set of eligibility criteria were required to qualify to 
operate in free trade zones. The four criteria included: (i) the introduction of new 
industries and know-how, (ii) the use of local inputs, (iii) the reduction of Jordanian 
imports allowing for the import substitution effect, and (iv) the improvement of 
Jordan’s skilled labour. Wide tax incentives and exemptions were granted, especially 
with regard to corporate and personal income taxations with the entities benefiting 
from a twelve-year exemption926. Furthermore, Jordan promulgated Law No. 31 of 
2014 on public-private partnership927, under which the private sector engaged with 
the GOJ entities in a set of developmental projects. Examples of such projects in-
clude the foundation of an industrial and medical waste project and a large water 
desalination project. 
(C) EBRD and privatization 
To assess the Jordanian legal framework from a commercial perspective, the EBRD 
assessed the pace of liberalising the Jordanian legislations. The pillars examined in-
clude laws connected to insolvency, corporate governance and judicial capacity928. 
The efficiency of the Jordanian judiciary and the enforcement of contracts repre-
sents a significant difficulty. An average commercial claim in Jordanian courts is 
likely to last over two years, with costs constituting 30 per cent of the claim’s value. 
Policies under consideration to ease judicial claims include the foundation of special 
courts governed through a digital system controlling case management. The out-
come is a higher inclination towards mediation and other dispute settlement alterna-
tives929. An important aspect is the inspiration of Jordan’s arbitration law930 by 
Egypt’s Arbitration Law No. 27 of 1994, based initially upon the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law931. 
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928 General Counsel Office 2012 4-5 
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930 Law No. 31 of 2001, Arbitration Law, Official Gazette, Issue 4496, 16 July 2001. 
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The privatisation programme began in the 1980s, and the second half of the 1990s 
witnessed the further stimulation of privatisation efforts. The acceleration of privat-
isation is clearly seen in data collected by the Amman Financial Market. The privati-
sation confirmed the new economic orientation of the regime932. The actual execu-
tion steps were delayed until early 2000s after promulgating the Privatization Law 
No. 25 of 2000933. Privatisation in Jordan puts the economy in a leading position 
when compared to Middle Eastern counterparts since it extended to encompass 
public services including electricity, telecommunications and national airways. For 
example, in telecommunications, a GOJ stake of 40 per cent in the national tele-
communication company was alienated to a consortium headed by France Telecom 
in 2007934.  
The privatisation programme was an opportunity for Jordan to seek more openness 
and global integration instead of the prevailing direct GOJ intervention and control. 
In the meantime, the private sector consolidated its position as a drive of future de-
velopment. The change in international donors from governments to financial insti-
tutions results in executing the SAP cutting the GOJ, lessening the GOJ’s involve-
ment in economic activity, especially in productive investments935. The GOJ pre-
served its right to intervene administratively through listing reasons upon which an 
official can justify the non-issuance of the required sector licences936.  
The range of reasons included national security, national economic plans, national 
healthcare and education, environmental and public interest and morality. The lack 
of further interpretation or guidance broadened the administrative authorities’ right 
to reject licence requests. Law No. 68 of 2003 banned any administrative authority 
from refraining to issue the necessary licences based on limitations of market entry 
or the exceeding of the maximum number of issued licences937. In this case, the ad-
ministrative authority was restricting market competition and size. It is worth high-
lighting that the administration’s failure to decide on sector licence applications 
within one month permits applicants to request the licence issue from the Cabinet.  
FDI attraction did not prove successful for several factors. The foremost of these 
factors is the small size of Jordan’s market. The low demand hinders multinationals 
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933 Law No. 25 of 2000, Privatisation Law, Official Gazette, Issue 4443, 2 July 2000. 
934 General Counsel Office 2014 5-8 
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from considering the occasion of relating their productive activities to Jordan938. 
With the evident FDI restrictions on sectors and minimum capital, Jordan did not 
manage to reach a high score in the OECD’s FDI Restrictiveness Index. Jordan’s 
score (0.3) proved below the OECD average (0.079) and the non-OECD members 
average (0.145). On a regional level, the Jordanian framework score was even below 
Morocco’s and Egypt’s scores, which showed lower rates of restrictiveness. The 
OECD mission recommended the consideration of the high restrictive score of the 
Jordanian framework in order to facilitate it procedurally to secure a more invest-
ment favourable outcome939.  
From the three components of section IV.B.4, the trade openness pillar, the privati-
sation together with the EBRD mission conclusion, all evidence reflects the Jorda-
nian economy’s experience of intense changes during the 2000s era to promote de-
regulation. These attempts were all started by the accession of the new King Abdul-
lah II in 1999. The engagement in FTAs and the promulgation of new legislation 
such as the public-private partnership law are further evidence of Jordan’s aim to 
liberalise and deregulate its economy. This represented the same thread of policies 
executed since the structural adjustment process of the 1980s, even though at an 
obviously quicker pace. These changes should be analysed in conjunction with in-
vestment laws and their prescribed incentives and guarantees. They all serve the 
same interest of deregulating and opening the economy to the private sector and 
foreign investors. 
IV.B.5 Conclusion 
The conclusions deduced from the overview of the Jordanian legal framework can 
be grouped into three categories. The first addresses the title of the thesis regarding 
Jordan’s level of compliance with international investment law obligations, and the 
second the shift in Jordan’s legal framework from being a restricted regulated econ-
omy to a more open and liberalised one. This moves the discussion to the third cat-
egory connected to the concept of economic freedom.  
Going through the same form of the Egyptian case study conclusion, the first prin-
ciple under examination is the national treatment. Under this notion and as ex-
plained above, Jordanian efforts are partially successful in aligning domestic legisla-
tion with international obligations. This was evident in the abolishment of foreign 
 
938 Chomo 2002 23 
939 Rey M. 2013 70 
  196  
investors’ applicable minimum capital requirement. On the side of foreign owner-
ship, the services under restrictions are being reduced with each legislative amend-
ment to the investment laws. Concerning importation, Jordanian law maintains a 
strict position on banning importation for trading and commercial purposes. The 
analysis under this subsection concerned restrictions on foreigners’ acquisition and 
ownership of land. Jordan maintains a firm position, prohibiting acquisition without 
the Cabinet’s approval after filing a request citing the connection between business 
operations and land ownership. Approval is required for rent exceeding three years. 
With such restrictions, Jordan raises the prices of the productive factors for inves-
tors seeking investment opportunities in the country.  
With regard to expropriation, the Jordanian position under domestic laws and BITs 
remains remarkable. The Jordanian constitution of 1952 adopted the Hull Rule, 
Law No. 12 of 1987 provided for requisition procedures and compensation, and in-
vestment laws prohibited direct and indirect expropriation unless in the public in-
terest and in return for adequate and prompt compensation. This places Jordan a 
step closer to compliance with its international obligation under BITs and reduces 
possible risks for investors.  
In terms of dispute settlement, the Jordanian investment laws guarantee access to 
international arbitration. This comes in compliance with Jordan’s obligations under 
its concluded BITs. The new arbitration law allowed for dispute settlement in con-
nection to commercial and civil affairs through a third-party regime. This widening 
serves the benefit of complying with the BITs since it unifies the treatment between 
commercial and civil affairs and establishes it upon the contractual parties’ agree-
ment. Second, Jordan in 2006 promulgated mediation, becoming an early adopter of 
this regime of dispute settlement that remains an additional mechanism to settle in-
vestment disputes. 
For the last category of other guarantees, Jordan proved more relaxed when com-
pared to Egypt. Jordan allows foreign repatriation of profits without restrictions on 
amount or duration. Moreover, it entitles non-residents to open foreign currency 
bank accounts in Jordan. From the freedom of pricing side, the Jordanian legislator 
adopted a vague position when allowing market forces to determine prices of prod-
ucts if the products do not fall under the scope of the Industry and Commerce Law 
(which allows setting prices for basic products and services). This vagueness threat-
ens Jordan’s compliance with its international obligations as pricing freedom falls 
within the scope of protections against indirect expropriation. Hence, the Jordanian 
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legislation deviates from the international principle. The most relaxed domestic leg-
islation is connected to the rights of employing foreigners. This right appears as an 
indicator for the presence of performance requirements within the Jordanian legal 
framework. The only requirement in connection to foreigners’ employment is the 
need to finalise residency documents. The law imposes no quotas or restrictions on 
foreigners’ employment in Jordanian investments. This comes more in line with the 
principle of limiting performance requirements. Such entitlements reduce produc-
tive factor prices as well as transaction costs of hiring foreign employees. 
The second category of conclusions is connected to the orientation of the Jordanian 
state. From the birth of the modern Jordanian state, it appears that country has 
maintained a pro-private sector approach. This appeared in adopting the Hull Rule 
in 1952. However, from the economic history chapter, the wider intervention of the 
state in economic operations to promote public employment during the 1960s and 
1970s was recognised. With the SAP, Jordan returned to its prior position, when the 
private sector was leading economic activity, and the new king’s rise to the throne 
catalysed such process. This is witnessed in section IV, where the continuous bilat-
eral and unilateral efforts promoting openness and deregulation were discussed. All 
evidence provided throughout the chapter consolidates the same conclusion regard-
ing the Jordanian policymakers’ efforts to deregulate and liberalise the economy. As 
in the Egyptian case, Jordanian policymakers utilised this liberalisation and deregula-
tion to market Jordan as a favourable investment destination, targeting the amplifi-
cation of development and filling the gap from the government’s retreat. 
This moves the discussion to a third conclusion associated with economic freedom 
that will be used in the context of the economic analysis provided in chapter VI. 
The above section on Jordan has outlined the legal development, showing Jordan’s 
movement from a regulated to a less regulated economy. These developments must 
be analysed in parallel with the county’s economic changes to observe the impact of 
deregulation on economic indicators. The processes of privatisation, trade open-
ness, tax incentives are all examples of deregulation policies. 
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IV.C Morocco: Legal Framework 
IV.C.1 Introduction 
The Moroccan Investment Charter Law No. 18 of 1995940 (IC) will be the base for 
the benchmarking analysis. Protections provided in the IC will be compared against 
the protections Morocco is under obligation to guarantee to foreign investors under 
international investment law and BITs. 
Morocco’s legal framework chapter is divided into three subheadings covering: the 
overview of the Moroccan legal framework, international investment obligations 
from a Moroccan legal perspective, and openness to the private sector through pri-
vatisation or trade liberalisation. 
IV.C.2 An overview of the legal framework 
Analysing the investment legal framework in Morocco requires starting from the 
top of the legal framework before funnelling the research to a narrower context, 
concentrating on more detailed issues. The section first identifies the constitutional 
articles that refer to investments and private ownership, by examining the two con-
stitutions of Morocco: (i) the one promulgated in 1962 with the establishment of 
the new state, and (ii) that of 2011 in conjunction with the Arab Spring uprisings. 
Secondly, the structure of the IC and its main components are examined. Finally, 
the tax incentives offered under the IC are highlighted to show the country’s dereg-
ulation and openness to the private sector and foreign investors. 
(A) Investments in the constitution 
After the country’s independence in 1956, the King of Morocco, Mohamed V, pur-
sued a plan to build up the nation and institutionalise Moroccan society. The cor-
nerstone for both targets was the creation of a social contract binding on the entire 
population. The early attempts to establish the Moroccan constitution were inspired 
by the Constitution of 1958 of the French Fifth Republic941. The first Constitu-
tion942 of Morocco was promulgated on 14 December 1962. The inspiration from 
De Gaulle’s authoritarian democracy resulted in a Moroccan constitution that con-
 
940 IC, Official Gazette, Issue 4336, 6 December 1995. 
941 Maghraoui 2001 78 
942 Dahir Sharif No. 61 and 172 of 192, Constitution 1962, Official Gazette, Issue 3098, 10 March 
1972. 
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solidated the king’s wide powers compared to parliament, and made little reference 
to citizens’ rights and entitlements. In other words, the basic rights guaranteed un-
der the Constitution of 1962 did not represent a principal part of that constitution. 
Generally, compared to other legislations of Muslim world countries, Morocco’s le-
gal framework was influenced by Western legislations and specifically the French 
one943. Thus, Moroccan law mixed with the French Civil Code with Islamic Sharia 
Law944. 
The new ruling regime targeted benefiting from the pre-independence wealthy 
groups to consolidate its grip on power. This appeared in the guarantee of private 
ownership in the Constitution of 1962945, which allowed the law to limit private 
ownership if social and economic growth required limitations. Finally, the Article 
15(2) of the Constitution of 1962 prohibited requisition unless it is in line with the 
domestic law in determining the circumstances and procedures for such interven-
tion. Article 15 of the Constitution of 1962 was the only reference to the private 
property as well as the GOM’s right to limit private ownership or requisition it.  
By comparing the reference to private property and associated rights in the Consti-
tution of 1962 to the Constitution of 2011946, several conclusions can be derived. 
Prior to introducing these conclusions, it is worth mentioning that the Constitution 
of 2011 was adopted in a referendum of 1 July 2011. The new constitution attempt-
ed to modernise Morocco’s monarchical system by moving it towards a constitu-
tional monarchy rather than a traditional form similar to the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) monarchies. 
In comparing the constitutions, Article 35 of the Constitution of 2011 did not 
amend Article 15 of the Constitution of 1962 by continuing to guarantee individu-
als’ right to own private property947. Therefore, there was no change between the 
two constitutions since the GOM had the right to limit private ownership in the 
same manner in both constitutions. An important update to the new constitution 
was that parliament was granted the exclusive right to issue legislation governing the 
expropriation of private property or the privatisation of public enterprises948. This 
 
943 Gömmel 2015 8 
944 Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs 2015c 9 
945 Article 15 of the Constitution of 1962. 
946 Constitutional Council Decree No. 815 of 2011, Constitution 2011, Official Gazette, Issue 5964, 
30 July 2011. 
947 Additionally, the second paragraph of Article 35 used the exact wording of Article 15 of the Con-
stitution of 1962. 
948 Article 71 of the Constitution of 2011. 
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change explicitly vested the parliament with the power to introduce legislation to 
manage expropriations and privatisations. 
The second conclusion from the comparison of the Moroccan constitutions of 
1962 and 2011 was the infinite use of the word “social”. Different from in the case 
of Egypt’s Constitution of 1971, the references to the word “social” were all in the 
context of the family and solidarity rather than as the reflections of the ruling re-
gime’s political orientation and adoption of the leftist socialist policies. The third 
conclusion of the comparison is the complete absence of the word “investment” in 
both constitutions. This highlights the lack of Moroccan emphasis on the promo-
tion of investment and the GOM’s or the population’s obligation to adopt invest-
ment-friendly legislation or policies. The GOM’s guarantee of the preservation of a 
freely competitive market and the criminalisation of anti-competitive practices is not 
enough to make up for the constitution’s silence regarding promoting investments 
and adopting market-oriented policies. 
The Constitution of 1962 and 2011 maintained the same position regarding the 
GOM’s right to requisition private property if the state’s socio-economic plan re-
quired this. However, this notion of “socio-economic growth plans” is vague enough to 
justify any type intervention. Accordingly, the following reference to the domestic 
law as the governing framework for the procedures and the conditions of requisi-
tion could be helpful in defining such “socio-economic growth plans” (further discussed 
below). Conversely, the fact that the state’s critical right to requisition property is 
determined under domestic law rather than explicitly regulated in the constitution 
undermines the guarantee of private property ownership. The reasoning appears in 
the ease of amending legislation when compared to the extreme difficulty of amend-
ing a constitutional article. Moreover, the conditioning of the expropriation in Mo-
rocco upon the issuance of new laws through the parliament puts Morocco in a 
lower position when compared to Egypt regarding the protection of private owner-
ship. Egypt’s Constitution of 2014 totally abolished references to expropriations 
and permitted only requisitions under strict limitations. 
The silence of Morocco’s constitution in referring to the word “investments” resem-
bles the failure of the Constitution of 2011 to reflect the prevalent economy’s inter-
actions. In other words, it did not represent the shift in Morocco’s economic struc-
ture towards the private sector rather than the public sector as in the 1970s. Thus, 
by using the same wording in the Constitution of 2011, there are no signals of the 
continuous openness and deregulation pursued by the GOM. Different from the 
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scenario in Egypt, Morocco’s transformation towards the private sector appeared in 
domestic legislation without any explicit references in the constitution. 
(B) The Investment Charter No. 18 of 1995 
Chapter III asserted the GOM’s wide involvement in the economic activity of the 
1970s. This was primarily based on the production and exportation of phosphate. 
With the debt crisis and the IMF interventions, the GOM came under the obliga-
tion to open its markets to its trade and investment partners. This attempt at dereg-
ulation was witnessed on several levels. On top of these attempts came the intro-
duction of the IC. The guarantees and incentives awarded in the IC were a mere 
translation of the intentions to open and deregulate the economy. In Morocco, dif-
ferent from Egypt949 and Jordan950, the IC of 1995 has remained in place to this day.  
Before the IC, Morocco had investment legislation specifically governing each sec-
tor of activity951. The legislative efforts to promote Morocco as an investment desti-
nation started by promulgating the IC. On the executive side, 16 investment centres 
were founded in order to handle the investors’ requests. The centres were one-stop 
shops that eased the process of incorporation businesses and decentralised the in-
vestment-related decision-making process. Moreover, the centres published cata-
logues guiding the investors while interacting with it or with any of its administra-
tive partners when issuing the necessary licences or permits952. 
The IC terminated the sector-by-sector investment regulation system. Unifying the 
investment laws permitted extending the scope of the IC to cover all sectors on an 
equal basis. The main highlights of the IC include its embracing of the international 
principles of non-discrimination and freedom of income transfers. Regardless of the 
tax and importation incentives, the IC opened the competitive markets and indus-
tries to foreign competition, excluding phosphate, where the GOM preserved its 
monopoly. On the institutional side, the GOM created a competent ministerial 
committee to supervise the process of establishing a more investor-friendly climate. 
Furthermore, the committee was vested with the authority to simplify obstacles 
hindering foreign investors from pursuing or progressing with their investments953. 
 
949 For Egypt, the IGIL experienced several amendments before its abolishment by the IL of 2017. 
950 For Jordan, the IPL experienced several amendments before its abolishment by Law No. 30 of 
2014. 
951 Usa International Business Publications 2008b 42 
952 Elkhafif et al. 2012b 117 
953 Koplan, S., Okun, D. etal 2004 75 
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One of the IC objectives was to unify the frameworks governing investments. Eco-
nomic activities such as exportation, real estate, mining, industrial and maritime 
were each regulated under independent investment rules. The goals announced un-
der the IC were threefold954: (i) to cut costs of the importation of raw material, 
equipment and machinery (the IC provided a wide range of incentives from value 
added tax (VAT) and custom duties); (ii) to encourage regional development by pre-
scribing tax preferential treatment to investments located in underdeveloped areas; 
and (iii) to establish exportation free trade zones and allow the operation of finan-
cial off-shore entities. 
The IC was promulgated by the Moroccan House of Representatives on 3 October 
1995 and contained five sections: (i) objectives, (ii) fiscal measures and incentives, 
(iii) investment rights and guarantees, (iv) agricultural sector, and (v) enforcement 
measures. The IC targeted the promotion of investment through the improvement 
of the business environment and reconsideration of the taxation regime955. The ob-
jectives included: (i) reducing taxes on income and profits, (ii) providing regional 
development tax holidays, (iii) giving investors the rights to appeal tax assessments, 
(iv) lowering taxes associated with importing equipment and purchasing lands dur-
ing the business establishment phase, and (v) sponsoring financial centres and ex-
portation free zones956. The announced targets for these policies included increased 
employment and exportation, in conjunction with a reduction of investment-related 
costs, environment protection and rationalising of the consumption of energy and 
water.  
The IC offered different tax incentives for custom duties, VAT, registration, corpo-
ration, income, real estate, franchising, and urban taxes957. The incentives ranged 
from abolishing variable taxes on licences and a five-year exemption958 from the 
corporate income tax in cases of exportation. Additionally, the latter corporate ex-
emption could be followed by a 50 per cent reduction in tax rate starting from the 
date the exemption elapsed. The incentives are discussed in more detail below. 
The third section of the IC governs the guarantees and rights of investors, and ad-
ministration of the investment process. Investors are accorded two rights, encom-
passing the right to freely transfer their investments capital, profits and liquidation 
 
954 Usa International Business Publications 2008b 42, 50 
955 Article 1 of the IC. 
956 Article 2 of the IC. 
957 Articles 3 to 14 of the IC. 
958 Article 7 of the IC. 
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proceeds abroad and in foreign currency without amount or time limitations959. Sec-
ond, the GOM is under obligation to allocate to the investor sufficient lands that 
are properly serviced in order to establish new investments. On the administrative 
side, the IC established an administrative authority acting as a caretaker in guiding 
investors. Additionally, the IC still requires the GOM to make the maximum effort 
to ease the administrative procedures governing investments.  
The IC provides additional non-tax incentives, allowing the GOM to enter into 
contracts to reimburse investors for costs borne in connection to the infrastructure, 
employee training or land acquisition upon meeting the eligibility criteria960. These 
criteria include: (i) the project’s size, (ii) the number of jobs created, (iii) the level of 
know-how or technology transferred, and (iv) the region of the investment. Meeting 
any of these criteria is sufficient to qualify the investor for a reimbursement of costs 
paid from the “Investment Promotion Fund”961.  
Additionally, the IC allows the GOM to introduce international arbitration clauses 
as a mechanism to settle disputes arising in connection to investments. Under the 
IC, Morocco’s BITs govern claims filed in international arbitration962. The last form 
of investment incentives is prescribed under the “Industrial Zones”963. The incentive 
is a form of financial support from the GOM to cover the costs borne by investors 
in establishing their industrial projects in underdeveloped regions.  
The IC sets a precedence in Morocco’s investment legislation by deeming the inves-
tors’ operational licence application approved, if the administrative authority pro-
vided no response for sixty days from the application964. Hence, the IC moved the 
obligation to the authority’s side, which is forced to justify its decisions if it rejected 
licence requests. This allowed imposing a judicial review over the authority’s deci-
sions. Finally, the IC established a committee to solve the difficulties arising from 
cumbersome bureaucracy and delaying the establishment, the operation or the 
commencement of investments. The committee is responsible for monitoring the 
modernisation of the investment legal framework and to transform it into a more 
investor-friendly one with less procedures and requirements965.  
 
959 Articles 15 and 16 of the IC. 
960 Article 17 of the IC. The eligibility criteria were listed in Article 3 of Decree No. 895 of 2000, Of-
ficial Gazette, 31 January 2001.  
961 The fund is instituted as per Article 18 of the IC. 
962 Article 17 of the IC. 
963 Article 19 of the IC. 
964 Article 22 of the IC. 
965 Elkhafif et al. 2012b 117 
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More importantly, the IC aims to assure investors the continuity of the: (i) invest-
ment promotion plans, (ii) the accorded guarantees, and (iii) the granted incentives 
until expired966. The pledge ensures the guarantees and incentives maintain their na-
ture and form as when initially granted against any future interventions967. The only 
limitation of the IC appears in the exclusion of the investments in the agricultural 
sector from benefiting from the incentives and guarantees968. This may be justified 
based on the special nature of this sector as witnessed below in prohibiting foreign-
ers from owning agricultural lands. This is another difference when compared to 
the Egyptian IGIL, as the latter applies to land reclamation projects, whereas in the 
case of Morocco, agricultural activities are completely excluded from the scope of 
the IC. 
Before moving the discussion to the investment incentives, from the above analysis 
of the IC one conclusion can be confirmed. The legal developments reflects the 
continuous efforts of the GOM to liberalise its regulatory framework and allow ad-
ditional access for foreign investors to the economy. With all the critics of the in-
vestment legislation, the conclusion derived remains the policymakers’ ultimate in-
terest in attracting investors at whatever cost. The IC remains a clear example of at-
tempts to rationalise the prices of the factors of production and cut investment 
transaction costs. 
(C) IC incentives 
Examining the process of deregulating the economy, this section observes the in-
vestment schemes opened to investors in Morocco. The Moroccan efforts of incen-
tivising investors has two bases. The first is the granting of tax and non-tax incen-
tives under the IC. The second is the establishment of free zones where invest-
ments were incorporated and operating in it are exempted from tax. 
The IC comprises a set of incentives to attract investors. The list of incentives ex-
tends to cover corporate tax holidays prescribed for the five years in the event of 
exportation969. Machinery, raw material and other goods are exempted for VAT on 
imports for the first three years from when the business is incorporated, if the pro-
ject’s value exceeds the threshold of MAD 200 million (USD 24 million). The same 
 
966 Article 23 of the IC. 
967 This differs in the case of Egypt, which actually abolished the tax incentives regime applicable 
under the IGIL by introducing the Income Tax Law No. 91 of 2005. 
968 Article 24 of the IC. 
969 Article 7 of the IC. 
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exemption applies regarding import duties for projects exceeding the same thresh-
old970. The tax incentives are split into two categories. First, the incentives relate to 
the investment installation971. Under this phase, investors are exempted from impor-
tation tax levy and the urbanisation tax for the first five years after establishing and 
completing new buildings. Moreover, the incentives encompass an exemption from 
a set of cumbersome procedures in connection to land acquisition. By the second 
phase of operation, the incentives are closely linked to operative taxes. Businesses 
are entitled to create annual reserves not subject to tax. Finally, a real estate tax ex-
emption applies if buildings established proved to be used for accommodation pur-
poses972.  
Other than the tax incentives, the IC provides domestic and foreign investors four 
regimes through which to implement their projects. The first973 requires the fulfil-
ment of any of four options to qualify for governmental support: (i) the creation of 
no fewer than 250 permanent jobs to be filled, (ii) an investment value exceeding 
MAD 200 million, (iii) location of the project in one of the 20 least-developed Mo-
roccan regions, or (iv) the founding of the investment with environmental protec-
tion impacts. Meeting any of the above provided cases qualifies the investing entity 
for the incentives scheme. Incentives include the GOM funding of investors’ costs 
connected to training employees, acquiring land, and extending infrastructure as in-
troduced above. 
The second investment scheme was issued under the 1990–1999 Budget Law grant-
ing investments a customs and VAT exemption for three years from incorporation 
upon capital goods importation. The threshold to benefit from the exemption is 
having an investment value of over MAD 200 million that is arranged through a 
state-investor agreement. The scheme applies to mega-projects, complemented by 
the Hassan II Fund for Economic and Social Development addressing small and 
medium-sized projects974. The third investment scheme was the GOM foundation 
of the Casablanca Finance City, granting investors another batch of incentives in 
2010975. The Casablanca Finance City authority’s mission is to encourage foreign en-
tities to carry on business activities in the city through initiating continuous reforms 
 
970 Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs 2015c 12 
971 Article 4 of the IC. 
972 IBP 2016b 131 
973 Article 17 of the IC. 
974 Kalinova 2010 58 
975 Benner 2013 6 
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improving the investment climate976. In addition to the five-year exemption follow-
ing incorporation, a reduced corporate tax rate of 10 per cent (compared to a stand-
ard of 30 per cent) applies after the exemption period. Other benefits are associated 
with administrative support in cases of cutting the waiting periods for issuing for-
eign employees work permits to one week instead of six months977. 
The last investment scheme is the Tangiers Free Zone Area (TFZA), established in 
1999978. The TFZA grants investors a wide range of incentives, besides the general 
ones applicable under the IC of 1995. In addition to the infrastructure extension 
present in the Tangiers port and the international airport, the TFZA projects bene-
fit from a specific customs treatment exempting importation from taxes and duties 
as well as imposing a simplified customs regime. The TFZA’s projects benefit from 
a unique taxation regime exempting them from registration and stamp duties upon 
capital and lands acquisition. Tax incentives include: a 15-year exemption from 
VAT on purchases of goods, and CIT holidays for five years from the start of the 
business activity, following which the same investments are subject to a permanent 
reduced CIT rate of 7.5 per cent979. The TFZA provides an advantageous invest-
ment regime for foreign and Moroccan investors. Entities operating within the free 
zone are eligible to import without custom duties and benefiting from tax exemp-
tions. The sole obligation is that of communicating workers’ salaries in foreign cur-
rency (converted into MAD)980. 
The various forms of investment schemes and continuously granted incentives are 
obvious examples of the GOM’s shift in its orientation towards the private sector as 
the leader of economic activity. The more incentives were granted, the greater the 
deregulation and the more opportunities opened to the private sector to enter the 
market. Tax exemptions and incentives are deemed examples of deregulation, since 
a taxpayer is relieved from paying tax due or even filing a tax return. 
IV.C.3 Investment laws principles and International Obligations  
In this section, the development towards a more opened economy appears more 
obvious. The section benchmarks the IC’s guarantees to the international invest-
ment law obligations as prescribed in Morocco’s BITs. The guarantees were deemed 
 
976 Casablanca Finance City 2013 
977 Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs 2015c 6 
978 Tanger Med Zones (TMZ) 2017 
979 Kalinova 2010 58 
980 IBP 2016b 133 
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the signal of standardised treatment, encouraging foreign investors to invest in Mo-
rocco. Moreover, it highlights the means available to foreign investors to mitigate 
the risk of the GOM intervening in their private investments. 
The section is associated with the discussion introduced under the theoretical 
framework concerning the benefits investigated by policymakers when deciding on 
their states’ engagement in BITs981. The guarantees were deemed as important as the 
fiscal incentives in assuring foreign investors and reflecting the willingness of Mo-
rocco to grant foreign investors standardised treatment in line with international in-
vestment law. Prior to beginning the benchmarking analysis and assessing the levels 
of compliance, the chapter provides a brief overview of Morocco’s BITs and intro-
duces the guarantees granted under the IC. 
Morocco participated in several regional and international initiatives to promote in-
vestment and attract foreign investors. An example is the UNCTAD training ses-
sion arranged for Moroccan officials to enhance their FDI statistics analysis and 
their capacity to negotiate BITs. Another initiative was the MENA-OECD Invest-
ment Programme in which the MENA economies’ decision makers interact with 
their OECD counterparts to exchange experiences and policies to enhance the per-
formance of FDIs. This programme was the base for the GOM’s preparation of the 
foreign investors’ restriction list, which comprises the sectors where foreign invest-
ments are restricted or even prohibited. The initiative: (i) identifies the reforms, (ii) 
ranks them as per the discussions with the stakeholders, and (iii) executes them and 
offers an evaluation follow-up process982.  
Morocco’s efforts to attract foreign investments have been continuous since the late 
1990s. The GOM’s investment orientation is evident in having 51 BITs in force983, 
in addition to 51 double tax conventions. On a bilateral level with the US, Morocco 
is engaged in a comprehensive FTA since 2006984. Morocco comes in second place 
(after Egypt) in terms of the number of signed BITs in Africa. Its treaties prescribe 
additional protections for foreign investors when compared to the protections 
granted under the constitution and the IC. Moroccan BITs’ substantive protections 
are deemed to be of high value for foreign investors to preserve their rights under 
international investment law, especially when domestic legislation is criticised for its 
insufficient protection.  
 
981 See II.E.1. 
982 Kalinova 2010 62 
983 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 2017c 
984 Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs 2015c 4 
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Morocco’s BITs include the same BIT model protections as the NT, the MFN, the 
lawful non-discriminatory expropriation in presence of an adequate and prompt 
compensation, the right of investors to freely transfer their funds, the right of for-
eign investors to initiate claims under international arbitration or domestic judiciary, 
and the extension of the scope of the BIT’s based on umbrella clauses985. 
Another important step was the GOM’s endorsement of the US Joint Principles for 
International Investment in December 2012986 (Principles). The endorsement al-
lowed Morocco to become the first investment partner of the US in the MENA to 
engage in such a partnership. The Principles are similar to those of international in-
vestment law introduced within the theoretical framework with slight additions. 
Apart from the re-confirmation of the NT and the MFN, another important princi-
ple is represented in the “competitive neutrality” concept. It is a concept introduced by 
the OECD to ensure equal treatment for state owned enterprises (SOEs) versus 
private entities. The principle seeks to promote a commercially competitive market 
by eliminating any favourable treatment accorded to SOEs.  
The Principles include the investors’ right to participate in developing the domestic 
legislation of the other signatory with a special focus to the investment-related laws. 
Furthermore, the Principles adopted a narrowed definition of the “national security” 
concerns. If any restrictions are imposed on the foreign investors based on national 
security concerns, these concerns should be a result of genuine risk. Finally, they 
addressed the protection of foreign investors against any kind of discriminatory, ar-
bitrary, or harmful treatment. Moreover, it entitled investors injured from nationali-
sations and expropriations to the Hull Rule effective, prompt and adequate com-
pensation987. 
The next section benchmarks the IC’s guarantees against Morocco’s international 
obligations based on the BITs. The base for the analysis will be the BIT substantive 
protections as introduced in the theoretical framework988, and the IGIL guarantees 
will determine the fields of law to be addressed under this section from the Moroc-
can side989. In other words, the silence of the IC regarding the investment’s right to 
freedom of pricing will be addressed by visiting the other Moroccan laws to ensure 
the compliance with this BIT obligation. The discussion will now include four sub-
 
985 Kalinova 2010 47 
986 Embassy of the kingdom of morocco in the USA 1/23/2014 
987 U.S. Trade Representatives 2012  
988 See II.F. 
989 See IV. 
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sections covering NT and expropriation, dispute settlement and finally foreign 
ownership of investments, currency transferal rights and employment of foreign 
employees. 
(A) National treatment and foreign ownership 
The first notion in the phase of benchmarking the IC and the BIT obligations is 
NT. The notion was introduced in the theoretical framework chapter as one of the 
substantive protections under the international investment law. Morocco pursued 
continuous attempts to modernise its domestic legislations to: (i) standardise the 
treatment of foreigners, (ii) rationalise the costs of the factors of production, and 
(iii) cut the transaction costs of doing business in Morocco. However, the re-
strictions imposed on foreigners wishing to do business in Morocco vary between 
restrictions on FX, precluding entry to specific economic sectors, and prohibiting 
foreign investors from acquiring and owning agricultural land. 
Under the OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multinationals En-
terprises (OECD Declaration)990, Morocco notified the FDI restrictions hindering 
its full conformity to international investment principles. In accordance with the 
Declaration, Morocco was under the obligation to provide a negative list covering 
foreign investment restrictions. Similarly, under the Morocco-US FTA, Morocco 
was obliged to provide a negative FDI restrictions list991. The arbitration tribunals’ 
enforcement of the NT depends on a comparison of the treatment of national and 
foreign investors, regardless of the BIT clause and whether it refers to the treatment 
of national and foreign investors. The tribunals’ main role is setting the criteria to 
assess how treatments accorded to foreign and national investors under the Moroc-
can laws should coincide992. 
- Ownership of shares 
Morocco began to align its domestic legislation with the NT since it abolished the 
Morocconisation Law in 1983993. The legislation waived foreign investors from the 
50 per cent Moroccan ownership threshold in business incorporation. This allowed 
foreigners to establish their investments without any nationality limitations on 
 
990 Morocco adhered to the OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multinationals En-
terprises 2007 becoming the 47th member. 
991 Kalinova 2010 24 
992 Newcombe, Paradell 2009 161 
993 Kalinova 2010 46, as introduced within the historical chapter. 
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shareholdings994. Moreover, it waived the investments from the previously required 
Moroccan majority on the board of directors995. On the IC side, it provides an equal 
footing treatment with no differentiation between foreign and domestic investors. 
Although the IC does not adhere explicitly to the non-discrimination principle, the 
implicit message of the text is sufficient to conclude with such an understanding996. 
Under the Tangier’s Free Trade Zone, the enforcement of the NT remains vague 
and specifically concerning the tax incentives and the benefits reached by investors 
operating in there997. 
On the potential conflicts with the NT regards the restrictions on foreigners inter-
ested in investing in the maritime industry, with a requirement that 75 per cent of 
the ownership of a vessel be in Moroccan hands. If a company owns the vessel, a 
Moroccan majority on the company’s board of directors is sufficient to deem the 
vessel Moroccan998. With regard to the fishing business, the same restrictions apply 
in order to qualify the licensee as an enterprise. In airline services, foreign owner-
ship in Moroccan entities cannot exceed 49 per cent999. It remains possible to con-
sider the sectors fully monopolised by the GOM as potential conflicts to the NT. In 
these sectors, the GOM precludes foreigners’ entry into such activities as in the case 
of rights to explore and exploit phosphate as limited to the GOM entity Office 
Chérifien des Phosphates (OCP). 
The last decades have witnessed developments in Morocco’s domestic legal rules to 
align them with international investment law. This included abolishing the Moroc-
conisation Law of 1973 regarding the maximum limits imposed on the right of for-
eigners to share holdings in investments in Morocco. Conversely, the efforts of 
GOM were still confronted with potential conflicts with the international invest-
ment law as prevalent in the phosphate market. The benefits of aligning the legal 
rules with the NT include permitting foreigners to carry on business activities in 
Morocco through their full and direct control over their business. Moreover, the 
abolishment of the ownership limits reduces the transaction costs of establishing a 
new investment in Morocco since local partners or shareholders are no longer nec-
essary. Finally, it lowers the risks borne by foreign investors who are not forced to 
 
994 Cammett, M. in Heydemann, S. 2004 256 
995 Usa International Business Publications 2008b 50 
996 Kalinova 2010 24 
997 OECD 2008a 105 
998 OECD 2008a 103 
999 Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs 2015c 7 
  211  
agree on future businesses since they can establish their business without local part-
ners. 
- Land ownership 
The second limitation related to the NT is experienced under the right of the for-
eigners to own agricultural lands. Under the Acquisition of Agricultural Property 
Law1000, Moroccan entities are exclusively entitled to own lands and property outside 
urbanised zones required for and utilised in agricultural purposes1001. The prohibi-
tion of foreign ownership of agricultural land ownership is explicit. Introduced in 
1973 as part of the nationalist moves accompanying the Morocconisation policy of 
19731002 and still in place until today. The main reason for its issuance was protect-
ing the agricultural sector when it employed 42 per cent of the population and ac-
counted for 14 per cent of GDP.  
In an attempt to circumvent the restriction, the GOM managed to reduce the nega-
tive impact of prohibited foreign ownership through introducing the 99-year lease 
program. It allowed foreigners to benefit from the agricultural lands under long-
term lease contracts rather than full ownership. On the other hand, the mentioned 
restriction does not preclude the foreign investors from owning lands for non-
agricultural purposes. Morocco applies strict limitations on foreigners’ rights to ac-
quire lands, preventing them from acquiring agricultural lands unless they are li-
censed to use the lands for non-agricultural purposes. The main restriction is con-
nected to the need to use convertible MAD accounts to acquire the lands1003. The 
general entitlement to own lands is governed by Morocco’s obligations and con-
tracts law (OCL)1004, which regulates the sale of property, requiring a written con-
tract covering the price and other terms agreed between the buyer and seller1005.  
Thus, NT inconsistencies are recognisable in relation to the different treatment of 
Moroccan and foreign investors in terms of ownership of agricultural lands. The 
difficulties experienced by foreigners in owning agricultural lands increases the costs 
of the factors of production for any foreigner looking for investment opportunity in 
 
1000 Dahir Sharif No. 645 of 1973, Acquisition of Agricultural Property, Official Gazette, Issue 3264, 
21 May 1975. 
1001 Article 1 of the Acquisition of Agricultural Property Law. 
1002 Dahir Sharif No. 213 of 1973, Transferring agricultural or potential agricultural lands owned by 
foreign individuals and companies to the State, Official Gazette, Issue 3149, 7 March 1973. 
1003 OECD 2008a 105 
1004 Dahir Sharif of the OCL, 12 August 1913. 
1005 Article 488 and 489 of the OCL. 
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Morocco’s agricultural sector. This can negatively influence FDI in Morocco when 
compared to other more open economies. 
- Importation 
The third reference to the NT is related to foreigners’ right to import. The Foreign 
Trade Law1006 guaranteed individuals and companies, regardless of their nationality, 
the right to import after registering in the importers’ registry1007. The law does not 
differentiate between nationals and foreigners regarding their rights to engage in 
importation1008. This is aligned with the notion of equal footing under the NT prin-
ciple. More importantly, such treatment guarantees Morocco a leading position over 
Egypt, where foreigners are subject to more restrictions if engaging in importation 
activities for trading purposes1009.  
The above equal treatment allows foreigners to carry on their business activities in 
Morocco at rationalised prices for the factors of production. In the current situa-
tion, the foreign produced know-how and technologies could be easily imported in-
to Morocco without nationality restrictions, permitting foreign investors to access 
needed tech at lower prices. The second important benefit from the equal treatment 
is cutting transaction costs borne by foreign investors in Morocco. The foreign 
trade law allows foreign investors to access the importation markets without estab-
lishing any special business structures to undertake the importation (e.g., as the case 
before in Egypt prior to the recent changes of 2017). These two benefits may justify 
a foreign investor’s decision to direct his investments into Morocco. 
- Public procurement 
The last concerns of the NT appears in government procurement. Under the public 
procurement law1010, if a Moroccan entity’s bid for public works or designs is more 
expensive than the foreign one up to 15 per cent, the Moroccan entity’s bid is 
deemed the best financial offer1011. This 15 per cent is similar to the percentage pro-
vided under the Egyptian Tenders and Bids Law. This percentage appears to not be 
in line with the NT. The preference price is granted for Moroccan entities regardless 
of their foreign control or ownership. Therefore, this general application of the 
 
1006 Dahir Sharif No. 25 of 2016, Foreign Trade Law, Official Gazette, Issue 6450, 24 March 2016. 
1007 Article 6 of the Foreign Trade Law. 
1008 Santander Trade Portal 2016 
1009 Newcombe, Paradell 2009 161 
1010 Art. 155, Dahir Sharif No. 349 of 2012, Public Contracts, Official Gazette, Issue 6140, 04 April 
2013. 
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preferable treatment accorded to the Moroccan entities could be a violation of the 
NT1012. 
(B) Expropriation 
The second notion in the process of benchmarking is “expropriation”1013. Morocco’s 
constitution generally prescribes requisition only in cases explicitly stipulated by law. 
The constitution guarantees private ownership of property as long as this does not 
conflict with Morocco’s social planning and economic needs. According to the US 
Trade Mission, there was no property requisitioned for reasons other than public 
purpose in the recent years. The same applies with regard to incidents of arbitrary 
or discriminatory GOM interventions1014. The Constitution of 2011 refers to expro-
priation when it permits requisition only within the context of and at the conditions 
explicitly stipulated in domestic law1015. The constitutions of Morocco did not refer 
to the Hull Rule principles of prompt, adequate and fair compensation.  
Under the requisition law (RL)1016, which governs the requisition of private property 
for public use, the requisition is permitted only if serving the announced public in-
terest1017. Requisition can be applied by the public and private law entities and indi-
viduals to which the state assigns its right to participate in operating activities of 
public interest1018. The RL proposed compensation equal to the value of the requisi-
tioned property’s value as effectively used1019, with the assessment of the value tak-
ing place on the day the requisition is announced. The Law provides an additional 
guarantee to investors by requiring that any requisition for public purposes be based 
on a judicial ruling1020. This moves the discussion to the protection of foreign inves-
tors under the BITs concluded by the GOM. The BITs condition lawful expropria-
tions upon serving the public interest, without discrimination, in respect of due 
process and in return for effective, prompt and adequate compensation1021. 
 
1012 Kalinova 2010 24 
1013 See II.F.2. 
1014 Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs 2015c 9 
1015 Article 15 of the Constitution of Morocco of 2011 
1016 Dahir Sharif No. 254 of 1982, Requisition and Temporary Occupation, Official Gazette, Issue 
3685, 15 June 1983. 
1017 Article 1 of the RL. 
1018 Article 3 of the RL. 
1019 Article 20 of the RL. 
1020 Article 2 of the RL. 
1021 Kalinova 2010 45 
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The RL addresses the procedures and details necessary to assure the requisition’s 
compliance with the due process and compensation1022. Damage compensated is the 
injuries incurred when the requisition occurs1023. Any forecasted, potential or indi-
rect damages cannot be accounted for when calculating the compensation due. The 
value base for the compensation calculation is the property’s value on the date of 
the requisition (i.e., when the requisition notification was communicated). Any in-
crease in the property’s value after the communication of the requisition notifica-
tion is disregarded. With regard to challenging the requisition and the compensation 
order, the RL entitles the property owners to challenge only the awarded compensa-
tion and not the requisition order1024. The RL, which provides detailed procedures 
to govern: (i) compensation requests, (ii) compensation payments, (iii) compensation 
appeal procedures, and the (iv) impact of requisition, puts Morocco in a leading po-
sition when compared to Jordan and Egypt. It is especially ahead when compared to 
Egypt, which even lacks special legislation to govern the compensation process. 
The second form of intervention under the RL is “temporary occupation”. The RL enti-
tles the GOM and its authorities to occupy private properties temporarily in return 
for fair compensation. The failure to agree on compensation allows the dispute to 
be referred to courts to decide on the fair compensation. The RL1025 provided three 
criteria to govern the calculation of compensation: (i) the damage due to the tempo-
rary occupation, (ii) the value of the explored and extracted material or resources 
during the temporary occupation, and (iii) the appreciation in the land’s value due to 
the continuous undertaken activities. The law sets a maximum limit for the tempo-
rary occupation at five years1026.  
The third part of the RL regards the appreciation in the land’s value due to the pub-
lic works. In these circumstances, landowners and beneficiaries are obliged to share 
the burden of repaying the GOM compensation in return for the land’s apprecia-
tion due to the public works1027. When the announced public works result in the ap-
preciation of the requisition property’s value by more than 20 per cent, the com-
pensation is determined by taking into account three criteria: (i) the value of the 
property prior to announcing the public works, (ii) the value of property on the day 
of announcing the public works and filing for requisitioning the property, and (iii) 
 
1022 Section 2 of the RL. 
1023 Article 20 of the RL. 
1024 Article 32(3) of the RL. 
1025 Article 56 of the RL. 
1026 Article 57(1) of the RL. 
1027 Article 59 of the RL. 
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the court’s assessment of the appreciation in the property’s value for reasons other 
than the public works execution. Under the current Moroccan ICSID cases, none of 
the claims were associated with requisition. This highlights the smooth application 
of the RL in Morocco. 
Morocco provides significant guarantees to operational investors against the risk of 
expropriation or requisitioning of their private property in Morocco. This appears 
on several levels: (i) the payment of compensation to the party damaged from the 
requisition, (ii) the requisition must be under a judicial ruling, and (iii) details of the 
procedures regarding the process of carrying out the requisition – including notifi-
cation timings, transfer of ownership, and establishing compensation – appears as a 
guarantee by the GOM to respect due process when acting against investors. These 
guarantees lower the risks borne by foreign investors when investing in Morocco, 
which can encourage them to invest even further. 
(C) Dispute settlement 
The third notion in the comparison process is the right of a foreign investor to re-
vert the dispute to the ICSID. In the theoretical chapter, the referral of contractual 
dispute between the host state and foreign investors to a third party for internation-
al arbitration is a fundamental protection1028. For dispute settlement, the IC has no 
explicit reference to international arbitration as an alternative means for dispute set-
tlement. The failure to settle disputes in a friendly manner at local levels transfers 
the dispute to the GOM’s committee chaired by the prime minister. The arbitration 
law of 2007 (AL)1029 amended the Civil Procedures Law introducing the notions of 
mediation, conciliation and international arbitration in a separate chapter. 
The AL defines international arbitration and its pre-requisite conditions. It is the 
first legislation of Morocco to prescribe international arbitration as a means to settle 
disputes arising between states and investors1030. The AL is inspired by the UN-
CITRAL model, with limited differences. The AL differentiates between the arbitra-
tion agreements and the clauses, since the UNCITRAL provided only for arbitra-
tion agreements. In the AL, the legislator successfully differentiated between do-
mestic and foreign arbitration. Furthermore, the reform of 2007 opened access to 
domestic and international arbitration for the public and the SOEs1031. The AL rec-
 
1028 See II.F.4. 
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ognises foreign tribunal awards and rulings and deems them enforceable in Moroc-
co. It vested the commercial courts with the right to enforce international arbitra-
tion awards in the presence of an exequatur. The enforcement procedure is as sim-
ple as requesting an enforcement order from the competent commercial court’s 
president. The president issues the order only after examining the award’s conform-
ity to public order and the parties’ rights to defence. 
The history of Morocco in international arbitration dates back to the signing of the 
New York Convention on 12 February 1959. Followed by its becoming a member 
state of the ICSID Washington Convention on 10 June 19671032. Under the current 
AL, the wording can be interpreted as extending the application of the arbitration 
clause to foreign investors from non-BIT signatories with Morocco. The unilateral 
consent appears in the AL in a manner similar to the legal wording of the arbitra-
tion settlement clause in the former versions of Article 7 in the IGIL. 
A subsequent attempt to stimulate alternative dispute resolution mechanisms was in 
partnership with the United States Agency for International Development and the 
International Finance Corporation. The plan targeted the foundation of mediation 
training centres and an accreditation system for certifying mediators1033. These at-
tempts were in line with the US-Morocco FTA, specifically the dispute settlement 
section aimed at founding a transparent, effective, and timely regime to settle dis-
putes. The US trade representative advisory report cited the efficiency of the FTA’s 
dispute settlement regime1034. 
Under the current dispute settlement regime, a 12-month procedure is required to 
initiate proceedings at the different levels of Morocco’s judiciary from first instance 
to appeal. Moreover, a court ruling is usually expected to be issued in a period of 2–
10 years (if not more). In turn, filing for alternative and third party dispute settle-
ments became more common through submitting claims to the Rabat International 
Mediation and Arbitration Centre1035. Under the Moroccan law, mediation efforts 
are capped at six months, which can be renewed. In fact, mediation efforts were 
usually reported successful in periods of no more than three months. Regarding ar-
bitration, no ceilings for settlement periods are stipulated in Moroccan law, alt-
hough the practice highlighted that complicated disputes last a maximum of 12–18 
months.  
 
1032 ICSID 2017  
1033 Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs 2015c 11 
1034 Koplan, S., Okun, D. etal 2004 91-92 
1035 Centre International de Médiation et d'Arbitrage à Rabat 2016 
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The practice assists in highlighting the advantage of alternative dispute resolution 
methods over litigation in the domestic Moroccan courts. A disadvantage of court 
litigation appears in inconsistent rulings due to lack of the publication of case law, 
dissemination and sharing1036. Additionally, poor legal knowledge and practice of 
lawyers, judges and magistrates promotes fallacies in litigation. The shortcomings in 
Morocco’s domestic judiciary highlights more emphasis on the role played by the 
IC’s reference to international arbitration as an accepted (alternative to domestic lit-
igation) mechanism of dispute settlement between the state and investors. This ref-
erence lowers risk for foreign investors in connection to the need to litigate within 
the unpredictable Moroccan judiciary, as it guarantees the possibility to settle in-
vestment disputes in a more predictable manner. Guaranteed access to third party 
dispute settlement lowers the risks of investing in Morocco and possibly stimulates 
more FDI.  
(D) Currency transfer, pricing freedom and performance re-
quirements 
The fourth and the last subsection within the benchmarking analysis is the one cov-
ering the right of foreign investors to repatriate their profits, freely price their prod-
ucts and employ foreigners1037. With regard to the right to employ foreigners, this 
appears as an indicator of the presence of performance requirements within the 
domestic legal framework. 
- Currency transfers 
The IC eradicated all FX restrictions hindering the inflows of foreign invest-
ments1038. It complemented the original step adopted by the FX office executing the 
convertibility regime. Based on those two policies, foreign investors became eligible 
to freely remit their profits and transfer their funds to and from Morocco without 
delays or restrictions on quantities1039. This entitles foreign investors to freely con-
vert and transfer their foreign currency as profit repatriation and/or dividend distri-
bution. The only requirement is that of notifying the GOM through the necessary 
financial and legal documentation. With regard to dividends and bonuses, investors 
are bound to submit their annual financial statements plus the adjusted income 
 
1036 Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs 2015c 11 
1037 See II.F.5. 
1038 Article 16 of the IC. 
1039 Kalinova 2010 46 
  218  
statement providing their taxable income1040. The right was asserted explicitly twice 
in the IC1041. This resembles the GOM’s interest in complying with the principle of 
investors’ freedom to transfer their currency abroad. The legal provisions of the IC 
reveal and did not initiate the legal right of foreign investors to freely transfer their 
funds, as it was actually in practice since the 1993 liberalisation. 
The FX office was established by the monarchical decision of January 22 of 1958. 
The office represented the authority responsible for governing the MAD foreign 
exchange rate. The adoption of a more flexible exchange rate in 1993 as part of 
IMF membership highlighted the FX office’s role in overseeing the trade of foreign 
currencies in Morocco. The role of the office was confined to verifying transactions 
and identifying any opportunities for illegal activities1042. In 2007, the FX office in-
troduced another set of liberalisation policies allowing the outflow of foreign cur-
rency as direct investments if connected to activity and below MAD 30 million per 
entity annually. The right was limited to setting new entities, participation in existing 
ones or creating a permanent establishment for the Moroccan entity abroad1043. Cur-
rently, Morocco executes no controls upon the transfer of funds abroad in connec-
tion to profits, capital gains and liquidation proceeds1044. 
The IC’s guarantee of investors’ right to repatriate their profits and proceeds is pos-
sibly reflected positively on FDI inflows into Morocco. This guarantee rationalises 
the prices of the factors of production since investors can easily move their capital 
into and outside of Morocco with fewer restrictions. The lower the restrictions on 
capital flow, the lower the prices of the factors of production (e.g., assets bought by 
injected capital). Moreover, the more aligned with the FX transfers principle under 
international investment law, the lower the transaction costs for an investor. In 
economies where the central banks impose severe restrictions to control the flow of 
FX, investors tend to structure their financial flows in less efficient manners to cir-
cumvent the restrictions. Here, transaction costs for injecting funds into an econo-
my increase as an outcome of the inefficient structure. 
 
1040 Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs 2015c 8 
1041 Articles 15 and 16 of the IC. 
1042 Ministry of Economy and Finance - Kingdom of Morocco 2013  
1043IBFD Tax Research Platform 2007 
1044 OECD 2008b 103 
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- Freedom of pricing 
The constitution of Morocco1045 prescribed a general umbrella for the role of free 
market forces’ interaction in setting market prices. The GOM began abolishing 
price-fixing strategies and liberalised the services sectors around the early 2000s1046. 
The attempt to liberalise the market forced the GOM to adopt the competition law 
(CL)1047. The CL was significant in reflecting the new orientation of economic and 
legal policies and their inclination towards a free market. Under the CL1048, products 
including goods and services must be priced in accordance with market competition 
rules without any intervention from administrative authorities regarding pricing pol-
icies.  
The CL1049, however, allows the competent authority to intervene and administra-
tively adjust the market outcomes in exceptional circumstances. These circumstanc-
es are broad, including sectors and geographical regions where competition is re-
stricted due to natural or existing monopolies. In these cases, the administrative au-
thority, after consulting the competition council, can impose administrative 
measures accordingly. This broad scope of intervention can mean several risks for 
foreign investors, based on the wide powers vested in the administrative authorities 
regarding the competition environment in markets. 
Morocco’s transformation towards the private sector by the turn of the century re-
quired respecting the outcomes of the interaction of free market forces. This came 
to align Morocco’s practise with international investment law regarding government 
intervention in pricing schemes of private investments. Entitling the private sector 
to freely price products allows private investors to compete freely in the local mar-
kets based on costs and forecasted returns. The interaction of the market forces al-
lows investors to access the factors of production at lower prices. Therefore, the 
lower the prices of the factors of production, the higher the enthusiasm of an inves-
tor to bring funds into the economy. Conversely, the intervention of the administra-
tive authority can increase risk for investors.   
 
1045 Article 35 of the Constitution of 2011. 
1046 Galal, Ahmed and Najib Harabi 2008 55 
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- Performance requirements 
Morocco’s laws have not imposed any performance requirements on investments, a 
principle adopted in several Moroccan BITs. An obvious difference appears from 
comparing the wording concerning the performance requirements between the US-
Morocco BIT1050 signed in 1985 and the subsequent Morocco-US FTA1051 signed in 
2006. Under the BIT1052, both parties endeavoured to avoid establishing any per-
formance requirements1053. The FTA used mandatory wording to ban imposing any 
performance requirements in connection to the operation, institution, activity or 
disposal of an investment. Examples of prohibited requirements include the setting 
of periodic exportation thresholds, the abidance with a minimum per centage of lo-
cal content or the assurance of transferring know-how to the host state1054.  
The development between both treaties can be justified based on the change in the 
US BIT Model. The US-Morocco BIT was concluded under the US Model of 1983, 
while the US-Morocco FTA of 2006 was concluded under the US Model of 2004. 
By comparing both wordings, one can notice that performance requirements 
changed from a weakness to avoid to a grave threat requiring prohibition. The as-
sessment of Morocco’s compliance with Trade-Related Investment Measures con-
cluded the lack violations to the WTO obligations. On the other hand, performance 
requirements may prevail under public procurement conditions through prioritising 
goods produced in Morocco as embracing a higher local content per centage. The 
second example of performance requirements is free zones projects that benefit 
from flexible labour and tax laws with obligations to export no less lower than 85 
per cent of production1055.  
The final consideration under this subsection is investors’ right to employ foreign-
ers. The labour law (LL)1056 guarantees investors the right to freely employ foreign-
ers1057 as long as they comply with set procedures. An investor interested in employ-
ing a foreigner must apply for a licence from the competent GOM authority1058. The 
LL1059 held an investor under obligation to bear the costs of the foreigner’s return to 
 
1050 United Nations (UNCTAD) 1985  
1051 United Nations (UNCTAD) 2004a  
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his home state if the licence application was refused. Another caveat1060 for foreign 
employees is limiting the right of investments engaged in public procurement and 
projects to cash their insurance-deposited amounts unless demonstrating, through 
an administrative certificate, the fulfilment of any obligations towards foreign em-
ployees including their return to their home states.  
The elimination of the performance requirements in the business environment of 
Morocco assists in reducing the prices of the production factors. From the above, 
the entitlement of investors to hire foreigners increases competition in the labour 
market, potentially driving down labour costs, which is reflected in lower prices of 
the factors of production. Additionally, Morocco’s respect of the endeavour not to 
impose performance requirements cuts transaction costs of operating in Morocco 
since investors have fewer restrictions imposed on them. However, the public pro-
curement law1061 allowed1062 employing at least 10 per cent of the labour force in a 
public contract from Moroccan nationals. Such requirement if strictly applied may 
have an opposite impact on the investments through raising the prices of the fac-
tors of production and the transaction costs of carrying out public contracts in Mo-
rocco. 
IV.C.4 Trade, privatization and openness to the private sector  
The aim of this section is to highlight the additional legislative efforts to deregulate 
the Moroccan economy. This section addresses the trade aspect as well as the 
GOM’s political changes, demonstrating its liberalisation stance. The analysis begins 
with the trade openness pillar. It then examines changes in the political structure 
and how they catalysed the privatisation programme and the shift towards deregula-
tion and the private sector. Finally, a brief overview is provided concerning Moroc-
co’s privatisation programme and the conclusions derived from the EBRD’s mis-
sion regarding the country’s legislation compliance with international standards. 
(A) Trade 
On the trade side, the efforts of trade liberalisation were evident in the Morocco-US 
FTA, in the Agadir Agreement and in the Morocco-EU Agreement. The first to ad-
 
1060 Article 519 of the LL. 
1061 Article 141 of the public procurement law. 
1062 This was introduced as part of a policy to stimulate domestic employment. The 10 per cent refer-
ence was permitted and is not mandatory in all public contracts. In other words, whenever a public 
authority sticks to the article’s permission, this may constitute a performance requirement. 
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dress is the Morocco-US FTA. The US, dissatisfied with the outcome of its en-
gagement in multilateral agreements, began to engage in bilateral discussions in the 
MENA to conclude trade and investment agreements. Priority was granted to Jor-
dan, Egypt and Morocco. The reasoning was the absence of mineral resources and 
the need to pursue economic openness policies. At the political level, the three 
states were adopting conciliatory behaviour towards Israel and were backing the US 
in the first against terrorism in the early 2000s1063. These efforts were in conjunction 
with concluding the US-Morocco FTA. In accordance with such treaty, the GOM 
was under obligation to list all restrictions applicable for market access and national 
treatment in the negative list. The motive behind the stipulation of the negative list 
of restrictions was to promote transparency and reflect the continuous reforms in 
the business climate. Chapter 10 of the FTA provided Morocco’s obligations in 
connection to investment. 
The obligations complied with international standards, encouraging the GOM to 
extend information access and improving interaction with investors and stakehold-
ers. With the BIT network concluded by Morocco, these benefits were attainable to 
all investors for BIT signatory states based on the MFN principle1064. In this sense, 
Morocco was also a member of the initiative concluding the OECD Policy Frame-
work for Investment. The framework was founded to target questions in connec-
tion to governmental efforts to create favourable business environments. The 
framework aims to assess the progress in the involved economies on ten aspects 
covering trade and investment policies. Hence, the investment policies are a corner-
stone for such a framework analysis. The assessment linked to it is tested upon the 
progress recorded in three pillars; non-discrimination, transparency and dispute set-
tlement. Starting with transparency, the GOM adopted a consultative manner in al-
lowing online access to the draft laws and receiving feedbacks from stakeholders 
and the population. Another website was established to address the restricted sec-
tors and the necessary prerequisites and procedures prior to operating in such sec-
tors.  
There were four motivations for the US trade representatives to recommend the 
conclusion of a FTA with Morocco. First, the agreement would highlight US inter-
ests in spreading openness and economic growth across Islamic countries. Second, 
the agreement would strengthen the GOM in liberalising and adopting more mar-
ket-oriented policies. Third, an FTA with the US would directly result in enhancing 
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the governance rates within partnering institutions. Fourth, the agreement prescrib-
ing protection to US investors in Morocco would grant investors equitable treat-
ment to European investors benefiting from the EU-Morocco Association Agree-
ment1065. 
The second indication of the trade efforts was Morocco’s involvement with Egypt, 
Jordan and Tunisia, in signing the Agadir Agreement on 25 February 2004 in Rabat 
(Agadir Agreement)1066. The Agadir Agreement created a free trade zone between its 
contracting parties. This came as part of the efforts to facilitate the creation of the 
Euro-Mediterranean free trade area. The agreement’s commitments covered the 
elimination of tariffs, duties and taxes, besides the abolishment of non-tariff trade 
barriers. Non-tariff barriers were defined in a broad sense to include cash adminis-
trative limitations, plus the measures curbing the flow of imports and goods. Ac-
cordingly, goods produced in a contracting state benefit from the NT in the other 
contracting states of the agreement1067. This agreement was complementary to the 
association agreement concluded with the European Union and effective from 
March 20001068.  
Finally, the EU-Morocco FTA signed in 1995 granted a preferential treatment to 
Moroccan exports to the EU. The agreement allowed access for industrial products 
to EU markets without neither quantity restrictions nor imposing duties. Another 
FTA was concluded with EFTA States including Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein 
and Switzerland. The agreement provides similar access for Moroccan products to 
these countries’ markets. In return, Morocco was under obligation to eliminate tar-
iffs over a twelve-year period from the entry of force date in 19981069. 
(B) Market oriented policies 
Proof of Moroccan liberalisation have been continuous since the 1990s. Initially, 
this started since the 1992 legalisation of currency convertibility system allowing in-
vestors to freely remit their profits and funds. The IC of 1995, the trade liberalisa-
tion and the US FTA and the privatisation programme are additional proof of Mo-
rocco’s economic transformation. A significant change was allowing the private sec-
tor to participate in fully SOEs as concluded by the EBRD mission. More im-
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portantly was Morocco’s adherence to the Declaration, completing the efforts to in-
tegrate globally and improve competitiveness1070. The role of the IC was discussed 
above in detail. This section focuses on the complementary policies connected to 
trade and privatisation.  
The rise of Mohammed VI to the Moroccan throne in 1999 was in conjunction 
with the continuous GOM efforts to liberalise the market. The economic diplomacy 
was an essential pillar in Mohamed’s VI vision for Morocco. Accordingly, the two-
decade shift from protectionist policies was extended, the plan of globalising Mo-
roccan companies was under way, the attraction of FDI was an ultimate objective, 
together with boosting tourism proceeds. These core activities of Morocco’s Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs were performed jointly with other competent technical minis-
tries1071. The legislative developments include issuing an industrial property law and 
a copyright law providing the necessary intellectual property protection. Additional-
ly, the customs code of 2000 abolished cumbersome procedures and computerised 
the process of customs clearance, reducing its duration from five days in 1997 to 
only one hour in 2012. In the international arena, the GOM in 2002 appointed an 
Investment Inter-Ministries Committee. The primary mission of the committee was 
to handle contractual agreements that brought foreign investments to mega projects 
and reform the investment environment to attract more foreign investors1072. 
(C) EBRD and privatization 
To assess the Moroccan legal framework from the commercial side, the EBRD as-
sessed the pace of liberalising the Moroccan legislations. The pillars examined in-
clude laws connected to insolvency and judicial capacity1073. With regard to insol-
vency legislation, Morocco’s insolvency law was affected by the French insolvency 
law. This is a positive signal since the French insolvency code is considered one of 
the most debtor-friendly pieces of legislation worldwide. With regard to Moroccan 
judges, besides their lack of updated knowledge, they are not allowed to specialise in 
any field of law and the process of case allocation is unclear. This raises investors’ 
uncertainty concerning the predictability of judiciary decisions. Furthermore, the 
cumbersome procedures to file claims result in a two-year lapse of time between fil-
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ing a claim and the trial. The outcome is higher inclination towards mediation and 
other dispute settlement alternatives1074. 
The privatisation programme began in 1993, targeting tourism, banking and tele-
communications. The programme was opened for foreign investors and resulting in 
total revenues into the GOM by its end in 2011 of USD 13 billion1075. The privatisa-
tion law1076 facilitated the floating of the SOEs on Morocco’s and foreign stock ex-
changes1077. Morocco applied an intense privatisation plan, reflecting the GOM’s in-
terest in opening its markets. The forecasted plan for 1996 covered the privatisation 
of approximately 112 public sector business entities worth nearly USD 2 billion. 
However, shortcomings in Morocco’s economic performance in 1995 permitted the 
GOM to collect only USD 400 million in privatisation proceeds1078.  
The three consecutive phases of updating Morocco’s public enterprises system 
commenced by reforming the SOEs, followed by modernisation and finally privati-
sation. After the completion of the three phases in 2000, the public enterprise re-
gime comprised of 241 SOEs. The three categories of public enterprises included: 
(i) SOEs fully owned by the GOM and known as a state company; (ii) the public 
subsidy, where the GOM held more than half of the shareholding capital; and (iii) 
the semi-public entities, the capital of which GOM held less than 50 per cent. 
In conjunction with privatisation, the liberalisation process allowed the private sec-
tor to enter the previously monopolised sectors such as electricity and water distri-
bution, and the construction and operation of highways. Nevertheless, sectors un-
der public monopoly included railways, post, airport sector, and phosphate produc-
tion1079. The privatisation and liberalisation allowed the creation of several monopo-
lies, which triggered the requirement of listing the restricted markets in accordance 
to Morocco’s obligations under the Declaration and the US FTA as part of its 
transparency rating. The Declaration permits two kinds of monopolies. The first is 
the state monopoly, where the producer or service provider is the central or local 
government. The second is the licensed monopoly where a private entity is granted 
an exclusive licence to provide such product or service on a monopolistic basis.  
 
1074 General Counsel Office 2013a 4, 37 
1075 Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs 2015c 7 
1076 Law No. 39 of 1989, subject to amendments in 1995 and 1999. 
1077 Elkhafif et al. 2012b 118 
1078 IBP 2016b 133 
1079 Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs 2015c 17 
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Under the Moroccan list, the main examples of state monopolies prevailed in the 
phosphate market of exploitation and exploration are managed by the OCP, besides 
the railway transportation, postal services and airport management. Mining projects 
executed in Morocco are usually owned and managed by SOEs as the case of the 
OCP in the phosphate extraction. The OCP is 94.12 per cent held by the GOM, 
while the remaining 5.88 per cent are owned by the Banque Centrale Populaire 
(governmental bank)1080. The efforts to liberalise these markets depended upon 
transforming public authorities into public corporations. Additionally, the GOM 
launched a process to split the regulatory authorities from the actual service provid-
er engaged in commercial activities1081. 
From the three components of the last section, the trade openness pillar, the politi-
cal rise of King Mohamed VI, and the catalysed privatisation and the EBRD mis-
sion, all elements reflect the fact that the economy of Morocco experience intense 
changes during the 2000s. Each change signalled the willingness to exit the former 
protectionist and state interventionist policies in favour of a liberalised, deregulated 
economy. Starting from the rise of the new king promoting the private sector, the 
conclusion of the FTA with the US and the EU, the fuelling of the privatisation 
programme, to the final step of legislatively permitting public private partnerships. 
All these changes can be grouped under the process of deregulating and liberalising 
the Moroccan economy and leaving behind the former restrictive, highly regulated 
protectionist economy of the 1950s–1970s. These changes should be analysed in 
conjunction with the IC and its prescribed incentives and guarantees. They all serve 
the same interest of deregulating and opening the economy for the private sector 
and for the foreign investors. 
IV.C.5 Conclusion 
The conclusions deduced from the overview of the Moroccan legal framework can 
be grouped into three categories. The first category addresses the title of the thesis 
regarding the Moroccan IC level of compliance with the international investment 
law obligations. The second category tackles the shift in the Moroccan legal frame-
work from the restricted regulated economy to the more opened and liberalised 
one. This moves the discussion to the third category connected to the concept of 
economic freedom (this will be briefly highlighted here and more deeply investigat-
ed as part of the economic chapter). 
 
1080 Office Chérifien des Phosphates 2016 
1081 Kalinova 2010 29 
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Starting from the notion of the “national treatment principle”, the Moroccan legislator 
managed to secure a better compliance position with its international obligations 
when compared to Egypt. Based on the notions identified to test compliance, which 
are the right of foreigners to own lands and the right to import and access all in-
vestment sectors, Morocco still has further steps to implement to attain full compli-
ance with the principle of national treatment. The main inconsistency appears in the 
prohibition of foreigners’ ownership of agricultural lands. This exclusion of foreign 
investors from owning land raises the cost of undertaking an investment in Moroc-
co. 
Under the “expropriation” notion, the Moroccan legal framework regime is the most 
aligned with the international investment law principle. This alignment appears in 
several instances. First, in the presence of a specialised requisition legislation. This 
legislation offers an explicit guarantee that is absent in the Egyptian and Jordanian 
legal frameworks – that is, basing a requisition policy only upon a judicial ruling and 
not only upon an administrative decree subject to later judicial review. In other 
words, the Moroccan legislator adopted a form of a prior review rather than a sub-
sequent one as in the Egyptian and Jordanian cases. Moreover, the legislation gov-
erns the procedures and criteria for compensation in a detailed manner. For exam-
ple, the law prescribes the treatment of forecasted forgone profits due to the exe-
cuted requisition. This grants an investor a better guarantee, thus reducing the risks 
arising from the possibility of the GOM intervening to expropriate an investment. 
Under the third notion titled “dispute settlement”, the conclusion from the Moroccan 
developments in this field are split into two parts. The first tackles the legislative ef-
forts reflected in the promulgation of a new AL. The law adopted a form of a uni-
lateral consent as discussed in the Egyptian country study. This unilateral consent 
permitted investors from non-BIT signatories to benefit from such consent and file 
claims against Morocco. This represents the GOM’s acknowledgment of the right 
to revert disputes to arbitration as a substantive protection. Moreover, this law 
permitted the public sector and SOEs to access the international arbitration arena. 
Hence, the legislative update moved the Moroccan legal framework closer towards 
the international one.  
Finally, in the last subsection of the substantive protections comes the referral to 
the right to repatriate profits, the freedom to price products, and employ foreigners. 
First, with regard to the right to repatriate of profits, Moroccan laws are closely 
aligned with international investment law requirements. The right is exercised in re-
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lation to profits, liquidation proceeds, as well as salaries and wages of foreigners. 
With regard to the freedom to price products, the Moroccan authorities abolished 
by the millennium price controls and issued a new competition law. A red flag ap-
pears within this law concerning the role of the competition authority as an admin-
istrative body entitled to intervene under undefined exceptional circumstances. This 
obscurity of the exceptional circumstances diminishes the outcome of legal compli-
ance with the principle of pricing freedom and, in turn, indirect expropriation. The 
last notion under this conclusion paragraph is connected to the employment of for-
eigners as an indicator for performance requirements under Moroccan laws. Entities 
are entitled to hire foreigners if the they successfully finalise the procedural re-
quirements to obtain the necessary work licences. This resembles a clear step within 
the scope of rationalising factor prices for investments flowing into Morocco. 
From the above referral to the IC, two general conclusions can be derived. First, the 
Moroccan investment legislator attempted to grant the investors wide guarantees to 
signal the state’s interest in attracting foreign investors and offering them their 
needed protections. This was even reflected in the explicit referral to the BITs indi-
cating the state’s willingness to respect its international obligations. The second ob-
vious conclusion is the economy’s deregulation and shift towards the private sector. 
All of the above tax and non-tax incentives are serving the same aims prescribed in 
Articles 1 and 2 of the IC. The incentives represent an explicit example for the legis-
lator’s interest in cutting the transaction costs for all investments established in Mo-
rocco. By revisiting them, it appears that Morocco opened the door for the private 
sector to engage in economic activities, incentivising it to lead the state’s economy 
instead of the former public sector hegemony.  
The efforts to deregulate the Moroccan laws and economy were addressed under 
three pillars. The first was the political one, when referring to King Mohamed VI’s 
rise to power. This catalysed the shift towards deregulating the economy and open-
ing it to foreigners. This was evident on the trade level by engaging in a set of trade 
agreements with the EU, US and other Arab countries. More importantly, this was 
translated into a more intense privatisation programme that focused on previously 
highly restricted public services. Moreover, and in connection with the dispute set-
tlement conclusion above, the Moroccan authorities established a mediation centre 
providing a new alternative for settling disputes other than the inefficient, less in-
formed judiciary. Additionally, the EBRD mission approved the compliance levels 
of the recent Moroccan legislation connected to public private partnerships. Finally, 
the widely granted tax and customs incentives, as in the case of Jordan, are explicit 
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proof of the authorities’ interest in deregulating the economy, decreasing the burden 
of compliance for investors. 
The above analysis provides an important base for the economic analysis in chapter 
VI . Chapters IV and VI are closely linked since the above analysis  provides an evi-
dence of the changes in the legal rules of Morocco over time, which relates to the 
correlation analysis to be provided in chapter VI. . The transformation of the Mo-
roccan investment climate from being restricted and highly regulated to a more 
opened and liberal one can have positive correlations with the FDI inflows to Mo-
rocco, which will be discussed more in depth in chapter VI. 
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V. Case Law 
V.A Egypt ICSID Cases 
V.A.1 Introduction 
After the introduction of the Egyptian investment legal framework in the chapter 
IV, chapter V intends to examine the practical compliance of the State of Egypt 
with its international investment law obligations from an adjudication side. The in-
ternational obligations under investigation in this chapter are the ones introduced 
within chapter II.F covering the BIT substantive protections. The analysis within 
chapter V assists in fulfilling two aims. First, it highlights the reasoning behind the 
number of disputes filed against Egypt in ICSID. Second, it assists in understanding 
the position taken by the Egyptian side when responding to the claims of violating 
the international investment law principles filed before ICSID.  
Chapter V will be split into two main sections. Section 2 addresses numerically and 
factually the disputes filed against Egypt in ICSID arbitration. Section 3 is dealing 
with the legal analysis of Egypt’s ICSID disputes is split into two sub-sections. First, 
an analysis of two ICSID disputes where a final award was rendered, and second, an 
analysis of two ICSID disputes settled amicably. The dispute analysis includes; a 
brief factual background for the filed claim, an overview of the respondent’s claims, 
an overview of the tribunal’s ruling and the final concluding legal remarks concern-
ing the dispute overall. 
V.A.2 Egypt in International Arbitration 
Chapter IV has covered the legal framework regulating the investment climate in 
Egypt. As a brief recap, Egypt has concluded 110 BITs and is a member of the New 
York Convention for Arbitral Awards Enforcement of 1958 and the Washington 
Convention on State Nationals Investment Disputes Settlement of 1965. The Egyp-
tian history in ICSID arbitration is quite long. With the first case registered in 1984 
and the latest in 2016, Egypt has played the respondent part in 29 ICSID cases. This 
puts Egypt in the third position as the highest number of participant in ICSID arbi-
tration after Argentina and Venezuela1082. The situation of the latter two states can 
be explained based on their economic and political developments. In the case of 
Argentina, the severe financial crisis in 2002 creating legal difficulties raised the total 
 
1082 Sherif, N., Khalil, H. and Zayed, H. 2015 22 
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registered claims until today to 53 cases. For Venezuela, the rise of Chavez to power 
followed by Maduro and the execution of hostile leftist policies against foreign in-
vestors explained the hike in the number of the filed cases to 43 from 2000 to 2016. 
For the Egyptian side, an opinion may blame the Arab Spring uprising of January 
2011 for the witnessed increase in ICSID cases registered. This could be true since 
the number of cases filed against Egypt only after 2011 reached 17 cases. However, 
prior to the January 2011, Egypt already was a respondent in 12 cases. This number 
still remains high especially when recognizing that Egypt as one of the top invest-
ment destinations in Africa. Moreover, the number contradicts with the essence of 
the Egyptian policies implemented within the IMF reform program of the 1990s. 
The IMF recommended Egypt to execute more market oriented policies in order to 
promote investment flows and create jobs. The high number of cases filed mirrors 
the hegemony of the former restrictive mind set of Egyptian officials who adopted 
the market oriented policies economically as per the IMF recommendations without 
translating them into the regulatory perspective. Hence, the hostile behaviour 
against foreign investors in actions, laws or regulations prevailed over the economi-
cally pro-investment implemented policies. 
The comparison of Egypt’s ICSID history with Morocco and Jordan would demon-
strate the positive lead of the latter two over Egypt. Morocco with only three cases 
registered in ICSID and Jordan with eight cases show Egypt’s negative experience 
with the ICSID. Furthermore, Egypt’s worse situation appears in the number of 
cases where it was held liable for violating a BIT obligation. This happened in four 
cases, when Egypt was rendered liable and under obligation to compensate the for-
eign investors for its violations. In the case of Morocco this never happened. In the 
case of Jordan, it was held liable in one case and a judicial restitution was sufficient 
without any additional compensation1083. This verifies the above statement concern-
ing the Egyptian officials’ true belief in welcoming foreign investors and protecting 
them when engaging in BITs. It confirms the officials interest to engage in BIT as a 
signalling tool to promote Egypt as an investment destination.  
For the 17 cases filed against Egypt after January 2011, the justification is obvious. 
The instability resulting from the uprising was reflected in changing governments, 
policies and regulatory frameworks. Accordingly, the legitimate expectations of in-
vestors were negatively impacted. This encouraged more investors to register more 
 
1083 Please see under subsection V.B.3(A) the case of ATA Construction, Industrial and Trading 
Company v. Jordan. 
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claims against Egypt in the ICSID. The uprising remains an important point differ-
entiating Egypt from Jordan and Morocco since the latter two countries featured a 
stable political regime with a peaceful throne succession far from any political insta-
bilities. This hike in cases after January 2011 undeniably influenced the inflow of 
FDI in the following years. Therefore, the Egyptian side has undertaken a set of 
policies to settle the already filed cases, while assuring the reduction of the poten-
tially registered claims. 
The enforced policies included the introduction of the Law No. 4 of 20121084. The 
Law guaranteed the right of investors to engage with the Egyptian authorities in in-
formal reconciliations if the investor was held liable for any legal violations. The 
domestic informal settlement highlighted the GOE prioritization of settling foreign 
investors internally and informally rather than via referring disputes to ICSID where 
a rise in claims provides negative signals for potential investors1085. This Law was ac-
tually used to settle one of the claims filed in ICSID by Hussain Sajwani in the 
DAMAC case1086. 
Another joint move was the promulgation of the Law No. 32 of 20141087. As per the 
referenced Law, the third parties were denied the right to challenge the validity of 
public contracts without identifying a direct interest in the claim. The legislation 
immunized all the privatization contracts concluded by the GOE with investors 
against any legal challenges. Finally, the last legislative move was present in Chapter 
7 of the IGIL added by the Law No. 17 of 20151088. The Law established through 
Article 108 a specialized ministerial committee to work on settling the investment 
disputes prior to filing them in domestic courts or ICSID. This committee success-
fully settled many of the post-January 2011 filed cases. 
V.A.3 Egypt ICSID Disputes 
In this section, the research approaches closely the facts and flow of proceedings 
associated with the only three cases registered in ICSID against Egypt. For each of 
the cases, a brief overview is provided for the background facts. The second part 
addresses the respondent state’s claims on the jurisdiction and the merits within the 
scope of the international investment law. The third and last part of the section ex-
 
1084 Law No. 4 of 2012, Official Gazette, Issue No. 52-bis (E), 3 January 2012. 
1085 Sherif, N., Khalil, H. and Zayed, H. 2015 22 
1086 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 2011 
1087 Law No. 32 of 2014, Official Gazette, Issue No. 16-bis (H), 22 April 2014. 
1088 Law No. 17 of 2015, Official Gazette, Issue No. 11 (cont.), 12 March 2015. 
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amines the arbitration Tribunal’s decision. The outcome of the filed case either veri-
fies the understanding and the position of the respondent state or conflicts it to 
trigger in certain situation a liability over the respondent. It is worth mentioning that 
the publicly available material differs on case by case basis. This depends upon the 
agreement of the dispute parties to share the arbitral awards or the final agreement 
in case of amicable settlement. 
(A) Final Awards 
ICSID Tribunal has rendered a final award in seven of the 29 cases filed against 
Egypt. Of these seven, in four cases the Egyptian side was held liable and under ob-
ligation to compensate the claimant for the violation of the BIT obligations. In the 
three other claims, the Tribunal ruled in favour of the Egyptian side by dismissing 
the registered claims of the foreign investors. 
o Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Limited v. Egypt  
The first ICSID request for arbitration registered against Egypt was in 1984. The 
request was filed by the Southern Pacific Properties (SPP) (Middle East) Ltd. v. Ar-
ab Republic of Egypt1089. 
 Facts 
The background facts started since September 1974 when an agreement (agree-
ment) was concluded between SPP a Hong Kong company engaged in developing 
touristic resorts and the Egyptian Ministry of Tourism represented in the Egyptian 
General Organization for Tourism and Hotels (EGOTH)1090. EGOTH was a pub-
lic-sector entity regulated in accordance to the Law No. 60 of 19711091 and is con-
trolled by the Minister of Tourism. The agreement was governed by the Law No. 43 
of 1974 encouraging Arab and foreign investments. Its subject was the development 
of two touristic complexes in the Pyramids area and the Mediterranean coast. The 
agreement allowed the incorporation of a joint venture (EDTC) between SPP and 
the EGOTH where the former controlled 60 per cent and the latter controlled 40 
per cent. SPP was under obligation to provide the funding for the project. On the 
EGOTH and the Ministry of Tourism side, the two main obligations were obtain-
ing the necessary licenses and allocating the land usufruct rights to commence the 
project. 
 
1089 ICSID, International Arbitration of Registration Date 8/28/1984 
1090 See Paras. 42-43 of the Award of the ICSID Case No. ARB/84/3. 
1091 Law No. 60 of 1971, Official Gazette, Issue No. 39, 30 September 1971.  
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The project’s execution started smoothly until interrupted in the earlier months of 
1978. A parliamentary opposition to the project took place on the grounds that the 
land allocated to the project within the Pyramids zone included antiques where de-
velopmental projects should be prohibited under the UNESCO Convention1092. In 
line with the mounting opposition and the Egyptian Antiques Authority, the Minis-
ter of Information and Culture issued a decree prescribing the lands surrounding 
the Pyramids as Antiques public property. In turn, the Egyptian General Investment 
Authority (GIA) withdrew its previously granted approval for undertaking the pro-
ject. Afterwards, the Presidential Decree No. 267 of 19781093 abolished the previous 
Presidential Decree No. 457 of 19771094 assigning the Pyramids surrounding land for 
tourist utilization1095. 
 Respondent’s claims 
 Jurisdiction 
The first claims filed by Egypt in the SPP case were concerning the lack of ICSID’s 
jurisdiction to decide on the dispute. Egypt’s claim was based on the lack of an arbi-
tration clause within the agreement. Also, the absence of BIT between Hong Kong 
and Egypt by the time of filing the request. For Egypt, the registration of the arbi-
tration request in ICSID had no legal bases due to lack Egypt’s necessary consent as 
required by Article 25 of the ICSID. The analysis would not extend to the Tribu-
nal’s ruling on the compensation. 
 Merits 
From the several claims filed by the Egyptian side regarding the dispute’s merits, the 
most important for the purpose of this research remains the challenge of “expropria-
tion”. The Egyptian side confronted the deeming of the project’s cancellation as an 
“expropriation” pursuant to the Egyptian and international laws. The challenge was 
justified on a set of reasons. First, the concept of “expropriation” under the Egyptian 
laws applies only to real property and not to contractual rights. Therefore, the dam-
aged rights of the SPP do not represent a real property and in turn cannot be sub-
ject to “expropriation” under the Egyptian laws. Second, the Law No. 43 of 1974 
prohibited the State’s interventions in the form of “confiscation” (deprivation from 
 
1092 See Award Para. 62 – 150 of the Award of the ICSID Case No. ARB/84/3. 
1093 Presidential Decree No. 267 of 1978, Official Gazette, Issue No. 23, 5 June 1975. 
1094 Presidential Decree No. 475 of 1975, Official Gazette, Issue No. 26, 29 June 1978. 
1095 See Para. 65 of the Award of the ICSID Case No. ARB/84/3. 
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property or interest with the payment of a compensation) and “nationalization” (re-
ferred to as the transfer of ownership) and not the mere cancellation of project.  
Third, SPP was offered substitute lands to proceed with the cancelled project in a 
new area with similar characteristics. This confirms the diminished value of SPP’s 
rights without amounting to expropriation. Finally, and although the Egyptian offi-
cials offered a compensation to the SPP in order to proceed with alternative pro-
jects in Egypt, it was the latter’s full decision to reject the compensation and fully 
abandon the previously agreed projects. 
 Tribunal’s ruling 
 Jurisdiction 
Article 21 of the agreement provided the legal basis for reviewing the Law No. 43 
of 1974 for being one of the agreement’s governing legislations1096. The Law No. 43 
of 1974 provided three alternatives to settle the investor-state disputes arising pur-
suant to this Law including; (i) the agreement between the State and the investor, (ii) 
the BITs in place between Egypt and the investor’s home State and (iii) the ICSID 
Convention to which adhered by the Law No. 90 of 19711097. Article 45 of the Ex-
ecutive Regulations issued by the Minister of Economy’s Decree No. 375 of 
19771098 provided a mandatory hierarchy when using the available dispute settle-
ment mechanisms in line with above mentioned ranking. 
With the Tribunal verifying the (i) lack of an ICSID arbitration clause in the State-
investor agreement and (ii) the absence of a BIT between Egypt and Hong Kong, 
the Tribunal deemed the reference to the ICSID Convention in Article 8 of the Law 
No. 43 of 1974 amounting to a unilateral consent. Thus, the deemed unilateral con-
sent qualified the ICSID Tribunal to extend its jurisdiction over the SPP v. Egypt 
dispute after fulfilling the requirements of Article 25 of the ICSID Convention1099. 
 Merits 
The Tribunal acknowledged the right of the GOE to cancel the project in order to 
serve the public purpose after proving the presence of antiques within the Pyramids 
area. The Tribunal secured evidence under the Egyptian Law where a lawful expro-
 
1096 See Para. 51 of the Award of the ICSID Case No. ARB/84/3. 
1097 Law No. 90 of 1971, Official Gazette, Issue No. 39, 30 September 1971. 
1098 Minister of Economy Decree No. 375 of 1977, Egyptian Gazette, Issue No. 1 (cont.), 1 January 
1978. 
1099 See Para. 24 of the Award of the ICSID Case No. ARB/84/3. 
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priation requires paying a compensation to the damaged party. Reference was made 
to the Egyptian domestic legal framework to decide on the compensation basis and 
means. This connects this chapter to the preceding one related to the investment 
legal framework in Egypt. As mentioned in the preceding chapter, Article 34 of the 
Constitution of Egypt 1971 granted the GOE the right to expropriate private prop-
erty if for public purpose, against a fair compensation and in compliance with the 
law. The second important reference was to the Egyptian Protection of Monuments 
and Antiques Law No. 215 of 19511100, where in Article 11, the authorities were 
granted the right to expropriate the private spaces were the antiques were located in 
case they were difficult to remove. The expropriation must be against compensation 
that disregards the value of the discovered monument. 
In turn, the Tribunal ruled the investor’s right in a compensation for the damaged 
interests by the project’s cancellation. From the Constitutional and domestic law 
side, the second condition for a lawful expropriation was the communication of a 
fair compensation. The Tribunal considered the compensation the differential point 
between counting the GOE’s measures as a confiscation or a lawful expropriation. 
The Tribunal ruled the subject of the lawful expropriation was the SPP’s sharehold-
ing rights in the EDTC and not the land or the rights to its usufruct. These share-
holding contractual rights were under the protection of international law and creat-
ed the SPP’s right to a compensation. In regard to the third Egyptian claim, the 
subsequent Egyptian authorities’ actions against the EDTC turned the possibility to 
proceed with the other touristic complexes into impossible. The withdrawal of 
EGOTH from the EDTC joint venture (terminating the joint venture’s affection 
societatis), the blocking of EDTC’s bank accounts and sequester of the EDTC as-
sets were all evidences of the SPP’s impossibility to proceed with the alternative 
touristic projects in Egypt. 
 Case analysis 
 Jurisdiction 
With the three necessary pre-requisites for creating ICSID’s jurisdiction over dis-
putes including; first, the nature of the dispute as constituting an investment or not. 
Second, the parties of the dispute as one of them must be an ICSID Contracting 
State against a foreign investor. Thirdly, is the most important pre-requisite repre-
sented in the parties’ consent. This consent has to be in writing approving ICSID’s 
 
1100 Law No. 215 of 1951, Egyptian Gazette, Issue No. 105, 12 November 1951. 
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jurisdiction over investment disputes. Consents can be explicitly provided as a BIT 
clause in a bilateral sense. The second option is the unilateral consent when stipulat-
ed in the investment promotion domestic laws. The SPP v. Egypt remains one of 
the most significant cases in connection to the unilateral consent. 
The significance appears in ICSID’s only decision of its jurisdiction based on the 
broad unilateral consent prevailing in the Egyptian Investment Law No. 43 of 1974. 
The Egyptian understanding for Article 8 of the Law No. 43 of 1974 was not in line 
with the understanding of the Tribunal. The debate stressed whether Article 8 con-
stituted a unilateral consent or not. The GOE deemed the Article insufficient to ful-
fil the pre-requisite consent. The Tribunal rejected the GOE position considering 
adding Article 8 on its own representing a unilateral consent based on the mandato-
ry nature of the wordings. The claims were rejected, since the GIA marketed the 
Law No. 43 of 1974 to foreign investors through English translated brochures 
guaranteeing ICSID access in cases of any disputes arising connected to the Law’s 
enforcement. 
The claimant upheld the hierarchical regime in place under the Executive Regula-
tions of the Law No. 43 of 1974 issued by the Minister of Economy’s Decree No. 
375 of 1977. As per the Decree, the mandatory hierarchy governed the dispute set-
tlement mechanisms. In the SPP v. Egypt, the claimant communicated his approval 
to the State’s ICSID consent through a letter directed to the Egyptian Ministry of 
Tourism. The Tribunal held the claimant’s requests, and ruled the unilateral consent 
in Article 8 of the Law No. 43 of 1974 as an express consent sufficient to invoke 
ICSID’s jurisdiction over the dispute as per the Convention’s Article 25. In addi-
tion, it rejected the GOE request concerning the need for complementary agree-
ments to create ICSID’s jurisdiction. 
From the above case, the Egyptian legislator adopted a legislative change to avoid 
the wide interpretation of the unilateral consent under Article 8 of the Law No. 43 
of 1974. The amendment required the conclusion of an additional subsequent 
agreement in order to establish the ICSID jurisdiction. By reviewing the wording of 
the dispute settlement article in the initial IGIL, two changes would be recognized. 
First, the wording of the Article adopted an optional sense for the dispute settle-
ment mechanisms instead of the former mandatory tone. Second, the Law explicitly 
required an independent bilateral agreement between the investor and Egypt in or-
der to qualify an investment law-related dispute to the ICSID. In absence of such 
agreement, the dispute cannot be automatically invoked at ICSID. 
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Afterwards, and in a subsequent legislative amendment, the Law No. 17 of 2015 
adopted a vaguer wording in connection to the investor-state dispute settlement ar-
ticle. The aim was to avoid any kind of ICSID’s jurisdiction reference in the domes-
tic law. This limited the Tribunal’s powers to extend their jurisdictions through 
broadly interpreting the domestic law to locate any form of unilateral consents. As 
per the legislative amendment, the new Article 7 provides investors with the right to 
settle disputes as per the agreement with the State or in accordance with the Arbi-
tration Law No. 27 of 1994. It is clearly the case that the new Article is vaguer and 
does not explicitly refer to ICSID avoiding any broad interpretations of unilateral 
consent. 
 Merits 
Another important conclusion regarding the Egyptian policymakers understanding 
of their international obligations is evident in the Tribunal’s acknowledgement of 
the lawful expropriation implemented by the GOE in order to serve the public pur-
pose of protecting the antiques. This verifies the alignment of the GOE under-
standing of its right to regulate private property after considering the protections 
and obligation of interacting with foreign investors. On the other hand, the Tribu-
nal rejected the Egyptian understandings in connection to the constitution of the 
project’s cancellation of an “expropriation” under the Egyptian and international laws. 
For the Tribunal, the Egyptian narrow understanding of the “expropriation” concept 
as only valid over real property was invalid. The Tribunal ruled the protection 
against expropriation under the international law extends to interests and contractu-
al rights. Thus, the compensation awarded to SPP was in return for the expropriat-
ed shareholding in the EDTC and not for the land or the usufruct rights.  
Second, the Tribunal rejected the Egyptian understanding regarding the Law No. 43 
of 1974 guarantees only against nationalization and confiscations and not expropria-
tion. In this regard, the Tribunal referred to the Constitution of 1971 and the do-
mestic Law governing Antiques where the legislator refers to the withdrawal of 
lands as an expropriation. The narrow definition of the confiscation and nationali-
zation were also deemed invalid and the project cancellation was considered an ex-
propriation. Third, the Tribunal held the Egyptian officials offer to proceed with 
the investment projects as invalid since all proofs (GOE hostile actions) verified the 
impossibility to execute such investments. This entailed the officials lack of inten-
tion to allow the SPP to proceed with its investments in Egypt. 
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- Wena Hotels Limited v. Egypt 
The second case under examination within the final awards section is the Wena Ho-
tels Limited v. Arab Republic of Egypt1101. In the international arbitration prece-
dence, the Wena case features the application of the FET and full protection and 
security. The analysis would not extend to the Tribunal’s ruling on the compensa-
tion. 
 Facts 
WENA Hotels Limited, (Wena) a UK company, was engaged with the Egyptian 
Hotels Company (EHC) a public-sector entity under the control of the Tourism 
Public Sector Authority in two contractual agreements1102. The first agreement was 
the Luxor Hotel “lease and development agreement” for a 21.5 year’ period, while the 
second (identical agreement to the first agreement) was for 25 years and connected 
to the Cairo’s El Nile Hotel. Both agreements granted Wena the right to operate 
and manage the contract subjects aiming at raising the efficiency and quality stand-
ards including the upgrading of the hotels as per the Egyptian Ministry of Tourism 
specifications1103.  
The dispute erupted directly after the conclusion of the agreements based on 
Wena’s claims that the subject hotels were far below that provided in the lease 
agreement1104. On the other side, EHC claimed Wena’s failure to pay the due rents, 
forced the EHC to liquidate Wena’s performance security amount. After several un-
successful meetings to settle the dispute between EHC and Wena involving the 
Minister of Tourism, the EHC Board Chairman issued the Decree No. 215 of 1991 
on March 27th to seize the two hotels by force1105. The actual exercise of the repos-
session process was on April 1st. 
The General Prosecutor in January 1992 ruled the seizure measures as illegal, and 
entitled Wena to repossess the hotels. Regardless of the entitlement, the Ministry of 
Tourism preserved its stance against Wena and delayed the return of the hotels1106. 
In addition, the returned Nile Hotel was in a bad status after EHC auctioned the 
hotel’s furniture and fixtures. Although Wena’s repossession of the Luxor Hotel 
was executed in April 1992, still the same conditions in the first hotel applied in the 
 
1101 ICSID, International Arbitration of Registration Date 7/31/1998. 
1102 Yannaca-Small 2005 107. 
1103 See Para. 17 of the Award of the ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4. 
1104 See Para. 19 of the Award of the ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4. 
1105 See Para. 29 of the Award of the ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4. 
1106 See Para. 54 of the Award of the ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4. 
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second. The domestic arbitration filings ruled a compensation for Wena, before its 
later nullification by the Cairo Court of Appeal. Hence, Wena initiated a claim in 
ICSID arbitration under the Egypt-UK BIT1107. Wena’s two claims were the Egyp-
tian authorities’ unlawful expropriation of the two hotels, besides, the violation of 
the BIT obligations of FET and “full protection and security”1108. 
 Respondent’s claims 
 Jurisdiction 
Egypt filed three claims against the jurisdiction of the ICSID over the dispute. First, 
the Egyptian authorities raised the lack of agreement to arbitrate with Wena by 
deeming it treated as an Egyptian company. Second, the lack of any legal dispute 
between Egypt and Wena. Third, Egypt confronted Wena’s undertaking of an “in-
vestment” in Egypt since the claim was filed in an early phase prior to directing any 
actual flows to Egypt (this claim was later withdrawn). 
 Merits 
With the two claims of Wena regarding the expropriation and the breach of the 
FET principle under the UK-Egypt BIT, Egypt denied its involvement in the pro-
cess of repossessing the previously handed hotels of Luxor and the Nile. It negated 
any kind of awareness with EHC’s interest to illegally seize the two hotels. The sec-
ond defence (more of a jurisdictional nature) was the time barring of Wena’s claims 
due to filing it after the elapse of the Egyptian Civil Law statute of limitation. The 
third defence was the ephemeral nature of the intervention. In other words, the in-
tervention did not constitute an act of expropriation especially with the afterwards 
return of the hotels to Wena possession. 
 Tribunal’s ruling 
 Jurisdiction 
The Tribunal responded to the two jurisdictional objections. It rejected the Egyp-
tian claims and upheld its jurisdiction to decide on Wena’s claims. In connection to 
the first contention by the Egyptian authorities, the Tribunal ruled Wena cannot be 
deemed an Egyptian company for the purposes of applying the UK-Egypt BIT. Ac-
cordingly, the Tribunal ruled Wena was a British company. In regard to the pres-
ence of a legal dispute, the Tribunal ruled Wena’s claims were sufficient to identify a 
 
1107 See Para. 62 of the Award of the ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4. 
1108 See Para. 80 of the Award of the ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4. 
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prima facie legal dispute between Wena and Egypt falling within the scope of a 
State-investor dispute. 
The Tribunal disagreed with the time barring claim filed by the Egyptian side. For 
the Tribunal, Article 42(1) of the ICSID Convention entitled the Tribunal to apply 
the domestic law and “the international law as may be applicable”. By referring to the 
Egyptian Civil Law as reference for the domestic law, the Tribunal recognized the 
elapse of the statute of limitation. The Tribunal considered such strict enforcement 
of the three years limitation would conflict with the general rule concerning the 
prevalence of the international law norms and precedence over the domestic law ar-
ticles in cases of conflict. Accordingly, the Tribunal followed the international prec-
edence and rejected the time barring jurisdictional claim. 
 Merits 
The Tribunal ruled in favour of Wena’s claims of violating the FET concept and re-
jected the defences of the Egyptian authorities1109. It asserted the direct link between 
the State of Egypt and the repossession process triggering the violation of the BIT. 
The Tribunal provided six evidences for the link. First, the Egyptian GOE officials’ 
other than the EHC ones had all the opportunities to realize the measures imple-
mented by EHC and still refrained from intervening to settle the escalating situa-
tion. Second, the police reports concerning the damages constituted clear evidence 
of the Egyptian police’s failure to protect Wena’s investments.  
Third, the hotels stayed for nearly one year under the control of the EHC with no 
attempts to restore Wena’s possession over the hotels. Fourth, the Egyptian author-
ities failed to avoid the physical damages to the two hotels prior to returning them 
to Wena’s control. The hotels were returned in an operational state different than 
the one as before exercising the seizures. Fifthly, the EHC officials involved in this 
dispute were promoted and never sanctioned or penalized for their activities. This 
signals the authorities approval of their adopted measures. Finally, no compensation 
was communicated to Wena to cover its incurred losses. 
The filing of claims and processing of the case held Egypt as violating its obliga-
tions under the Egypt-UK BIT due to its non-implementation of all the necessary 
measures to assure the foreign investor’s enjoyment of security and protection. The 
facts highlighted the GOE’s prior knowledge of the EHC willingness to seize the 
hotels. In addition to the lack of the initial GOE’s physical protection, the Minister 
 
1109 See Para. 82 of the Award of the ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4. 
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of Tourism (i) refrained from terminating the illegal act by returning the hotels to 
Wena in a timely manner, (ii) did not compensate Wena for any damages and (iii) 
did not prosecute the EHC officials, were all proofs entitling the Tribunal to hold 
Egypt liable for its violation of the FET and the full protection and security1110. 
Regarding the second claim from Wena’s side concerning the Egyptian authorities’ 
expropriation of its private property without communicating a prompt effective and 
adequate compensation, the Tribunal ruled again in favour of Wena1111. The Tribu-
nal justified the prevalence of expropriation since the Egyptian authorities’ actions 
deprived Wena of its fundamental right to own the hotels. Examples of the depriva-
tion were the seizure of the hotel, for a period exceeding one year and finally a re-
turn of the hotels to Wena in a grave status lacking fixtures and furniture.  
In the same context, the Tribunal rejected the authorities claim that the measures 
were “ephemeral” not constituting expropriation. The rejection prescribed that a one-
year full and effective control of EHC over the hotels exceeds the notion of “ephem-
eral” intervention in the use and enjoyment of property. The second part of the 
same claim was more focused on the communication of the prompt, effective and 
adequate compensation1112. The authorities did not indemnify Wena for the losses it 
incurred in consequence to the interventions of EHC precluding Wena from pos-
sessing the hotels and enjoying their benefits. 
 Case analysis 
 Jurisdiction 
The Tribunal ruled in favour of its jurisdiction against the objections of the Egyp-
tian side. The claims of Egypt having a jurisdictional nature were three. First, the 
nationality of Wena as a British or an Egyptian entity. In this regard, the Tribunal 
disregarded the claims of Egypt and considered Wena a British company for the 
purposes of applying the UK-Egypt BIT. Such decision highlighted the Egyptian 
side’s lack of understanding for the definition of a national within the scope of 
BITs. 
The second contention of ICSID’s jurisdiction was the lack of a legal dispute. The 
Tribunal managed to identify from the initially submitted documents a set of prima 
facie disputes to which it may extend its jurisdiction. Finally, in regard to the time 
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barring, the Egyptian side stressed the importance of sticking to the Egyptian Civil 
Law. For Egypt, being the Contracting State, the Egyptian Law should be the law 
applicable to the dispute. However, the Tribunal rejected this claim. The justifica-
tion was the domestic law’s violation of an international law precedence and norm. 
Accordingly, the Tribunal upheld the international norm over the domestic law. 
 Merits 
The case of Wena Hotels Limited v. Egypt preserves its position as a remarkable 
case in applying the BIT obligations connected to FET, full protection and security, 
and expropriation. The lack of definition for FET as briefly introduced in the theo-
retical framework chapter did not bar the Tribunal from evidencing and ruling the 
measures of EHC constituting a violation to it. Unfairness can be simply evident in 
the treatment accorded to Wena. The justifications provided above by the Tribunal 
are explicit proofs of unfairness. In connection to the full protection and security, 
the process or seizing the hotels from Wena’s possession is a clear violation. The 
Tribunal rejected the defences provided by the Egyptian side. Theref were many ev-
idence proving the Egyptian side’s awareness and connection to the illegal seizure 
of the hotels from Wena.  
Finally, in relation to expropriation, the seizure of the property for such lone period 
amounting to a year negatively influencing Wena’s opportunity to benefit from the 
hotels is an obvious example of expropriation. The one-year period of seizure was a 
sufficient evidence for the Tribunal to reject the defence concerning the “ephemeral” 
nature of the intervention as not amounting to an “expropriation”. The Egyptian au-
thorities’ denial of wrong-doing resulted in the non-communication of the necessary 
compensation to cover for the losses incurred by Wena in consequence to the sei-
zure, physical damage and lost commercial opportunity. 
Of the main insights connected to the Wena v. Egypt case include; first, Egypt was 
held liable for the wrong-doing represented in a set of actions and not only in legis-
lative interventions or changes in the domestic law resulting in breaches to the BIT. 
In other words, the theoratical framework represented in the Law No. 43 of 1974 
guaranteed protection against expropriation. However, the actual practice of the 
Egyptian authorities was ruled amounting to an “expropriation” in violation to the 
UK-Egypt BIT. Secondly, the Tribunal held Egypt liable for its passiveness and not 
its active action. In case of an earlier intervention by the Egyptian authorities to 
erase the damaging effects of the illegal seizure, Egypt could have been in a better 
position. Conversely, the passiveness of Egypt activity allowed the long seizure in-
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creasing the possibilities of deeming the intervention as an “expropriation”. Finally, 
the follow-up actions by the Egyptian authorities played a major role in driving the 
Tribunal to reach its final ruling. The complimentary actions highlighted the inten-
tions of the Egyptian authorities and consolidated Egypt’s liability. 
(B) Amicable Settlement 
The second subsection in the Egypt ICSID Tribunal part addresses the cases where 
the investors and Egypt resorted to settling it amicably. As introduced above, the 
efforts of amicable settlement intensified after the January 2011 revolution to miti-
gate the obvious increase in filed claims. Moreover, to enhance the reputation of 
Egypt as an investment destination especially with the economy’s desperate need 
for investment inflows to amplify job creation and assist the economy to restore the 
pre-January 2011 economic performance. Within the last three years, the Egyptian 
GOE through the specialized ministerial committee reached successfully an amica-
ble settlement in eleven disputes, ten of them were registered after the January 2011 
uprising. On the pending cases side, Egypt is still a respondent in seven cases all 
filed after January 2011.  
The fifteen cases filed against Egypt in ICSID after the January 2011 uprising were 
mostly incorporated upon violating the expropriation principle in the BITs. Of 
these claims settled amicably and to be considered for further investigation would 
be the Hussein Sajwani case of DAMAC and Arcelor Mittal due to the legislative 
changes accompanying their settlement. 
- Hussain Sajwani, Damac Park Avenue for Real Estate Devel-
opment S.A.E., and Damac Gamsha Bay for Development 
S.A.E. v. Egypt 
 Facts 
The dispute registered in June 2011 by the Emirati Hussain Sajwani against Egypt 
was connected to his real estate project in the field of tourism development1113. The 
dispute erupted after convicting the Emirati investor and sentencing him to five 
years in jail. The revolutionary wave of January 2011 opened the door for investigat-
ing the land awarding contracts concluded by Egyptian ministers in the recent years 
preceding the uprising. These contracts were all examined under accusations of 
fraud and corruption. One of these cases was the one in connection to the Gamsha 
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Bay Project where the Minister of Tourism granted the Emirati investor the dispute 
subject land to develop a luxurious compound. The claim filed by the Emirati inves-
tor invoked protection under the Egypt-UAE BIT1114. The claims submitted were all 
associated with the investigation and prosecution processes as damaging the inves-
tor and ruining his investments in Egypt and the Gulf area1115. 
 Case analysis 
With the calmness of the uprising, the GOE attempted to restore investments. The 
first mechanism was through introducing a legislative amendment through the Law 
No. 4 of 2012. The Law established a dispute settlement committee to review the 
pending investment disputes aiming to finalize an out of court settlement binding 
on Egypt and the investor. In addition, the Law allowed reconciliations with inves-
tors convicted in criminal cases related to public interest as long as before the ver-
dict rendered is not final. The conditions for reconciliation include refunding the 
subject of the crimes from funds, movables, lands or immovable property or its 
equivalent in case of refund impossibility. 
One of the earliest cases benefiting from the above provided legislative amendment 
was the Hussain Sajwani case. The Egyptian officials arranged several negotiation 
rounds with the representatives of the investor and concluded a settlement in May 
20131116. The investor discontinued the proceedings. The details of such settlement 
were never published. As part of the dispute settlement agreed, the investor filed a 
criminal reconciliation request to the competent authorities seeking the avoidance 
of spending the five years in jail sentence. 
- ArcelorMittal S.A. v. Egypt 
 Facts 
The Luxemburg ArcelorMittal S.A. bided for a license to construct a steel plant in 
Egypt in 20081117. After clinching the license in February 2008, ArcelorMittal post-
poned the launch of the plant construction process due to the financial crisis of the 
late 2000s claiming it impacted the demand for steel. With an initial timeline of pro-
duction start in 2009, the Industrial Development Authority in June 2010 requested 
the steel producer to begin the execution of actual steps reflecting their commit-
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ment in retaining the awarded license1118. The data available provide no further de-
tails regarding the exact timing of terminating the awarded license. However, the 
claim filed with ICSID demanded compensation for losses arising from the license 
and land withdrawal by the Egyptian authorities1119. The claim1120 was registered in 
December 2015 invoking protection under the Luxemburg-Egypt BIT. 
 Case analysis 
Continuing its stance in settling investment disputes out-of-court, the GOE intro-
duced another legislative amendment improving the out-of-court dispute settlement 
mechanism1121. The new regime depended on the compromise reached between the 
two counterparts1122. It was composed of specialized ministerial committees vested 
with the full authority to examine the disputes and seek their resolve or settlement 
with the investor prior to the latter’s filing of an arbitration claim in ICSID. The 
committee was under obligation to prepare reports regarding the examined disputes 
and present them to the Council of Ministers for approval. The Council’s approval 
of the final settlement between the ministerial committee and the investor bound 
both the State and the investor. In the ArcelorMittal case, the investor benefited 
from the ministerial committee in reaching the final out-of-court settlement. No de-
tails were provided regarding the agreement terms. Obviously, the discontinuation 
of proceedings in ICSID was a direct outcome for such settlement1123. 
V.A.4 Conclusion 
The analysis regarding the Egyptian engagement in ICSID arbitration can be a 
source of long analysis. To start with this analysis, it is worth categorizing the cases 
registered based on their outcomes. From the 29 cases, eight of the cases witnessed 
the Tribunal rendering an arbitral award. Four of these final awards held Egypt lia-
ble, while the other four dismissed the claims of the foreign investors. Going back 
to the 29 cases, four of them were dismissed for the Tribunal’s failure to extend its 
jurisdiction over the dispute. Moreover, eleven of the registered claims were settled 
amicably between the Egyptian authorities and the foreign investors. Finally, there 
are seven cases still pending for a final award or the amicable settlement. 
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The long history of Egypt in the ICSID puts it in a different category compared to 
Jordan and Morocco. However, there are three basic reasons for such long interac-
tion between ICSID and Egypt when compared to the other country studies. First, 
the political instability experienced in Egypt since 2011 and until nearly 2014. This 
period the legislative and executive chaos costed the Egyptian economy its credibil-
ity and reputation as an investment destination. The chaos encouraged the foreign 
investors to register their arbitration claims in order to preserve their rights taking 
into account the damaging uncertainty.  
Second, with the higher inflows of FDI to Egypt, the higher the probabilities of 
dispute between the foreign investors and the Egyptian authorities. This allows 
Egypt to suffer more registered claims due to its hosting of more FDI when com-
pared to Jordan and Morocco. Thirdly, and although 17 claims were registered after 
2011, having 11 claims registered before reflects a worrying position for Egypt in 
comparison to Jordan and Morocco. The high number of registered claims verifies 
the lack of Egyptian officials understanding to Egypt’s obligations under the BITs. 
This triggered holding Egypt liable in four of the eleven cases filed prior to the Jan-
uary 2011 uprising.  
In this regard, it is important to refer to the Egyptian authorities’ legislative efforts 
to ease the process of settling investment disputes out of court and out of interna-
tional arbitration. This mechanism depending on the exchange of compromises al-
lowed the GOE to settle amicably a set of disputes allowing Egypt to restore its 
credibility and reputation as an investment destination upholding its international 
obligations in connection to the protection of foreign investors. 
The 29 cases appear to cover different scopes and natures of contracts. It cannot be 
restricted to infrastructure development contracts as in cases of Jordan and Moroc-
co. The Egyptian authorities seem at different economic sectors inclined to non-
respecting their international obligations under BITs. However, from the eleven 
disputes registered prior to January 2011, four were related to the Tourism industry 
either in managing and operating hotels or in the development and construction of 
touristic resorts. This observation confirms the important role the tourism industry 
played in the Egyptian economic structure until 2011. 
From the case examined throughout the section of Egypt in chapter V, a set of 
conclusions can be deduced. First, the Egyptian officials have a deficient knowledge 
of Egypt’s obligations under the BITs, especially when compared to Jordan and 
Morocco. This appears in defence claims provided to the Tribunal’s, which usually 
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adopt narrow definitions for the international investment law obligations as “expro-
priation” and the FET. In turn, this results in holding Egypt liable to compensate the 
investors in the two above reviewed cases. Second, the Egyptian violations of the 
BITs were not only an outcome of legislative changes. The state actions were on 
their own sufficient to breach the international obligations. This was witnessed in 
incidents when the Egyptian authorities unilaterally terminated contracts, seized 
property or even revoked licenses or lands.  
Third, the significant increase in the number of filed arbitration claims in ICSID 
against Egypt and specifically after the uprising of 2011 encouraged the Egyptian 
legislator to intervene and try to stem the number of ICSID filed claims against 
Egypt. In this regard, it is important to note the role of the filed international arbi-
tration claims in pushing the Egyptian legislator to adopt a different policy seeking 
the resolution and settlement of state-investor disputes amicably prior to their filing 
in international arbitration. The change in the policy was evident in the legislative 
amendment of the IGIL by the Law No. 17 of 2015. 
V.B Jordan ICSID Cases 
V.B.1 Introduction 
After the introduction of the Jordanian investment legal framework in the chapter 
IV, chapter V intends to examine the practical compliance of the State of Jordan 
with its international investment law obligations from an adjudication side. The in-
ternational obligations under investigation in this chapter are the ones introduced 
within chapter II.F covering the BIT substantive protections. The analysis within 
this chapter assists in fulfilling two aims. First, it highlights the reasoning behind the 
number of disputes filed against Jordan in ICSID. Second, it assists in understand-
ing the position taken by the Jordanian side when responding to the claims of vio-
lating the international investment law principles filed before ICSID.  
Chapter V will be split into two main sections. Section 2 addresses numerically and 
factually the disputes filed against Jordan in ICSID arbitration. Section 3 is dealing 
with the legal analysis of Jordan’s ICSID disputes is split into two sub-sections. 
First, an analysis of two ICSID disputes where a final award was rendered and sec-
ond, an analysis of two ICSID disputes settled amicably. The dispute analysis in-
cludes; a brief factual background for the filed claim, an overview of the respond-
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ent’s claims, an overview of the tribunal’s ruling and the final concluding legal re-
marks concerning the dispute overall. 
V.B.2 Jordan in International Arbitration 
As provided in the preceding legal chapter, Jordan has ratified in 1972 the Washing-
ton Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Na-
tionals of Other States, while in 1980 it ratified the New York Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards. The effectively in force 45 Jor-
danian BITs all encompass international arbitration and dispute settlement clauses. 
The Investment Law No. 16 of 1995 guaranteed access to ICSID for dispute set-
tlement amicably, conciliatorily or through arbitration1124. 
The ICSID cases registered against the Kingdom of Jordan until 2017 are eight cas-
es. The first case was registered in 2002 and the last was in 2015. The higher num-
ber and the shorter time frame of dispute registration when compared to Morocco 
reflects the wider conflict arising between Jordan as a host state and the foreign in-
vestors. Conversely, Jordan was never held liable to compensate any foreign inves-
tor, which is a position similar to that of Morocco. The non-compensation does not 
acquit the Jordanian authorities from the possibility of breaching the BIT obliga-
tions in any instance. The eight cases filed against the Hashemite Kingdom of Jor-
dan include the JacobsGibb Limited (ARB/02/12) - Salini Costruttori S.p.A and 
Italistrade S.p.A (ARB/02/13) - Trans-Global Petroleum, Inc (ARB/07/25) - ATA 
Construction, Industrial and Trading Company (ARB/08/2) - International Com-
pany for Railway Systems (ICRS) (ARB/09/13) - Orange SA (ARB/15/10) - Ali 
Alyafei (ARB/15/24). From the eight cases, a final award was rendered in only the 
ATA Construction case and the Salini Costruttori. Five cases were settled amicably 
and the case of Al-Ghanim is still pending. 
The higher number of cases filed signals a discrepancy in treating foreign investor 
by the Jordanian authorities when compared to Morocco. In addition, the eight cas-
es were registered during the rule of the current King Abdullah who rose to power 
by 1999. This notes another difference when compared to Morocco having its most 
recent claim filed in 2000. The rise in the registered cases lowers the outcomes of 
the GOJ efforts to promote Jordan as a favourable investment destination in the 
Middle East. This may sound more reasonable only when the host state is held lia-
ble for violating its BIT obligations. However, the reputational damage from the 
 
1124 Rey M. 2013 106 
  250  
registration of ICSID claims is undeniable. By the initial review, Jordan was held li-
able in only the ATA Construction case. In the seven other cases, the dispute was 
settled amicably or denied by the ICSID Tribunal. At this point Jordanian authori-
ties seem in a better reputational position compared to Egypt in regard to respect-
ing BIT obligations. Therefore, the negative impact of the cases registration is min-
imal since only one arbitral award was rendered holding Jordan liable for BIT viola-
tion. 
V.B.3 Jordan ICSID Disputes 
In this section, the research approaches closely the facts and flow of proceedings 
associated with the only three cases registered in ICSID against Jordan. For each of 
the cases, a brief overview is provided for the background facts. The second part 
addresses the respondent state’s claims on the jurisdiction and the merits within the 
scope of the international investment law. The third and last part of the section ex-
amines the arbitration Tribunal’s decision. The outcome of the filed case either veri-
fies the understanding and the position of the respondent state or conflicts it to 
trigger in certain situation a liability over the respondent. It is worth mentioning that 
the publicly available material differs on case by case basis. This depends upon the 
agreement of the dispute parties to share the arbitral awards or the final agreement 
in case of amicable settlement. 
(A) Final Awards 
- ATA Construction, Industrial and Trading Company v. Jor-
dan 
The only case against Jordan where the Tribunal successfully rendered a final award 
was the ATA Construction, Industrial and Trading v. Hashemite Kingdom of Jor-
dan1125. 
 Facts 
The claim was filed in ICSID on January 14th 2008. In the claim, ATA Construc-
tion, Industrial and Trading Company (ATA) alleged that the Jordanian State had 
violated its obligations prescribed under the Turkey-Jordan BIT. The dispute was 
connected to a FIDIC Contract upon which the claimant was responsible for exe-
cuting a dam construction project in favour of the Jordanian Arab Potash Company 
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(APC). With the completion of the construction, the dike was submitted to the 
beneficiary entity, that commenced filling it with water.  
During this process, the dike partly collapsed1126. This was the starting point for the 
claim since both parties began arguing about the responsibility for such collapse. 
The Jordanian entity initiated arbitration proceedings against the claimant in the 
FIDIC Arbitration Tribunal as per Article 67 of the contract. The FIDIC Arbitra-
tion Tribunal dismissed the claims of APC and ruled that no responsibility shall fall 
on the claimant. The Turkish entity was awarded a $6 million compensation1127. This 
award was later annulled by the domestic Jordanian Court of Appeal before the 
Court of Cassation upheld the ruling. The Court of Cassation’s ruling upholding the 
annulment of the FIDIC Arbitration Tribunal was the dispute leading ATA to file 
its case in ICSID. 
 Respondent’s claims 
 Jurisdiction 
The ICSID Tribunal started investigating the claims by reviewing its jurisdiction 
over this dispute. Jordan objected such jurisdiction under the ratione temporis1128. 
The ratione temporis notion refers to the principle of prospective enforcement of 
legislations. In the current case, the first jurisdiction challenge by GOJ was the Tur-
key-Jordan BIT entrance into force only in 2006, while the disputes arising in con-
nection to annulling the FIDIC Arbitration Tribunal award were initiated only in 
the year 2003. Second, there was no “investment existing”1129 to which the Turkey-
Jordan applies since the contract was fully executed before the BIT’s entry into 
force. 
 Merits 
On the merits, the GOJ claims can be provided in four points1130. First, the rulings 
of the Jordanian courts are erroneous since in line with Jordan’s domestic legal pro-
cedures, which both parties acknowledged, which was enforced in a fair and equita-
ble manner. Second, the failure of ATA to identify the misapplication of the Jorda-
nian Arbitration Law amounting to a violation of the Turkey-Jordan BIT. Third, 
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1128 See Para. 63 of the Award of the ICSID Case No. ARB/08/2. 
1129 See Para. 66 of the Award of the ICSID Case No. ARB/08/2. 
1130 See Para. 84 of the Award of the ICSID Case No. ARB/08/2. 
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ATA’s failure to prove both the procedural and substantive denial of justice. Finally, 
ATA’s failure to signal any unlawful expropriation. 
 Tribunal’s ruling 
 Jurisdiction 
From a jurisdictional side, the Tribunal ruled it extension of jurisdiction over the 
ATA’s claims related to the Jordanian Court of Cassation ruling extinguishing the 
Arbitration Agreement in the FIDIC Contract between the ATA and the APC1131. 
Pursuant to Article 9(1) of the Turkey-Jordan BIT read as follows: “[…] investments 
existing at the time of entry into force […]”, the jurisdiction would extend only if the dis-
pute arose after the Turkey-Jordan BIT entered into force in January 2006. The Tri-
bunal ruled the Court of Cassation ruling of 2007 raised a new dispute, to which the 
Turkey-Jordan BIT apply since it was established after the treaty entrance into force 
in 2006. 
The ruling of the Court of Cassation annulling the Final Award of the FIDIC Arbi-
tration Tribunal, would entitle ATA to file a new arbitration claim under the New 
York Convention and the Jordanian Law. However, the promulgation of the new 
Jordanian Arbitration Law No. 31 of 2001 and specifically Article 51 deemed a 
Court of Cassation’s ruling annulling a final arbitration award was in itself an auto-
matic extinguisher for the right to arbitrate1132. Accordingly, the ruling of the Court 
of Cassation in 2007 extinguished ATA’s right to arbitrate since the Arbitration 
Agreement in the FIDIC Contract was extinguished. The Tribunal deemed the ex-
tinguished right to arbitrate fitting within the definition of an “investment” under Ar-
ticle 1(2)(a)(ii)1133. Based on this, the Tribunal revisited the definition of “investment” 
and deemed the right to arbitrate a “right having a financial value associated with an invest-
ment”. 
 Merits 
The second phase after ruling on jurisdiction was the Tribunal’s role to decide on 
the merits. For the Tribunal, the automatic extinguishment of the arbitration 
agreement by nullifying the final award was considered a violation of the FET stipu-
lated in the preamble of the Turkey-Jordan BIT and Article 2(2) of it1134. The Tribu-
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nal ruled the nullification of the Arbitration Agreement concluded in 1998 as part of 
the FIDIC Contract was a retrospective enforcement of Article 51 of the Jordanian 
Arbitration Law provision promulgated only in 20011135. The Tribunal expressed its 
willingness to dismiss the ATA’s claims in case the Jordanian Court of Cassation 
applied the extinguishment of the right to arbitrate and the arbitration agreement 
prospectively and not retroactively1136. 
The third phase is deciding on the appropriate remedy and relief after holding Jor-
dan liable for violating the BIT. The awarded reliefs granted by the Tribunal aimed 
to; first, eliminate the effects of extinguishing the claimant’s right to arbitrate allow-
ing the latter full access to the Arbitration Agreement of 1998. Second, the termina-
tion of all the judicial proceedings in Jordanian courts connected to the dike dis-
pute. 
 Case analysis 
The analysis of the ATA case can be split into two discussions. The first examines 
the Jordanian understanding of the notions under the disputed contract and the 
BIT. The second investigates the role of the Tribunal in setting the precedence of 
the judicial restitution. 
 Jordan’s position 
The Jordanian understanding of the BIT notions and obligations was denied by the 
Tribunal in more than situation. First, the ratione temporis claims of the GOJ were 
rejected since the claimant’s dispute in connection to the extinguishment of the 
right to arbitrate (Court of Cassation ruling in 2007) was after the Turkey-Jordan 
BIT entered into force in 2006. Second, in regard to the existence of an “investment”, 
the right to arbitrate was deemed as an “investment” and it existed at the date the 
Turkey-Jordan BIT entered into force and until it was extinguished by the Court of 
Cassation ruling in 2007. 
On the merits side, the four claims of the GOJ reflect a conflict in understanding 
when reviewed in comparison to the Tribunal’s award. To start with the erroneous 
application of the domestic law, the Tribunal ruled the Article 51 of the Jordanian 
Arbitration Law is violating the Turkey-Jordan BIT, regardless of the parties’ initial 
acknowledgment of the Jordanian legal system prior to contract conclusion in 1998 
(the new Law was promulgated in 2001). Second, the Tribunal managed to identify 
 
1135 See Para. 129 of the Award of the ICSID Case No. ARB/08/2. 
1136 Rey M. 2013 106 
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the misapplication of the Jordanian Arbitration Law, when it recognized the extin-
guishment of the Arbitration Agreement in the FIDIC Contract through the Court 
of Cassation ruling in 2007.  
Thirdly, the Tribunal ruled the automatic extinguishment of the right to arbitrate 
was a violation of the FET obligation and the legitimate expectations of the ATA as 
a party to the Arbitration Agreement in the FIDIC Contract. The precedence held 
Jordan liable for the retroactivity of its legislation. This retroactivity was considered 
a violation to the general principles of justice and the legitimate reliance on the Ar-
bitration Agreement in the FIDIC Contract. Thus, the Tribunal was clear in accept-
ing only the prospective application of the Jordanian Arbitration Law. Finally, it 
amounted the extinguishment of the right to arbitrate as a retroactive deprivation of 
the ATA from a valuable asset. Therefore, the final ruling held the extinguishment 
of the Arbitration Agreement in the FIDIC Contract as a violation for the Turkey-
Jordan BIT. 
 Precedence 
From the ATA case, the ICSID Tribunal has set a significant precedent in two in-
stances. First, its consideration of the right to arbitrate as an “asset” and an “invest-
ment” in itself. The initial dispute connected to the arbitration rights extinguished 
fell within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. This is another incident where the Tribunal 
adopts a broad definition of an “investment” in a manner unfavourable for the Re-
spondent State. 
The second instance of precedent was the provision of judicial restitution as a mat-
ter of compensation. This was the case when the Tribunal directed the prompt un-
conditional termination of proceedings in front of Jordanian courts, while revalidat-
ing the Arbitration Agreement in the FIDIC Contract. This order granted the 
claimants the right to arbitrate under the parties’ arbitration agreement. Hence, the 
award returned the arbitration agreement into effect. This revival represents a situa-
tion of juridical restitution1137. 
- Salini Costruttori S.p.A and Italstrade S.p.A v. Jordan 
The only dispute filed against Jordan, where the Tribunal dismissed the claimant’s 
request due to lacking jurisdiction was the one registered by the joint venture of 
Salini Costruttori S.p.A and Italstarde S.p.A (JV)1138. 
 
1137 Sabahi 2011 78 
1138 ICSID, International Arbitration of Registration Date 7/11/2002 
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 Facts 
The registration of the arbitration claims dated to August 20021139. The dispute was 
in connection to the “Construction of the Karamah Dam Project” invoking the Italy-
Jordan BIT. The construction contract of 1993 was concluded between the Jordani-
an Valley Authority and the JV1140. As per the contractual agreement, and specifical-
ly the dispute settlement Clause 67.3, any proceedings of settlement in association 
with the contract could be initiated only by the completion of the contractual work. 
The contracted construction work was completed by October 1997. The presence 
of amounts due for the JV and the eruption of contractual disputes motivated the 
JV to communicate a letter to the Minister of Water and Irrigation with the unde-
cided issues1141. The failure of the amicable settlement and the presence of condi-
tional arbitration encouraged Dr. Salini to request an arbitration settlement during 
his often visits to Jordan when meeting officials1142. The requests were raised to the 
highest rank of officials in both states. The dispute was listed over the meeting’s 
agenda of the Italian delegation headed by the Italian Prime Minister Massimo 
d’Alema who visited Amman officially in February 20001143. The outcome of this 
meeting was still disputed between both the JV and the GOJ. 
The continuous rejections from the GOJ to revert the JV’s claims to arbitration ra-
ther than Jordanian judiciary forced the JV to file their claims in ICSID1144. The JV 
claimed the GOJ’s restriction from accessing international arbitration constituted a 
violation of the FET principle guaranteed under the Italy-Jordan BIT. For them, the 
GOJ’s failed to comply with its obligation of preserving a legal framework for in-
vestors to adhere to in good faith. 
 Respondent’s claims 
 Jurisdiction 
Jordan’s objections to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction cane be provided in five points. 
First, establishing the ICSID jurisdiction as per Article 9(2) of the Italy-Jordan BIT, 
which excludes the ICSID’s jurisdiction. Jordan deemed the construction project 
 
1139 See Para. 1 of the Award of the ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13.  
1140 See Para. 52 of the Award of the ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13 
1141 See Para. 53 of the Award of the ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13 
1142 See Para. 54 of the Award of the ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13. 
1143 See Para. 59 of the Award of the ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13. 
1144 See Para. 69 of the Award of the ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13. 
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met the definition of an “investment”. Accordingly, the construction contract became 
an “investment agreement” under Article 9(2) of the Italy-Jordan BIT1145. This was sup-
plemented by the understanding that the Jordan Valley Authority was a public entity 
and not the State of Jordan itself. This entailed the under-consideration disputes 
should be settled as per the Clause 67 of the construction contract (the “investment 
agreement”). In other words, it is obvious that investment agreements are excluded 
from the scope of the ICSID. 
The second objection was the absence of an “Umbrella Clause” for the construction 
contract’s breaches to qualify as violations to the Italy-Jordan BIT1146. The third ob-
jection was connected to the ratione temporis. For Jordan, no violations for the BIT 
were committed after the Italy-Jordan BIT entered into force1147. The fourth objec-
tion stressed the lack of the written consent as per Article 25(1) of the ICSID Con-
vention. In case of considering the project as an “investment”, the jurisdiction of the 
ICSID over the dispute required the presence of the dispute parties’ written con-
sents as a pre-requisite for jurisdiction. This written consent was not available in 
case of Jordan whether in regard to the ICSID or even any other form of arbitra-
tion.  
The fifth objection of jurisdiction appeared in connection to the JV’s plan to benefit 
from the MFN clause of the Italy-Jordan BIT1148. Jordan objected the JV’s request 
to apply the MFN principle as per the US-Jordan BIT, which entitled them to bene-
fit from the favourable treatment granted to US investors under Article 9 of the US-
Jordan BIT. As per the referenced Article, the investors were entitled to submit 
their claims to the ICSID regardless of any contractual clauses providing for any 
different dispute settlement regimes. The objection stressed the MFN in Article 3 of 
the Italy-Jordan BIT cannot apply to procedural obligations and cannot prevail over 
the intentions of the Italy-Jordan BIT parties. 
 Merits 
The JV filed this case in ICSID and the GOJ objected the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. By 
referring to Clause 67.3 of the construction contract, the contractual disputes 
should be referred to the Jordanian competent court unless amicably settled. In ad-
dition, the same Clause stipulated two conditions. First, the dispute parties should 
 
1145 See Para. 30 of the decision on jurisdiction of the ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13. 
1146 See Para. 41 of the decision on jurisdiction of the ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13. 
1147 See Para. 44 of the decision on jurisdiction of the ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13. 
1148 See Para. 43 of the decision on jurisdiction of the ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13. 
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agree on settling it through arbitration. Second and more importantly, the referral of 
the dispute to arbitration was conditioned upon the receipt of the Jordanian Council 
of Ministers prior approval in case the dispute involved a public entity (government 
or any other). The GOJ considered the Jordanian Valley Authority as a public entity 
and not the State of Jordan itself. This entailed the need for the Jordan’s Council of 
Ministers prior approval in order to fulfil the condition for referring the dispute to 
arbitration1149. Under this understanding, the GOJ deemed the referral of the dis-
pute to arbitration was breaching the Clause 67(3) of the construction contract and 
that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction.  
The second complementary claim of the Jordanian side was the lack of sufficient 
evidence for any agreement communicated by the GOJ regarding its approval to re-
fer the dispute to arbitration1150. This included the dispute over the outcome of the 
meetings between the different ranks of state officials until the Prime Ministers of 
Italy and Jordan1151. The GOJ provided continuous evidences for letters exchanged 
between both States to reflect its continuous rejection regarding the referral of the 
dispute to the ICSID arbitration. 
 Tribunal’s ruling 
 Jurisdiction 
The Tribunal’s ruling on jurisdiction considered the construction contract as an “in-
vestment agreement” within the scope of Article 9(2) of the BIT. This did not limit the 
ICSID’s jurisdiction to decide on the claims in case triggering a violation of the 
BIT. Otherwise, the contractual breaches of the construction contract, should be 
governed solely by the procedures of the contract as in Clause 67 with no jurisdic-
tion for the Tribunal1152. For the second objection, the Tribunal interpreted the Ar-
ticles of the Italy-Jordan BIT and ruled the lack of an “Umbrella Clause” in the Italy-
Jordan BIT1153. This in turn entailed the lack of jurisdiction over the contractual dis-
pute. In connection to the third objection, the Tribunal ruled the rejection of the 
Jordanian Prime Minister to refer the dispute to ICSID was communicated at a date 
after the entry into force of the Italy-Jordan BIT in January 20001154. 
 
1149 See Para. 33 of the Award of the ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13. 
1150 See Para. 36 of the Award of the ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13. 
1151 See Para. 60 of the Award of the ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13. 
1152 See Para. 92 and 94 of the decision on jurisdiction of the ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13. 
1153 See Para. 127 of the decision on jurisdiction of the ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13. 
1154 See Para. 175 of the decision on jurisdiction of the ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13. 
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For the fourth objection, the Tribunal asserted the differentiation between the mer-
its and jurisdiction. It added that the lacking proofs of the Jordanian Council of 
Ministers approval to refer the contractual dispute to ICSID, would not exclude the 
possibility of breaching the FET principle under Articles 2(3) and 2(4) of the Italy-
Jordan BIT1155. In reply to the fifth objection, the Tribunal ruled its lack of jurisdic-
tion as per the MFN principle in Article 3 of the Italy-Jordan BIT1156. The reason 
was the lack of evidence concerning the BIT parties’ intention to extend the scope 
of the MFN clause to govern the dispute settlement process1157. This is confirmed 
with Article 9(2) of the aforementioned BIT, where the Contracting States referred 
a contractual dispute settlement to the contractually agreed procedures. In addition, 
the Tribunal may not broadly interpret the MFN clause to extend its scope to dis-
pute settlement. 
 Merits 
The Tribunal placed the burden of proof on the JV to provide the legal proofs for 
the oral agreement concluded between the two States Prime Ministers’ concerning 
the JV’s right to refer the dispute to arbitration. Both parties provided a set of let-
ters and witnesses attending the meetings to verify their opposing positions1158. The 
opposing views confirmed the meetings of February 2000, while they totally disa-
greed about the content of the final outcomes.  
As a result, the Tribunal ruled that the documents unilaterally provided from the 
JV’s side were insufficient to prove the legally binding agreement between both par-
ties regarding the claim’s referral to arbitration1159. Therefore, the Tribunal did not 
proceed further to examine the violation of the BIT since no agreement was 
reached regarding the dispute referral to arbitration. The JV’s claims “must in any 
event be rejected”1160. 
 Case analysis 
The analysis of the Salini Costruttori and Italstrade v. Jordan case can be split into 
two discussions. Both examine the Jordanian understanding of the notions under 
the disputed contract and the BIT but once from a jurisdictional side and the other 
from the merits side. 
 
1155 See Para. 166 of the decision on jurisdiction of the ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13. 
1156 See Para. 118 of the decision on jurisdiction of the ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13. 
1157 Houde 2006b 154 
1158 See Para. 80 of the Award of the ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13. 
1159 See Para. 99 of the Award of the ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13. 
1160 See Para. 100 of the Award of the ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13. 
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 Jurisdiction 
On the jurisdiction side, the Jordanian understanding of the BIT notions and obli-
gations proved in line with the Tribunal’s ruling in three instances out of the initial 
five objections to jurisdiction. These instances were; first, the scope of Article 9(2) 
and its exclusion of the ICSID jurisdiction as long as the contractual breach does 
not amount to a violation of the BIT. In this sense, the Jordanian side properly un-
derstood the aim and the intentions of the BIT parties when providing such clause. 
The intention was obvious to exclude the ICSID’s jurisdiction from contractual 
disputes “investment agreement” unless violating the BIT.  
Second, Jordan successfully defined the notion of an “Umbrella Clause”, which the 
Tribunal failed to locate in the Italy-Jordan BIT1161. The construction contract did 
not encompass any wordings even to mirror the Italy-Jordan BIT, which could have 
created any sort of doubt. Thirdly and finally, in relation to the MFN principle. The 
Tribunal could not broadly interpret the MFN Article 3 of the Italy-Jordan BIT es-
pecially, with the presence of Article 9(2) reflecting the interest of both parties to 
refer contractual disputes to contractual settlement procedures and not the BIT. An 
extension of the MFN principle over the dispute settlement process would have 
over interpreted the role of the MFN Article Italy-Jordan BIT. 
The two other instances where the Tribunal identified its jurisdiction over the dis-
pute in an opposing view to the Jordanian understanding were; first, the ratione 
temporis. Under this notion, the Tribunal considered the dispute start date was the 
negative reply the JV received from the Jordanian Prime Minister regarding the re-
quest of the Council of Ministers approval to refer the dispute to ICSID arbitration. 
For Jordan, the dispute dated back to the 1990s and the BIT invoked entered into 
force only in January 2000. Second, the Jordanian understanding required the 
Council of Ministers approval, while the Tribunal considered such issue within the 
merits scope and not a jurisdictional one. It extended its jurisdiction based on the 
potential violation of the FET principle. 
 Merits 
The Tribunal confirmed the validity of the Jordanian understanding of Clause 67(3) 
of the construction contract in connection to the dispute settlement procedures. 
The Tribunal entered into the long debate of proving the presence of the Council of 
Ministers’ approval to refer the dispute to the ICSID arbitration. Its final ruling ver-
 
1161 Yannaca-Small 2006 112-118 
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ified the proper position of the Jordanian officials in this regard where the necessary 
approval was never identified and the final award favoured the Jordanian side. 
The new issue raised under such claim was connected to the evidence and the need 
to prove the possibility to arbitrate. The difficulty was in connection to the meeting 
convened between the states’ officials behind closed doors. The Tribunal requested 
the JV to provide sufficient proofs of the agreement over arbitration - when the 
amicable settlement failed - deemed sound. Accordingly, the JV’s dependence on 
the unilateral letters communicated to guarantee acceptance was ruled insufficient to 
verify the Council of Ministers of Jordan’s approval to direct the case to arbitration. 
(B) Amicable Settlement 
The cases finalized under an amicable settlement are five. Information is publicly 
available for only four of them. The one considered in this research is the Trans-
Global Petroleum Inc. v. Jordan1162 based on its special nature. 
- Trans-Global Petroleum Inc. v. Jordan 
 Facts 
The claim was filed by Trans-Global Petroleum (claimant) against the State of Jor-
dan (respondent) on August 2nd 2007. The claimants’ allegations were three. First, 
the breach of the FET principles prescribed in Article 3(a) of the US-Jordan BIT. 
Second, the provision of unreasonable and discriminatory treatment in violation of 
Article 3(b) of the same treaty. Finally, the lack of consultations as stipulated in Ar-
ticle 8 of the aforementioned treaty. Jordan objected the claims, before agreeing 
with the claimant on settling the dispute amicably. The agreed settlement was issued 
in an award by the Tribunal and later published after the parties’ agreement. 
 Case Analysis 
The Trans-Global Petroleum v. Jordan preserves a noteworthy position in ICSID 
precedent. The settlement agreement between both parties allowed cutting the liti-
gation and the arbitration costs1163. Pursuant to Article 43(2) of the ICSID Conven-
tion1164, the parties asked the Tribunal to frame their settlement agreement in the 
form of a rendered award. This ensures its legally binding power against third par-
 
1162 ICSID, International Arbitration of Registration Date 9/24/2007. 
1163 See Para. 9 of the Consent Award of the ICSID Case No. ARB/07/25. 
1164 See Article 43(2) of the ICSID Convention available at World Bank 1965. 
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ties. The Tribunal approved the request and on March 2nd 2009, an award was ren-
dered stipulating in details the agreement concluded between Trans-Global Petrole-
um and Jordan. As per the settlement agreement, the claimant should withdraw all 
its filed claims against Jordan. This generic statement was broadly interpreted on 
both sides to include all subsidiaries, affiliates, holdings and owners directly or indi-
rectly for the claimant as well as all agencies, authorities and organs of the respond-
ent. This was the side of dispute parties’ settlement section. 
On the subject matter side, the claimant guaranteed the withdrawal of any claims 
related to its investment in Jordan through its affiliate and all other associated 
agreements between the State and the investment. The settlement agreement was 
published in accordance to Article 48(4) of the ICSID Convention1165. This case on 
its own represents a special standard since both parties managed to settle the dis-
pute amicably through another alternative other than arbitration. Accordingly, the 
need to proceed with the litigation and arbitration costs became worthless. Howev-
er, both parties were still interested in issuing such settlement agreement in the form 
of an award rendered by the ICSID Tribunal to ensure it maintains its binding legal 
power and credibility against third parties. 
V.B.4 Conclusion 
Jordan has a wider experience in the ICSID arbitration when compared to Moroc-
co. The number of cases filed against Jordan are eight in total and the latest two 
were filed in 2015. Moreover, in the eight cases, only two of them were the ICSID’s 
Tribunals successfully delivered final awards. For the other cases, the dispute was 
amicably settled between the two parties. 
From the above cases highlighting the Jordanian manner in treating foreign inves-
tors two conclusions can be drawn before deeply analysing the precedent set in 
three of the disputed cases. The first conclusion is that cases fall within the scope of 
infrastructure development. For example, the main two cases of ATA and Salini 
were construction contracts. The same applies for Orange, where the dispute arose 
upon the renewal of the necessary license. This nature of infrastructure develop-
ment reflects the newer trend as compared to the earlier 1960s and 1970 when the 
government was principally responsible for the execution of public utility projects 
and services provision. This confirms the openness towards the private sector in the 
1990s and the same trend followed by King Abdullah in the 2000s. This under-
 
1165 See Article 48(4) of the ICSID Convention available at World Bank 1965. 
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standing appears further when checking the dates of filing the claims. The eight 
claims were registered between 2002 and 2015. This observation provides an addi-
tional proof for the State’s interest in engaging the private sector in the economic 
activity when compared to the decades before under King Hussein’s rule. 
Another conclusion focuses upon the outcome of the ICSID arbitration cases. 
From the eight registered cases, five cases were settled amicably after registering the 
claims. This opens the door for the discussion concerning the role of registering 
claims in solidifying the parties’ negotiation power and cutting of litigation costs. Of 
the eight cases, there is only the Ghanim Sons still pending for an award or amica-
ble settlement. There were two cases where a final award was rendered that of ATA 
and Salini Costruttori and Italstrade. In addition, the interest of Jordan to settle am-
icably its disputes remains a positive point in preserving its image as an investment 
destination. Although, more cases are filed against Jordan compared to Morocco, 
still it was held liable in only the ATA case. 
This moves the conclusion to the last point related to the Jordanian understanding 
of the BIT notions and obligations. The above analysed in detail cases highlighted 
different rates of compliance with the BIT obligations. In the case of ATA, the do-
mestic Arbitration Law and the Court of Cassation triggered a violation to FET 
principle under the Turkey-Jordan BIT. Also, this came with the definition of the 
right to arbitrate as an “investment”. In the second case, the Jordanian understanding 
successfully acquitted Jordan from any liability since the Tribunal failed to locate the 
necessary GOJ approval to decide on the Italian claims. 
V.C Morocco ICSID Cases 
V.C.1 Introduction 
After the introduction of the Moroccan investment legal framework in the chapter 
IV, chapter V intends to examine the practical compliance of the State of Morocco 
with its international investment law obligations from an adjudication side. The in-
ternational obligations under investigation in this chapter are the ones introduced 
within chapter II.F covering the BIT substantive protections. The analysis within 
this chapter assists in fulfilling two aims. First, it highlights the reasoning behind the 
number of disputes filed against Morocco in ICSID. Second, it assists in under-
standing the position taken by the Moroccan side when responding to the claims of 
violating the international investment law principles filed before ICSID.  
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Chapter V will be split into two main sections. Section 2 addresses numerically and 
factually the disputes filed against Morocco in ICSID arbitration. Section 3 is deal-
ing with the legal analysis of Morocco’s ICSID disputes is split into two sub-
sections. First, an analysis of two ICSID disputes where a final award was rendered 
and second, an analysis of two ICSID disputes settled amicably. The dispute analy-
sis includes; a brief factual background for the filed claim, an overview of the re-
spondent’s claims, an overview of the tribunal’s ruling and the final concluding legal 
remarks concerning the dispute overall. 
V.C.2 Morocco in International Arbitration 
Prior to starting the analysis, it is important a set of background facts about Moroc-
co. First, it is a member in the two international arbitration instruments. The first is 
the New York Convention concerning the Recognition and Enforcement of For-
eign Arbitral Awards since June 1959. On June 1967, Morocco became a member 
of the Washington Convention founding the ICSID governing disputes between 
Host States and Foreign Investors1166. The cases filed against Morocco in ICSID 
since its initiation were three. The start was the Holiday Inns S.A. and others v. Mo-
rocco1167, followed by the Salini Costruttori S.p.A and Italstrade S.p.A v. Kingdom 
of Morocco (ICSID case No. ARB/00/4)1168 and the final case of Consortium 
R.F.C.C. v. Kingdom of Morocco (ICSID case No. ARB/00/6)1169.  
Morocco was never held liable for any BIT breaches in the three cases. These cases 
were remarkable in the history of international arbitration for the reasons men-
tioned afterwards. In the first case of Holiday Inns v. Morocco of 1972 the dispute 
was settled amicably. Conversely, the dispute maintains its precedent for being the 
first ever filed in ICSID by 1972. In the second case of Salini, the Tribunal intro-
duced the remarkable test for defining an “investment”. The Tribunal in that case 
ruled its jurisdiction dismissing the challenges of the Moroccan side concerning the 
Tribunal’s lack of jurisdiction. On the merits the Tribunal declined the liability for 
the Moroccan state.  
By examining the ICSID Convention, it becomes obvious that the Convention sig-
natories did not define explicitly “investment” granting signatories a wider power to 
decide on ICSID’s jurisdiction as per their definition of investment. The inconsist-
 
1166 Kalinova 2010 49. 
1167 ICSID, International Arbitration of Registration Date 1/13/1972. 
1168 ICSID, International Arbitration of Registration Date 6/13/2000. 
1169 ICSID, International Arbitration of Registration Date 6/28/2000. 
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encies between signatories’ in defining “investment” leading to the start of several 
claims was problematic. This motivated defining the term “investment”, in order to 
set the borderlines for ICSID’s authority1170. The same applied in the case of Con-
sortium R.F.C.C. v. Morocco where the jurisdiction challenges of Morocco were 
dismissed without being liable for any BIT violations on merits. 
The numbers and dates of filed cases against Morocco compared to Egypt and Jor-
dan signals the state’s respect and action in line with the obligations set within its 
concluded BITs. A comparison of the ICSID registered claims against the three 
states under study in this research (regardless of the outcomes) assists in under-
standing the Moroccan authorities’ behaviour towards foreign investors.  
With the number of cases registered in ICSID against Morocco being three and the 
latest was in 2000. From the low number of cases and the old date of filing, two 
conclusions are deduced regarding Morocco’s behaviour towards its BIT obliga-
tions. First, Morocco properly treats its foreign investors by granting them a non-
egregious treatment. In other words, Morocco complies more with its BIT obliga-
tions when compared to Egypt and Jordan. Second, it verifies the economic 
thought highlighted in the chapter III regarding the new King’s position from wel-
coming the foreign investments and the establishment of a more business-friendly 
investment climate. 
V.C.3 Morocco ICSID Disputes 
In this section, the research approaches closely the facts and flow of proceedings 
associated with the only three cases registered in ICSID against Morocco. For each 
of the cases, a brief overview is provided for the background facts. The second part 
addresses the respondent state’s claims on the jurisdiction and the merits within the 
scope of the international investment law. The third and last part of the section ex-
amines the arbitration tribunal’s decision. The outcome of the filed case either veri-
fies the understanding and the position of the respondent state or conflicts it to 
trigger in certain situation a liability over the respondent. It is worth mentioning that 
the publicly available material differs on a case by case basis. This depends upon the 
agreement of the dispute parties to share the arbitral awards or the final agreement 
in case of amicable settlement. 
 
1170 Grabowski 2014 289. 
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(A) Jurisdiction Awards 
The second case filed against Morocco came twenty-eight years after the first one. It 
was submitted by the Italian Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. against 
the Kingdom of Morocco. The Kingdom of Morocco was involved in the dispute 
as a respondent since the Societe Nationale des Autoroutes du Maroc (ADM) rep-
resented the GOM in the contractual agreement with the two Italian construction 
entities. 
- Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Morocco 
 Facts 
ADM entity acted on behalf of the Minister of Infrastructure and Professional & 
Executive Training i.e. the State of Morocco. In August 1994, a tender invitation 
was issued for the construction of the Rabat Fes 50 Km highway. The two claim-
ants were awarded the tender and in turn had to establish a joint venture to proceed 
with executing the project.  
The joint venture was a transparent entity where each of the two Italian entities was 
independent. Therefore, the arbitration claim is provided jointly. The contract exe-
cution lasted for 36 months instead of the 32 months as initially agreed. The ADM 
issued the final account notification to the two Italian entities, who signed the draft 
letter with reservations concerning the reduced payment. The reservations were 
communicated to the Minister of Infrastructure who neither him nor the ADM re-
sponded to. Hence, the Italian entities reverted their claims to ICSID arbitration 
registering it on June 13, 20001171 claiming a compensation for suffered damages. 
 Respondent’s claims 
The GOM challenged the ICSID’s jurisdiction to decide on the dispute. The re-
spondent state’s claims of Morocco against ICSID’s jurisdiction can be split into 
two categories. First, was the formal procedural and was connected to the dates of 
filing and exhausting amicable settlement solutions. Secondly and more importantly, 
the challenges concerning both the persons (ratione personae) and the subject (ra-
tione materiae) of the dispute.  
Under the ratione personae, Morocco claimed the ADM was a private limited liabil-
ity entity having its own assets and independence regardless of its GOM ownership 
 
1171 See Para. 6 of the decision on jurisdiction of the ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4. 
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structure. Engaging the ADM in such public procurement contract preserved the 
legal nature of ADM. On the other side, the Italian companies structured their 
claims on the control pursued by the Infrastructure Minister over the critical deci-
sions in association to the contractual arrangements. In addition, the contractors 
claimed the contract was performed in favour of the GOM and the ADM financing 
depended directly and indirectly on the GOM budget1172. 
The second Moroccan claim against the ICSID’s jurisdiction was based on the ra-
tione materiae. Under this notion two claims prevail. The first was linked to the 
qualification of the Italian entities operations to fit within the definition of an “in-
vestment”. The second tackled the claims themselves and whether they constitute vio-
lations to the BIT or not. To begin with the definition of “investment”, Morocco in-
sisted on the need to reference the host state domestic law to define “investment” as 
per Article 1(1) of the Italy-Morocco BIT read in French as follows: “[…] in accord-
ance with the laws and regulations of the aforementioned party”. 
Pursuant to the Moroccan Law, the Decree No. 2-98-482 promulgated on Decem-
ber 30, 1998 treats the construction activities transaction as a “services contract” and 
not an “investment” 1173. The plaintiffs pleaded the contract constituted an “investment” 
based on the Italy- Morocco BIT.  
For the second claim, Morocco considered the claims of the Italian entities as con-
tractual breaches, which do not qualify to a BIT violation. For the Italians, the con-
tractual breaches are assimilated with violating the BIT, and both can be submitted 
for ICSID arbitration1174. 
 Tribunal’s ruling 
When deciding on the claims, the Tribunal split the ruling into two categories. First, 
jurisdictional claims associated with the definition of an “investment”. Second, the ju-
risdictional claims connected to Morocco’s consent. 
 Defining an “investment” 
To start with the decision on the jurisdiction and specifically with the ratione perso-
nae, the tribunal held ADM was a public natured entity representing the State of 
Morocco. This was justified from a structural and functional points of view. From a 
structural standpoint, the majority stake in the ADM was in GOM’s hands. The 
 
1172Omar E. Garcia-Bolivar 2012 
1173 Salacuse 2015 185 
1174Omar E. Garcia-Bolivar 2012 
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ADM’s board of directors was a representation of a wide range of public authority 
officials engaged in the transportation sector. Moreover, the board of directors’ 
minutes were often communicated to Morocco’s Prime Minister and to the Gov-
ernment Secretariat. On the functional side, the ADM’s Articles of Association 
were an explicit proof for its role in constructing, operating and managing roads 
and highways as public utilities, which was granted its competence by GOM’s deci-
sions1175. 
On the other hand, and in connection to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction over the ratione 
materiae. The Tribunal qualified the construction project to an “investment” in itself 
under the Italy-Morocco BIT and the ICSID. It disregarded the Moroccan requests 
to define an “investment” under the domestic laws as per Article 1(1) of the Italy-
Morocco BIT. It deemed the reference was necessary only for deciding on the valid-
ity of the activity and its conformity to the domestic law. In other words, the illegal 
activities were not deemed in compliance with Article 1 of the BIT and therefore 
were not eligible to the treaty’s protection. The construction contract was in total 
compliance with the Moroccan law and based on a tender invitation constituting the 
administrative authority’s approval. As per the “investment” listed examples in Article 
1 of the BIT, subtitles 1(c) and 1(e) refer to the competent authority approval or 
contract granted as a necessary pre-requisite to qualify contractual agreements as an 
“investment”1176.  
The third part of extending the tribunal’s jurisdiction was the qualification of a pro-
ject as an “investment” under the ICSID Washington Convention. In this situation, 
the Tribunal introduced the Salini test to define an “investment” for the first time in 
the ICISID’s jurisprudence.  
The evaluation of the contract as an “investment” was tested upon meeting the four 
criteria. First, the construction project obliged the Italian entities to use their know-
how, equipment, personnel and moved them to the building site to participate in 
performing the construction work. This fulfilled the first requirement addressing 
the contribution by the foreign investor in asset or in money. 
The second criterion dealt with the duration of the activity. The initial agreed con-
tract was 32 months. Even though the contract was executed over a 36 months’ pe-
riod, the initial 32 ones were already sufficient to exceed the minimum threshold re-
 
1175 See Para. 33 of the decision on jurisdiction of the ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4. 
1176 Government of Italy and Government of Morocco 1990. 
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quired for defining investments. The threshold falls between two and five years. 
Hence, the second criterion was met1177.  
The third criterion under consideration in the Salini test was the foreign investor’s 
borne risk from engaging in the “investment”. This test was successfully fulfilled 
through only reviewing the claimants’ memorandum replying to the jurisdictional 
claims of Morocco. The exhaustive risks list included for example, the owner’s right 
to terminate the contract prematurely, the right to execute variations within limited 
ranges without affecting the fixed pricing system1178 and one last example is lack of 
compensation for changes in work loads by addition or reduction as long as within 
20 per cent of the contract’s value. From these examples of risks, it appeared the 
risks criterion is met1179.  
The final and last criterion, and was proposed for the first time as part of the cur-
rently known Salini test was the investment’s participation in the host state’s eco-
nomic development1180. The crystal change in this case was providing for such re-
quirement since it became a remarkable decision upon which wide debates erupted. 
In the reviewed case, since the dispute’s subject is an infrastructure project, the con-
tract’s contribution to the Moroccan economy’s development is undeniable. An es-
tablishment of a 50-km highway cannot be actually questioned as whether serving 
public interest or not. Highways construction falls within the competencies of cen-
tral governments based on their necessity to serve the public interests. The assign-
ment of this competency to a foreign investor through a contractual arrangement 
constitutes a contribution to the economic development of the host state. Further-
more, another contribution was evident in the flow of the know-how from the Ital-
ian entities to Morocco in connection to the infrastructure project completion1181.  
After the fulfilment of the four Salini test requirements of (i) money or asset contri-
bution, (ii) the duration of activity and operations, (iii) the investor’s borne risk and 
(iv) the economic contribution to the host state’s economic development, the Tri-
bunal concluded the contractual arrangement between the Italian companies and 
ADM constituted an “investment” in accordance to the Italy-Morocco BIT Articles 1 
and 8(2)(c)1182. This legal definition provided pursuant to the Salini test comes in 
line with the definition of investments from an economic point of view being a risk-
 
1177 See Para. 54 of the decision on jurisdiction of the ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4. 
1178 Brown, Miles 2011 596 
1179 See Para. 55 of the decision on jurisdiction of the ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4. 
1180 League of Arab States 11/26/1980 309. 
1181 See Para. 57 of the decision on jurisdiction of the ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4. 
1182 Government of Italy and Government of Morocco 1990. 
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taking opportunity represented in the allocation of funds to execute a long-term 
project aiming to create and economic value in a good or service and targeting prof-
its. 
 Morocco’s consent 
After the qualification of the construction contract as an “investment”, the Tribunal 
started reviewing the second jurisdictional claims related to the Contracting Parties’ 
consent. First, the Tribunal analysed the Italy-Morocco BIT Article 8 in order to 
confirm its jurisdiction over the subject matter. The BIT adopted a broad under-
standing for disputes permitting the initiation of claims under the treaty’s dispute 
settlement system. Article 8(1) in the Italy-Morocco reads as follows: 
“All disputes or differences, including disputes related to the amount of com-
pensation due inthe event of expropriation, nationalisation, or similar 
measures, between a Contracting Party and an investor of the other Contract-
ing Party concerning an investment of the said investor on the territory of the 
first Contracting Party ...” 
From the above paragraph, the Article 8(1) covers all kinds of disputes and diver-
gences arising between the national of a Contracting State and the other Contract-
ing State where the investment is hosted. This extends to encompass all compensa-
tion-related disputes in cases of expropriation, nationalization or the undertaking of 
any similar actions against the national’s investment in the host state. Accordingly, 
and from the subject matter side, the Tribunal is qualified to decide on the disputes 
connected to the contractual arrangement between ADM and the Italian contrac-
tors in case the former’s actions breach the Italy-Morocco BIT.  
On the other hand, Morocco claimed the lack of its consent for the Tribunal’s ju-
risdiction over the BIT breaches. The Tribunal approached the consent question as 
a pre-requisite to extend its jurisdiction over the dispute in accordance to Article 25 
of the ICSID Convention. There were two points to consider in this context. First, 
Article 25(1) reads of the ICSID Convention reads as follows: 
“The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly 
out of an investment, between a Contracting State (or any constituent subdivi-
sion or agency of a Contracting State designated to the Centre by that State) 
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and a national of another Contracting State, which the parties to the dispute 
consent in writing to submit to the Centre …”1183 
From Article 25(1) it appears the necessity of the written consent of the two parties 
of the dispute as a pre-requisite to establish the ICSID Centre’s jurisdiction over 
any BIT breaches. In the considered case, it is important to differentiate between 
Morocco being the host state and ADM being a legally independent state-owned 
entity. The parties of the disputed contract were the ADM (not the State of Moroc-
co) and the Italian contractors. Morocco claimed its unilateral consent under Article 
8(2)(c) was insufficient to extend the Tribunal’s jurisdiction over the breaches of the 
disputed contract. The Tribunal upheld this claim in connection to the ADM-Italian 
entities contractual breaches. It justified the lack of jurisdiction on the non-binding 
nature of the ADM’s actions upon the State of Morocco. Although the ADM was a 
state-owned and controlled entity, it remained having an independent legal capacity 
and its actions were not binding on the State of Morocco. 
 Case analysis 
The analysis of the Salini case can be split into two discussions. The first examines 
the Moroccan understanding of the notions under the disputed contract and the 
BIT. The second investigates the role of the Tribunal in setting a precedent by in-
troducing the four criteria for defining an “investment” in what was later identified in 
ICSID’s jurisprudence as the “Salini Test”. 
 Morocco’s position 
Although the Tribunal ruled its lack of jurisdiction over the dispute, the Salini Cos-
truttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Morocco remains a remarkable case in the 
ICSID jurisprudence. In this section, the analysis of the Moroccan understanding of 
the international investment law notions and obligations can be examined from 
three sides. First, Morocco considered the ADM as a private legal entity and this 
was denied by the Tribunal. The Moroccan understanding focused on the formal 
side of the ADM’s position. However, the Tribunal adopted a see-through ap-
proach when examining the ownership, governance and functions of the ADM. Ex-
cept for the ADM’s formal legal independence, on the substance side the entity was 
subject to the control of the GOM. Hence, the Tribunal followed the substance 
over form approach, when ruling the ADM is deemed a state-owned entity. 
 
1183 See Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention available at World Bank 1965, Article 25(1) reads as 
follows: “... which the parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit to the Centre ...”. 
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The second category of the GOM denied jurisdictional claims was the one related 
to the definition of an “investment”1184. The Moroccan claims denied the presence of 
an “investment”. Morocco requested defining an “investment” under the domestic law 
in accordance to its interpretation of Article 1(1) of the Italy-Morocco BIT. As per 
the Moroccan interpretation, the domestic law should be consulted to define the 
term “investment”. Based on this understanding, the construction contract would be 
deemed a “services contract”, which for Morocco would not qualify as an “investment” 
eligible for protection under the Italy-Morocco BIT.  
The Tribunal rejected this interpretation and defined an “investment” in accordance 
to Article 1(1) of the afore-mentioned BIT and introduced the four criteria Salini 
test. It interpreted the reference to the domestic law as a matter of an “investment” 
legality check under the host state’s domestic law. In other words, the reference at-
tempted to confirm the validity of the constriction contract as an “investment” under 
the Moroccan law as a requirement to entitle the Italian contractors to the treaty 
protections1185. Hence, illegal investments under Moroccan Law would have no ac-
cess to the Italy-Morocco BIT protections since it violates the Moroccan domestic 
law. 
Finally, the Tribunal ruled its lack of jurisdiction over the contractual breaches by 
ADM since they did not constitute a violation of the BIT by the State of Morocco. 
The Tribunal’s decision on jurisdiction ruled its right to decide on claims connected 
to the violation of the BIT as well as contractual breaches only if binding the state 
directly. However, breaches of the disputed contract to which the State is not in-
volved but represented in a state entity, were not within the scope of the BIT’s Ar-
ticle 8. This restriction prevailed since the Italian companies’ claims were principally 
based on the contract’s breach with minimal references to a simultaneous violation 
of the BIT. Therefore, the Tribunal’s final ruling verified its jurisdiction over the 
Italian claims connected only to the BIT violation and not all the ADM-Italian con-
tractors disputed contract. 
 Salini test 
From this perspective, the case of Salini v. Morocco represents a significant posi-
tion. The reason is the Tribunal’s introduction of the economic development crite-
rion as part of the definition of “investment” when deciding on its jurisdiction. The 
Tribunal’s remarkable decision highlighted the BITs preamble focus devoted to 
 
1184 Sasson 2010 16. 
1185 Yannaca-Small 2008. 
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economic development as an essential criterion when deciding on the scope of the 
“investment” notion. The following step was the tribunal’s extended attempt to define 
“the economic development of the host state”1186. The concept was defined based on two 
criteria. First, is the entity or activity’s benefit to the host state’s public interest, 
while the second addresses the know-how transfer to the host state from the for-
eign owned or funded entity. 
Other supporting references in international law for the Salini Test appear in the 
Vienna Convention setting the rules for the interpretation of international trea-
ties1187. As per the Vienna Convention, resolving treaties ambiguities as in the case 
of defining “investment” depends on reaching the Contracting States preparatory 
work, context and circumstances covering the intentions of both parties to engage 
in such treaties. By investigating the BITs initial work, the parties confirmed their 
interest in concluding the BIT for economic development purposes.  
The positive impact of the Salini Test is principally highlighted in creating a form of 
precedent together with the Vienna Convention interpretation to guide the scope 
and jurisdiction of ICSID arbitration tribunals1188. The Test sets standards and rules 
informally governing the cross-border investment stakeholders. It reduces the in-
vestors’ uncertainty since it highlights beforehand whether the flow can be consid-
ered within the ICSID jurisdiction and scope. Risk averse investors will benefit 
from the creation of the Salini Test to boost their certainty and diminish any ambi-
guity, allowing them to depend on these tests while framing their cross-border 
plans. 
- Consortium R.F.C.C. v. Morocco 
The second claim in the year 2000, and in a manner similar to the challenge under 
the Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Morocco was the Consortium v. 
Morocco. The challenges of Morocco and the rulings of the Tribunal over jurisdic-
tion were similar to the aforementioned case. There is a difficulty to analyse the case 
below due to lack of information, besides the similarity of challenges when com-
pared to the Salini Case. 
 
1186Omar E. Garcia-Bolivar 2012 
1187 Grabowski 2014 304. 
1188 Grabowski 2014 306. 
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 Facts 
The Société National des AutoRoute du Maroc a state-owned enterprise has offered 
a public bid to construct a section of a Moroccan Highway. Consortium R.F.C.C 
has bided for this offer and secured it signing the concession contract on the 7th of 
June 1995. Regardless of opening the Highway for the public’s use on April 1998, 
there were preceding events triggering disputes. Consortium R.F.C.C invoked inter-
national arbitration as per the clause stipulated in the Italy-Morocco BIT of July 
18th 1990. The ICSID Centre on June 28, 2000 registered a claim for arbitration 
proceeding initiation presented by Consortium R.F.C.C. an Italian organized con-
sortium against Morocco1189. 
 Respondent’s claims 
As mentioned before, the challenges of the ICSID’s jurisdiction were similar to the 
Salini Case. First, Morocco explicitly challenged ICSID’s jurisdiction ratione materi-
ae and ratione personae1190. Second, the claimant had accepted earlier the adminis-
trative jurisdiction over the contract-related disputes. In July 16, 2001, the Tribunal 
upheld its jurisdiction over the dispute only in connection to the violations of the 
BIT and not the Consortium contract. 
 Tribunal’s ruling 
This phase was split into two consequent steps. The first was the Tribunal’s review 
of the assimilation between breaching the contract as violation of a BIT clause. The 
Tribunal investigated the role of the ADM as an independent entity and whether its 
actions were binding for the State of Morocco. As in the Salini Case, the Tribunal 
ruled ADM was acting on its own behalf without binding the State of Morocco1191. 
This entails there was no assimilation between breaching the Consortium contract 
and violating the BIT. Hence, the Tribunal dismissed all the Consortium claims 
against Morocco in connection to the most-favoured nation, national treatment, ex-
propriation and non-discrimination. 
 
1189 Avila 2005 389. 
1190 Avila 2005 389. 
1191 Godfrey 2011 184. 
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(B) Amicable Settlement 
- Holidays Inn v. Morocco 
Generally speaking, the first case filed in ICSID arbitration was submitted by the 
Holiday Inns (HI) group against the state of Morocco. The project covered the con-
struction of a set of HI hotels in Morocco. The GOM intervened through different 
measures and forced HI to suspend its operations, which later invoked protection 
under the ICSID. The dispute was settled amicably and no further information was 
publicly available. The lack of information implies both parties’ willingness to re-
serve the amicable settlement agreement conditions away from third parties. 
V.C.4 Conclusion 
Morocco has a short experience in the ICSID. The number of cases filed against 
Morocco are three in total and the latest two were filed in 2000. Moreover, in the 
three cases, two of them the ICSID lacked jurisdiction since the breaches were only 
contractual breaches and not amounting to a BIT violation. For the third case, the 
dispute was amicably settled between the two parties. 
One of two alternatives can justify Morocco’s short experience with the ICSID. The 
first alternative considers Morocco as an investor friendly environment where the 
GOM successfully sticks to its BIT obligations. The second option is the low inflow 
of FDI into Morocco throughout the years, which makes the filing of disputes in 
the ICSID less probable. With Morocco one of the top FDI destinations in Africa, 
the first alternative seems more appealing. The legal reform introduced by the King 
Mohamed VI since accession to power in 1999 remains another supporting reason 
for the validity of the first alternative over the second one. 
To understand the Moroccan position from aligning the domestic practise with the 
BIT obligations, evidence can be examined to an extent in the Salini Costruttori 
S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Morocco. In the mentioned case, the jurisdiction chal-
lenges provided a level of understanding for the Moroccan side regarding Articles 1 
and 8 of the Italy-Morocco BIT. The Moroccan side failed to validate the reference 
to the domestic law in defining an “investment”. However, the Tribunal confirmed 
the lack of connection between the contract breach and the violation of the BIT 
since the ADM was not binding Morocco by its own actions. At the end, it is con-
cluded that Morocco is more practically aligned with its BIT obligations when com-
pared to theoretically as introduced in the chapter IV.  
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VI. Economy and foreign direct investments 
VI.A Introduction and Methodology 
VI.A.1 Introduction 
Chapter VI addresses the correlation between a set of economic variables and the 
net FDI of the three countries. Using the word correlation explicitly excludes causa-
tion between these variables and FDI. In other words, the chapter intends to identi-
fy and calculate possible correlations between the seven chosen variables and the 
performance of the FDI in the three economies. The conclusion aims to highlight 
the economic variables with the strongest and weakest correlations with the FDI. 
The chapter uses a descriptive analytics approach to examine the variables and the 
performance of net FDI. Based on previous literature, the assessment covers varia-
bles of proven impact on FDI inflows to an economy. The list of variables refers to 
variables featured in the FDI host state and includes for example; the levels of eco-
nomic freedom, the market size, the level of human index development, the infra-
structure’s quality, the inflation rates and the recorded rates of real GDP growth. 
Section 9 titled “Net FDI (current US$)” would review the performance of net FDI 
of the three economies over the study period in order to locate possible correla-
tions. 
At this stage, it is important to justify the choice of the descriptive analytics meth-
odology over the implementation of an econometric model. The three countries ex-
perience data limitations and more specifically structural breaks in their time series 
datasets. This negatively influences the reliability of any econometric model. The 
limitations and breaks are direct outcomes of significant and recurrent changes in 
the policy orientations of the three countries between a centrally planned economy 
during the 1960s and 1970s, then a private sector led economy from the 1980s until 
the 2000s. More importantly, the legal framework inconsistencies (as provided in 
chapters IV and V) highlight the legislative chaos. With legislations restricting for-
eigners’ ownership of lands and others guaranteeing a treatment equal to that ac-
corded to national investors, the contradiction appears eminent. Another pillar for 
the structural breaks is the political instability precedent either in wars, terrorist at-
tacks or even popular uprisings as in the Arab Spring. 
The chapter’s assessment of the available data of the net FDI and the variables in-
fluencing it would assist in concluding a set of patterns. With the research question 
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being: how are the legal rules applied in an economy correlated with the FDI inflows into it?, the 
calculation of the correlations between the chosen variables and the net FDI of 
each economy is required1192. The datasets under analysis and used for the calcula-
tions are exported from the World Bank Data Bank. Unifying the source of the data 
is a strength point in order to avoid any reporting errors since a standardized meth-
odology is used when collecting data. Moreover, the dependence on datasets from 
an international institution could enhance the credibility of the data when compared 
to the local sources of data if any.  
Regarding the comparative analysis, the thesis would depend on the annual Article 
IV consultations implemented by the IMF on its members. The chapter’s timespan 
starts from 1990 until 2015. This is the period during which the investment laws 
were promulgated, many BITs were concluded and specifically in the 1990s. Hence, 
it assists in actually understanding the possible correlations between such changes in 
the investment framework and the net FDI of the three economies. In addition, this 
period embraces the three economies’ transformation from the wide intervention of 
the government in the 1980s to the market oriented liberalization and openness of 
the 1990s and 2000s respectively.  
The chapter splits below into seven sections. Each of them addresses an economic 
variable of those provided above, with possible correlations with the net FDI of the 
three economies. The subsection provides an insight of the previous literature using 
such economic variable as a determinant of the net FDI of an economy. Section 1 is 
dedicated to GDP growth, Section 2 for the market size, Section 3 for inflation, 
Section 4 for the infrastructure quality, Section 5 for levels of human development 
index, Section 6 for levels of merchandise trade, and Section 7 for economic free-
dom. 
VI.A.2 GDP Growth 
The first variable under consideration as impacting FDI is the GDP growth. As per 
the general theory, holding all other variables constant, the GDP growth has a posi-
 
1192 In the “Comparative conclusions” of Section E below, the linear correlation between the chosen var-
iables and the net inflows into each country is calculated. The correlation coefficients between two 
variables are analysed as follows: (i) a -1 is a perfect negative correlation, (ii) a -0.70 is a strong nega-
tive correlation, (iii) -0.50 is a moderate negative correlation, (iv) a -0.30 is a weak negative correla-
tion, (v) 0 is a no correlation, (vi) a +0.30 is a weak positive correlation, (vii) +0.50 is a moderate posi-
tive correlation, (viii) a +0.70 is a strong positive correlation and (ix) +1 is a perfect positive correla-
tion. The same scheme of correlation coefficients analysis was provided in Willoughby 2015 208 
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tive relationship to the rates of FDI into a country. Bengoa and Sanchez Robles1193, 
Foreman1194 and Quere, Coupet and Mayer1195 tested the impact of the GDP growth 
rates on the inflows of FDI in different economies. There are many reasons for 
such understanding since the features connected to the GDP growth include higher 
rates of job creation and even more disposable incomes. This increases foreigners 
interest to inflow their investments into these host economies. On the other hand, 
an economy experiencing lower rates of GDP growth would face difficulties in at-
tracting FDI for the reasons opposing the above mentioned. The annual per 
centage of the GDP growth is the variable used to assess the indicator’s perfor-
mance. 
VI.A.3 GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$) 
The second variable under consideration as impacting FDI is the Market Size. As 
per the general theory, holding all other variables constant, the market size has a 
positive relationship with the rates of FDI into a country. Foreman1196, Bengoa and 
Sanchez Robles1197, Buckley et al1198, Quazi1199, Quere, Coupet and Mayer1200, 
Asideu1201, Ali, Fiess and McDonald1202 and Meon and Sekkat1203 tested the impact 
of the market size on the inflows of FDI into different economies. The market size 
reflects the strength of demand and the consumer purchasing power present in the 
economy. The larger the market size, the stronger the potential demand in that 
economy and the more the FDI will inflow into it. In case of the large market size, 
the investor seeking a market expansion will be interested to benefit from this op-
portunity. The larger market size allows the investor to benefit from his produc-
tion’s economies of scale. Thus, a small market economy will be less beneficiary for 
an investor to operate in when compared to a large market. There are several prox-
ies depicting the market size. In this research, the GDP per capita (constant 2010 
US$) is the chosen proxy. It represents Gross Domestic Product divided by the 
mid-year’s population. 
 
1193 Bengoa, Sanchez-Robles 2003 
1194 Kapuria-Foreman 2007 
1195 Bénassy‐ Quéré et al. 2007 
1196 Kapuria-Foreman 2007 
1197 Bengoa, Sanchez-Robles 2003 
1198 {Clegg 2004 #211} 
1199 Quazi 2007 
1200 Bénassy‐ Quéré et al. 2007 
1201 Asiedu 2006 
1202 Ali et al. 2010 
1203 Méon, Sekkat 2004 
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VI.A.4 Inflation 
The third variable under consideration as impacting FDI is the inflation. As per the 
general theory, holding all other variables constant, the inflation rate has a negative 
relationship to the rates of FDI into a country. Bengoa and Sanchez Robles1204, Ali, 
Fiess and McDonald1205 tested the impact of the macroeconomic stability on the in-
flows of FDI. The inflation rate as an indicator reflects the levels of macroeconom-
ic stability experienced within an economy. The lower the inflation rate the more 
the economy is stable and the opposite remains true. Investors prefer to inflow their 
investments into economies featuring stabilities, where the higher degrees of cer-
tainty ensure the investors their investment outcomes will align with the results of 
the preliminary feasibility studies. Therefore, lower inflation rates imply higher mac-
roeconomic stability and a higher inflow of FDI into an economy. 
VI.A.5 Fixed Telephone Subscriptions (per 100 people) 
The fourth variable under consideration as impacting FDI is the infrastructure. As 
per the general theory, holding all other variables constant, the abundance of infra-
structure has a positive impact on the rates of FDI into a country. Quazi1206, 
Asideu1207 and Ali, Fiess and McDonald1208 tested the impact of the infrastructure on 
the inflows of FDI into different economies. The infrastructure as a variable repre-
sents the quality and accessibility to the public services and utilities including trans-
portation, telecommunication, electricity, energy and etc. The level of an economy’s 
infrastructure is a pre-requisite variable any investor investigates prior to deciding 
on the location of his investment. Therefore, the general rule provides that the 
higher the quality and the more abundant the infrastructure, the more the FDI will 
flow into an economy. There are several proxy indicators used to assess the quality 
and the accessibility to infrastructure. One of the proxy variables used by Ali, Fiess 
and McDonald was the number of fixed telephone subscriptions per 100 people in 
an economy. The higher the number of fixed telephone subscription per 100 peo-
ple, the better the economy’s infrastructure and the more the FDI will flow into this 
economy. 
 
1204 Bengoa, Sanchez-Robles 2003 
1205 Ali et al. 2010 
1206 Quazi 2007 
1207 Asiedu 2006 
1208 Ali et al. 2010 
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VI.A.6 Life expectancy at birth, total (years) 
The fifth variable under consideration as impacting FDI is the human development 
index. As per the general theory, holding all other variables constant, an economy’s 
human development level has a positive relationship with the rates of FDI into a 
country. Foreman1209, Bengoa and Sanchez Robles1210, Quazi1211, Azman-Saini, Ba-
harumshah and Law1212 and Asideu1213 tested the impact of the human capital on the 
inflows of FDI into different economies. They used the life expectancy variable as a 
proxy indicator for human capital.  
The FDI is more interested in an economy where the high-quality labour is abun-
dant. The labour’s quality may appear in the levels of education, productivity or 
health conditions. The higher the educational attainment, the higher the productivi-
ty and the better the health conditions, the higher the labour’s quality and the more 
the FDI will be interested to flow into this economy. There are several proxies de-
picting the rates of an economy’s human development. In this research, the life ex-
pectancy at birth, total (years) is the chosen proxy. It signals the number of years a 
newly born infant would survive in case the mortality rates at the time of birth re-
main unchanged throughout the infant’s lifetime. 
During the 1990s and the early 2000s the provision of the education and health was 
primarily through the government with a limited role for the private sector. The en-
hancement of the human development indices depended on the funds allocated to 
these services in the annual budgets. In general, an improvement in the human de-
velopment indices requires huge investments in order to attain the expected out-
comes. With the crises and fiscal deficits of the 1980s and 1990s, governments cut 
the most from the social welfare spending including education and health. The lack 
of sufficient funding for a significant improvement kept the annual additions in the 
life expectancy number of years at a minimal rate. 
VI.A.7 Merchandise Trade (as  per cent of GDP) 
The sixth variable under consideration as impacting FDI is the Trade. As per the 
general theory, holding all other variables constant, the rates of trade have a positive 
 
1209 Kapuria-Foreman 2007 
1210 Bengoa, Sanchez-Robles 2003 
1211 Quazi 2007 
1212 Azman-Saini et al. 2010 
1213 Asiedu 2006 
  280  
relationship with the rates of FDI into a country. Ali, Fiess and McDonald1214, Pain 
and Barrell1215, Shapiro and Globerman1216 tested the impact of the trade openness 
on the inflows of FDI into different economies. The levels of trade are a proxy for 
the economy’s openness and integration in the global economic activity. A foreign 
investor maybe inclined to invest in an open and globally integrated economy in or-
der to benefit from the opportunities to export his products and import his produc-
tion necessities. Conversely, an investor may prefer to route his investments into a 
more closed economy under certain circumstances. Of these circumstances could 
be the benefit from the stronger demand in a more populous economy to justify in-
curring the additional costs of accessing such closed economy. There are many indi-
cators depicting an economy’s trade levels, in this research the merchandise trade 
(as  per cent of GDP) is the chosen proxy. The merchandise trade (as  per cent of 
GDP) is represented in the sum of merchandize exports and imports divided by the 
GDP. 
VI.A.8 Foreign ownership/investment restriction 
The seventh variable under consideration as impacting FDI is the Economic Free-
dom. As per the general theory, holding all other variables constant, the rates of 
economic freedom have a positive relationship with the rates of FDI into a country. 
Bengoa and Sanchez Robles1217, Quazi1218, Asideu1219, Buthe and Milner1220 and 
Quere, Coupet and Mayer1221 tested the impact of the economic freedom on the in-
flows of FDI into different economies. The levels of economic freedom is a proxy 
for the economy’s dependence on institutions to determine the allocation of its 
abundant resources. A foreign investor may prefer to invest in an economy offering 
a more institutionally efficient allocation of resources. Thus, the higher the score of 
an economy in the EFW, the more expected the inflow of the FDI to that econo-
my.  
The economic freedom is measured through the Economic Freedom of the World 
(EFW) Index. It is an index prepared by the Fraser Institute to assess the extent to 
which the institutions align to their limited roles under the classical microeconomic 
 
1214 Ali et al. 2010 
1215 Barrell, Pain 1996 
1216 Globerman, Shapiro 2003 
1217 Bengoa, Sanchez-Robles 2003 
1218 Quazi 2007 
1219 Asiedu 2006 
1220 Büthe, Milner 2008 797 
1221 Bénassy‐ Quéré et al. 2007 
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theories (i.e., where the government guarantees the protection of property rights and 
provides a limited number of public goods as for example the national defence). 
The EFW comprises of five components, this research focuses only on the fourth 
component being the freedom to trade internationally. The sub-components of the 
freedom to trade internationally are four including (i) tariffs, (ii) regulatory trade bar-
riers, (iii) black market exchange rates, and (iv) controls of the movement of capital 
and people. By examining in depth each sub-component, the last seems the most 
linked and specifically its indicator reflecting the restrictions imposed on foreign in-
vestments and ownerships.  
With the primary focus of the research on the means of developing the domestic 
legal rules to attract FDI including the guaranteed protections and openness to in-
vestors, it becomes reasonable to confine the analysis in this section to the numeri-
cal outcome of the foreign ownership restrictions’ indicator. This provides an un-
derstanding of the evolution in the foreign investment restrictions in the three 
countries throughout the indicator’s time period (i.e., 1995 - 2014). Based on this 
confined analysis, the higher the outcome of the foreign ownership/investment re-
strictions of an economy’s indicator, the higher the expected FDI flowing into that 
economy. The lower the investment restrictions signal the institutional and the legal 
framework’s reliability and openness to welcome foreign investments. 
VI.A.9 Net FDI (current US$) 
Section 9 of the analysis addresses the performance of FDI being the analysis’s de-
pendent variable. Throughout the preceding seven sections, Chapter IV identifies 
the possible relationship of a group of independent variables to the performance of 
the FDI inflows. In Section 9 of each country, the patterns of FDI for the study pe-
riod from 1990 until 2015 will be analysed. The aim is to identify the possible rela-
tionship between the previously introduced seven independent variables and the 
FDI inflows. In addition, it is important to highlight the economic variables with 
the strongest and weakest relationships to FDI. There are several indicators recog-
nized to measure the economy’s performance in attracting FDI. For the purposes 
of this thesis, the indicator under consideration as introduced by the World Bank 
site is the net FDI (current US$). This section of the following chapters will focus 
on the evolvement of the net FDI over the entire study period. 
The World Bank’s definition of net FDI is the subtraction outcome of the outflows 
(representing an economy’s assets) and the inflows (representing an economy’s lia-
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bilities) realized when accounting for the economy’s Balance of Payments financial 
account. Thus, for calculation purposes, the net inflows of FDI into an economy 
will be represented in negative values and the opposite is otherwise provided for the 
positive values. The more negative the value of the indicator the more the economy 
experiences an inflow of FDI.  
On a theoretical level, the definition of “investment” in the context of international 
law was addressed under the Salini test1222. The test consisted of four components: 
(i) a contribution of an asset or money, (ii) a specified period during which the pro-
ject is executed, (iii) a factor of risk and (iv) a contribution to the host state’s econ-
omy1223. The last component remained controversial when deciding on the scope of 
the word “investment”. The case law of the European Court of Justice lists three 
forms of FDI including for example the establishment of branches owned by the 
foreign undertaking in the host state, the acquisition of already present undertakings 
in the host state, contributions or participations in already present undertakings 
with a view of maintaining lasting economic links1224. 
Section 9 does not address the (i) role of net FDI in the economic development of 
the host state, (ii) impact of net FDI on raising the living standards of the econo-
my’s stakeholders, or (iii) impact of the economic conditions in the investment 
partnering economies (investors home economies) on net FDI flows into the three 
countries. Together with the economic freedom variable, the FDI is the key indica-
tor within the economic section when answering the thesis’s question concerning 
the correlation between the legal rules and the inflows of FDI into an economy. 
VI.B The Determinants of FDI in Egypt 
VI.B.1 Introduction 
After the introduction of the chosen variables as per the previous literature, this 
chapter has two objectives. First, analysing the patterns of these variables in Egypt 
throughout the study period from 1990-2015. Second, the analysis aims to identify 
the possible correlations if any between the chosen variables and the volume of 
FDI inflows to Egypt. The chapter splits into nine subsections. Each of the first 
subsections addresses an economic variable of the list provided above. Section 2 is 
dedicated to the GDP growth, Section 3 for the market size, Section 4 for inflation, 
 
1222 Further analysis in Chapter V(C)(3)a. 
1223 Grabowski 2014 296 
1224 Laurence 2013 532 
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Section 5 for the infrastructure quality, Section 6 for the level of human develop-
ment index, Section 7 for the levels of merchandise trade, and Section 8 for eco-
nomic freedom. Section 9 analyses the pattern of the FDI inflows to Egypt. Finally, 
the conclusion in Section 10 identifies the potential and significant correlations be-
tween the variables and the FDI inflows to Egypt. 
VI.B.2 GDP Growth 
Egypt’s economy did not record any contraction in its annual GDP growth rates 
throughout the study period (from 1990 - 2015). The first phase starting from 1990 
(and until 2000) and regardless of the debt crisis of the late 1980s, the economy se-
cured an annual growth GDP growth rate of 5.70 per cent. Possibly, the conclusion 
of the stand-by agreement with the IMF and its subsequent austerity resulted in the 
annual GDP growth rate deterioration in 1991 to 1.08 per cent. The deterioration 
was of a temporary nature as the economy rebounded in 1992 reaching a GDP 
growth rate on annual basis of 4.43 per cent. The recovery from the restructuring 
process extended throughout 1993 and 1994 where the economy recorded annual 
GDP growth rates of 2.9 per cent and 3.97 per cent respectively. 
Afterwards, the economy may have begun reaping the benefits of the restructuring 
program concluding three years of increases in the annual GDP growth from 4.64 
per cent in 1995 to 5 per cent in 1996 and finally 5.49 per cent in 1997. The annual 
growth inclination was discontinued in 1998 with a GDP growth of only 4.04 per 
cent. The reasons for the decline may include the slump in the tourism proceeds af-
ter the 1997 Luxor terrorist attack, besides, the lower inflows of FDI in conjunction 
with the Asian Crisis of 1997. In 1999, the economy restored its strong growth and 
recorded an over 6 per cent annual GDP growth for the first time in fifteen years. 
By the turn of the new century the second phase started (until 2008), the pace of 
economic activity in Egypt slowed down pressuring the annual GDP growth rates 
to 5.37 per cent in 2000. The worse came afterwards when in the three years 2001, 
2002 and 2003 the average annual GDP growth rate was only 3.03 per cent. The 
main possible justification for the economic downturn was the regional instability; 
due to first, the War on Terrorism and second the US invasion of Iraq. The rising 
threats of terror may have hit the Egyptian tourism industry proceeds resulting in a 
negative outcome upon the annual GDP growth rates. 
The lower growth was a red-flag to launch a new process of reform. Actually, the 
process started in January 2003 by the devaluating the EGP against the US Dollar 
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by 19 per cent1225. An additional measure in 2004 was the appointment of a busi-
ness-background new government. This signalled the regime’s interest in establish-
ing a friendly business climate and integrating the economy globally. The annual 
GDP growth rates responded positively and this may be attributed to the preceding 
changes. With less than 1 per cent increase in GDP growth between 2003 and 2004, 
the economy in 2005 preserved its rising trend of GDP growth recording 4.47 per 
cent. The remarkable annual change was evident in 2005-2006 when the annual 
change in the GDP growth was of nearly 2.4 per cent. The proliferation in the an-
nual GDP growth continued to attain 7.09 per cent and 7.15 per cent in 2007 and 
2008 respectively. 
The third and last phase started with the worldwide financial crisis of 2008 and last-
ed until 2015. The possible lagged impact of the crisis was reflected in the nearly 
halving of the annual GDP growth rate to only 4.69 per cent in 2009. The short res-
toration in 2010 vanished directly due to a probable reasoning as the Arab Spring 
uprisings of January 2011. The political instability experienced in the process of the 
political transformation could be considerably blamed for the annual rates of GDP 
growth. The average rate of GDP growth for the rates from 2011 to 2015 was only 
2.51 per cent. The instability hit to the GDP growth may be more evident by com-
paring the five years earlier annual GDP growth to the calculated average. The rate 
of 2010 (5.14 per cent) was double the five years’ calculated average. 
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VI.B.3 GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$) 
The Egyptian situation of the GDP per capita may mirror the role of the population 
growth in moderating the effects of the GDP growth rate on the GDP per capita. 
Starting from a low reading ($1,588), the GDP per capita preserved its low readings 
due to the austerity plans executed with the conclusion of the IMF’s SAP (recorded 
an average GDP per capita from 1990 until 1997 equal to $1,661). With focus di-
rected to tackling the population growth problem and the recovery of the growth 
rates to around 5 per cent, the GDP per capita inclined significantly. The average 
GDP per capita for the years 1998, 1999 and 2000 was $1,924.  
In the early 2000s, the economy experienced a slowing down in the economic activ-
ity. The GDP per capita annual increases in the GDP per capita dwindled until 
2003. The changes (devaluation, appointing new government and etc.) stimulated 
the economic activity and the GDP per capita began its second upward trend. The 
highest annual increase in the GDP per capita was recorded between 2005 and 2008 
when the annual increases ranged around $120. The rates started falling in 2009 
possibly due to the financial crisis and was followed by the uprisings and the politi-
cal instability of January 2011. From 2011 until 2014, the GDP per capita nearly 
stagnated around $2,659. 
VI.B.4 Inflation 
The annual inflation rate in Egypt started from the high rates resulting from the 
debt and balance of payments crisis of the late 1980s. By reviewing the data, the an-
nual rate recorded a 16.8 per cent. In 1991, the GOE successfully concluded the 
SAP with the IMF. The execution of the SAP’s austerity including the subsidy cuts 
probably increased the inflationary pressures. The higher pressures were possibly 
reflected in the first peak of the annual inflation rate of 1991 at 19.8 per cent. The 
rate began to moderate from 1992 onwards until 1994. The moderation could have 
been driven by the slowdown in the economic activity and the lower consumption 
especially after introducing the General Sales Tax in 1991. The downward pressure 
was evident starting from 1992 at 13.6 per cent to 8.15 per cent in 1994, before ex-
ceptionally rising to 15.7 per cent in 1995. 
After the sudden hike of 1995, the inflation rate dropped to 7.19 per cent and even 
further to 4.62 per cent in 1996 and 1997 respectively. This moderate inflation rate 
around the 4 per cent or even below was preserved until 2004. In January 2003, the 
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devaluation of the EGP against the foreign currency may justify the inflationary 
pressures pushing the annual inflation rate to the zone of the double-digit readings 
recording a 11.3 per cent. The annual rate did not moderate in a manner similar to 
the 1990s. It stayed at 7.64 per cent in 2006 and 9.32 per cent in 2007. In 2008, the 
GOE implemented a plan of lifting the fuel subsidies forcing the annual inflation 
rate to rise and reach its second peak of 18.3 per cent. Since 2008 until 2016, the 
annual inflation rate recorded a single-digit rate in only the two years of 2012 and 
2013. Otherwise, the inflation rate remained at nearly 11 per cent before beginning 
its upward trend in 2016 in conjunction with foreign currency shortage. 
From the data and the descriptive analysis, it becomes obvious the volatility of 
Egypt’s inflation rate. Throughout the study period, the annual inflation rate rec-
orded two peaks at 19.8 per cent in 1991 and 18.3 per cent in 2008. Moreover, an 
important differentiation is the number of years where the inflation rate recorded a 
double-digit inflation rate. During the study period, Egypt experienced a double-
digit annual inflation rate in 13 readings out of the 27 years. The average annual in-
flation rate for Egypt during the period under examination recorded a 9.35 per cent.  
 
VI.B.5 Fixed Telephone Subscriptions (per 100 people)  
With 2.84 subscribers per 100 people, Egypt maintained an upward slope line repre-
senting the continuous increase in the number of subscribers. This may reflect the 
understanding of the Egyptian policymakers concerning the importance of guaran-
teeing the FDI inflows an available and accessible infrastructure. The number of 
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terwards, the growth in the number of subscribers moderated allowing Egypt to 
reach its peak in 2008. The peak point in the number of subscribers in Egypt at 15.7 
per 100 people allowed Egypt to have the highest peak point between the three 
country studies. 
The data may highlight the focus of the Egyptian policymakers to develop the infra-
structure’s quality and abundance. This allowed Egypt to reach higher numbers of 
subscribers per 100 people even before it significantly shifted to the mobile services 
in 2008. Moreover, taking into account the high population of Egypt, reaching a 
higher number of subscribers per 100 people reflects the efforts exerted by the 
Egyptian policymakers in order to ensure the expansion of the infrastructure and its 
maintenance of an appropriate quality. The shift to the mobile telecommunication 
services may justify the obvious deterioration in the number of subscribers in the 
fixed telephone per 100 people. The deterioration is an explicit evidence for the 
lower investment and even demand on the fixed telephone subscriptions when 
compared to the 1990s and the early 2000s. 
 
VI.B.6 Life expectancy at birth, total (years)  
Egypt started from the lowest point between the three country studies with a life 
expectancy of 64.5 years. During the period elapsing from 1990 until 1999, Egypt 
managed to increase its life expectancy at birth number of years by 4 years to reach 
68.3 years. Conversely, from 2000 until 2015, Egypt increased the life expectancy’s 
number of years by only three years to end up in 2015 at 71.3 years. The Egyptian 
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VI.B.7 Merchandise Trade (as  per cent of GDP) 
In 1990, the sum of merchandise trade as a per centage of Egypt’s GDP was 31.8 
per cent. The conclusion of the SAP, the austerity policies and the slowing down of 
the economic activity possibly strained the trade levels pushing them to record ob-
vious decreases. The downward trend of Egypt’s trade levels continued until the 
EGP devaluation in 2003. The dip of the merchandise trade as a per centage of 
GDP was recorded in 2001 when the economy less than halved its reading of the 
1990 by recording a 18.6 per cent. From 1992 until 2002, the average merchandise 
trade recorded a 23 per cent. 
The devaluation of the EGP in January 2003 may be considered a starting step in 
opening the Egyptian economy for further trade and integration in the global econ-
omy. In addition, the appointment of a business background government may have 
facilitated such process of opening and integration. The possible direct impact was 
the increases in the merchandise trade as a per centage of the GDP. The rate moved 
upward from 24.5 per cent in 2003 to 32.5 per cent in 2004 and 39.4 per cent in 
2005. Egypt maintained its upward trend until 2008 recording its peak reading at 
45.8 per cent. The financial crisis started the decrease in the per centage of mer-
chandise trade to GDP and this seemed aggravated by the political instabilities fea-
tured since January 2011. The political turbulence probably had a negative on 
Egypt’s trade levels forcing it to record its worst reading in twelve years in 2015 at 
25.4 per cent. 
These observations confirm the lower level of openness in Egypt’s economy. The 
Egyptian policymakers for long favoured through the 1960s the import-substitution 
policies. The traces of such policies could be evident in the lower trade levels of the 
1990s. On the other hand, the devaluation of the EGP followed by the business-
friendly opened economy remain important steps in boosting Egypt’s levels of mer-
chandise trade as a per centage of the GDP.  
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VI.B.8 Foreign ownership/investment restriction 
The first reading for Egypt’s foreign ownership and investment restrictions was 
recorded in 1995 and it was already high at 9.21. Accordingly, the introduction of 
the new IGIL was not expected to provide a jump in the recorded readings. The 
IGIL boosted the reading further putting it at 9.23 in 2000 and 2001. The overvalu-
ation of the EGP in the early 2000s may have resulted in the deterioration of the 
readings to record 6.17 in 2002 and 5.83 in 2003. The economic restrictions trig-
gered the ruling regime to appoint a new government with the mandate of stimulat-
ing FDI and opening further Egypt’s domestic legal framework. A set of new legis-
lations were introduced in 2004 onwards including the amendment of the IGIL, 
probably without any reflections on the investment restrictions since the readings 
for the years from 2004 until 2009 revolved around 6 with the highest reading in 
2007 at 6.63 and the lowest in 2009 at 5.48. 
The political instability arising from the January uprisings may be correlated to the 
deteriorations witnessed in the readings concerning the investment restrictions and 
foreign ownership. This was evident for example in the capital controls introduced 
by the Central Bank of Egypt upon the transfer of foreign currency abroad. Hence, 
the readings dipped at 4.36 and 4.07 in 2012 and 2013 respectively. With the estab-
lishment of the new government in 2014 and the preservation of a sense of stability 
the readings jumped positively to reach 6.67 in 2014. 
With the lowest average between the country studies, Egypt had an average of 6.35 
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of the domestic legal rules in 2004 was not reflected significantly on the readings of 
the restrictions since the rate remained around 6. Moreover, the initial readings rec-
orded prior to and simultaneous with the introduction of the IGIL were never 
reached again based on several possible justifications. This may include the lack of 
political stability, the lack of the political will to approach such sensitive topics con-
nected to the abolishment of the foreign investment restrictions. 
 
VI.B.9 Net FDI (current US$) 
In 1990, Egypt’s net FDI inflows recorded a $0.722 billion, then declined to only 
$0.191 billion in 1991. The slow-down of the net FDI inflows in 1991 (recorded the 
lowest net FDI inflows throughout the study period after excluding 2011 when the 
economy recorded a net outflow), could be related to the severe economic situation 
of Egypt paving the way to the conclusion of the SAP with the IMF in 1991. The 
IMF-agreement may have positively affected the net FDI inflows through more 
than doubling it to reach a $0.455 billion. The following obvious hike was in 1994, 
when the net FDI inflows exceeded the $1 billion for the first time to reach $1.21 
billion. The increase is partially justified by the privatization proceeds amounting to 
$376 million. The inflows nearly halved in 1995 before rebounding in 1996 and 
1997 from the lowest point at $0.505 to $0.631 and $0.761 billion respectively.  
The 1997 marked the year of introducing the IGIL. It may have had a lagging im-
pact pushing the net FDI inflows upward to record $1.03 billion in 1998. The rise 
of 2000’s reading is justified also through the 25 privatization transactions realizing 
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1999 and 2000 (with a larger share for the privatization proceeds in the net FDI in-
flows) before dropping in 2001 to only $0.498 billion. A possible explanation for 
the drop may be the lack of the regional political stability in conjunction with the 
start of the war on terrorism. The second lowest reading for the net FDI inflows 
was in 2003 when the inflows totalled to only $0.217 billion. This could be justified 
pursuant to the uncertainty associated with the devaluation of the previously over-
valued EGP in January 2003. Also, the GOE slowed down its execution of the pri-
vatization program as evident in the data showing no privatization transactions con-
cluded in the years 2002 and 2003.  
The third phase in the net FDI inflows started in 2004 and lasts until 2010, when 
the Arab Spring uprising started in Egypt in January 2011. During this period, the 
net FDI inflows into the economy featured a significant hike allowing the average 
per year for the period from 2005 to 2010 to record a $7.5 billion. The reasoning 
for the unprecedented rates of inflows may include; first, the positive impact of the 
currency devaluation. Second, the appointment of a new government with a clear 
objective of opening legally the doors for the private sector, easing the doing busi-
ness in Egypt and reviving the privatization program. Third, the completion of the 
legal framework with legislations deregulating the economic activities.  
With the witnessed high annual averages of net FDI inflows, the benefits were no-
ticeably being reaped. In the years 2006 and 2007, Egypt secured net FDI inflows of 
$9.89 (out of which $7.58 billion were privatization proceeds) and $10.9 billion re-
spectively. There is an important observation to note connected to the share of the 
privatization proceeds from the net FDI inflows. In 2006, the privatization pro-
ceeds represented nearly 77 per cent of the net FDI inflows, while in 2007, this per 
centage dropped to nearly 3 per cent. The inflows began to gradually deteriorate in 
2008 until 2010 and the possible reasoning is the less appetite to invest due to glob-
al financial crisis. 
The last phase started from 2011 and lasted until 2015, where the economy experi-
enced its only net FDI outflow throughout the study period with a magnitude of 
$1.11 billion. The direct possible reasoning for such outflow is the political instabil-
ity resulting from the Arab Spring uprisings and the stepping down of Mubarak in 
January 2011. The net FDI reading returned to the inflow side from 2012 onwards. 
The featured rates were gradually increasing on the horizon to record $3.89, $4.53 
and $6.7 billion in 2013, 2014 and 2015 respectively. The increase in the net FDI 
inflows may translate the continuous efforts of the GOEs after the Arab Spring to 
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restore stability and investor confidence in order to boost the net FDI inflows and 
reach the rates recorded prior to the global financial crisis. 
 
VI.B.10 Conclusion 
Reviewing the FDI determinants in conjunction with the above analysis of the rec-
orded FDI inflows can help in realizing possible correlations between the FDI in-
flows to Egypt and the previously introduced economic variables. To start with the 
GDP growth, by reviewing the pattern of Egypt’s GDP growth throughout the 
study period together with the pattern of the FDI inflows, a positive correlation be-
tween both notions could be identified. The stability of the GDP growth rates of 
Egypt’s economy during the 1990s was similar to the stability witnessed in the pat-
tern of the FDI inflows around an average of $0.703. Again, the record rates of 
GDP growth at 7.09 per cent and 7.15 per cent of the 2007 and 2008 respectively, 
featured record rates in the FDI inflows to the Egyptian economy in 2007 at $10.9 
billion. From these patterns, the significant positive correlation between the GDP 
growth and the FDI inflows could be located. 
In the Egyptian case, the annual GDP growth rates could be insufficient due to the 
obvious annual increases in the population growth. The significant positive correla-
tion between the GDP growth rates and the FDI inflows to Egypt could be moder-
ated by the evident slow increases in the Egypt’s GDP per capita throughout the 
study period. With a slightly long-time increasing value averaging at $2,125 from 
1990 to 2015, Egypt’s GDP per capita seems having low positive correlation, if any 
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may still have interest to invest in Egypt targeting the benefits of accessing the large 
growing population and regardless of the low rates of GDP per capita. 
Third, in the case of inflation, tracing a correlation between the inflation rate and 
the FDI inflows to Egypt could seem difficult. The volatility of Egypt’s inflation 
rate recording almost 20 per cent in two instances at 1991 and 2008, were not in 
conjunction with increases or decreases in the FDI inflows to Egypt. Moreover, the 
downward inflationary pressures of the second half of the 1990s did not feature a 
similar pattern of increases or decreases in the FDI inflows to Egypt. Alternatively, 
the increases of the FDI inflows during the mid-2000s were in conjunction with a 
building-up of inflationary pressures until the inflation peaked at 18.3 per cent in 
2008. It can be argued that the increases in the FDI inflows of 2006, 2007 and 2008 
were outcomes of the lower inflation rates, however, the low inflation of the 1990s 
did not lead to a similar increase in the FDI inflows. Hence, claiming the presence 
of a negative correlation between the inflation rate and the FDI inflows could be 
inappropriate. 
The fourth determinant of the FDI inflows to Egypt is the quality and accessibility 
of infrastructure as represented in the number of fixed line telephones per 100 peo-
ple. The variable denoting the infrastructure developments featured a significant in-
crease from 1997 until 2008 were Egypt’s average reached 11.2 fixed lines per 100 
people. The increases in the FDI inflows to Egypt came at a later stage starting 
from 2004, however, it is difficult to ignore the role of the accessible infrastructure 
in determining the FDI inflows into Egypt during the booming period starting from 
2005. Another link is evident in the low FDI inflows during the 1990s, which may 
be correlated with the low infrastructure. Therefore, the data can provide evidence 
for a strong positive correlation between the number of fixed line telephones per 
100 people and the FDI inflows to Egypt.  
The human development index represented in the life expectancy of Egyptians, the 
FDI inflows should increase with the increases in the number of years Egyptian 
survive since birth. Egypt had been experiencing increases in the life expectancy 
throughout the study period. This can be attributed to the general advancement fea-
tured worldwide and may not be related to any governmental policies. In addition, 
the life expectancy has been on the upward trend, which makes it more difficult to 
correlate it with the patterns of the FDI inflows to Egypt. The identification of a 
correlation between both notions requires a significant increase in the life expectan-
cy, which was in conjunction with an increase in the FDI inflows. This is not the 
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case, and, therefore, the positive correlation between the life expectancy and the 
FDI inflows may be difficult to trace.  
On the trade level, the low per centages of merchandise trade as per centage of 
GDP during the 1990s were in line with the low FDI inflows to Egypt during the 
same period. Conversely, the increase in the trade openness starting from 2003-
2004 resulted in an increase in the rates of the merchandise trade as of GDP until 
peaking in 2008 at 45.8 per cent. The increases in trade came together with the sig-
nificant increases evident in the FDI inflows to Egypt starting from 2004 until 
peaking in 2007. Hence, the merchandise trade as per centage of the GDP possibly 
has strong a positive correlation with the FDI inflows to Egypt. The increases in the 
volumes of merchandise trade and FDI since 2004 can be direct outcomes of the 
GOE’s policies of liberalizing the Egyptian markets for foreign products and inves-
tors. This process of openness was detailed within the legal chapter, which provides 
an analysis for the development in Egypt’s legal framework from a high-restricted 
and regulated economy to an open de-regulated market through several legislative 
amendments.  
The seventh variable under consideration is the investments restrictions pursuant to 
Egypt’s domestic laws. With the annual calculations starting from 2002, Egypt’s re-
cording of the investments restrictions remained within the same range without 
much volatility between 2002 and 2008. The volatility in this regard is an excluded 
factor since the legal changes are of a strict nature and require difficult procedural 
steps in order to amend or change. Taking this into account, Egypt starting from 
2003 planned to undertake another reform of its legal framework making it more 
investor-friendly. Besides, the examples provided for the development in Egypt’s 
legal framework, other liberalization legislations include for example (i) the Compe-
tition Law promoting the market forces interaction as the determinant of products 
prices, (ii) the new Income Tax Law lowering the corporate tax rate from a maxi-
mum 40 per cent to a flat rate of 20 per cent. These continuous efforts during the 
mid-2000s onwards improved Egypt’s ranking in the Ease of Doing Business report 
(World Bank), that chose Egypt as its top reformer worldwide in 2008 (based on the 
legal changes introduced in 2007). This year recorded the peak year for the FDI in-
flows to Egypt and the highest reading on the investment restrictions indicator in 
the 2000s at 6.63. Therefore, it is possible to locate a strong positive correlation be-
tween the investment restrictions indicator and the FDI inflows to Egypt. 
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VI.C The Determinants of FDI in Jordan 
VI.C.1 Introduction 
After the introduction of the chosen variables as per the previous literature, this 
chapter has two objectives. First, analysing the patterns of these variables in Jordan 
throughout the study period from 1990-2015. Second, the analysis aims to identify 
the possible correlations if any between the chosen variables and the volume of 
FDI inflows to Jordan. The chapter splits into nine subsections. Each of the first 
subsections addresses an economic variable of the list provided above. Section 2 is 
dedicated to the GDP growth, Section 3 for the market size, Section 4 for inflation, 
Section 5 for the infrastructure quality, Section 6 for the level of human develop-
ment index, Section 7 for the levels of merchandise trade, and Section 8 for eco-
nomic freedom. Section 9 analyses the pattern of the FDI inflows to Jordan. Finally, 
the conclusion in Section 10 identifies the potential and significant correlations be-
tween the variables and the FDI inflows to Jordan. 
VI.C.2 GDP Growth 
The Jordanian experience of annual rates of GDP growth appears positive 
throughout the study period (1990-2015). After recording negative growth rates in 
the late 1980s, in 1990 the economy recorded a sluggish GDP growth rate of only 
0.97 per cent. The early 1990s low growth rates may be the outcomes of the politi-
cal instability in the region especially after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait resulting in 
the Second Gulf War. The GDP growth skyrocketed in 1992 to reach an outlier 
performance by recording a growth rate of 18.7 per cent. The jump may be associ-
ated with the return of Jordanian professionals from the Gulf countries and their 
funds after their expulsion due to the GOJ’s position against the international coali-
tion liberating Kuwait. From 1993 until 1995, the annual rates of GDP growth ad-
justed and averaged around 5.26 per cent. The introduction of the IPL in 1995 
seemed did not strengthen a positive correlation with the annual rates of GDP 
growth. In fact, by 1996 the growth rates more than halved to record only 2.09 per 
cent. The three years following the promulgation of the IPL with its list of incen-
tives and guarantees, the GDP growth still recorded a sluggish growth performance 
of 3.29 per cent in 1997, 3 per cent in 1998 and 3.41 per cent in 1999. 
By the turn of the century and the accession of King Abdullah to the throne with 
his business-friendly policies may have assisted the economic activity began to re-
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cover. The recovery evident in the upward slope of the annual growth rates from 
4.23 per cent in 2000 to 5.27 per cent and 5.79 per cent in 2001 and 2002 respec-
tively. The upsurge of the growth rates was discontinued may be by the US invasion 
of Iraq in 2003 destabilizing the delicate situation of Jordan within the region. A 
possible direct outcome was a temporary decline in the growth rates of 2003 to 4.16 
per cent. Probably through benefiting from its political position favouring the US 
invasion of Iraq, the Jordanian economy received more western investments allow-
ing it to more than double its growth rates in 2004 to reach 8.56 per cent. Moreo-
ver, and for the first time, the around 8 per cent annual growth were sustained for 
the following three years 2005, 2006 and 2007 until the start of worldwide financial 
crisis in 2008.  
The impact of the financial crisis on Jordan seemed lagged by one year since only in 
2009 the annual growth rates fell to 5.48 per cent before slumping to 2.34 per cent 
in 2010. From 2010 onwards, the Jordanian economy failed to reach the mid-2000s 
annual growth rates. The rates of growth ranged until 2015 between 2 and 3 per 
cents. Of the possible reasons for such extended deterioration in growth rates was 
the Arab Spring and the continuous instability experienced in Jordan’s neighbouring 
countries including the civil war in Syria since 2011 and the rise of Islamic State in 
Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Iraq since 2014. These instabilities burdened the Jordanian 
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VI.C.3 GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$) 
The financial aid and support from the western economies to Jordan permitted it to 
experience a high reading of the GDP per capita in 1990. The reading of 1990 pro-
vided a GDP per capita of $2,587. This was slightly below the $2,773, which was 
the average GDP per capita realized during the 1990s. As in the case of trade, the 
accession of King Abdullah was reflected positively on the GDP per capita.  
In the 2000s, Jordan began its annual upward trend of GDP per capita. Starting 
from $3,006 in 2000, heading to $3,297 in 2003 and $3,490 in 2004. The exponen-
tial growth in the GDP per capita was a direct reflection of increases in the real 
GDP growth rates recorded in the 2000s. The GDP per capita continued its upward 
rally peaking at $4,120 in 2009. However, the slowing of the real GDP growth rates 
after the financial crisis was reflected in slight decreases in the GDP per capita end-
ing in 2015 at $3,976. 
VI.C.4 Inflation 
Jordan’s inflation rate throughout the study period preserved a moderate inflation 
rate below the 7 per cent. Throughout the 25 years under investigation only three 
readings went over the 7 per cent. This was evident in the 1990 and 1991 when the 
inflation rate recorded 16.2 per cent and 8.16 per cent respectively. The high rates 
of inflation in these two years can be reasoned based on the effects of the SAP of 
Jordan. The conclusion of the SAP obliged the GOJ to adopt a plan of austerity in 
1989. The direct outcome of such plan was a cut in subsidies pressuring the infla-
tion to increase in 1989 and 1990. The jump in the inflation rate was moderated in 
1991, when the pressures began to moderate.  
The downward trend of the inflation rate continued in the early 1990s, where the 
rate halved to only 4 per cent in 1992. In the following years until 1996, the infla-
tion rate remained around or even below the 3 per cent. Only in 1996, the rate of 
inflation doubled to record a 6 per cent. From 1996 to 2006, Jordan proved its 
maintenance of its macroeconomic stability with an inflation rate always below the 4 
per cent. With the soaring of economic activity, the inflation pressures possibly be-
gan to build-up and in 2008, the economy reached its second inflation peak attain-
ing a rate of 14.9 per cent. In the following years, the global financial crisis may jus-
tify the slowdown experienced in the economic activity. This pushed the inflation 
rate downward to its previous annual rates of around 4 per cent. It is worth noting 
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that the economy in the years 2015 and 2016 recorded a deflation of 0.873 per cent 
and 0.788 per cent respectively. 
From the available data and the analysis, it is simple to follow the stability of the 
economic activity in Jordan. The inflation rate experienced only two hikes at 16.2 
per cent in 1990 and 14.9 per cent in 2008. The average annual inflation rate of Jor-
dan recorded a 4.04 per cent. Otherwise, the economy was recording moderate in-
flation rates reflecting the macroeconomic stability in Jordan. The moderation of 
the inflation rate turned it even into a deflation at 2015 and 2016. 
 
VI.C.5 Fixed Telephone Subscriptions (per 100 people) 
The number of fixed telephone subscriptions per 100 people in Jordan can be rep-
resented in a normal distribution form. The starting point of the demonstration in 
1990 provided that 7.31 people per 100 people had a fixed telephone subscription. 
From 1990 until 1996, the number of subscribers stayed around 7.47 per 100 peo-
ple. By 1997, the number of subscriber per 100 people started its upward trend 
from 8.88 per 100 people. Following the inclining trend, the subscribers reached 
11.03 and 12.03 per 100 people in 1998 and 1999 respectively. The top three years 
were 2000, 2001 and 2002 where the number of subscribers per 100 people were 13, 
13.65 before peaking at 13.76 in 2002. 
The deterioration in the number of subscribers per 100 people began in 2003 when 
it recorded 12.5 subscribers. From 2003 until 2015 the readings provided a decrease 
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investments from both the public and the private side. The decline in the number of 
subscribers continued until the lowest point in 2015 when the recorded reading was 
4.8. It is important to note that the decline in the rates of the subscribers in the 
fixed telephones was in conjunction with the development of the telecommunica-
tion services by the invention of the mobile phones. 
With the importance of the fixed telephones as a proxy for the quality and the ac-
cessibility of the infrastructure, it is evident in the case of Jordan the focus of the 
policymakers during the 1990s to improve the infrastructure network to ensure its 
positive impact on the inflows of FDI. In fact, this plan proved a success where the 
number of subscribers reached its maximum point in 2002. Conversely, the shift of 
preferences and businesses towards the mobile services reduced the investments in 
the fixed telephones sectors and even the demand on the fixed telephone services.  
 
VI.C.6 Life expectancy at birth, total (years)  
With its small population, Jordan managed to secure the highest starting point in 
the life expectancy at birth indicator. An infant born in 1990 would live until 69.9 
years old. Jordan secured an added year to reach 71 years only after five years-time 
as in 1995. The following one-year addition reaching the 72 years was reached in 
2001 and the 73 years was reached in 2007. Finally, the 74 years was attained only in 
2013. The Jordanian average life expectancy for the study period is 72.2 years old 
allowing Jordan to rank first between the country studies.  
On the other hand, Jordan recorded the lowest increase in the number of years 
throughout the study period with 69.9 years in 1990 and 74.2 in 2015. The differ-
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VI.C.7 Merchandise Trade (as  per cent of GDP) 
As introduced in the economic history chapter, the Jordanian position in the inter-
national scene depended to a wide extent upon the inflows of foreign aids and fi-
nancial support. This may have allowed Jordan to record very high rates of trade 
and integration within the global economy since 1990. From 1990 until 1997, all the 
readings provided a merchandise trade of above 80 per cent of the GDP (except for 
1994, where the rate was exceptionally 77 per cent). A possible justification was the 
Iraqi use of Jordan’s trade outlets as an alternative to avoid the imposed interna-
tional economic sanctions throughout the 1990s. The latest years of King Hussein’s 
rule indicated a deterioration in the rates of merchandise trade. In 1999, Jordan rec-
orded a merchandise trade equal to 68.1 per cent of the GDP. This was the lowest 
reading throughout the study period. 
The throne accession of King Abdullah in 1999 may be chosen as the turning point 
for the merchandise trade as per centage of GDP. The indicator preserved an up-
ward trend until 2005. Specifically, when in 2004 began the process of easing trade 
through the Aqaba port1226. Furthermore, Jordan possibly benefited from the US in-
vasion of Iraq in expanding exponentially its merchandise trade levels to reach its 
peak reading at 118 per cent in 2005. The high rates of merchandise trade continued 
until 2008, when the global economy was hit with the financial crisis. The crisis 
seemed pushing down the merchandise trade to the before the US invasion boom 
rates of 86.5 per cent in 2009. From 2009 until 2014, the rates of merchandise trade 
as per centage of GDP recorded the lowest reading at 85.5 per cent in 2010 and the 
highest reading at 93.4 per cent in 2011. The difficulties to recover the readings of 
the peak year can be based on the outbreak of the Syrian civil war and ISIS presence 
in the neighbouring economies. 
 
1226 Cebotari, D. and Dennis, A. 2008 
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VI.C.8 Foreign ownership/investment restriction 
The first available reading for Jordan’s foreign ownership restriction (as part of the 
EFW sub-component addressing the controls on the movement of capital and peo-
ple) is recorded in 1995. Being the year of promulgating the IPL, the restrictions 
were expected to feature a high reading reflecting low restrictions. The new legisla-
tion seemed the primary reason in allowing Jordan to record its highest reading 
throughout the period under investigation (i.e., 1995 - 2014) at 8.85. The continued 
application of the IC in the same manner justified the readings of 8.71 in 2000 and 
2001 respectively. In 2002 and 2003, the restrictions on capital controls experienced 
an increase forcing the reading to reach 7 and 7.17.  
The introduction of the new Investment Law No. 68 of 2003 may have resulted in 
the upturning of the foreign investment restrictions to record 8.11. The non-
continuation of the high readings may be based on the Law’s formalisation of the 
foreign investors restrictions regarding the ownership in Jordanian investments. The 
readings of the foreign restrictions remained around 7.5 until the financial crisis in 
2008. Afterwards, the restrictions of foreign ownership began the significant deteri-
oration in conjunction with the global financial crisis of 2008. The downward trend 
of the readings started from 6.60 in 2009 until it reached its dip in 2013 by record-
ing 5.88. Only the introduction of the new Investment Law No. 30 of 2014 may 
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From the readings followed above, it may be concluded the obvious role of the Jor-
danian Investment Laws in eliminating or lessening the restrictions applicable upon 
foreign investments. The introduction of the three Investment Laws were directly 
followed by higher readings in the foreign investment restriction indicator, which 
implies more expected FDI inflows. 
 
VI.C.9 Net FDI (current US$) 
With only $0.069 billion in 1990, the sign of Jordan’s net FDI was even reversed in 
1991 resembling a net outflow of $0.025 billion. The early struggling of the net FDI 
indicator continued in the years from 1992 until 1995 recording a maximum inflow 
of $0.044 billion in 1992. The introduction of the IPL in 1995 did not assist in iden-
tifying a correlation with the inflows of FDI, which recorded only $0.041 and 
$0.059 billion in 1995 and 1996 respectively. In 1997, the net FDI skyrocketed to 
$0.361 billion and $0.310 billion in 1998. The rise may be justified on the lagged 
flows of FDI until investors were assured the GOJ is willing to respect and enforce 
the guarantees and incentives granted under the new IL. The net FDI halved in 
1999 to only $0.153. A possible reasoning could be the investors’ uncertainty about 
Jordan’s political future and stability with the illness and death of King Hussein and 
the King Abdullah’s II accession of throne in June 1999. 
The placement of the new King and his initial policies signalled Jordan’s interest to 
continue its transformation line towards the private sector’s lead through a more in-
tense privatization program. This seemed a positive message for foreign investors 
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was nearly triple the highest reading recorded in 1997. After only four privatization 
transactions from 1995 to 1998 with total proceeds of less than $65 million, the sig-
nificant increase in the net FDI inflows in 2000 seemed associated with the partial 
privatization of the Jordan Telecommunication Company (proceeds equal to $508 
million). The surge of the year 2000 proved exceptional since the net FDI inflows 
returned to even below the pre-2000 levels at $0.242 and $0.224 in 2001 and 2002 
billion respectively. The witnessed deterioration may be reasoned upon the deviated 
interest of investors to take the risks of investing in the Middle East when its al-
ready featuring several political instabilities due to the start of the Palestinian Intifa-
da in 2000 and the War against Terrorism in 2001.  
In 2003, the net FDI inflows more than doubled compared to the preceding year to 
reach $0.551 billion. The doubling could be justified from two contradicting sides. 
On the increase side, the doubling may be an outcome of the inflows of wealthy 
Iraqis into Jordan after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Moreover, the Jordan may 
have received more FDI inflows as a reward for its strategic alliance with the US in 
regard to the latter’s policies against terrorism generally in the Middle East specifi-
cally. The partial privatization of Arab Potash Company1227 (proceeds equal to $173 
million) could be the last possible reasoning for the doubling of the net FDI inflows 
in 2003. On the other hand, on the downside level of the FDI, a view may consider 
the recorded net FDI was below the level which would have been recorded in case 
the US did not invade Iraq in 2003 due to the increased region’s stability. 
From 2004 until 2015, the average net FDI inflows recorded during this time frame 
was nearly $2 billion per year. After almost doubling in 2004 to $0.919 billion, the 
net FDI inflows surpassed the $1 billion on annual basis only in 2005 to record 
$1.82 billion. The possible justifications include the positive impact of the new In-
vestment Law No. 68 of 2003 and the growing global investment interest in emerg-
ing markets may have affected positively the flows of the FDI into the Jordanian 
market. The continuous negative net FDI flows into Jordan recorded the highest 
reading throughout the study period 1990-2015 in the year 2006 at $3.68 billion. 
The net FDI inflows started moderating in the years 2007, 2008 and 2009 recording 
an average of $2.58 billion in net FDI inflows per year. An additional reason for the 
increase in the net FDI inflows in 2006 and 2007 was the rise in the number of the 
concluded SOEs’ privatization transactions (seven transactions with total proceeds 
of nearly $874 million in the two years). 
 
1227 World Bank 2017 
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The global financial crisis in the late 2000s could be blamed for the decline in the 
readings of the net FDI inflows starting from 2010, when it recorded only $1.66 bil-
lion. In 2011, other possible factors pressuring down the net FDI inflows recorded 
readings may include the political instability of the region after the Arab Spring up-
risings and the initiation of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria at the borders of Jor-
dan. This may have affected negatively the appetite of investors who may have been 
interested in seeking opportunities in the Jordanian market. Taking into account 
these possibly influencing factors, the average net FDI inflows in Jordan for the 
years between 2011 and 2015 was $1.59 billion. 
 
VI.C.10 Conclusion 
Reviewing the FDI determinants in conjunction with the above analysis of the rec-
orded FDI inflows can help in realizing possible correlations between the FDI in-
flows to Jordan and the previously introduced economic variables. To start with the 
GDP growth, by reviewing the pattern of Jordan’s GDP growth throughout the 
study period together with the pattern of the FDI inflows, it is possible to verify a 
strong paternal correlation between both variables. During the 1990s (apart from 
1992) Jordan maintained stable annual growth rates around an average of 3.4 per 
cent and the similar stability in volumes of FDI was applicable to the inflows to 
Jordan. The beginning of the 2000s and the positive rates of annual GDP growth in 
Jordan came in conjunction with evident increases in the volume of FDI inflows to 
Jordan. The peaking of the GDP growth rates in 2004-2006 was simultaneous with 
the peaking of the FDI inflows in 2006. From these patterns, a positive correlation 
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The second economic determinant for the FDI inflows to Jordan under considera-
tion was the GDP per capita. The GDP per capita in Jordan increased from 1990 to 
2015 by around $1,389. Moreover, the average of GDP per capita throughout the 
study period was $3,364. In theory, these data reflect the positive development in 
the market size and in turn the standards of living, the purchasing power and the 
stronger demand of Jordan’s population. In other words, the economy experiences 
a continuous size expansion. The continuous stable incremental increases in the 
GDP per capita cannot be paternally correlated with the changes in the FDI inflows 
to Jordan. The latter changed positively and negatively throughout the study period, 
which is not the case of the GDP per capita. However, a weak positive correlation 
could be traced in the exponential increase of the GDP per capita between 2003 
and 2008, when in the meantime, the FDI inflows to Jordan were recording their 
peak readings. 
The identification of a correlation between the inflation rate and the FDI inflows to 
Jordan remains a possible matter. The pattern of the inflation rate during the 1990s 
with the recorded low rates seem coinciding with the low volumes of FDI inflows 
to Jordan. Similarly, the increases in the inflation rate since the 2000s upward trend 
until skyrocketing in 2008 timely coincides with the boosted volumes of FDI in-
flows to Jordan (peaking in 2006-2008). The same paternal correlation stayed valid 
for the years 2011-2015, where the inflation rate began its increase and the volumes 
of the FDI inflows to Jordan were recovering. Accordingly, it is possible to recog-
nize a strong positive correlation between the inflation rate and the FDI inflows to 
Jordan. 
The fourth determinant of the FDI inflows to Jordan is the quality and accessibility 
of infrastructure as represented in the number of fixed line telephones per 100 peo-
ple. The variable denoting the infrastructure developments featured a significant in-
crease from 1997 until 2002 were Jordan’s average reached 12.1 fixed lines per 100 
people. The significant rise in the FDI inflows to Jordan started from 2003. It is 
simple to correlate the presence of accessible and proper quality infrastructure with 
the volumes of FDI inflows to Jordan witnessed from 2003-2008. Alternatively, 
during the 1990s, the levels of the infrastructural development was in conjunction 
with lower FDI inflows to Jordan. Hence, it is possible to conclude a positive corre-
lation between the number of fixed line telephones per 100 people and the FDI in-
flows to Jordan.  
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The human development index represented in the life expectancy of Jordanians, the 
FDI inflows to an economy should increase with the increases in the health stand-
ards of the population due to higher productivities. Jordan manged to preserve a 
steady increase in its life expectancy readings throughout the study period. It would 
not be entirely correct to praise the GOJ for such increases since it may be attribut-
able to the general development featured in health standards and medication 
worldwide. Furthermore, the life expectancy did not mark any breaks in its continu-
ous increases, which makes it difficult to identify any correlation with the FDI in-
flows to Jordan. The identification of a correlation between both notions requires a 
significant increase in the life expectancy, which was in conjunction with an increase 
in the FDI inflows. This is not the case, and, therefore, the positive correlation be-
tween the life expectancy and the FDI inflows may be difficult to locate.  
On the trade level, Jordan’s merchandise trade as per centage of GDP already rec-
orded high readings during the 1990s. This could be justified upon the structure of 
Jordan’s economy being highly dependent on foreign assistance and trade. During 
the same period, the FDI inflows to Jordan were recording their lowest rates when 
compared to the 2000s. Even the decline in the merchandise trade per centage of 
GDP during the late 1990s was in conjunction with a slight increase in the volume 
of the FDI inflows to Jordan. Hence, it remains difficult to identify any possible pa-
ternal correlation between the merchandise trade as per centage of GDP and the 
FDI inflows to Jordan. The opposite could be argued by checking the increases in 
the merchandise trade from 2003-2008 (in line with increases in FDI inflows to Jor-
dan), however, the overall liberalization on investment and trade levels with King 
Abdullah is the justification and not the correlation between both notions.  
The seventh variable under consideration is the investments restrictions pursuant to 
Jordan’s domestic laws. The annual calculations of the indicator started from 2002, 
when Jordan managed to experience a strong start between 2002 and 2004. Howev-
er, the strong start did not represent a clear volatility since legislations have a strict 
nature and several procedural steps are needed to amend them. Taking this into ac-
count, the accession of King Abdullah to the throne in 1999 helped in enhancing 
the business environment of Jordan. An important part of these improvements was 
linked to the reforms of Jordan’s legal framework making it more investor-friendly. 
Besides, the examples provided for the development in Jordan’s legal framework, 
other liberalization legislations within 2002-2004 include for example (i) the Compe-
tition Law promoting the market forces interaction as the determinant of products 
prices, (ii) the temporary Investment Law of 2003 lowering restrictions on foreign 
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ownership of business entities in certain sectors. These years represented the base 
from which the FDI inflows to Jordan began its inclination until peaking in 2006. 
The pace of legal liberalization and lowering of foreign investments restrictions be-
gan to decrease (appears in lower readings on the indicator), in conjunction with the 
moderation of the volumes of FDI inflows to Jordan. Therefore, it is possible to lo-
cate a strong positive correlation between the investment restrictions indicator and 
the FDI inflows to Jordan. 
VI.D The Determinants of FDI in Morocco 
VI.D.1 Introduction 
After the introduction of the chosen variables as per the previous literature, this 
chapter has two objectives. First, analysing the patterns of these variables in Moroc-
co throughout the study period from 1990-2015. Second, the analysis aims to identi-
fy the possible correlations if any between the chosen variables and the volume of 
FDI inflows to Morocco. The chapter splits into nine subsections. Each of the first 
subsections addresses an economic variable of the list provided above. Section 2 is 
dedicated to the GDP growth, Section 3 for the market size, Section 4 for inflation, 
Section 5 for the infrastructure quality, Section 6 for the level of human develop-
ment index, Section 7 for the levels of merchandise trade, and Section 8 for eco-
nomic freedom. Section 9 analyses the pattern of the FDI inflows to Morocco. Fi-
nally, the conclusion in Section 10 identifies the potential and significant correla-
tions between the variables and the FDI inflows to Morocco. 
VI.D.2 GDP Growth 
The performance of the annual rates of GDP growth of Morocco can be split into 
three phases. In the first phase, the economy preserves a special nature as continu-
ously swinging between the growth and contractions. A popular phenomenon dur-
ing the 1990s allowed the Moroccan economy to secure significantly high growth 
rates of 12 per cent before slumping to a contraction in the following year. The vol-
atility may be primarily justified upon Morocco’s concentration of economic activity 
in few sectors as agriculture and raw materials1228. These sectors return depended on 
the world market prices and the prevalent climatic conditions.  
 
1228 Castel 2015 50 
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In 1990, the Moroccan annual growth rates started from an annual growth rate rec-
orded was 3.41 per cent. The rate doubled in the following year to attain a 7.22 per 
cent, before the economy experienced a contraction at 2.1 per cent in 1992. After a 
lower magnitude of contraction in 1993, the economy exceptionally grew at 10.6 per 
cent in 1994. The second evidence of the GDP growth rate volatility was in 1995 
when the economy severely contracted at 5.41 per cent before upturning to 12.4 per 
cent growth in 1996. The negative-positive annual GDP growth volatility continued 
until 2000 with lower magnitudes of variance. 
The volatility was blamed mainly upon the lack of industrialisation and diversifica-
tion. Throughout the 1990s, the economy was primarily dependent on the agricul-
tural activities irrigated principally through rainfalls. Accordingly, the witnessed an-
nual GDP growth rates depended on the levels of rainfalls. High rainfalls would 
boost the agricultural activity, its outcomes and proceeds leading to higher growth 
rates and vice versa. Another important pillar was the dependence on the exporta-
tion of phosphate. The volatility in the international prices of the mineral influenced 
positively or negatively the annual rates of GDP growth. The accession to throne of 
King Mohamed VI in 1999 was a turning point for the economy to begin a sus-
tained process of reform and recovery starting the second phase in analysing Mo-
rocco’s annual GDP growth rates. 
Although the second phase (lasting from 2001 until 2006) featured similar swinging 
in the rates of the annual GDP growth, the swinging remained always in the posi-
tive side without evidencing any economic contractions. In addition, the deviation 
between the annual rates of growth were minimized. From 2002 until 2005, the 
economy recorded an average annual GDP growth rates of 4.29 per cent. In 2006, 
the rate of GDP growth doubled to 7.57 per cent before declining again to the 3.53 
per cent in 2007. When the worldwide financial crisis was starting, the economy se-
cured an annual GDP growth of 5.92 per cent. The lagging impact of the crisis 
pressured the growth rates down to 4.24 per cent and 3.82 per cent in 2009 and 
2010. Morocco was not severely hit by the instabilities of the Arab Spring. In 2011, 
the economy secured an annual 5.25 per cent of GDP growth. The rates of the 
GDP growth between 2012 and 2015 remained around the average of 3.65 per cent. 
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VI.D.3 GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$) 
The performance of the GDP per capita of Morocco seems positive regardless of 
the slight volatility in the GDP per capita. For example, in the late 1990s the GDP 
per capita changed in line with the changes evident in the GDP growth of the 
economy, however, from 1999 onwards the economy preserved a steady growth in 
the GDP per capita. The volatility of the 1990s is connected to the lower rainfalls 
affecting the agricultural output, the GDP growth rates and in turn the GDP per 
capita. The average GDP per capita for the period between from 1990 until 1998 
was only $1,817. 
From 1999 and 2000, the economy began to operate at a faster pace. The GDP per 
capita started its upward rally from $2,087 in 2001, reaching $2,787 in 2009 before 
arriving at $3,240 in 2015. Despite the volatility in the GDP growth rates of Moroc-
co during the 2000s, the rise in the GDP per capita was increasing at a nearly stable 
pace. This signals the control posed over the population growth rates. Hence, the 
minimal increases in the GDP growth were still reflected positively on the GDP per 
capita. For the period between 2001 and 2015, the average GDP per capita was 
$2,671. 
The rise in the GDP per capita of Morocco between 1990 and 2015 was equal to 
$1,524. With an average GDP per capita of only $2,315 (closer to the average of 
2001 to 2015), the period of the 2001 to 2015 raised the overall average of the indi-
cator upward. The steady growth of the GDP per capita in the 2000s highlights the 
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though the economy experienced downturns in its rate of GDP growth, it secured 
positive reflections on the GDP per capita rates after the population growth was 
brought more under control. 
VI.D.4 Inflation 
The inflation rates recorded in Morocco throughout the studying period signals the 
high rates of macroeconomic stability. The conclusion of the SAP with the IMF and 
undertaking of the austerity plans probably pushed the inflation rates to reach their 
peak at 1991 by recording a 7.99 per cent. From 1991 until 1997, the annual infla-
tion rate of Morocco declined until reaching a 1.04 per cent. With an increase in 
1998 to 2.75 per cent, the annual inflation rate remained below the 3 per cent until 
2005. In the three years from 2006 to 2008, the inflation rate picked up with the rise 
in economic activity experienced in the emerging economies and the increases in 
commodity prices (ex: oil). It recorded a 3.28 per cent in 2006 and 3.71 per cent in 
2008, which were the highest recorded rates since 1996.  
Afterwards, the rise in the inflation rate moderated, possibly, due to the global fi-
nancial crisis of 2008. From 2008 up until 2016, the inflation rate never surpassed 
the 2 per cent. From the annual inflation rate data available, Morocco’s peak never 
exceeded the 8 per cent throughout the study period. Moreover, the average annual 
inflation rate of Morocco for the period under examination recorded a 2.67 per 
cent. With the low rates of annual inflation, Morocco maintained a reasonable level 
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VI.D.5 Fixed Telephone Subscriptions (per 100 people)  
Morocco started from the worst position in connection to the number of fixed tele-
phone subscriptions per 100 people by recording a reading of 1.63 in 1990. The 
Moroccan policymakers probably recognized in the 1990s the importance of direct-
ing investments to the field of infrastructure based on its importance in raising the 
standards of living and in attracting FDI. Thus, the number of subscribers pre-
served its inclining stance and recorded a 5.18 subscriber per 100 in 1999. By the 
turn of the millennium, Morocco witnessed a decline in the number of subscribers 
at 4.96 before remaining constant around this rate until 2006. 
From 2007 up until 2011, the Moroccan economy featured a significant improve-
ment in the number of subscribers in fixed telephones per 100 people. With 7.81 
subscribers in 2007 to 9.66 in 2008 and 11.8 in 2010. In the end of the late 2000s 
the infrastructure investments and consumer preferences were shifted away from 
the fixed telephone in favour of the mobile telecommunication services. This justi-
fies the deterioration in the number of subscribers in fixed telephone at a rapid pace 
pushing the number of subscribers to half at 6.55 in 2015. 
The difficult start of Morocco’s infrastructure quality and accessibility would not 
have a positive impact on the FDI inflows. The obvious development in the infra-
structure was experienced in mid-2000s where the number of subscribers per 100 
people increased exponentially reaching the peak in 2010. The subscribers’ numbers 
deteriorated until 2015 due to the shift towards using mobile services over fixed tel-
ephones. It is worth highlighting the delay in shifting investments to the infrastruc-
ture as Morocco recorded its peak reading of the number of subscribers only in 
2010, which came at a date after the introduction of the mobile phones services 
presumably by the late 2000s. 
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VI.D.6 Life expectancy at birth, total (years) 
Morocco in 1990 started from a of life expectancy with a number of years equal to 
64.7 years. In the Moroccan situation, the improvement in the life expectancy by 
one-year was attainable in shorter periods. For example, the first year to reach the 
65.7 years was attainable in two-years’ time (i.e., 1992). The following year addition 
was in three years’ time (i.e., 1995), followed by another three years until 1998 to 
reach the 67.7 years. By the turn to the 2000s, the one-year increase in the life ex-
pectancy became attainable in less than the three years. This even puts Morocco in a 
better position in relation to the annual increases. The Moroccan average life expec-
tancy for the study period is 69.6 years old allowing Morocco.  
On the other hand, Morocco recorded a significant incremental increase in the 
number of years of the life expectancy throughout the study period from 1990 until 
2015. The increase in the number of years throughout the study period from 64.7 
years in 1990 to reach 74.3 in 2015. The increase amounts to 9.6 years and allowed 
Morocco to close the gap in the life expectancy’s number of years with other mem-
bers of the MENA region. 
VI.D.7 Merchandise Trade (as  per cent of GDP) 
The merchandise trade as a per centage of GDP for Morocco experienced a posi-
tive trend throughout the study period. However, the upward line appeared nearly 
flat from 1990 up until 1999. During this period, the average merchandise trade per 
centage of GDP was 38.5 per cent. The accession of King Mohamed IV allowed 
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towards openness permitted the economy to increase its average merchandise trade 
level as a per centage of GDP (for the period 2000 – 2014) by nearly 17 per cent to 
record an average of 55.6 per cent. 
The increase in the average started since 2000 with a reading of 48.8 per cent. The 
rate stayed relatively stable until in 2005 it reached 51.3 per cent before jumping to 
59.9 per cent and 67.8 per cent in 2007 and 2008 respectively. The increase was jus-
tified upon the flows of investments to the emerging economies until the eruption 
of the financial crisis of 2008. This forced the merchandise trade per centage as 
GDP to drop to 50.5 per cent. The Moroccan’s trade recovery from the crisis was 
speedy with a per centage of merchandise trade to GDP at 57 per cent and 65 per 
cent in 2010 and 2011 respectively with similar rates recorded until 2015. 
From the data, it becomes obvious that Morocco managed to boost its trade levels 
as per centage of the GDP. Morocco recorded a wide 26 per cent positive change 
when comparing the readings at the starting and the ending of the chosen indicator. 
This highlights the policymakers focus on enhancing the economy’s openness and 
integration in the global economic activity. This inclination and stress of openness 
may have signaled the country’s interest in globalization boosting the positive corre-
lation with the flows of the FDI into Morocco. 
 
VI.D.8 Foreign ownership/investment restriction 
The first available reading for Morocco’s foreign ownership restriction (as part of 
the EFW sub-component addressing the controls on the movement of capital and 
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can investment framework preserved its stance from the restrictions against foreign 
investors ownership in Moroccan entities. The readings in the early 2000s recorded 
higher ranging around 7. This remained the situation until in 2007, the readings be-
gan to decline significantly to reach 5.05 in 2008 and 5.35 in 2009. On the invest-
ment level, there were no legislative changes to justify these evident restrictions. 
However, it may be the case that the GOM introduced a set of restrictions aiming 
to mitigate the effect of the global financial crisis.  
The rebound upward of the readings dealing with the foreign investor restrictions 
was evident in 2010. The readings jumped by one full point to reach 6.30 before 
moving forward to 6.81 in 2011 and 7.19 in 2012. This comes in line with the con-
tinuous efforts to stimulate the FDI inflows into Morocco. Although this does not 
appear in any legislative changes since the IC remains in place without featuring any 
amendments since its introduction in 1995. 
 
VI.D.9 Net FDI (current US$) 
Morocco started its study period in 1990 recording the second highest reading for 
the net FDI inflows between the country studies at $0.165 billion. The following 
years until 1994 witnessed a continuous gradual increase in the net FDI inflows 
reaching its maximum for the early 1990s at $0.527 billion (including the proceeds 
realized from offering publicly the Société Nationale d’Investissement equaling to 
$227 million). In 1995 and 1996, the net FDI inflows decreased to around $0.320 
per year. This may reflect the lack of any positive impact of the IC on the stimula-
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surged to slightly cross the $1 billion out of which $716 million were proceeds from 
the privatization of 12 SOEs (e.g., SAMIR and the Societe Cherifienne de Petroles). 
Nevertheless, the justification may be invalid since the years from 1997 until 2004 
experienced an obvious volatility in the recordings of the net FDI inflows. The vol-
atility in net FDI inflows may be associated with the similar volatility featured in the 
rates of real GDP growth. The evidences for the volatility include the net FDI in-
flows of $1.07 billion in 1997 followed by a significant drop to only $0.313 billion in 
1998. The volatility may refute the previous possibility of the lagging impact of the 
IC, which would have continued if the IC had successfully convinced the interna-
tional investor to route their investments in Morocco. The same applies for the rise 
to net FDI inflows of $0.831 billion in 1999 before dropping again to $0.368 billion 
in 2000. It is important to highlight that the privatization proceeds in 1999 reached 
$1.14 billion, while the recorded net FDI inflows were only $0.831. By excluding 
the privatization section from the net FDI inflows calculation, it appears the green-
field operational FDI recorded a negative number (an actual outflow).  
The accession of King Mohamed VI of the Moroccan throne in 2000 and the sig-
nals of the continued inclination towards the private sector in formulating the 
economy’s activity may have incentivized the inflows of FDI allowing the recorded 
reading in 2001 to reach $2.73 billion. The recorded net FDI inflows featured $2.11 
billion proceeds from the privatization of the Morocco Telecom Company). The 
readings preserved the volatility and fell again to only $0.452 billion in 2002. The 
same scenario of volatility continued between 2003 and 2004. From 2005 until 2015 
the economy managed to an extent to overcome the volatility problem, and record-
ed an annual average of $2.13 billion. A possible reason could be the successful di-
versification of the economic activity in Morocco away from agriculture. This al-
lowed the creation of more investment opportunities in other fields including infra-
structure and industrial activities. Accordingly, the net FDI inflows could have se-
cured this high annual average for this long period (2005-2015) due to the invest-
ment flows seeking the new potential opportunities. In this regard, it is important to 
refer to the net FDI inflows featured increase reaching the $2.92 billion and even 
exceed the $3 billion (recorded $3.09 billion) in the years 2013 and 2014 respective-
ly. 
From the above preliminary analysis, a set of observation can be deduced. First, the 
average net FDI inflows into Morocco throughout the study period is $1.34 billion. 
Second, Morocco clinched in 2014 a net FDI inflows of $3.09 billion as its highest 
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reading. Third, privatization played an influential role during the 1990s in boosting 
the net FDI inflows with a lower impact during the 2000s. An important observa-
tion is the continuous strong net FDI inflows to Morocco after 2011. This may be 
justified upon the non-affection of Morocco with the Arab Spring uprisings. The 
possible reasoning is the quick King Mohamed’s VI intervention to settle the pro-
tests at an early stage through offering a constitutional amendment moving the 
country a step closer to constitutional monarchy. 
 
VI.D.10 Conclusion 
Reviewing the FDI determinants in conjunction with the above analysis of the rec-
orded FDI inflows can help in realizing possible correlations between the FDI in-
flows to Morocco and the previously introduced economic variables. To start with 
the GDP growth, the volatility of the variable’s annual data throughout the study 
period makes the recognition of a paternal correlation between the variable and the 
FDI inflows to Morocco difficult. The volatile pattern of the annual growth rates in 
the 1990s was not shared in the patterns of the FDI inflows to Morocco during the 
same period. For example, the difference in the FDI inflows to Morocco between 
1995 and 1996 is $7 million, while in the recorded growth rates, there is a difference 
of nearly 17 per cent. The same applies at a lower magnitude to the period from 
2000 onwards when the annual GDP growth rates began to stabilize. However, 
identifying the paternal correlation remained difficult. An example is 2007 and 2008, 
when nearly the same volume of FDI flowed into Morocco, while the annual GDP 
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trace a positive/negative correlation between the annual GDP growth and the FDI 
inflows to Morocco. 
The second determinant of the FDI inflows to Morocco under examination was the 
GDP per capita. With an average GDP per capita of $1,830 for the period between 
1990 and 2000, the FDI inflows to Morocco were featuring stable volumes at an 
average of $0.461 billion. By the turn of the 2000s, the GDP per capita started its 
positive rally raising its average to $2,671 (2000-2015), and this coincided with a sig-
nificant increase in the volumes of the FDI inflows to Morocco reaching an average 
of $1.89 billion. Accordingly, the two notions seem featuring similar patterns of sta-
bility and increases, which assists in identifying a possible positive correlation be-
tween them. In other words, the increase in the GDP per capita in Morocco seems 
coinciding with increases in the volumes of FDI inflows to Morocco. 
The identification of a correlation between the inflation rate and the FDI inflows to 
Morocco remains a possible matter. From a high start of the inflation rate (around 
6-7 per cent until 1995) after the SAP policies of cutting subsidies, the inflation rate 
in Morocco began its downward trend throughout the study period. Giving a look 
to the pattern of the FDI inflows to Morocco, it is difficult to identify a correlation 
between the inflation rate and the FDI inflows. Moving to the 2000s, a slight corre-
lation appears in the years 2006-2008, where the inflation rate increased in conjunc-
tion with the peaking of the FDI inflows to Morocco. Hence, it is inappropriate to 
claim the presence of a positive or negative correlation between the inflation rate 
and the volume of the FDI inflows to Morocco.  
The fourth determinant of the FDI inflows to Morocco is the quality and accessibil-
ity of infrastructure as represented in the number of fixed line telephones per 100 
people. The significant increases in the number of subscribers started only in 2007. 
This coincides with the period of the peaking of the FDI inflows to Morocco. The 
low number of subscribers prior to 2007, cannot be correlated with the FDI in-
flows, which maintained its performance regardless of the patter of the subscribers’ 
number. The peaking of the number of subscribers in 2010 could be correlated with 
the general increase in the volumes of the FDI inflows from 2006 onwards. Accord-
ingly, the correlation between the number of fixed line telephones per 100 people 
and the FDI inflows to Morocco was absent until the mid-2000s when a slight posi-
tive correlation began to appear. 
The human development index represented in the life expectancy of Moroccans, 
the FDI inflows to an economy should increase with the increases in the health 
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standards of the population allowing higher productivities per person. Morocco se-
cured nearly a ten-year increase in its citizens life expectancies throughout the study 
period. Reviewing the steady upward trend of the Moroccans life expectancy may 
reflect the interest of the GOM to improve the health standards of the population. 
However, the identification of a correlation between the life expectancy in Morocco 
and the volume of FDI inflows to Morocco remains tricky. The continuous increas-
es in the life expectancy over the years did not coincide with continuous increases in 
the FDI inflows volumes. Therefore, a claim of a positive correlation between both 
notions would be in appropriate. 
On the trade level, Morocco’s merchandise trade as percentage of GDP could be 
spilt into phases: (i) before King Mohamed VI and (ii) after him. In the period pre-
ceding his throne’s accession, the merchandise trade as percentage of GDP pre-
served a stable performance close to the 39-40 per cent. From 1999 onwards, after 
the accession of King Mohamed to the Moroccan throne, the rates of merchandise 
trade as a per centage of GDP climbed up raising the average between 2000-2015 to 
56 per cent. On the other hand, the pattern of the volume of the FDI inflows to 
Morocco is to a wide extent coinciding with that of the merchandise trade as per 
centage of GDP. The stability of the 1990s followed by the increases of the 2000s 
allow tracing a strong positive correlation between the merchandise trade as a per 
centage of GDP and the FDI inflows to Morocco. 
The seventh variable under consideration is the investments restrictions pursuant to 
Morocco’s domestic laws. The annual calculations of the indicator started from 
2002, when Morocco secured a strong start at 2002 (a reading of 7.5). The readings 
of Morocco’s investment restrictions indicator experienced continuous decreases in 
the following years (apart from a slight increase in 2005) until its trough point in 
2008. This could be related to the non-introduction of a new Investment Law (re-
placing or amending the in-force IC). In regards to the FDI inflows to Morocco 
during the same period (2002-2008), the volume of inflows was volatile from 2000 
to 2004 before reaching significantly high volumes for the period from 2005 until 
2009. From 2011 onwards, the patterns of the investment restrictions variable and 
the FDI inflows to Morocco became more aligned. The lower the investment re-
strictions (increases in the variable’s readings) coincided with increases in the FDI 
inflows to Morocco allowing the latter to reach its peak readings between 2012-
2015. Hence, it is possible to conclude the lack of correlation between both notions 
prior to 2011, while in the period afterwards, a strong positive correlation could be 
identified. 
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VI.E Comparative Conclusions 
VI.E.1 Introduction 
With the Chapter IV discussing the changes in legal rules in connection to the coun-
tries’ investment frameworks, deriving a more complete picture of the net FDI into 
the three countries requires considering the economic variables determining the lev-
els of net FDI. As mentioned before, the variables were chosen based on the previ-
ous literature prepared in relation to the determinants of the net FDI of an econo-
my. In chapter VI, the analysis intends to compare the calculated correlations be-
tween the seven variables and the FDI1229 inflows to each country. The comparative 
conclusion of chapter VI compares structurally the correlations evident in the three 
countries in order to identify differences between them. This requires addressing 
the factors influencing the performance of the seven variables and how this paved 
their correlations with the net FDI in each of the three countries. The conclusion is 
split into seven sections in the same order of the chapter VI of each country. 
VI.E.2 GDP Growth 
The correlation coefficients between the GDP growth and the net FDI of Egypt, 
Jordan and Morocco had differing magnitudes. In Egypt’s case, a strong negative 
correlation appears between the GDP growth (annual  per cent) and the net FDI 
with a coefficient of -0.5231230. The volatility of the GDP growth rates coincided 
with the pattern of the net FDI simultaneously throughout the study period and 
specifically in the 2000s. The downward trend of the annual GDP growth rates 
from 1999-2003 due to the (i) effects of the September 11 and Iraq War1231 on tour-
ism and (ii) GOE’s ambiguity regarding the exchange rate regime. The recovery of 
the annual growth rates from 2004-2008 onwards was driven by (i) growth in non-
hydrocarbon sectors (e.g., manufacturing, agriculture and construction)1232 and (ii) 
rise in private consumption1233. The upward trend of the annual GDP growth rates 
was hit by the (i) global financial crisis1234 and (ii) Arab Spring instabilities starting in 
January 2011 until 2015. The performance of the net FDI nearly coincided with that 
 
1229 The Foreign Direct Investment net (BoP current US$) is the variable catching the flows of FDI 
into or outside of an economy. The variable is calculated through subtracting the FDI inflows from 
the FDI outflows. Hence, the more negative the variable, the more the FDI inflows to an economy.  
1230 The correlation coefficient between GDP growth (annual %) and net inflows in Egypt is +0.529. 
1231 International Monetary Fund 7/12/2004. 
1232 International Monetary Fund 2007b, 4. 
1233 International Monetary Fund 2009a, 4. 
1234 International Monetary Fund 2010b, 8. 
  320  
of the annual GDP growth rates. It peaked from 2005-20101235 to record an average 
of $7.5 billion compared to an average of only $0.71 billion from 1990-2004. 
In Jordan’s case, a very weak negative correlation at -0.1231236 (weaker when com-
pared to Egypt and Morocco’s correlation coefficients) appears in the increase of 
the GDP growth rates and the net FDI simultaneously during the 2005-2008 peri-
od. Preserving a positive rate of GDP growth throughout the study period could be 
an advantage, however, the political instabilities in the region including the (i) Pales-
tinian-Israeli conflict, (ii) Iraq War of 2003 and (iii) the rise of ISIS, have had 
downward pressures on the annual GDP growth rates precluding Jordan from 
reaching its full growth capacity. For example, the significant doubling of the GDP 
growth rates in 2004 was a direct outcome of the end of the Iraq War allowing a re-
covery (i) in foreign demand on Jordanian products (from Iraq) and (ii) Jordan’s in-
dustrial production rates. For the net FDI of Jordan, the increase in the volume by 
around 67 per cent with one of its reasons being the boost in the real estate acquisi-
tions in Jordan by Iraqis1237. 
In Morocco’s case, another weak negative correlation appears between the GDP 
growth (annual  per cent) and the net FDI with a coefficient of -0.1481238 (weaker 
than in Egypt and slightly stronger than in Jordan). The patterns of both variables 
and specifically the volatility of the annual GDP growth rates made it difficult to 
identify a stronger correlation between the annual GDP growth and the net FDI of 
Morocco. The difficulty may be justified upon the volatility of the annual GDP 
growth rates specifically in the 1990s and early 2000s. This volatility was due to the 
economy’s wide dependence on the agricultural production (especially cereals) as an 
important pillar of growth1239. With the droughts and the changes in the weather 
conditions, the cereals output differed resulting in significant decreases in the annu-
al GDP growth rates. This triggered the GOM’s implementation of an economic 
diversification process to lower dependency on agricultural as the driver of econom-
ic growth. Sectors like construction and services began to boost their share in the 
GDP’s composition, however, the agriculture’s share remained significant regardless 
 
1235 The volume of the FDI inflows to Egypt was negatively affected by the global financial crisis of 
2008, before the severe reduction associated with the Arab Spring uprising of 2011. 
1236 The correlation coefficient between GDP Growth (annual %) and net inflows in Jordan is 
+0.123. 
1237 International Monetary Fund 2005b, 6-9 
1238 The correlation coefficient between GDP Growth (annual %) and net inflows in Morocco is 
+0.124. 
1239 International Monetary Fund 2005d, 5. 
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of the diversification1240. For the net FDI of Morocco, the diversification intentions 
encouraged the net FDI from 2005 to 2015 to record average annual inflows of 
$2.13 billion (compared to an average of only $0.76 billion from 1990-2005). 
With the differences in the compositions of the GDP of the three countries, the 
correlations with the net FDI differ. For example, the political stability and the eco-
nomic diversification in Morocco could be the reasons behind the stability featured 
in the recorded GDP growth rates and the inflows of FDI into Morocco specifically 
in the late 2000s. Conversely, in Egypt and Jordan, instabilities due to the (i) Arab 
Spring protests and (ii) rise of ISIS have negatively hit the GDP growth rates and 
the net FDI into the two economies from 2011 onwards. Still, the GOE efforts to 
liberalize the economy since 2004 incentivized an increase in the inflows of capital 
to the economy facilitating the recovery in annual growth rates1241. In Jordan, the 
GDP growth rates and the net FDI benefited for example from the (i) Iraqis migra-
tion to Jordan when fleeing the effects of the War of 2003 and (ii) the improve-
ments in the investment climate. 
 
VI.E.3 GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$) 
The GDP per capita developments in Egypt, Jordan and Morocco have a very 
strong negative correlation with the net FDI with coefficients of -0.585, -0.857 and 
-0.795 respectively. Having strong negative correlations between the two variables 
entails a positive correlation between GDP per capita and net inflows to the three 
 
1240 International Monetary Fund 2008, 4. 
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countries. Regardless of the continuous upward trend of the GDP per capita curves 
in the three countries, the magnitude of the correlation coefficients differed be-
tween the three countries.  
From 1990 to 2015, Egypt GDP per capita1242 increased by $1,119. Also, during the 
same study period, the average GDP per capita was $2,124. In Egypt, the recorded 
GDP per capita was the (i) lowest increase and (ii) lowest average throughout the 
study period in comparison to Jordan and Morocco. It is important to note differ-
ences in the populations’ sizes between the three countries. Therefore, in the Egyp-
tian case, the annual GDP growth rates could be insufficient to significantly im-
prove the readings of the GDP per capita due to the obvious annual increases in the 
population growth. This could be an advantage to Egypt’s market size when com-
pared to Jordan and Morocco. However, the steep increase in GDP per capita 
2005-2008 was justified upon the rise in the (i) employment rates and (ii) possibili-
ties of wealth creation1243. 
Jordan secured the highest average of GDP per capita1244 between the three coun-
tries by reaching a $3,364. The economy is experiencing a continuous expansion in 
its size (doubled GDP per capita from 1999 to 20081245). This signals a positive ob-
servation for a market seeking investors interested to invest in the Jordanian econ-
omy. In Morocco, steady growth in the GDP per capita1246 from 20001247 allowed 
the economy to record the highest increase throughout the study period. Finally, in 
Jordan and Morocco, a question for a foreign investor thinking of routing his in-
vestments into these two economies will be related to the small sized populations. 
Moreover, it is important to note the stagnation of the GDP per capita in Egypt 
and Jordan from 2011 onwards did not affect the magnitude of their correlation co-
efficients, which remained very strong with net FDI specially in the case of Jordan.  
 
1242 The correlation coefficient between GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$) and net inflows in 
Egypt is +0.615. 
1243 International Monetary Fund 2009a, 4. 
1244 The correlation coefficient between GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$) and net inflows in Jor-
dan is +0.868. 
1245 International Monetary Fund 2009b, 4. 
1246 The correlation coefficient between GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$) and net inflows in Mo-
rocco is +0.9. 
1247 International Monetary Fund 2006, 5. 
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VI.E.4 Inflation 
The inflation as a proxy for macroeconomic stability in Egypt, Jordan and Morocco. 
In general terms, Egypt maintained the highest average inflation at around 9.35 per 
cent throughout the study period reflecting a lower level of macroeconomic stabil-
ity, when compared to Jordan and Morocco. In this sense, Egypt may be considered 
as the least macro-economically stable economy. Egypt’s recorded peaks of 19.8 per 
cent in 1991 and 18.3 per cent in 2008 are the highest between the three countries 
with Morocco only at 8 per cent and Jordan at 16.2 per cent. The average inflation 
rate for Egypt is double the one recorded in Jordan and more than triple the Mo-
roccan rate. The reasons for such inflationary pressures mainly include (i) deprecia-
tions in exchange rate1248 (e.g., January 2003) and (ii) hikes in oil prices1249 and cuts in 
fuel subsidies (e.g., 2008). In the meantime, pursuant on the patterns of inflation and 
the net FDI, claiming the presence of a negative correlation between the inflation 
rate and the net FDI of Egypt is inappropriate, since the calculated correlation be-
tween both variables resulted in a weak negative coefficient at -0.1221250. 
For Morocco, the annual average inflation revolved around only 2.67 per cent. This 
has put Morocco in the first position between the three countries. Hence, Morocco 
had the highest level of macroeconomic stability. With such low inflation rates, the 
macroeconomic stability seems the least risk to negatively influence an investor’s 
decision to inflow his funds to the Morocco. In addition, the calculated correlation 
 
1248 International Monetary Fund 1/30/2003 
1249 International Monetary Fund 2009a, 4. 
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provided a strong negative coefficient at +0.5901251 between the inflation rate and 
the net FDI. The data highlighted that increases in inflation rate coincided with de-
creases in the net FDI of Morocco. It is important to highlight the benefits of Jor-
dan1252 and Morocco1253 from anchoring their local currencies with the US Dollar in 
lowering their inflation rates. 
Jordan ranked second between the three countries maintained a low average annual 
inflation at around 4 per cent (reached 15 per cent in 20081254 driven by increases in 
commodity prices) throughout the study period as a decent level of macroeconomic 
stability. Aligned with Egypt, the calculated correlation between inflation rate and 
the net FDI of Jordan provided a very weak negative coefficient at -0.1371255 (a 
stronger correlation in case of Jordan when compared to Egypt). In this regard, 
Egypt and Jordan a possible interpretation for the weak negative correlations be-
tween both variables could be interest of investors to benefit from higher demands 
in the two economies, which in the same time created a sort of inflationary pres-
sures. 
 
VI.E.5 Fixed Telephone Subscriptions (per 100 people)  
With the number of subscribers in the fixed telephones used as a proxy for the in-
frastructure quality, Egypt and Morocco had a very strong negative correlation with 
 
1251 The correlation coefficient between Inflation and net inflows in Morocco is -0.412. 
1252 International Monetary Fund 2007a, 5. 
1253 International Monetary Fund 2005d, 4. 
1254 International Monetary Fund 2009b, 5. 
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the net FDI with coefficients of -0.626 and -0.516 respectively. Having strong nega-
tive correlations between the two variables entails a positive correlation between 
GDP per capita and net inflows to the two countries. In the case of Jordan, the cal-
culations provided almost the lack of any correlation (with a coefficient of only 
0.08) between the number of fixed telephone subscribers and the net FDI of Jor-
dan. In the three countries the boom in the number of subscribers was simultane-
ous with the rise in the net FDI. In Egypt’s1256 the strong continuous negative corre-
lation may trigger conclusions concerning the possible inflows of the net FDI into 
Egypt’s infrastructure sector. This appeared in directing a lump sum of the portfolio 
funds from the international financial institutions (e.g., World Bank and IFC) to in-
frastructure projects1257.  
In the case of Jordan1258, the rate of 7.31 of 100 people was seven times the number 
and nearly two times the number of fixed telephone subscriptions in Morocco and 
Egypt respectively. The development in the infrastructure quality could be a poten-
tial reason for the latter inflows of FDI in 2005 and 2006, where the economy 
reaped the benefits of its infrastructural improvements. An example of the GOJ at-
tempts to enhance infrastructure appears in reforming the Aqaba port in 2003 elim-
inating any shipping congestions1259. However, the lack of almost any correlation be-
tween the number of subscribers in fixed telephones and the net FDI may deviate 
from the general theory regarding the positive relationship between the two varia-
bles.  
In case of Morocco1260, the strong negative correlation between the number of sub-
scribers in the fixed telephones and the net FDI seemed graphically less evident. 
Only in the late 2000s, a boom was featured in the number of subscribers per 100 
people, while the rise in the net FDI was experienced during the 2005–2008 
timeframe. The lack of the paternal link appears in the lower net FDI at the late 
2000s, while the number of fixed telephone subscriptions continued increasing. 
However, the calculated correlation provided a strong negative coefficient between 
the two variables. In this regard, a possible conclusion for the delay in the im-
provement of the fixed telephone subscriptions readings could be an increase in 
 
1256 The correlation coefficient between Fixed Telephone Subscriptions (per 100 people) and net in-
flows in Egypt is +0.65. 
1257 International Monetary Fund 2005c, 37. 
1258 The correlation coefficient between Fixed Telephone Subscriptions (per 100 people) and net in-
flows in Jordan is -0.08. 
1259 Cebotari, D. and Dennis, A. 2008, 1. 
1260 The correlation coefficient between Fixed Telephone Subscriptions (per 100 people) and net in-
flows in Morocco is +0.632. 
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public spending to such infrastructural development. Morocco’s consultations with 
the IMF confirm such understanding as in 2006 the GOM’s highlighted its willing-
ness to increase spending on infrastructure, while this was evident in the proxy data 
only three years later starting from 20091261.  
The cases of Egypt, Jordan and Morocco reflect at different levels, the attention 
paid by the policy-makers in establishing the infrastructure as needed by foreign in-
vestors interested in seeking business opportunities in these economies. Studying 
the causal link or the relationship between the two variables could assist in under-
standing the possible roles played if any by direction or directing the inflowing FDI 
to contractual and constructional public works in the countries’ infrastructure sec-
tors. 
 
VI.E.6 Life expectancy at birth, total (years)  
Life expectancy as a proxy for the human development index has a very strong neg-
ative with the net FDI of Egypt1262 (correlation coefficient of -0.538), Jordan1263 
(correlation coefficient of -0.745) and Morocco1264 (correlation coefficient of -
0.801). Having strong negative correlations between the two variables entails a posi-
tive correlation between GDP per capita and net inflows to the three countries. 
Although the readings of life expectancy continuously improve throughout the 
 
1261 International Monetary Fund 2006, 14. 
1262 The correlation coefficient between Life expectancy at birth, total (years) and net inflows in 
Egypt is +0.554. 
1263 The correlation coefficient between Life expectancy at birth, total (years) and net inflows in Jor-
dan is +0.758. 
1264 The correlation coefficient between Life expectancy at birth, total (years) and net inflows in 
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study period, regardless of the performance of the net FDI, the calculations provid-
ed a very strong negative correlation. In Morocco’s case, the life expectancy rates 
significantly improved throughout the study period. This was supported for exam-
ple by the National Initiative for Human Development introduced by King Mo-
hamed VI in 20051265. The Moroccan average life expectancy for the study period is 
69.6 years old allowing Morocco to rank second between the three countries after 
Jordan. Furthermore, the improvement by one-year in the life expectancy of a Mo-
roccan was attainable in shorter periods when compared to Jordan. 
In Jordan, the increase in life expectancy by one-year was attainable every six years. 
Although the improvement in life expectancy throughout the study period was lim-
ited (possibly due to the good starting point in 1990), the World Bank funded the 
GOJ plans to boost education and health1266. In the case of Egypt, and regardless of 
the sluggish increases in the 2000s, Egypt secured the second ranking after Morocco 
in the number of years added since 1990 until 2015 with a total of 6.8 years. The life 
expectancy increase in the number of years could have been higher, however, the 
GOE’s policies favoured the reduction of social expenditures on health1267. The In-




1265 International Monetary Fund 2005d, 59 and International Monetary Fund 2008, 47.  
1266 International Monetary Fund 2005b, 52. 
1267 International Monetary Fund 2007b, 14. 
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VI.E.7 Merchandise Trade (as  per cent of GDP) 
From the merchandise trade, it is possible to deduce the strong negative correlation 
between the merchandise trade as per centage of GDP and the net FDI of Egypt, 
Jordan and Morocco. However, the magnitude of the negative correlation coeffi-
cients between both variables differed between the three economies. Morocco came 
on top of the list with a correlation coefficient of -0.7741269, before Jordan with -
0.6961270 and finally Egypt with a coefficient -0.6611271. The negative correlations ev-
ident in the three countries could be a proof of the close contact between trade lib-
eralization and the movement of capital and inflows of FDI to the three economies. 
By checking the average merchandise trade as a per centage of GDP, Egypt record-
ed the lowest average when compared to the two other countries. The highest read-
ings of merchandise trade per centages in Egypt and Jordan were from 2005 to 
2008, came in conjunction with the highest inflows of FDI during the second half 
of the 2000s, while for Morocco the highest readings were from 2011 to 2015 and 
were in conjunction with the highest inflows of FDI during the same period. The 
strong negative correlation is evident with the increases in the merchandise trade as 
a per centage of GDP from 2003-2008. 
The Jordanian economy experienced the highest rates of merchandise trade as per 
centage of GDP. Jordan’s average merchandise trade during the study period was 
88.7 per cent compared to Egypt’s and Morocco’s averages of 30.1 per cent and 
49.1 per cent respectively. Furthermore, the peak reading for the merchandise trade 
in Jordan was 118 per cent, while in Egypt and Morocco was only 45.8 per cent and 
67.8 per cent. These evidences reflect the higher level of integration of Jordan in the 
global economy. In this regard, Jordan higher rates of trade and integration may 
have facilitated the negative correlation with the net FDI of Jordan. The continued 
high rates of participation in global trade were supported by the structural changes 
implemented by King Abdullah since acceding throne in 1999. These reforms from 
2000-2004 included for example Jordan’s (i) membership of the World Trade Or-
ganization in 20001272 and (ii) conclusion of FTA with the US1273, Singapore and an 
Association Agreement with the EU1274. 
 
1269 The correlation coefficient between Merchandise Trade (as % of GDP) and net inflows in Mo-
rocco is +0.834. 
1270 The correlation coefficient between Merchandise Trade (as % of GDP) and net inflows in Jor-
dan is +0.699. 
1271 The correlation coefficient between Merchandise Trade (as % of GDP) and net inflows in Egypt 
is +0.696. 
1272 International Monetary Fund 2005b, 29. 
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Morocco recorded the widest change when comparing the starting and the ending 
readings of the chosen indicator. While Jordan and Egypt recording readings in 
2015 below their readings in 1990, Morocco recorded a 26 per cent increase in its 
trade levels. This highlights the policymakers focus on enhancing the economy’s 
openness and integration in the global economic activity. This inclination and stress 
of openness may have signaled the country’s interest in globalization strengthening 
the negative correlation with the net FDI of Morocco. The increases in global trade 
involvement began by the accession of King Mohamed VI the throne in Morocco. 
The process of liberalizing trade for example included the (i) conclusion of FTAs 
with the EU, US, Turkey and the Agadir Agreement1275 and (ii) reduction of tariff 
rates from 33 per cent in 2002 to 20 per cent in 20081276. 
Egypt similar to Jordan finished the study period recording a reading below the 
starting reading. By checking the average merchandise trade as a per centage of 
GDP, Egypt recorded the lowest average when compared to the two other coun-
tries. This confirms the lower trade openness in Egypt’s economy when compared 
to Jordan and Morocco. The Egyptian policymakers for long favoured through the 
1960s the import-substitution policies. The traces of such policies could be evident 
in the lower trade levels of the 1990s. On the other hand, the (i) reduction of 
weighted average tariffs from 9 per cent to 6.9 per cent in January 20071277, (ii) cut-
ting of the number of ad valorem customs from 27 to 6, (iii) abolishment of discre-
tionary customs were all reasons to boost Egypt’s merchandise trade as a per 
centage of the GDP1278 (iv) easing the customs clearance process from 20 days in 
2003 to 1 day in 20071279. Furthermore, although the trade levels of Egypt are lower, 
it could host more FDI based on its bigger population offering investors a stronger 
demand. The benefits derived from such demand could exceed the cost of operat-
ing in less globally-integrated economy. 
 
1273 International Monetary Fund 2007a, 5. 
1274 International Monetary Fund 2005b, 30. 
1275 International Monetary Fund 2006, 14. 
1276 International Monetary Fund 2010a, 16. 
1277 International Monetary Fund 2007b, 10. 
1278 International Monetary Fund 2005c, 51. 
1279 Rachid 2007. 
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VI.E.8 Foreign ownership/investment restriction 
Seventh, from the economic freedom variable as represented in the foreign owner-
ship/investment restrictions, the possible conclusion is the strong negative correla-
tion between Egypt’s investment restrictions indicator and the net FDI with a coef-
ficient of -0.3381280. The negative correlation between the two variables entails that 
an increase in the reading of the foreign ownership/ investment restrictions varia-
bles (i.e., lower foreign ownership/investment restrictions) coincides with an in-
crease in the net FDI of Egypt. This conclusion comes in line with the general theo-
ry concerning the higher interest of foreign investors to route their investments to 
an economy where the legal rules impose less restrictions on their investments in 
general and/or their ownership of business in specific. 
Egypt introduced changes to its IGIL, the deregulation of other legislations govern-
ing investment were necessary to secure the foreign investments flows into Egypt. 
With the lowest average between the countries, Egypt had an average of 6.35 in 
connection to the investment restrictions on foreign ownership. The overhauling of 
the domestic legal rules in 2004 was not reflected significantly on the readings of the 
investments restrictions since it remained around 6. Moreover, the initial readings 
recorded prior to and simultaneous with the introduction of the IGIL were never 
reached again based on several possible justifications including the lack of (i) politi-
cal stability (e.g., Arab Spring) and (ii) political will (reform fatigue1281) to approach 
 
1280 The correlation coefficient between foreign ownership/investment restrictions and net inflows in 
Egypt is +0.329. 
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publicly sensitive topics as those of abolishing restrictions on foreign investments. 
Based on the averages, the Egypt foreign ownership/investment restrictions read-
ings put it in the third position when addressing this variable in comparison to Jor-
dan and Morocco. Nevertheless, Egypt remains the only economy with a significant 
correlation between the variable of the foreign ownership/investment restrictions 
and the net FDI since in the other two economies the correlation was nearly negli-
gible. 
Egypt’s scenario of openness dates to July 2004 upon the appointment of business-
men based government. One of the first steps of the new GOE of developing the 
legal rules was facilitating the doing of business in Egypt. In this regard, Egypt 
topped the reformers in the World Bank Doing Business of 2008 by, for example, 
cutting the capital requirements for companies’ incorporation as well as the number 
of days to finalize such process1282. Another measure was the introduction of a new 
Income Tax Law in 2005 lowering the corporate income tax rate from 40 per cent 
and 32 per cent to a flat rate of only 20 per cent1283. Moreover, the direct re-
launching of the privatization program allowing the privatization of 17 companies 
within the first 9 months1284. The program continued even at a stronger pace for the 
following two years. Finally, the GOE since the early 2000s adopted a business-
oriented legislative agenda entailing the introduction of the (i) Intellectual Property 
Rights Law, (ii) Special Natured Economic Zones Law, (iii) Telecommunication 
Law, (iv) Banking Law, (v) Competition Law and etc. 
 
 
1282 World Bank Group 2008 
1283 Ramalho 2007. 
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In the case of Jordan, a lag may appear between the legal changes and the increases 
in the volume of net FDI. Based on the calculation of the correlation between the 
investment restrictions indicator and the net FDI of Jordan, the coefficient a very 
weak negative one (nearly negligible) at -0.0871285. From the readings of the invest-
ment restrictions indicator, it may be concluded the obvious role of the Jordanian 
Investment Laws in eliminating or lessening the restrictions applicable upon foreign 
investments. The introduction of the three Investment Laws were directly followed 
by higher readings in the foreign investment restriction indicator, which may imply 
an increase in the expected net FDI. An additional important observation is Jor-
dan’s higher recorded average based on the 16 available readings at 7.27, when 
compared to Egypt and Morocco. As per this indicator, it may be concluded that 
Jordan’s legal rules have less foreign investment restrictions when compared to 
Egypt and Morocco. This justifies the continuous intervention by the GOJ to stim-
ulate net FDI through legislations. Finally, it is important to note that using the net 
FDI indicator in monetary terms when compared to the per centage of the GDP 
could reflect another view. As per centage of the GDP, Jordan could have received 
the highest net FDI compared to Egypt and Morocco, however, this was not the 
case from the monetary side.  
Having the investment restrictions indicator resembling the investment climate, it 
encompasses the effects of developments of the investment-related legal rules. In 
addition to the above addressed amendments in Jordan’s Investment Laws, there 
were examples of other plans adopted by the GOJ to develop the legal rules, the in-
dicator’s reading and possibly the net FDI of Jordan. On top of these came the pri-
vatization plan, which allowed the GOJ to dispose its shares in Jordan Telecom, the 
Cement factories, Royal Airlines. Such plan resulted in (i) improving the efficiency 
of these service providers, (ii) creating jobs and (iii) increase the FX reserves of Jor-
dan with inflows of nearly $1 billion from 1996-20041286. Other investment-oriented 
measures included the establishment of the Aqaba Special Economic Zone in 
20011287 as a hub for environment-oriented investments. This required modernizing 
the Aqaba Port in 2003 from on both levels infrastructure and administration1288. 
In case of Morocco, the calculation of the correlation between the investment re-
strictions indicator and the net FDI, the coefficient was a very weak negative one 
 
1285 The correlation coefficient between foreign ownership/investment restrictions and net inflows in 
Jordan is +0.095. 
1286 International Monetary Fund 2005b, 30. 
1287 Aqaba Special Economic Zone Authority 
1288 This was briefly referenced under footnote 19. 
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(nearly negligible) at +0.0591289. It may be true to conclude the lack of correlation 
between both notions prior to 2011, while in the period afterwards, a strong nega-
tive correlation could be identified. The Moroccan readings when compared to the 
two other countries show an average of 6.63 from only 13 readings. When especially 
compared to Jordan, the IC did not experience any legislative changes, while in Jor-
dan three investment legislations were introduced throughout only the study period. 
The difficulty in identifying the correlation between the legal rules and the net FDI 
prior to 2011 may be connected to the absence of any subsequent amendments to 
the main legislation governing investments being the IC introduced in 1995. Based 
on the averages, the Morocco foreign ownership/investment restrictions put it in 
the second position when assessing the legal framework with the least/most in-
vestment restrictions against foreign investments. 
The investment climate changes in the legal rules in Morocco were more linked to 
the financial sector, through efforts to align it with the international practices. In 
addition, the GOM introduced a reduction to the corporate income tax rate in 2008 
from 35 per cent to 30 per cent1290. In the same manner, the simplification of the 
VAT system in 2009 entailed reducing the general rate in order to encourage for-
malizing the informal sector, thus, widening the tax base1291. The inauguration of 
“Green Morocco Plan”1292 in 2008 to modernize the Moroccan agricultural system 
through mechanization and the use of the latest technologies in order to magnify its 
contribution to the GDP. It aims to overcome the problems of (i) low water re-
sources and droughts, (ii) land fragmentation between small farmers and (iii) weak 
national policy in determining the cultivated crops in order to attain the optimum 
benefit from agriculture. 
 
1289 The correlation coefficient between foreign ownership/investment restrictions and net inflows in 
Morocco is -0.192. 
1290 International Monetary Fund 2008, 47. 
1291 International Monetary Fund 2010a, 15. 
1292 Ministry of Agriculture and Maritime Fishing of Morocco 
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VII. Conclusion 
The centre-focus of the thesis was the role of an economy’s domestic legal rules in 
attracting FDI inflows to that economy. The legal rules governing investment were 
represented in bilateral (e.g., BITs) and unilateral tools (e.g., domestic laws). States’ 
interested in attracting FDI attempt to use both tools in pursuing their objective. 
On the bilateral side, the investment partners (i.e., Contracting States) conclude 
BITs to govern the treatment accorded to the investors of both parties in each Con-
tracting State. These BITs encompass a set of protections and guarantees for for-
eign investors regarding their investments in the host states. On the other hand, the 
policy makers of a state may launch a program to unilaterally reform their domestic 
legal rules, making them more investment friendly. The thesis emphasises the uni-
lateral efforts of the three countries covering the main legal changes on paper and in 
practise, besides their potential correlations with the FDI inflows.  
It is important to highlight the role of BITs being the umbrella encompassing the 
protections and guarantees, which could have been later adopted into the domestic 
laws of the countries through the unilateral efforts. The substantive protections of 
BITs together with a brief historical overview of the creation of the international 
investment law were introduced in the theoretical framework to familiarize the 
reader with the main protections under discussion within the following chapters of 
the thesis. This was followed with chapter III where the economic history for each 
of the three countries was introduced in order to identify the (i) similar features be-
tween the countries economic heritage (e.g., role of government in economic activi-
ty) and (ii) economic base from which the legal changes (e.g., introduce the invest-
ment laws) of the 1990s started at the beginning of the market openness phase. 
Chapter IV focused on the domestic legal framework of each of the three countries. 
The chapter used two methodologies; (i) legal historical desktop and (ii) functional 
comparative analysis. Each of the legal framework chapters provided an overview 
of a country’s domestic legal system in relation to investment. This entailed (i) an 
analysis of references to investments in constitutions, and (ii) a review of the spe-
cially introduced investment laws and their main features and incentives. The chap-
ter proceeded with the interaction between the international investment law princi-
ples (i.e., substantive protections) and the domestic investment laws of the coun-
tries. It dealt with the potential alignment and mirroring of the previously intro-
duced protections in the domestic legal rules of the countries. Moreover, the chap-
ter addressed the policies implemented in order to consolidate transforming the 
  336  
domestic market into a free market where the private sector leads the economic ac-
tivity. Chapter V intended through - the case-law analysis methodology - to narrow 
the gap between the protections on-paper under the domestic investment laws and 
the practice of policy makers in each of the three countries. The chapter investigat-
ed in depth a set of cases filed by foreign investors in the ICSID arbitration against 
any of the three countries. 
Chapter VI focused on the potential correlations between the changes in the do-
mestic legal rules and the performance of FDI inflows into each of the three coun-
tries. Using the descriptive analytics methodology, the chapter identified seven vari-
ables based on the preceding literature regarding the determinants of the FDI in-
flows into an economy. The variables included; (i) GDP Growth, (ii) Inflation, (iii) 
Fixed Telephone Subscriptions (per 100 people), (iv) Merchandise Trade (as  per 
cent of GDP), (v) GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$), (vi) Life expectancy at birth, 
total (years), and (vii) Foreign ownership/investment restriction. The economic 
analysis calculated the correlations between net FDI and the seven variables. It pro-
vided the possible explanations for such patterns and correlations. Moreover, the 
analysis focused on identifying correlations and not causations between the patterns 
of the seven variables and the net FDI of each of the economies of the three coun-
tries. 
VII.A Research question 
As the thesis question is; how are the legal rules applied in an economy correlated with the 
FDI inflows into it? The research question was addressed in chapters IV, V and VI, 
however, each from a different perspective. Based on an understanding promoting 
the importance of a host state to accord foreign investors a standardised treatment 
in order to increase investors’ certainty and in turn their investment flows, chapter 
IV answered the research question in from the theoretical on-paper perspective.  
Chapter IV’s answer was provided over two parts. First, it investigated the degree of 
alignment of the domestic investment laws with the substantive protections pre-
scribed under the international investment law. From this side, the three countries 
witnessed continuous developments in their domestic legal systems on the way to 
align it with the international investment law. However, at varying rates these devel-
opments were not sufficient to deem the domestic legal systems of the three coun-
tries fully aligned with the international investment law, since conflicts between the 
former and the latter in different contexts may be still traceable. Accordingly, put-
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ting together the importance of the investors’ standardised treatment and the partial 
alignment of the domestic legal systems of the three countries with the international 
investment law, the prices of the factors of production (e.g., foreign investors access 
to lands) decreased making the countries more attractive as investment destinations. 
Taking into account the above, the changes in the domestic legal rules in this sense 
possibly would have a positive correlated to the FDI inflows. 
Second, it examined the transformation in the orientation of the policymakers in the 
three countries towards deregulating the domestic markets in order to offer a wider 
space for the private sector to participate in leading the economy’s business activi-
ties instead of the government. The transformation towards the private sector in-
cluded for example easing the process of business incorporation, streamlining bu-
reaucracy, introducing tax incentives and etc. These measures were all within the 
scope of cutting transaction costs for foreign investors interested in carrying-out 
business activities in any of the three countries. Apart from reducing the legal barri-
ers to entry into the domestic markets, the deregulation allowed the foreign inves-
tors to inflow their investments in new sectors previously monopolized or highly-
regulated by the State. Another important policy executed to serve the above-
mentioned transformation was the launch of the privatization programs. The three 
countries opened doors for privatizing SOEs, as a clear evidence for the intention 
to reduce the government’s intervention in the economic activity in favour of the 
private sector. These legal evidences could possibly stimulate the inflows of invest-
ments into the three countries. 
On the economic side, the thesis attempted to trace the correlations between the 
changes in the legal rules and the performance of the net FDI into the three coun-
tries. The correlation question was addressed after the inclusion of seven other de-
terminants of the FDI in order to catch their impacts on the FDI performance. The 
economic freedom variables was introduced to the chapter VI as a proxy variable to 
catch the impact of the changes in the legal rules by making them more investor 
friendly and market oriented. More specifically, only the foreign owner-
ship/investment restriction was used as a reference for the economic freedom vari-
able.  
The initial hypothesis provided for a possible increase in the FDI inflows to an 
economy as it proceeds further with its deregulation and opening the market for 
foreign investors. The actual data of the economic freedom sub-component and the 
FDI inflows have confirmed such correlation between the rise in legal rules deregu-
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lation and the increase in the FDI inflows into the three countries. In Egypt, it was 
possible to identify a moderate negative correlation between the foreign owner-
ship/investment restriction indicator and the net FDI to the country. This entails 
that the decrease in the net FDI (i.e., higher FDI inflows to Egypt) is correlated with 
higher readings of the indicator of foreign ownership/investment restriction (i.e., 
lower restrictions on foreign ownership/investment). In cases of Jordan and Mo-
rocco, the correlation between the foreign ownership/investment restriction indica-
tor and the net FDI to each of the two countries was negligible. and it is possible to 
conclude the lack of a correlation between both notions prior to 2011, while in the 
period afterwards, a strong positive correlation could be identified. 
VII.B Academic relevance 
The thesis consolidates the conclusions derived in the preceding literature of the 
LLSV, Trebilcock, Laffont and Stiglitz. To begin with LLSV, the thesis consolidates 
two conclusions of those reached by LLSV. First, LLSV studied the role of the his-
torical origins and culture in influencing the legal rules of a country. The similar his-
torical origins of the three countries since colonization and even before influenced 
their adopted legal rules, as in the three countries establishment based on the civil 
law legal system. The second consolidated conclusion was related to the globaliza-
tion’s role in transforming the legal rules enacted in a country making them market 
oriented and investor friendly. The thesis consolidated such understanding as evi-
dent in the continuous deregulation of the countries’ legal rules in the 1990s includ-
ing the introduction of a special investment law.  
The second paper considered of those part of the preceding literature is Trebil-
cock’s. In this paper, the emphasis was more upon the role of culture, history, polit-
ical and institutional influences on the legal rules. The nearly shared cultural, histori-
cal, institutional and political traditions at different decades since the 1950s resulted 
in similar legal rules introduced in the three countries ate nearly the same timings 
(e.g., investment laws in 1995 and 1997). In regard to the role of the domestic stake-
holders and the international institutions in modernizing the domestic legal rules, 
the three countries could be good examples of the interaction between the domestic 
stakeholders interested in attracting FDI and the international institutions that pro-
vided support when requested (e.g., during the debt crisis period). 
The third paper addressed within the introduction of the thesis as preceding litera-
ture was Stiglitz’s book of Making Globalization Work. As briefly mentioned in Tre-
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bilcock’s paper, the support provided by the international institutions and specifical-
ly during the debt crisis was support conditioned upon the compliance with the 
Washington Consensus comprising of deregulating the domestic markets, limiting 
the government’s role in economic activity and the promotion of privatization as an 
easier way of boosting the private sector’s share in the economic activities of the 
countries. The thesis provided in more than one instance evidences for the trans-
formation in the policy-orientation witnessed in the three countries. Similarly, in 
Laffont’s paper, the discussion studied the mirroring of the developed countries le-
gal rules in the developing ones. In fact, this was evident as part of the Washington 
Consensus supporting the three countries in deregulating their markets for private 
investors and specifically foreign ones. However, chapter V highlighted the gap (e.g., 
Egypt) between the of the actual implementation of the legislations and their initial 
form on-paper when previously copied from developed countries. 
VII.C Policy relevance 
The framing of the legal rules in order to attract FDI needed to stimulate economic 
growth has been the concern of the three countries, especially after the global fi-
nancial crisis and the Arab Spring instabilities. This was evident in the continuous 
efforts exerted by the three countries in the recent decades principally by introduc-
ing investment laws1293 and other market deregulatory legal changes. The thesis’s 
discussion regarding (i) the alignment of the domestic legal systems with the interna-
tional investment law and (ii) the de-regulation and opening of the domestic mar-
kets for the private sector fits within the current discussion featured in the three 
countries regarding the means of attracting FDI and the role of the government in 
economic activity. This makes the thesis up-to-date and even adds to its originality 
being one of the earliest academic papers to address the latest legislations of the 
countries (e.g., Egypt’s recently introduced new Investment Law No. 72 of 2017). 
Another policy perspective with a slight social side is the relationship between the 
populations of the countries and foreign investors. The long-history of colonization 
and continuous western armed interventions in the MENA region resulted in the 
eruption of sensitivities and lack of trust between the populations of the countries 
and many of the home countries of foreign investors and in turn the latter were af-
fected. The sensitivities were at their highest point directly after the de-colonization 
 
1293 For an example of the current discussions in Egypt, please see in Noueihed, L. and Feteha, A. 
2017  
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period when the new regimes adopted nationalistic-oriented legal rules to establish 
their sovereignty. With the elapse of time and the cultural and political develop-
ments, the countries began to moderate their nationalistic tones and this was re-
flected on their legal rules, which accepted foreign investments and accorded them a 
sort of an equal treatment. However, there are still legal rules applicable in the three 
countries unchanged since the nationalistic tones in the post de-colonization period 
(e.g., right of foreign ownership of agricultural lands). This remain a significant ex-
ample of the detestations between the countries populations and policy-makers and 
foreign investors. 
An important policy aspect for the thesis’s discussion could be relevant to the im-
pact of such rules on the quality of the legal system of the countries from three 
sides. First, the more the legal rules of the countries are aligned with the interna-
tional investment law, the closer the countries in guaranteeing a standardised treat-
ment to foreign investors. Such standardised treatment could be perceived as having 
a positive impact on the quality of the legal system of the host economy from the 
side of the foreign investors and their home countries who would welcome such 
developments in treatment. Conversely, a higher quality of the legal system for for-
eign investors does not in turn mean a positive outcome for other legal rules’ stake-
holders especially the host countries’ policy makers who experience more re-
strictions over their rights to regulate investments for public purposes (e.g., envi-
ronmental and labour issues). This moves the discussion to the policy trade-off be-
tween the guaranteeing protection to foreign investors as part of the standardised 
treatment as opposed to the host state’s sovereignty to act as represented in its right 
to regulate foreign investments for public purposes. 
Second, the standardised treatment based on the alignment of the legal rules with 
the international investment law, allows the countries to benefit from the interna-
tional support and expertise in enforcing the newly adopted legal rules. Also, after 
alignment, the countries may benefit from the foreign countries jurisprudence as 
guidance in defining and applying the international investment law substantive pro-
tections. Such benefit may be limited or delayed based on the lag in spilling over the 
legal rules on cross-jurisdictional level. When providing the international support or 
the practise in foreign jurisprudence, it is important to consider the domestic legal, 
cultural and political backgrounds of the countries (e.g., the role of Shari’a Law in 
the legal systems of the countries). 
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Third, a substantive protection as allowing foreign investors to access third-party 
dispute settlements may be perceived as having a positive impact on the quality of 
the legal system in the countries and specifically the litigation system. Critics are di-
rected towards the efficiency of the judiciary in the countries as concluded within 
the EBRD assessment concerning the judiciary system in the countries. By guaran-
teeing foreign investors the right to access third-party dispute settlements, the guar-
antee itself remedies the deficiencies associated with the judiciary of the three coun-
tries. The procedural side of international arbitration governs the composition of 
the Tribunals in a manner allowing them to have higher levels of knowledge and 
understanding of the dispute and its sector when compared to the local judges who 
usually lack the necessary knowledge regarding the modern business and economic 
related laws. Furthermore, the independence embedded in international arbitration 
as a mechanism for dispute settlement overcomes any negativities associated with 
the (i) partiality of the local judiciary or (ii) pressures of the domestic politicians and 
policy-makers. 
The last policy aspect addressed within the thesis was the economics side. On this 
level, the developments in the legal rules of the countries signalled their openness 
generally to the private sector and specifically to foreign investors. Moreover, the 
alignment of the domestic legal rules with the substantive protections of the inter-
national investment law signalled the countries (i) willingness to compromise partly 
their sovereign rights in regulating investments for public purposes and (ii) credibil-
ity as investment partners by abolishing legal rules possibly in violation of the sub-
stantive protections. The countries objectively used both signals to attract FDI. 
There is no doubt regarding the success of the signalling policies as evident in chap-
ter VI through examining the correlation between the economic freedom proxy of 
foreign ownership/investment restrictions and the FDI inflows into each country 
study. 
VII.D Limitations 
Although the research for the thesis required addressing the topic from different 
sides including history, law, economics and even other sides with a limited perspec-
tive, the list of research limitations extends to cover many issues uncovered within 
the thesis and on top of them are these five. First, the thesis did not address the re-
lationship between FDI inflows and development. In other words, being focused 
on how the legal rules can attract FDI into the countries, the thesis did not deal 
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with the questions regarding the effect of the FDI inflows on the levels of devel-
opment in the countries. The thesis cannot reach any conclusions regarding the role 
of the increase in FDI inflows in making the populations of the countries better-off 
or live at higher standards. The previously introduced papers of LLSV, Trebilcock, 
Stiglitz and Laffont added to the thesis in relation to the origination of the legal 
rules and not their effects on development. Another issue out of the scope of the 
thesis is the relationship between the FDI inflows and the re-distribution of wealth 
between the economy’s stakeholders. The thesis did not discuss any questions asso-
ciated with economic inequalities. 
Third, the thesis focused on the economic orientation of the countries’ studied gov-
ernments from the 1950s to the 2000s. However, it did not tackle the influence and 
implications of a country’s system on the framing of its investment policy and laws. 
This, in particular, appears in chapter VI, where the correlations studied do not re-
fer to any politically related variables. 
Fourth, an important limitation relevant to chapter VI is the reverse causality be-
tween a set of variables chosen within the descriptive analytics. In this regard, it will 
be helpful to provide an example of the relationship between the economic free-
dom and the FDI inflows. Such a relationship may have two sides representing the 
reverse causality. On the one hand, the increase in economic freedom may result in 
an increase in the FDI inflows. On the other hand, and as a reverse causation, the 
increase in FDI inflows into an economy may incentivize the policy-makers in that 
economy to work on boosting the level of economic freedom in their economy. By 
then, the reverse causality affects negatively the accuracy of the outcomes. Hence, 
the thesis aimed at investigating the correlations (and not causations) between eco-
nomic freedom and the FDI inflows. 
Fifth, another limitation to Chapter VI is the non-inclusion of a proxy variable to 
catch the economic situation in the home countries (e.g., main investment partners) 
from which most of the FDI inflows into the countries. Obviously, favourable eco-
nomic conditions at home may incentivize a home state’s national investor to inject 
his funds abroad in order to generate higher profits and vice versa. This was evident 
in the FDI inflows performance to the three countries, which experienced a deterio-
ration in 2008-2009 in conjunction with the global financial crisis. The same re-
mains true during the mid-2000s when the world economy featured a recovery, the 
FDI inflows to the three countries were on the rise. Another influential considera-
tion is the appetite of home countries investors in case of developed economies to 
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inject their funds in emerging markets (e.g., the three countries) in order to benefit 
from their positive economic growth rates. Other excluded variables possibly de-
termining the levels of FDI inflows into an economy are political stability, corrup-
tion and a proxy for the rule of law. 
VII.E Further research 
The future research in this context could be directly linked to the preceding sub-
section dealing with the research limitations. In this regard, the future research 
could adopt an econometric model approach to investigate the impact of the seven 
variables on the performance of the FDI inflows into the three countries or even on 
a wider sample (e.g., all the MENA or Arab countries). Such approach would guar-
antee a more accurate outcome for the analysis since it would be easier to identify 
the causal links (instead of only correlations) between the seven variables and the 
FDI inflows. Moreover, future research may include other FDI determinants (e.g., 
corruption, political freedom and economic status in home countries) when con-
ducting the econometric analysis in order to catch a wider picture for the impact of 
each FDI determinant.  
An important field of future research could address the role of legal rules in reach-
ing development. In this sense, the thesis focused on the correlation of legal rules 
and the FDI inflows to an economy, without neither examining the impacts of the 
legal rules on development nor the impact of the resulting FDI inflows on the de-
velopment of an economy. The previously discussed papers of LLSV, Trebilcock, 
Stiglitz and Laffont could provide preliminary guidance for any future academic 
works within this scope. Other issues of future research in relation to the four pa-
pers could be the role of colonization in framing the legislations concerning the 
rights of foreigners to own agricultural lands in developing (recently colonized) 
countries. Furthermore, the post-colonial nationalist ideologies and their roles in 
framing the legislations possibly still in place in many developing economies. This 
comes as part of the continuous discussion regarding the North-South relationships 
where the South members may signal levels of detestation towards the North mem-
bers as the previous colonial powers. 
The thesis discussed the motivations of policy-makers when (i) engaging in BITs 
and (ii) changing their legal rules (e.g., deregulation, openness and privatization) to 
attract FDI into their economies. At the start, such developments may appear as 
unilateral initiatives of the countries. This could be partly true, however, would not 
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resemble the whole big picture. In fact, the changes in the domestic legal rules of 
the countries was not solely based on the unilateral initiatives. Part of such changes 
were funding conditions imposed by the international financial institutions (e.g., 
IMF and the World Bank) when providing financial assistance during the different 
interactions between the countries and former. Another party interested in such 
changes other than the domestic policymakers and the international financial insti-
tutions could be the investors’ home state governments. Being the main investment 
partners, the home state governments may pressure the countries in order to frame 
their domestic legal rules in a manner beneficial for the home state investors. The 
role of each of the above parties interested in changing the legal rules should be ad-
dressed separately in future works. 
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IX. Summary 
The aim of this PhD thesis is to investigate the correlation between the legal rules 
applied in an economy and its Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows. The paper 
examines, from a Law and Economics perspective, the development of legal rules in 
Egypt, Jordan and Morocco to promote investment and attract foreign inflows, and 
how this correlated with the actual volumes of FDI inflows into each of the three 
countries.  
The thesis is split into seven chapters including the introduction and conclusion. 
Chapter II sets out the theoretical framework governing the thesis. It introduces the 
history of international investment law until the emergence of Bilateral Investment 
Treaties (BITs), the motives of policy-makers when engaging in BITs and, finally, 
the substantive protections of BITs. Chapter III provides a brief overview of the 
economic history of the three countries, from independence to market openness 
and passing through their debt crises. The chapter assists in identifying further simi-
larities between the three countries. 
Using a functional comparative analysis, the legal analysis begins in chapter IV with 
an introduction of the domestic legal framework governing investments in the three 
countries. This chapter takes the reader through the development of the legislation 
in each of Egypt, Jordan and Morocco, with a specific focus on the alignment of 
domestic legislation in these three countries with the protections accorded under 
the BITs, and the changing nature of the legislation from being highly restrictive to 
more liberal and market-oriented.   
Chapter V continues the legal analysis but uses a case law analysis approach when 
exploring the claims filed against the three countries in ICSID arbitration. The 
chapter analyses a set of cases for each of the three countries in order to draw con-
clusions regarding their understandings of international investment law and their 
behaviour towards foreign investors. 
Chapter VI proceeds with the economic analysis of the FDI volumes in the three 
countries. Based on the chosen set of variables, the chapter mainly through descrip-
tive analytics identifies correlations and patterns between the reviewed variables and 
the net FDI throughout the study period in the three countries. The analysis re-
mains limited to correlations and not causations.  
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Finally, the thesis concludes with statements of both a legal and economic nature. 
On the legal side, Egypt, Jordan and Morocco continuously developed their invest-
ment legal frameworks, seeking the enhancement of their investment climates in 
order to attract investors through rationalizing the factors of production prices, re-
ducing transaction costs of investments, and mitigating the risks borne by investors. 
Further, the three countries similarly adapted their economies from being centrally-
planned, highly regulated and investment restrictive to becoming more private-
sector based, deregulated and investment friendly. On the economic side, the in-
vestment legal restrictions proved to be positively correlated to the net inflows of 
FDI of Egypt, while the two variables were negligibly correlated in the cases of Jor-
dan and Morocco. 
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X. Samenvatting 
Het doel van dit proefschrift is om de correlatie te onderzoeken tussen de 
rechtsregels die worden toegepast in een economisch systeem en de instroom van 
Buitenlandse Directe Investeringen (BDI). In het proefschrift wordt vanuit 
juridisch en economisch oogpunt de ontwikkeling onderzocht van rechtsregels in 
Egypte, Jordanië en Marokko om investeringen te bevorderen en buitenlandse 
kapitaalstromen aan te trekken, en wordt nagegaan hoe dit zich verhoudt tot de 
werkelijke omvang van de instroom van buitenlandse directe investeringen in elk 
van de drie landen.  
Het proefschrift is onderverdeeld in zeven hoofdstukken, waaronder de inleiding en 
conclusie. Hoofdstuk II beschrijft het theoretisch kader van het proefschrift. Dit 
hoofdstuk biedt een inleiding in de geschiedenis van het internationaal 
investeringsrecht tot het ontstaan van bilaterale investeringsverdragen (BIV’s), de 
motieven van beleidsmakers wanneer zij zich bezighouden met BIV’s en, ten slotte, 
de materiële bescherming van BIV’s. Hoofdstuk III geeft een kort overzicht van de 
economische geschiedenis van de drie landen, van onafhankelijkheid tot 
openstelling van de markt en het doorstaan van hun schuldencrises. Dit hoofdstuk 
draagt bij aan het vaststellen van verdere overeenkomsten tussen de drie landen. 
Aan de hand van een functionele vergelijkende analyse begint de juridische analyse 
in hoofdstuk IV met een uiteenzetting van het nationale juridische kader voor 
investeringen in de drie landen. Dit hoofdstuk neemt de lezer mee in de 
ontwikkeling van de wetgeving in Egypte, Jordanië en Marokko, met bijzondere 
aandacht voor de aanpassing van de binnenlandse wetgeving in deze drie landen aan 
de bescherming die de BIV’s bieden, en de veranderende aard van de wetgeving van 
zeer restrictief naar liberaler en marktgerichter. 
Hoofdstuk V zet de juridische analyse voort, maar hanteert een analyse van de 
jurisprudentie bij het onderzoeken van de vorderingen die in ICSID-arbitragezaken 
tegen de drie landen zijn ingediend. In dit hoofdstuk wordt voor elk van de drie 
landen een aantal zaken geanalyseerd om conclusies te trekken over hun 
opvattingen over internationaal investeringsrecht en hun gedrag ten aanzien van 
buitenlandse investeerders. 
Hoofdstuk VI gaat verder met de economische analyse van de omvang van de BDI 
in de drie landen. Op basis van de gekozen reeks variabelen identificeert dit 
hoofdstuk voornamelijk door beschrijvende analyses correlaties en patronen tussen 
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de beoordeelde variabelen en de netto BDI gedurende de gehele onderzoeksperiode 
in de drie landen. De analyse blijft beperkt tot correlaties en gaat niet in op 
oorzakelijke verbanden.  
Het proefschrift sluit af met uitspraken van zowel juridische als economische aard. 
Op juridisch gebied hebben Egypte, Jordanië en Marokko hun wettelijke kaders 
voor investeringen voortdurend verder ontwikkeld, waarbij zij ernaar streefden hun 
investeringsklimaat te verbeteren om investeerders aan te trekken door 
rationalisering van de prijzen van productiefactoren, verlaging van de 
transactiekosten van investeringen en beperking van de risico's voor investeerders. 
Voorts pasten de drie landen hun economie aan van centraal gepland, sterk 
gereguleerd en investeringsbeperkend naar meer op de particuliere sector gebaseerd, 
gedereguleerd en investeringsvriendelijk. Op economisch gebied bleek er een 
positief verband te bestaan tussen de wettelijke investeringsbeperkingen en de 
netto-instroom van BDI in Egypte, terwijl er in het geval van Jordanië en Marokko 
een verwaarloosbaar verband bestond tussen de twee variabelen. 
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